Persona Assertion Token
draft-ietf-stir-passport-07
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (stir WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Chris Wendt , Jon Peterson | ||
| Last updated | 2016-09-09 | ||
| Stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
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draft-ietf-stir-passport-07
STIR C. Wendt
Internet-Draft Comcast
Intended status: Standards Track J. Peterson
Expires: March 13, 2017 Neustar Inc.
September 9, 2016
Persona Assertion Token
draft-ietf-stir-passport-07
Abstract
This document defines a canonical string object or 'token' including
a digital signature for verifying the author of the token, their
authority to author the token and the information asserted in the
token, minimally, the originating identity or 'persona' corresponding
specifically to the originator of 'personal communications', or
signalled communications between a set of parties with identities.
The PASSporT token is cryptographically signed to protect the
integrity of the identify the originator of a personal communications
session (e.g. the telephone number or URI) and verify the assertion
of the identity information at the destination. The cryptographic
signature is defined with the intention that it can confidently
verify the originating persona even when the signature is sent to the
destination party over an insecure channel. PASSporT is particularly
useful for many personal communications applications over IP networks
and other multi-hop interconnection scenarios where the originating
and destination parties may not have a direct trusted relationship.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on March 13, 2017.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. PASSporT Token Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. PASSporT Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. "typ" (Type) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3. "x5u" (X.509 URL) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.4. Example PASSporT header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. PASSporT Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. JWT defined claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1.1. "iat" - Issued At claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. PASSporT specific claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2.1. Originating and Destination Identity Claims . . . . . 6
4.2.1.1. "tn" - Telephone Number identity . . . . . . . . 7
4.2.1.2. "uri" - URI identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2.1.3. Future identity forms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2.1.4. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2.2. "mky" - Media Key claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. PASSporT Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Extending PASSporT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.1. "ppt" (PASSporT) header parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.2. Extended PASSporT Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. Deterministic JSON Serialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.1. Example PASSport deterministic JSON form . . . . . . . . 11
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.1. Avoidance of replay and cut and paste attacks . . . . . . 12
8.2. Solution Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8.3. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9.1. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9.1.1. Media Type Registry Contents Additions Requested . . 13
9.2. JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 15
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9.2.1. Registry Contents Additions Requested . . . . . . . . 15
10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Appendix A. Example PASSporT JWS Serialization and Signature . . 17
A.1. X.509 Private Key Certificate for Example . . . . . . . . 19
A.2. X.509 Public Key Certificate for Example . . . . . . . . 19
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1. Introduction
In today's IP-enabled telecommunications world, there is a growing
concern about the ability to trust incoming invitations for
communications sessions, including video, voice and messaging.
[RFC7340] As an example, modern telephone networks provide the
ability to spoof the calling party telephone number for many
legitimate purposes including providing network features and services
on the behalf of a legitimate telephone number. However, as we have
seen, bad actors have taken advantage of this ability for
illegitimate and fraudulent purposes meant to trick telephone users
to believe they are someone they are not. This problem can be
extended to many emerging forms of personal communications.
This document defines a method for creating and validating a token
that cryptographically verifies an originating identity, or more
generally a URI or telephone number representing the originator of
personal communications. Through extensions defined in this
document, in Section 5.2, other information relevant to the personal
communications can also be added to the token. The goal of PASSporT
is to provide a common framework for signing originating identity
related information in an extensible way. Additionally, this
functionality is independent of any specific personal communications
signaling call logic, so that the assertion of originating identity
related information can be implemented in a flexible way and can be
used in applications including end-to-end applications that require
different signaling protocols or gateways between different
communications systems. It is anticipated that signaling protocol
specific guidance will be provided in other related documents and
specifications to specify how to use and transport PASSporT tokens,
however this is intentionally out of scope for this document.
[I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] provides details of the use of PASSporT
within the SIP [RFC3261] signaling protocol for the signing and
verification of telephone numbers.
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2. PASSporT Token Overview
JSON Web Token (JWT) [RFC7519] and JSON Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7515]
and related specifications define a standard token format that can be
used as a way of encapsulating claimed or asserted information with
an associated digital signature using X.509 based certificates. JWT
provides a set of claims in JSON format that can conveniently
accommodate asserted originating identity information and is easily
extensible for extension mechanisms defined below. Additionally, JWS
provides a path for updating methods and cryptographic algorithms
used for the associated digital signatures.
JWS defines the use of JSON data structures in a specified canonical
format for signing data corresponding to JOSE header, JWS Payload,
and JWS Signature. JWT defines a set of claims that are represented
by specified key value pairs which can be extended with custom keys
for specific applications. The next sections define the header and
claims that MUST be minimally used with JWT and JWS for PASSporT.
3. PASSporT Header
The JWS token header is a JOSE header [RFC7515] Section 4, that
defines the type and encryption algorithm used in the token.
PASSporT header should include, at a minimum, the following header
parameters defined the the next three subsections.
3.1. "typ" (Type) Header Parameter
The "typ" (Type) Header Parameter is defined in JWS Section 4.1.9. to
declare the media type of the complete JWS.
For PASSporT Token the "typ" header MUST be the string "passport".
This represents that the encoded token is a JWT of type passport.
3.2. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter
The "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter is defined in JWS
Section 4.1.1. This definition includes the ability to specify the
use of a cryptographic algorithm for the signature part of the JWS.
It also refers to a list of defined "alg" values as part of a
registry established by JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) [RFC7518] and
defined in Section 3.1.
For the creation and verification of PASSporT tokens and their
digital signatures ES256 MUST be implemented as defined in JWA
Section 3.4
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Note that JWA defines other algorithms that may be utilized or
updated in the future depending on cryptographic strength
requirements guided by current security best practice.
3.3. "x5u" (X.509 URL) Header Parameter
As defined in JWS Section 4.1.5., the "x5u" header parameter defines
a URI [RFC3986] referring to the resource for the X.509 public key
certificate or certificate chain [RFC5280] corresponding to the key
used to digitally sign the JWS. Generally, as defined in JWS section
4.1.5, this would correspond to an HTTPS or DNSSEC resource using
integrity protection.
3.4. Example PASSporT header
An example of the header, would be the following, including the
specified passport type, ES256 algorithm, and a URI referencing the
network location of the certificate needed to validate the PASSporT
signature.
{
"typ":"passport",
"alg":"ES256",
"x5u":"https://cert.example.org/passport.cer"
}
4. PASSporT Payload
The token claims consist of the information which needs to be
verified at the destination party. These claims follow the
definition of a JWT claim [RFC7519] Section 4 and be encoded as
defined by the JWS Payload [RFC7515] Section 3.
PASSporT defines the use of a standard JWT defined claim as well as
custom claims corresponding to the two parties associated with
personal communications, the originator and destination as detailed
below.
Any claim key values outside the US-ASCII range should be encoded
using percent encoding as described in section 2.1 of [RFC3986], case
normalized as described in 6.2.2.1 of [RFC3986].
4.1. JWT defined claims
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4.1.1. "iat" - Issued At claim
The JSON claim MUST include the "iat" [RFC7519] Section 4.1.6 defined
claim Issued At. As defined this should be set to the date and time
of the origination of the personal communications. The time value
should be of the format defined in [RFC7519] Section 2 NumericDate.
This is included for securing the token against replay and cut and
paste attacks, as explained further in the security considerations in
section 6.
4.2. PASSporT specific claims
4.2.1. Originating and Destination Identity Claims
PASSporT defines claims that convey the identity of the origination
and destination of personal communications. Origination in the
context of PASSporT and for a given application's use of PASSporT is
the point in the network that has the authority to assert the callers
identity. This authority is represented in PASSporT by the
certificate holder and is signed at the applications choice of
authoritative point(s) in the network, for example, at a device that
has authenticated with a user, or at a network entity with an
authenticated trust relationship with that device and its user.
Destination represents the intended destination of the personal
communications, i.e. the identity(s) being called by the caller, The
destination point(s) determined by the application must have the
capability to verify the PASSporT token and the digital signature.
The PASSporT associated certificate is used to validate the authority
of the originating signer, generally via a certificate chain to the
trust anchor for that application.
The origination and destination identities are represented by two
claims that are required for PASSporT, the "orig" and "dest" claims.
Both "orig" and "dest" MUST have claims where the key represents an
identity type and the value is the identity string, both defined in
subsequent subsections. Currently, these identities can be
represented as either telephone numbers or Uniform Resource
Indicators (URIs).
The "orig" JSON object MUST only have one key value pair representing
the asserted identity of any type (currently either "tn" or "uri") of
the originator of the personal communications signaling.
The "dest" JSON object MUST have at least have one key value pair,
but could have multiple identity types (i.e. "tn" and/or "uri") but
only one of each. If both "tn" and "uri" are included, the JSON
object should list the "tn" array first and the "uri" array second.
Within the "tn" and "uri" arrays, the identity strings should be put
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in lexicographical order including the scheme-specific portion of the
URI characters. Additionally, in the case of "dest" only, the
identity type key value MUST be an array signaled by standard JSON
brackets, even when there is a single identity value in the identity
type key value.
4.2.1.1. "tn" - Telephone Number identity
If the originating or destination identity is a telephone number, the
key representing the identity MUST be "tn".
Telephone Number strings for "tn" MUST be canonicalized according to
the procedures specified in [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] Section 8.3.
4.2.1.2. "uri" - URI identity
If any of the originating or destination identities is of the form
URI, as defined in [RFC3986], the key representing the identity MUST
be "uri" URI form of the identity.
4.2.1.3. Future identity forms
We recognize that in the future there may be other standard
mechanisms for representing identities. The "orig" and "dest" claims
currently support "tn" and "uri" but could be extended in the future
to allow for other identity types with new IANA registered unique
types to represent these forms.
4.2.1.4. Examples
Single Originator, with telephone number identity +12155551212, to
Single Destination, with URI identity 'sip:alice@example.com',
example:
{
"dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"]},
"iat":"1443208345",
"orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}
}
Single Originator, with telephone number identity +12155551212, to
Multiple Destination Identities, with telephone number identity
+12125551212 and two URI identities, sip:alice@example.com and
sip:bob@example.com, example:
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{
"dest":{
"tn":["12125551212"],
"uri":["sip:alice@example.com",
"sip:bob@example.net"]
},
"iat":"1443208345",
"orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}
}
4.2.2. "mky" - Media Key claim
Some protocols that use PASSporT may also want to protect media
security keys delivered within their signaling in order to bind those
keys to the identities established in the signaling layers. The
"mky" is an optional PASSporT claim defining the assertion of media
key fingerprints carried in SDP [RFC4566] via the "a=fingerprint"
attribute [RFC4572] Section 5. This claim can support either a
single or multiple fingerprints appearing in a single SDP body
corresponding to one or more media streams offered.
The "mky" claim MUST be formated in a JSON form including the "alg"
and "dig" keys with the corresponding algorithm and hexadecimal
values. If there are more that one fingerprint values associated
with different media streams in SDP, the fingerprint values MUST be
constructed as a JSON array denoted by bracket characters.
For the "dig" key value, the hash value MUST be the hexadecimal value
without any colons. The "mky" array MUST order the JSON objects
containing both "alg" and "dig" key values in lexicographic order of
the "alg" string first followed by the corresponding lexicographic
order of the "dig" string values. Within each of those objects the
JSON keys MUST have "alg" first and "dig" second.
An example claim with "mky" claim is as follows:
For an SDP offer that includes the following fingerprint values,
a=fingerprint:sha-256 4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E:
5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB:3E:4B:65:2E:7D:46:3F:54:42:CD:54:F1
a=fingerprint:sha-256 02:1A:CC:54:27:AB:EB:9C:53:3F:3E:4B:65:
2E:7D:46:3F:54:42:CD:54:F1:7A:03:A2:7D:F9:B0:7F:46:19:B2
the PASSporT Payload object would be:
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{
"dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"]},
"iat":"1443208345",
"mky":[
{
"alg":"sha-256",
"dig":"021ACC5427ABEB9C533F3E4B652E7D463F5442CD54
F17A03A27DF9B07F4619B2"
},
{
"alg":"sha-256",
"dig":"4AADB9B13F82183B540212DF3E5D496B19E57C
AB3E4B652E7D463F5442CD54F1"
}
],
"orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}
}
5. PASSporT Signature
The signature of the PASSporT is created as specified by JWS
[RFC7515] Section 5.1 Steps 1 through 6. PASSporT MUST use the JWS
Protected Header. For the JWS Payload and the JWS Protected Header,
the lexicographic ordering and white space rules described above, and
JSON serialization rules in Section 6 of this document MUST be
followed.
Appendix A of this document has a detailed example of how to follow
the steps to create the JWS Signature.
JWS [RFC7515] Section 5.1 Step 7 JWS JSON serialization is not
supported for PASSporT.
JWS [RFC7515] Section 5.1 Step 8 describes the method to create the
final JWS Compact Serialization form of the PASSporT Token.
6. Extending PASSporT
PASSporT includes the bare minimum set of claims needed to securely
assert the originating identity and support the secure properties
discussed in various parts of this document. JWT supports a straight
forward way to add additional claims by simply adding new claim key
pairs. PASSporT can be extended beyond the defined base set of
claims to represent other information requiring assertion or
validation beyond the originating identity itself as needed.
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6.1. "ppt" (PASSporT) header parameter
For extension of the base set of claims defined in this document, a
new JWS header parameter "ppt" MUST be used with a unique string.
Any PASSporT extension should be defined in a specification
describing the PASSporT extension and the string used in the "ppt"
header string that defines any new claims that would extend the base
set of claims of PASSporT.
An example header with a PASSporT extension type of "foo" is as
follows:
{
"alg":"ES256",
"ppt":"foo",
"typ":"passport",
"x5u":"https://tel.example.org/passport.cer"
}
6.2. Extended PASSporT Claims
Specifications that define extensions to the PASSporT mechanism MUST
explicitly specify what claims they include beyond the base set of
claims from this document, the order in which they will appear, and
any further information necessary to implement the extension. All
extensions MUST include the baseline JWT elements specified in
Section 3; claims may only be appended to the claims object
specified; they can never be removed or re-ordered. Specifying new
claims follows the baseline JWT procedures ([RFC7519] Section 10.1).
Understanding an extension or new claims defined by the extension on
the destination verification of the PASSporT token is optional. The
creator of a PASSporT object cannot assume that destination systems
will understand any given extension. Verification of PASSporT tokens
by destination systems that do support an extension may then trigger
appropriate application-level behavior in the presence of an
extension; authors of extensions should provide appropriate
extension-specific guidance to application developers on this point.
An example set of extended claims, extending the first example in
Section 4.1.2.4. using "bar" as the newly defined claim would be as
follows:
{
"bar":"beyond all recognition"
"dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"]},
"iat":"1443208345",
"orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}
}
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7. Deterministic JSON Serialization
JSON, as a canonical format, can include spaces, line breaks and key
value pairs can occur in any order and therefore makes it, from a
string format, non-deterministic. In order to make the digital
signature verification work deterministically, the JSON
representation of the PASSporT Header and Claims, particularly if
PASSporT is used across multiple signaling environments, specifically
the JWS Protected Header object and JWS Payload object MUST be
computed as follows.
The JSON object MUST follow the rules for the construction of the
thumbprint of a JSON Web Key (JWK) as defined in [RFC7638] Section 3
Step 1 only. Step 2 MUST NOT be performed; as noted in JWK this is
still a legal JWK object.
The PASSporT header and claim direct members MUST follow the
lexicographical ordering rules. Any top level JSON members that
contain JSON objects or arrays, such as "dest" or "mky" MUST follow
their own lexicographical ordering and whitespace and line break
rules for the sub-elements. This includes any header or claims
defined in future specifications using PASSporT.
7.1. Example PASSport deterministic JSON form
This section demonstrate the deterministic JSON serialization for the
example PASSporT Payload shown in Section 4.2.2.
The initial JSON object is shown here:
{
"dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"]},
"orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}
"iat":"1443208345",
"mky":[
{
"alg":"sha-256",
"dig":"021ACC5427ABEB9C533F3E4B652E7D463F5442CD54
F17A03A27DF9B07F4619B2"
},
{
"alg":"sha-256",
"dig":"4AADB9B13F82183B540212DF3E5D496B19E57C
AB3E4B652E7D463F5442CD54F1"
}
],
}
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The parent members of the JSON object are as follows:
o "dest"
o "orig"
o "iat"
o "mky"
Their lexicographic order is:
o "dest"
o "iat"
o "mky"
o "orig"
The final constructed deterministic JSON serialization
representation, with whitespace and line breaks removed, (with line
breaks used for display purposes only) is:
{"dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"],"iat":1443208345,"mky":
[{"alg":"sha-256","dig":"021ACC5427ABEB9C533F3E4B652E7D463F5442
CD54F17A03A27DF9B07F4619B2"},{"alg":"sha-256","dig":"4AADB9B13F
82183B540212DF3E5D496B19E57CAB3E4B652E7D463F5442CD54F1"}],
"orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}}
8. Security Considerations
8.1. Avoidance of replay and cut and paste attacks
There are a number of security considerations for use of the token
for avoidance of replay and cut and paste attacks. PASSporT tokens
should be sent with other application level protocol information
(e.g. for SIP an INVITE as defined in [RFC3261]). In order to make
the token signature unique to a specific origination of personal
communications there should be a link between various information
provided in the token and information provided by the application
level protocol information. This uniqueness specified using the
following two claims:
o 'iat' claim should correspond to a date/time the message was
originated. It should also be within a relative time that is
reasonable for clock drift and transmission time characteristics
associated with the application using the PASSporT token.
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Therefore, validation of the token should consider date and time
correlation, which could be influenced by signaling protocol
specific use and network time differences.
o 'dest' claim is included to prevent the valid re-use of a
previously originated message to send to another destination
party.
8.2. Solution Considerations
The use of PASSporT tokens based on the validation of the digital
signature and the associated certificate requires consideration of
the authentication and authority or reputation of the signer to
attest to the identity being asserted. It should be recognized that
the use of this token should not, in it's own right, be considered a
full solution for absolute non-repudiation of the identity being
asserted. It can and often is the case that the end user that the
identity represents and signer are not one in the same. However,
applications that use PASSporT should ensure the signer is in an
authoritative position to represent the user and authenticate the
user onto the communications network and should be the responsible
party for protecting the destination party from potential identity
spoofing in addition to other abuse of the communications network
outside of PASSporT.
8.3. Privacy Considerations
Because PASSporT explicitly includes claims of identifiers of parties
involved in communications, date and times, and potentially other
call detail, care should be taken outside of traditional protected or
private telephony communications paths where there may be concerns
about exposing information to either unintended or illegitimate
actors. These identifiers are often exposed through many
communications signaling protocols as of today, but appropriate
precautions should be taken.
9. IANA Considerations
9.1. Media Type Registration
9.1.1. Media Type Registry Contents Additions Requested
This section registers the "application/passport" media type
[RFC2046] in the "Media Types" registry in the manner described in
[RFC6838], which can be used to indicate that the content is a
PASSporT defined JWT and JWS.
o Type name: application
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o Subtype name: passport
o Required parameters: n/a
o Optional parameters: n/a
o Encoding considerations: 8bit; application/passport values outside
the US-ASCII range are encoded using percent encoding as described
in section 2.1 of RFC 3986 (some values may be the empty string),
each separated from the next by a single period ('.') character.
o Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section
of RFC 7515.
o Interoperability considerations: n/a
o Published specification: draft-ietf-stir-passport-05
o Applications that use this media type: STIR and other applications
that require identity related assertion
o Fragment identifier considerations: n/a
o Additional information:
* Magic number(s): n/a
* File extension(s): n/a
* Macintosh file type code(s): n/a
o Person and email address to contact for further information: Chris
Wendt, chris-ietf@chriswendt.net
o Intended usage: COMMON
o Restrictions on usage: none
o Author: Chris Wendt, chris-ietf@chriswendt.net
o Change Controller: IESG
o Provisional registration? No
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9.2. JSON Web Token Claims Registration
9.2.1. Registry Contents Additions Requested
o Claim Name: "orig"
o Claim Description: Originating Identity String
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of draft-ietf-stir-
passport-05
o Claim Name: "dest"
o Claim Description: Destination Identity String
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of draft-ietf-stir-
passport-05
o Claim Name: "mky"
o Claim Description: Media Key Fingerprint String
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of draft-ietf-stir-
passport-05
10. Acknowledgements
Particular thanks to members of the ATIS and SIP Forum NNI Task Group
including Jim McEchern, Martin Dolly, Richard Shockey, John Barnhill,
Christer Holmberg, Victor Pascual Avila, Mary Barnes, Eric Burger for
their review, ideas, and contributions also thanks to Henning
Schulzrinne, Russ Housley, Alan Johnston, Richard Barnes, Mark
Miller, Ted Hardie, Dave Crocker, Robert Sparks for valuable feedback
on the technical and security aspects of the document. Additional
thanks to Harsha Bellur for assistance in coding the example tokens.
11. References
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11.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis]
Peterson, J., Jennings, C., Rescorla, E., and C. Wendt,
"Authenticated Identity Management in the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP)", draft-ietf-stir-rfc4474bis-12
(work in progress), August 2016.
[RFC2046] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2046, November 1996,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2046>.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
[RFC4566] Handley, M., Jacobson, V., and C. Perkins, "SDP: Session
Description Protocol", RFC 4566, DOI 10.17487/RFC4566,
July 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4566>.
[RFC4572] Lennox, J., "Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the
Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol in the Session
Description Protocol (SDP)", RFC 4572,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4572, July 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4572>.
[RFC6838] Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type
Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13,
RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6838>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
[RFC7518] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC7638] Jones, M. and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Key (JWK)
Thumbprint", RFC 7638, DOI 10.17487/RFC7638, September
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7638>.
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11.2. Informative References
[RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, June 2002,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC7340] Peterson, J., Schulzrinne, H., and H. Tschofenig, "Secure
Telephone Identity Problem Statement and Requirements",
RFC 7340, DOI 10.17487/RFC7340, September 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7340>.
Appendix A. Example PASSporT JWS Serialization and Signature
For PASSporT, there will always be a JWS with the following members:
o "protected", with the value BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header))
o "payload", with the value BASE64URL (JWS Payload)
o "signature", with the value BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
This example will follow the steps in JWS [RFC7515] Section 5.1,
steps 1-6 and 8 and incorporates the additional serialization steps
required for PASSporT.
Step 1 for JWS references the JWS Payload, an example PASSporT
Payload is as follows:
{
"dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"]}
"iat":"1443208345",
"orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}
}
This would be serialized to the form (with line break used for
display purposes only):
{"dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"]},"iat":"1443208345",
"orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}}
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Step 2 Computes the BASE64URL(JWS Payload) producing this value (with
line break used for display purposes only):
eyJkZXN0Ijp7InVyaSI6WyJzaXA6YWxpY2VAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20iXX0sImlhd
CI6IjE0NDMyMDgzNDUiLCJvcmlnIjp7InRuIjoiMTIxNTU1NTEyMTIifX0
For Step 3, an example PASSporT Protected Header comprising the JOSE
Header is as follows:
{
"typ":"passport",
"alg":"ES256",
"x5u":"https://cert.example.org/passport.cer"
}
This would be serialized to the form (with line break used for
display purposes only):
{"alg":"ES256","typ":"passport","x5u":"https://cert.example.org/
passport.cer"}
Step 4 Performs the BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)) operation
and encoding produces this value (with line break used for display
purposes only):
eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6InBhc3Nwb3J0IiwieDV1IjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9j
ZXJ0LmV4YW1wbGUub3JnL3Bhc3Nwb3J0LmNlciJ9
Step 5 and Step 6 performs the computation of the digital signature
of the PASSporT Signing Input ASCII(BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected
Header)) || '.' || BASE64URL(JWS Payload)) using ES256 as the
algorithm and the BASE64URL(JWS Signature).
rq3pjT1hoRwakEGjHCnWSwUnshd0-zJ6F1VOgFWSjHBr8Qjpjlk-cpFYpFYso
jNCpTzO3QfPOlckGaS6hEck7w
Step 8 describes how to create the final PASSporT token,
concatenating the values in the order Header.Payload.Signature with
period ('.') characters. For the above example values this would
produce the following (with line breaks between period used for
readability purposes only):
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eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6InBhc3Nwb3J0IiwieDV1IjoiaHR0cHM6Ly
9jZXJ0LmV4YW1wbGUub3JnL3Bhc3Nwb3J0LmNlciJ9
.
eyJkZXN0Ijp7InVyaSI6WyJzaXA6YWxpY2VAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20iXX0sImlhd
CI6IjE0NDMyMDgzNDUiLCJvcmlnIjp7InRuIjoiMTIxNTU1NTEyMTIifX0
.
rq3pjT1hoRwakEGjHCnWSwUnshd0-zJ6F1VOgFWSjHBr8Qjpjlk-cpFYpFYso
jNCpTzO3QfPOlckGaS6hEck7w
A.1. X.509 Private Key Certificate for Example
-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
MHcCAQEEIFeZ1R208QCvcu5GuYyMfG4W7sH4m99/7eHSDLpdYllFoAoGCCqGSM49
AwEHoUQDQgAE8HNbQd/TmvCKwPKHkMF9fScavGeH78YTU8qLS8I5HLHSSmlATLcs
lQMhNC/OhlWBYC626nIlo7XeebYS7Sb37g==
-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
A.2. X.509 Public Key Certificate for Example
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE8HNbQd/TmvCKwPKHkMF9fScavGeH
78YTU8qLS8I5HLHSSmlATLcslQMhNC/OhlWBYC626nIlo7XeebYS7Sb37g==
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
Authors' Addresses
Chris Wendt
Comcast
One Comcast Center
Philadelphia, PA 19103
USA
Email: chris-ietf@chriswendt.net
Jon Peterson
Neustar Inc.
1800 Sutter St Suite 570
Concord, CA 94520
US
Email: jon.peterson@neustar.biz
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