Secure Telephone Identity Credentials: Certificates
draft-ietf-stir-certificates-01

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Last updated 2015-03-25
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STIR Working Group                                           J. Peterson
Internet-Draft                                                   NeuStar
Intended status: Standards Track                               S. Turner
Expires: September 25, 2015                                         IECA
                                                          March 24, 2015

          Secure Telephone Identity Credentials: Certificates
                  draft-ietf-stir-certificates-01.txt

Abstract

   In order to prove ownership of telephone numbers on the Internet,
   some kind of public infrastructure needs to exist that binds
   cryptographic keys to authority over telephone numbers.  This
   document describes a certificate-based credential system for
   telephone numbers, which could be used as a part of a broader
   architecture for managing telephone numbers as identities in
   protocols like SIP.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 22, 2015.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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Peterson & Turner      Expires September 25, 2015               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                 STIR Certs                 March 24, 2015

   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2
   2.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   3.  Enrollment and Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     3.1.  Certificate Scope and Structure  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     3.2.  Provisioning Private Keying Material . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   4.  Acquiring Credentials to Verify Signatures . . . . . . . . . .  5
     4.1.  Verifying Certificate Scope  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     4.2.  Certificate Freshness and Revocation . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   5.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   6.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   7.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   8.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

1.  Introduction

   As is discussed in the STIR problem statement [13], the primary
   enabler of robocalling, vishing, swatting and related attacks is the
   capability to impersonate a calling party number.  The starkest
   examples of these attacks are cases where automated callees on the
   Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) rely on the calling number
   as a security measure, for example to access a voicemail system. 
   Robocallers use impersonation as a means of obscuring identity; while
   robocallers can, in the ordinary PSTN, block (that is, withhold)
   their caller identity, callees are less likely to pick up calls from
   blocked identities, and therefore appearing to calling from some
   number, any number, is preferable. Robocallers however prefer not to
   call from a number that can trace back to the robocaller, and
   therefore they impersonate numbers that are not assigned to them.

   One of the most important components of a system to prevent
   impersonation is an authority responsible for issuing credentials to
   parties who control telephone numbers.  With these credentials,
   parties can prove that they are in fact authorized to use telephony
   numbers, and thus distinguish themselves from impersonators unable to
   present credentials.  This document describes a credential system for
   telephone numbers based on X.509 version 3 certificates in accordance
 
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