Persona Assertion Token
draft-ietf-stir-passport-06
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (stir WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Chris Wendt , Jon Peterson | ||
| Last updated | 2016-08-22 | ||
| Stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
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draft-ietf-stir-passport-06
STIR C. Wendt
Internet-Draft Comcast
Intended status: Standards Track J. Peterson
Expires: February 23, 2017 Neustar Inc.
August 22, 2016
Persona Assertion Token
draft-ietf-stir-passport-06
Abstract
This document defines a canonical string object or 'token' for
verifying with non-repudiation the author of the token, their
authority to author the token and, minimally, the asserted
originating identity or persona contained within the token
corresponding specifically to the originator of 'personal
communications', or any signalled communications between a set of
parties with identities. A cryptographic signature is defined to
protect the integrity of the information used to identify the
originator of a personal communications session (e.g. the telephone
number or URI) and verify the assertion of the identity information
at the destination. The cryptographic signature is defined with the
intention that it can confidently verify the originating persona even
when the signature is sent to the destination party over an insecure
channel. The Persona Assertion Token (PASSporT) is particularly
useful for many personal communications applications over IP networks
and other multi-hop interconnection scenarios where the originating
and destination parties may not have a direct trusted relationship.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on February 23, 2017.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. PASSporT Token Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. PASSporT Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. PASSporT Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1.1. "typ" (Type) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1.2. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1.3. "x5u" (X.509 URL) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. PASSporT Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2.1. JWT defined claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2.1.1. "iat" - Issued At claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2.2. PASSporT specific claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2.2.1. Originating and Destination Identity Claims . . . 5
3.2.2.2. "mky" - Media Key claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3. PASSporT Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Extending PASSporT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1. "ppt" (PASSporT) header parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2. Extended PASSporT Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. Deterministic JSON Serialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1. Example PASSport deterministic JSON form . . . . . . . . 10
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.1. Avoidance of replay and cut and paste attacks . . . . . . 10
6.2. Solution Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.3. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.1. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.1.1. Media Type Registry Contents Additions Requested . . 11
7.2. JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.2.1. Registry Contents Additions Requested . . . . . . . . 12
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
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9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Appendix A. Example PASSporT JWS Serialization and Signature . . 14
A.1. X.509 Private Key Certificate for Example . . . . . . . . 16
A.2. X.509 Public Key Certificate for Example . . . . . . . . 16
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1. Introduction
In today's IP-enabled telecommunications world, there is a growing
concern about the ability to trust incoming invitations for
communications sessions, including video, voice and messaging.
[RFC7340] As an example, modern telephone networks provide the
ability to spoof the calling party telephone number for many
legitimate purposes including providing network features and services
on the behalf of a legitimate telephone number. However, as we have
seen, bad actors have taken advantage of this ability for
illegitimate and fraudulent purposes meant to trick telephone users
to believe they are someone they are not. This problem can be
extended to many emerging forms of personal communications.
This document defines a method for creating and validating a token
that cryptographically verifies an originating identity, or more
generally a URI or telephone number representing the originator of
personal communications. Through extensions defined in this
document, other information relevant to the personal communications
can also be added to the token. The goal of PASSporT is to provide a
common framework for signing originating identity related information
in an extensible way. Additionally, this functionality is
independent of any specific personal communications signaling call
logic, so that the assertion of originating identity related
information can be implemented in a flexible way and can be used in
applications including end-to-end applications that require different
signaling protocols or gateways between different communications
systems. It is anticipated that signaling protocol specific guidance
will be provided in other related documents and specifications to
specify how to use and transport PASSporT tokens, however this is
intentionally out of scope for this document.
Note: As of the authoring of this document,
[I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] provides details of how to use PASSporT
within SIP signaling for the signing and verification of telephone
numbers.
2. PASSporT Token Overview
JSON Web Token (JWT) [RFC7519] and JSON Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7515]
and related specifications define a standard token format that can be
used as a way of encapsulating claimed or asserted information with
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an associated digital signature using X.509 based certificates. JWT
provides a set of claims in JSON format that can conveniently
accomidate asserted originating identity information and is easily
extensible for extension mechanisms defined below. Additionally, JWS
provides a path for updating methods and cryptographic algorithms
used for the associated digital signatures.
3. PASSporT Components
The PASSporT is constructed based on JWT [RFC7519] and JWS [RFC7515]
specifications. JWS defines the use of JSON data structures in a
specified canonical format for signing data corresponding to JOSE
header, JWS Payload, and JWS Signature. JWT defines specific set of
claims that are represented by specified key value pairs which can be
extended with custom keys for specific applications.
3.1. PASSporT Header
The JWS token header is a JOSE header [RFC7515] that defines the type
and encryption algorithm used in the token.
PASSporT header should include, at a minimum, the following header
parameters defined the the next three subsections.
3.1.1. "typ" (Type) Header Parameter
JWS defines the "typ" (Type) Header Parameter to declare the media
type of the JWS.
For PASSporT Token the "typ" header MUST be the string "passport".
This represents that the encoded token is a JWT of type passport.
3.1.2. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter
For PASSporT, the "alg" should be defined as follows, for the
creation and verification of PASSporT tokens and their digital
signatures ES256 MUST be implemented.
Note that JWA [RFC7518] defines other algorithms that may be utilized
or updated in the future depending on cryptographic strength
requirements guided by current security best practice.
3.1.3. "x5u" (X.509 URL) Header Parameter
As defined in JWS, the "x5u" header parameter is used to provide a
URI [RFC3986] referring to the resource for the X.509 public key
certificate or certificate chain [RFC5280] corresponding to the key
used to digitally sign the JWS. Generally this would correspond to
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an HTTPS or DNSSEC resource with the guidance that it MUST be TLS
protected, per JWS spec.
An example of the header, would be the following,
{
"typ":"passport",
"alg":"ES256",
"x5u":"https://cert.example.org/passport.cer"
}
3.2. PASSporT Payload
The token claims consist of the information which needs to be
verified at the destination party. These claims follow the
definition of a JWT claim [RFC7519] and be encoded as defined by the
JWS Payload [RFC7515].
PASSporT defines the use of a standard JWT defined claim as well as
custom claims corresponding to the two parties associated with
personal communications, the originator and destination as detailed
below.
Key values outside the US-ASCII range should be encoded using percent
encoding as described in section 2.1 of [RFC3986], case normalized as
described in 6.2.2.1 of [RFC3986]. Matching of these values should
use string exact match.
3.2.1. JWT defined claims
3.2.1.1. "iat" - Issued At claim
The JSON claim MUST include the "iat" [RFC7519] Section 4.1.6 defined
claim Issued At. As defined this should be set to the date and time
of the origination of the personal communications. The time value
should be of the format defined in [RFC7519] Section 2 NumericDate.
This is included for securing the token against replay and cut and
paste attacks, as explained further in the security considerations in
section 6.
3.2.2. PASSporT specific claims
3.2.2.1. Originating and Destination Identity Claims
PASSporT defines claims that convey the identity of the origination
and destination of personal communications. There are two claims
that are required for PASSporT, the "orig" and "dest" claims. Both
"orig" and "dest" MUST have claims where the key represents an
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identity type and the value is the identity string, both defined in
subsecquent subsections. Currently, these identities can be
represented as either telephone numbers or Uniform Resource
Indicators (URIs).
The "orig" JSON object MUST only have one key value pair representing
the asserted identity of any type (currently either "tn" or "uri") of
the originator of the personal communications signaling.
The "dest" JSON object MUST have at least have one key value pair,
but could have multiple identity types (i.e. "tn" and/or "uri") but
only one of each. Additionaly, in the case of "dest" only, the
identity type key value MUST be an array signaled by standard JSON
brackets, even when there is a single identity value in the identity
type key value.
3.2.2.1.1. "tn" - Telephone Number identity
If the originating or destination identity is a telephone number, the
key representing the identity MUST be "tn".
Telephone Number strings for "tn" MUST be canonicalized according to
the procedures specified in [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] Section 7.2.
3.2.2.1.2. "uri" - URI identity
If any of the originating or destination identities is of the form
URI, as defined in [RFC3986], the key representing the identity MUST
be "uri" URI form of the identity.
3.2.2.1.3. Future identity forms
We recognize that in the future there may be other standard
mechanisms for representing identities. The "orig" and "dest" claims
currently support "tn" and "uri" but could be extended in the future
to allow for other identity types with new IANA registered unique
types to represent these forms.
3.2.2.1.4. Examples
Single Originator, with telephone number identity +12155551212, to
Single Destination, with URI identity 'sip:alice@example.com',
example:
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{
"dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"]},
"iat":"1443208345",
"orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}
}
Single Originator, with telephone number identity +12155551212, to
Multiple Destination Identities, with telephone number identity
+12125551212 and two URI identities, sip:alice@example.com and
sip:bob@example.com, example:
{
"dest":{
"tn":["12125551212"],
"uri":["sip:alice@example.com",
"sip:bob@example.net"]
},
"iat":"1443208345",
"orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}
}
3.2.2.2. "mky" - Media Key claim
Some protocols that use PASSporT convey hashes for media security
keys within their signaling in order to bind those keys to the
identities established in the signaling layers. One example would be
the DTLS-SRTP key fingerprints carried in SDP [RFC4566] via the
"a=fingerprint" attribute; multiple instances of that fingerprint may
appear in a single SDP body corresponding to media streams offered.
The "mky" claim MUST be formated in a JSON form including the 'alg'
and 'dig' keys with the corresponding algorithm and hexadecimal
values. If there is multiple fingerprint values, for example
associated with different media streams in SDP, the fingerprint
values MUST be constructed as a JSON array denoted by bracket
characters.
For the 'dig' key value, the hash value MUST be the hexadecimal value
without any colons.
An example claim with "mky" claim is as follows:
For an SDP offer that includes the following fingerprint values,
a=fingerprint:sha-256 02:1A:CC:54:27:AB:EB:9C:53:3F:3E:4B:65:
2E:7D:46:3F:54:42:CD:54:F1:7A:03:A2:7D:F9:B0:7F:46:19:B2
a=fingerprint:sha-256 4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E:
5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB:3E:4B:65:2E:7D:46:3F:54:42:CD:54:F1
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the PASSporT Payload object would be:
{
"dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"]},
"iat":"1443208345",
"mky":[
{
"alg":"sha-256",
"dig":"021ACC5427ABEB9C533F3E4B652E7D463F5442CD54
F17A03A27DF9B07F4619B2"
},
{
"alg":"sha-256",
"dig":"4AADB9B13F82183B540212DF3E5D496B19E57C
AB3E4B652E7D463F5442CD54F1"
}
],
"orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}
}
3.3. PASSporT Signature
The signature of the PASSporT is created as specified by JWS using
the private key corresponding to the X.509 public key certificate
referenced by the "x5u" header parameter.
4. Extending PASSporT
PASSporT includes the bare minimum set of claims needed to securely
assert the originating identity and support the secure propoerties
discussed in various parts of this document. JWT supports a straight
forward way to add additional claims by simply adding new claim key
pairs. PASSporT can be extended beyond the defined base set of
claims to represent other information requiring assertion or
validation beyond the originating identity itself as needed.
4.1. "ppt" (PASSporT) header parameter
For extension of the base set of claims defined in this document, a
new JWS header parameter "ppt" MUST be used with a unique string.
Any PASSporT extension should be defined in a specification
describing the PASSporT extension and the string used in the "ppt"
hedaer string that defines any new claims that would extend the base
set of claims of PASSporT.
An example header with a PASSporT extension type of "foo" is as
follows:
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{
"alg":"ES256",
"ppt":"foo",
"typ":"passport",
"x5u":"https://tel.example.org/passport.cer"
}
4.2. Extended PASSporT Claims
Specifications that define extensions to the PASSporT mechanism MUST
explicitly specify what claims they include beyond the base set of
claims from this document, the order in which they will appear, and
any further information necessary to implement the extension. All
extensions MUST include the baseline JWT elements specified in
Section 3; claims may only be appended to the claims object
specified; they can never be removed or re-ordered. Specifying new
claims follows the baseline JWT procedures ([RFC7519] Section 10.1).
Understanding an extension or new claims defined by the extension on
the destination verification of the PASSporT token is optional. The
creator of a PASSporT object cannot assume that destination systems
will understand any given extension. Verification of PASSporT tokens
by destination systems that do support an extension may then trigger
appropriate application-level behavior in the presence of an
extension; authors of extensions should provide appropriate
extension-specific guidance to application developers on this point.
5. Deterministic JSON Serialization
JSON, as a canonical format, can include spaces, line breaks and key
value pairs can occur in any order and therefore makes it, from a
string format, non-deterministic. In order to make the digitial
signature verification work deterministically, the JSON
representation of the PASSporT Header and Claims, particularly if
PASSporT is used across multiple signaling environments, specifically
the JSON header object and JSON Claim object MUST be computed as
follows.
The JSON object MUST follow the rules for the construction of the
thumbprint of a JSON Web Key (JWK) as defined in [RFC7638] Section 3.
Each JSON object MUST contain no whitespace or line breaks before or
after any syntactic elements and with the required members ordered
lexicographically by the Unicode [UNICODE] code points of the member
names.
In addition, the JSON header and claim members MUST follow the
lexicographical ordering and character and string rules defined in
[RFC7638] Section 3.3.
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5.1. Example PASSport deterministic JSON form
For the example PASSporT Payload shown in Section 3.2.2.2, the
following is the deterministic JSON object form.
{"dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"],"iat": 1443208345,"mky"
:[{"alg":"sha-256","dig":"021ACC5427ABEB9C533F3E4B652E7D463F5442
CD54F17A03A27DF9B07F4619B2"},{"alg":"sha-256","dig":"4AADB9B13F8
2183B540212DF3E5D496B19E57CAB3E4B652E7D463F5442CD54F1"}],
"orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}}
6. Security Considerations
6.1. Avoidance of replay and cut and paste attacks
There are a number of security considerations for use of the token
for avoidance of replay and cut and paste attacks. PASSporT tokens
should be sent with other application level protocol information
(e.g. for SIP an INVITE as defined in [RFC3261]). In order to make
the token signature unique to a specific origination of personal
communications there should be a link between various information
provided in the token and information provided by the application
level protocol information. This uniqueness specified using the
following two claims:
o 'iat' claim should correspond to a date/time the message was
originated. It should also be within a relative time that is
reasonable for clock drift and transmission time characteristics
associated with the application using the PASSporT token.
Therefore, validation of the token should consider date and time
correlation, which could be influenced by signaling protocol
specific use and network time differences.
o 'dest' claim is included to prevent the valid re-use of a
previously originated message to send to another destination
party.
6.2. Solution Considerations
It should be recognized that the use of this token should not, in
it's own right, be considered a full solution for absolute non-
repudiation of the persona being asserted. This only provides non-
repudiation of the signer of PASSporT. If the signer and the persona
are not one in the same, which can and often will be the case in
telecommunications networks today, protecting the destination party
from being spoofed may take some interpretation or additional
verification of the link between the PASSporT signature and the
persona being asserted.
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In addition, the telecommunications systems and specifications that
use PASSporT should in practice provide mechanisms for:
o Managing X.509 certificates and X.509 certificate chains to an
authorized trust anchor that can be a trusted entity to all
participants in the telecommunications network
o Accounting for entities that may route calls from other peer or
interconnected telecommunications networks that are not part of
the "trusted" communications network or may not be following the
usage of PASSporT or the profile of PASSporT appropriate to that
network
o Following best practices around management and security of X.509
certificates
6.3. Privacy Considerations
Because PASSporT explicitly includes claims of identifiers of parties
involved in communications, date and times, and potentially other
call detail, care should be taken outside of traditional protected or
private telephony communications paths where there may be concerns
about exposing information to either unintended or illegitimate
actors. These identifiers are often exposed through many
communications signaling protocols as of today, but appropriate
precautions should be taken.
7. IANA Considerations
7.1. Media Type Registration
7.1.1. Media Type Registry Contents Additions Requested
This section registers the "application/passport" media type
[RFC2046] in the "Media Types" registry in the manner described in
[RFC6838], which can be used to indicate that the content is a
PASSporT defined JWT and JWS.
o Type name: application
o Subtype name: passport
o Required parameters: n/a
o Optional parameters: n/a
o Encoding considerations: 8bit; application/passport values outside
the US-ASCII range are encoded using percent encoding as described
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in section 2.1 of RFC 3986 (some values may be the empty string),
each separated from the next by a single period ('.') character.
o Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section
of RFC 7515.
o Interoperability considerations: n/a
o Published specification: draft-ietf-stir-passport-05
o Applications that use this media type: STIR and other applications
that require identity related assertion
o Fragment identifier considerations: n/a
o Additional information:
* Magic number(s): n/a
* File extension(s): n/a
* Macintosh file type code(s): n/a
o Person and email address to contact for further information: Chris
Wendt, chris-ietf@chriswendt.net
o Intended usage: COMMON
o Restrictions on usage: none
o Author: Chris Wendt, chris-ietf@chriswendt.net
o Change Controller: IESG
o Provisional registration? No
7.2. JSON Web Token Claims Registration
7.2.1. Registry Contents Additions Requested
o Claim Name: "orig"
o Claim Description: Originating Identity String
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of draft-ietf-stir-
passport-05
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o Claim Name: "dest"
o Claim Description: Destination Identity String
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of draft-ietf-stir-
passport-05
o Claim Name: "mky"
o Claim Description: Media Key Fingerprint String
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of draft-ietf-stir-
passport-05
8. Acknowledgements
Particular thanks to members of the ATIS and SIP Forum NNI Task Group
including Jim McEchern, Martin Dolly, Richard Shockey, John Barnhill,
Christer Holmberg, Victor Pascual Avila, Mary Barnes, Eric Burger for
their review, ideas, and contributions also thanks to Henning
Schulzrinne, Russ Housley, Alan Johnston, Richard Barnes, Mark
Miller, and Ted Hardie for valuable feedback on the technical and
security aspects of the document. Additional thanks to Harsha Bellur
for assistance in coding the example tokens.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis]
Peterson, J., Jennings, C., Rescorla, E., and C. Wendt,
"Authenticated Identity Management in the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP)", draft-ietf-stir-rfc4474bis-10
(work in progress), July 2016.
[RFC2046] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2046, November 1996,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2046>.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
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[RFC6838] Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type
Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13,
RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6838>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
[RFC7518] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC7638] Jones, M. and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Key (JWK)
Thumbprint", RFC 7638, DOI 10.17487/RFC7638, September
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7638>.
[UNICODE] "The Unicode Consortium, "The Unicode Standard"",
<http://www.unicode.org/versions/latest/>.
9.2. Informative References
[RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, June 2002,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC7340] Peterson, J., Schulzrinne, H., and H. Tschofenig, "Secure
Telephone Identity Problem Statement and Requirements",
RFC 7340, DOI 10.17487/RFC7340, September 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7340>.
Appendix A. Example PASSporT JWS Serialization and Signature
For PASSporT, there will always be a JWS with the following members:
o "protected", with the value BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header))
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o "payload", with the value BASE64URL (JWS Payload)
o "signature", with the value BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
Note: there will never be a JWS Unprotected Header for PASSporT.
First, an example PASSporT Protected Header is as follows:
{
"typ":"passport",
"alg":"ES256",
"x5u":"https://cert.example.org/passport.cer"
}
This would be serialized to the form:
{"alg":"ES256","typ":"passport","x5u":"https://cert.example.org/
passport.cer"}
Encoding this with UTF8 and BASE64 encoding produces this value:
eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6InBhc3Nwb3J0IiwieDV1IjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9j
ZXJ0LmV4YW1wbGUub3JnL3Bhc3Nwb3J0LmNlciJ9
Second, an example PASSporT Payload is as follows:
{
"dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"]}
"iat":"1443208345",
"orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}
}
This would be serialized to the form:
{"dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"]},"iat":"1443208345",
"orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}}
Encoding this with the UTF8 and BASE64 encoding produces this value:
eyJkZXN0Ijp7InVyaSI6WyJzaXA6YWxpY2VAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20iXX0sImlhd
CI6IjE0NDMyMDgzNDUiLCJvcmlnIjp7InRuIjoiMTIxNTU1NTEyMTIifX0
Computing the digital signature of the PASSporT Signing Input
ASCII(BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)) || '.' || BASE64URL(JWS
Payload))
rq3pjT1hoRwakEGjHCnWSwUnshd0-zJ6F1VOgFWSjHBr8Qjpjlk-cpFYpFYso
jNCpTzO3QfPOlckGaS6hEck7w
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The final PASSporT token is produced by concatenating the values in
the order Header.Payload.Signature with period (',') characters. For
the above example values this would produce the following:
eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6InBhc3Nwb3J0IiwieDV1IjoiaHR0cHM6Ly
9jZXJ0LmV4YW1wbGUub3JnL3Bhc3Nwb3J0LmNlciJ9
.
eyJkZXN0Ijp7InVyaSI6WyJzaXA6YWxpY2VAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20iXX0sImlhd
CI6IjE0NDMyMDgzNDUiLCJvcmlnIjp7InRuIjoiMTIxNTU1NTEyMTIifX0
.
rq3pjT1hoRwakEGjHCnWSwUnshd0-zJ6F1VOgFWSjHBr8Qjpjlk-cpFYpFYso
jNCpTzO3QfPOlckGaS6hEck7w
A.1. X.509 Private Key Certificate for Example
-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
MHcCAQEEIFeZ1R208QCvcu5GuYyMfG4W7sH4m99/7eHSDLpdYllFoAoGCCqGSM49
AwEHoUQDQgAE8HNbQd/TmvCKwPKHkMF9fScavGeH78YTU8qLS8I5HLHSSmlATLcs
lQMhNC/OhlWBYC626nIlo7XeebYS7Sb37g==
-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
A.2. X.509 Public Key Certificate for Example
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE8HNbQd/TmvCKwPKHkMF9fScavGeH
78YTU8qLS8I5HLHSSmlATLcslQMhNC/OhlWBYC626nIlo7XeebYS7Sb37g==
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
Authors' Addresses
Chris Wendt
Comcast
One Comcast Center
Philadelphia, PA 19103
USA
Email: chris-ietf@chriswendt.net
Jon Peterson
Neustar Inc.
1800 Sutter St Suite 570
Concord, CA 94520
US
Email: jon.peterson@neustar.biz
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