Connected Identity for STIR
draft-ietf-stir-rfc4916-update-01
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| Last updated | 2022-10-24 | ||
| Replaces | draft-peterson-stir-rfc4916-update | ||
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draft-ietf-stir-rfc4916-update-01
Network Working Group J. Peterson
Internet-Draft Neustar
Intended status: Standards Track C. Wendt
Expires: 27 April 2023 Somos
24 October 2022
Connected Identity for STIR
draft-ietf-stir-rfc4916-update-01
Abstract
The SIP Identity header conveys cryptographic identity information
about the originators of SIP requests. The Secure Telephone Identity
Revisited (STIR) framework however provides no means for determining
the identity of the called party in a traditional telephone calling
scenario. This document updates prior guidance on the "connected
identity" problem to reflect the changes to SIP Identity that
accompanied STIR, and considers a revised problem space for connected
identity as a means of detecting calls that have been retargeted to a
party impersonating the intended destination, as well as the spoofing
of mid-dialog or dialog-terminating events by intermediaries or third
parties.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 27 April 2023.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Connected Identity Problem Statement for STIR . . . . . . . . 4
4. Connected Identity without Diversion . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Connected Identity with Diversion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1. Mid-dialog Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Connected Identity in Mid-Dialog and Dialog-Terminating
Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Authorization Policy for Callers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. Creating Pre-Association with Destinations . . . . . . . . . 9
8.1. Media-less Dialogs for Connected Identity . . . . . . . . 10
9. The 'rsp' PASSporT Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
10. UPDATE Procedures for Provisional Dialogs . . . . . . . . . . 11
10.1. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10.1.1. Connected Identity During Normal Call Setup . . . . 12
10.1.2. Connected Identity During Retargeted Call Setup . . 13
11. Updates to RFC4916 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
12. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
13. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
14. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
15. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
15.1. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
15.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1. Introduction
The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [RFC3261] initiates sessions,
and as a step in establishing sessions, it exchanges information
about the parties at both ends. Users review information about the
calling party, for example, to determine whether to accept
communications initiated by a SIP, in the same way that users of the
telephone network assess "Caller ID" information before picking up
calls. This information may sometimes be consumed by automata to
make authorization decisions.
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STIR [RFC8224] provides a cryptographic assurance of the identity of
calling parties in order to prevent impersonation, which is a key
enabler of unwanted robocalls, swatting, vishing, voicemail hacking,
and similar attacks (see [RFC7340]). There also exists a related
problem: the identity of the party who answers a call can differ from
that of the initial called party for various innocuous reasons such
as call forwarding, but in certain network environments, it is
possible for attackers to hijack the route of a called number and
direct it to a resource controlled by the attacker. It can
potentially be difficult to determine why a call reached a target
other than the one originally intended, and whether the party
ultimately reached by the call is one that the caller should trust.
The lack of mutual authentication of parties moreover makes it
possible for outside attackers to inject forged messages (e.g. BYE)
into a SIP session.
The property of providing identity in the backwards direction of a
call is here called "connected identity." Previous work on connected
identity focused on fixing the core semantics of SIP. [RFC4916]
allowed a mid-dialog request, such as an UPDATE [RFC3311], to convey
identity in either direction within the context of an existing
INVITE-initiated dialog. In an update to the original [RFC3261]
behavior, [RFC4916] allowed that UPDATE to alter the From header
field value for requests in the backwards direction: previously
[RFC3261] required that the From header field values sent in requests
in the backwards direction reflect the To header field value of the
dialog-forming request, for various backwards-compatibility reasons.
Under the original [RFC3261] rules, if Alice sent a dialog-forming
request to Bob, then even if Bob's SIP service forwarded that dialog-
forming request to Carol, Carol would still be required to put Bob's
identity in the From header field value in any mid-dialog requests in
the backwards direction.
One of the original motivating use cases for [RFC4916] was the use of
connected identity with the SIP Identity [RFC4474] header field.
While a mid-dialog request in the backwards direction (e.g. UPDATE)
can be signed with Identity like any other SIP request, forwarded
requests would not be signable without the ability to change the mid-
dialog From header field value: Carol, say, would not be able to
furnish a key to sign for Bob's identity, if Carol wanted to sign
requests in the backwards direction. Carol would however be able to
sign for her own identity in the From header field value, if mid-
dialog requests in the backwards direction were permitted to vary
from the original To header field value.
With the obsolence of [RFC4474] by [RFC8224], this specification
updates [RFC4916] to reflect the changes to the SIP Identity header
and the revised problem space of STIR. It also explores some new
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features that would be enabled by connected identity for STIR,
including the use of connected identity to prevent route hijacking
and to notify callers when an expected called party has successfully
been reached. This document also addresses concerns about applying
[RFC4916] connected identity to STIR discussed in the SIPBRANDY
framework [RFC8862].
One area of connected identity that is not explored in this document
is the implications for conferencing, especially meshed conferencing
systems. This scope of this mechanism is solely two-party
communications; any work towards multiparty sharing of connected
identity is left for future work.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. Connected Identity Problem Statement for STIR
The STIR problem statement [RFC7340] enumerates robocalling,
voicemail hacking, vishing, and swatting as problems with the modern
telephone network that are enabled, or abetted, by impersonation: by
the ability of a calling party to arbitrarily set the telephone
number that will be rendered to end users to identify the caller.
Today, sophisticated adversaries can redirect calls on the PSTN to
destinations other than the intended called party. For some call
centers, like those associated with financial institutions,
healthcare, and emergency services, an attacker could hope to gain
valuable information about people or to prevent some classes of
important services. Moreover, on the Internet, the lack of any
centralized or even federated routing system for telephone numbers
has resulted in deployments where the routing of calls is arbitrary:
calls to telephone numbers might be unceremoniously dumped on a PSTN
gateway, they might be sent to a default intermediary that makes
forwarding decisions based on a local flat file, various mechanisms
like private ENUM [RFC6116] might be consulted, or routing might be
determined in some other, domain-specific way. In short, there are
numerous attack surfaces that an adversary could explore to attempt
to redirect calls to a particular number to someplace other than the
intended destination.
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Another motivating use case for connected identity is mid-dialog
requests, including BYE. The potential for an intermediary to
generate a forged BYE in the backwards direction has always been
built in to the stateful dialog management of SIP. For example,
there is a class of mobile fraud attacks ("call stretching") that
rely on intermediary networks making it appear as if a call has
terminated to one side, while maintaining that the call is still
active to the other, in order to create a billing discrepancy that
could be pocketed by the intermediary. If BYE requests in both
directions of a SIP dialog could be authenticated with STIR, just
like dialog-forming requests, then another impersonation vector
leading to fraud in the telephone network could be shut down.
There are however practical limits to what securing the signaling can
achieve. [RFC4916] rightly observed that once a SIP call has been
answered, the called party can be replaced by a different party (with
a different identity) due to call transfer, call park and retrieval,
and so on. In some cases, due to the presence of a back-to-back user
agent, it can be effectively impossible for the calling party to know
that this has happened. The problem statement considered for STIR
focuses solely on signaling, not whether media from the connected
party should be rendered to the caller when a dialog has been
established. This specification does not consider further any
threats that arise from a substitution of media, though [RFC8862]
contains related guidance.
4. Connected Identity without Diversion
In sunny-day uses cases, the address-of-record of the party reached
by an INVITE corresponds to the "dest" field of the PASSporT in the
INVITE's Identity header field value. The calling party will,
however, have no secure assurance that they have reached the proper
party if an Identity header cannot be sent to them in the backwards
direction. Provided that the terminating side of the dialog is STIR-
capable, they should have the capacity to sign a PASSporT for the
address-of-record of the called party.
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This specification therefore adds provisional and final responses,
including the 100, 180, 183, and 200 responses, to the set of
messages that can contain an Identity header. PASSporTs that appear
in SIP responses SHOULD use a "ppt" of "rsp", which is defined in
Section 9 (although "div" MAY also appear in responses, per
Section 5). At a high level, an "rsp" PASSporT is signed similarly
to the "div" [RFC8946] PASSporT, in so far as the certificate that
signs a "rsp" PASSporT is signing the "dest" field, rather than the
"orig" field. If the terminating side does not possess an
appropriate credential to sign for the value of the "dest" element
value in the PASSporT, it MUST NOT sign and send a "rsp" PASSporT in
the backwards direction.
[TBD - Identity in 3xx, 4xx, 6xx responses?]
It is worth noting as well that at the time [RFC4916] was written,
the Identity mechanism was far stricter about what counted as
retargeting than [RFC8224], which has canonicalization processes that
eliminate minor changes to the URIs, especially when telephone
numbers are the identifiers used by the caller and callee. For
sunny-day use cases, a PASSporT in a 183 or 200 OK should be
sufficient to secure media keys for the purposes of SIPBRANDY
[RFC8862].
The handling of an "rsp" PASSporT differs from the handling of a
PASSporT received in a SIP request. Most importantly, note that SIP
responses cannot be rejected, unlike SIP requests -- there is no way
for the recipient of a response to report errors to the sender. The
only protocol action that the calling party could take upon receiving
a response carrying a problem PASSporT is to issue a CANCEL (for
provisional dialogs) or BYE request in order to tear down the dialog
(see Section 7). Provisional responses moreover are not reliably
delivered, without using 100rel and PRACK; moreover, provisional
responses may be consumed by intermediaries under a variety of
conditions. In short, their delivery is not guaranteed.
5. Connected Identity with Diversion
Many of the use cases that motivate connected identity are not sunny-
day cases, but instead involve retargeting: when a call acquires a
new target (in its Request-URI) during transit, then the destination
will no longer correspond to the target, the "dest" specified by the
PASSporT in the dialog-forming request. If a PASSporT in a response
came signed by a different destination than the caller intended, why
should the caller trust it?
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In STIR, the "div" PASSporT type [RFC8946] was created to securely
record when a call was retargeted from one destination to another.
Those "div" PASSporTs can be consumed on the terminating side by
verification services to determine that a call has reached its
eventual destination for the right reasons. As [RFC8946] explains
the situation, the only way those diversion PASSporTs will be seen by
the calling party is if redirection is used (SIP 3XX responses)
instead of retargeting; because some network policies aim to conceal
service logic from the originating party, sending redirections in the
backwards direction is the only current defined way for secure
indications of redirection to be revealed to the calling party. That
in turn would allow the calling user agent to have a strong assurance
that legitimate entities in the call path caused the request to reach
a party that the caller did not anticipate.
This specification introduces another alternative. When sending a
"rsp" PASSporT type in a SIP response, a UAS MAY also include (in
Identity header field values) any "div" PASSporTs it received in the
INVITE that initiated this dialog. Thus, PASSporTs of type "div" MAY
also appear in SIP responses. These "div" PASSporTs can enable the
originating side to receive a secure assurance that the call is being
fielded by the proper recipient per the routing of the call. In this
case, the "dest" signed in the "rsp" PASSporT will be the address-of-
record of the party who was reached, rather than the "dest" of the
PASSporT received in the dialog-initiating INVITE.
An "rsp" PASSporT that signs a different "dest" than the one that
appeared in the PASSporT of the dialog-forming request MUST send at
least one "div" PASSporT with it. If no "div" PASSporTs were
received in the dialog-forming request, then "rsp" PASSporTs MUST NOT
be used in responses. "div" is not universally supported, so calls
may be retargeted without generating a "div" PASSporT.
Note that sending "div" PASSporTs in the backwards direction will
potentially reveal service logic to the called party. As presumably
this service logic is enacted on behalf of the called party, the
called party can make a policy determination about reflecting those
"div" PASSporTs back to the caller: connected identity may not be
compatible with some operator policies.
This mechanism does not require altering the value of the From header
field value in requests or responses in the backwards direction.
While this was a major concern of [RFC4916], in many operating
environments, the From header field value does not even contain the
identity of the caller that has been asserted by the network, which
is instead conveyed by the P-Asserted-Identity header field
[RFC3325]. STIR is in general more flexible in constructing the
"dest" than the Identity header was managing addresses-of-record at
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the time [RFC4916] was written. The contents of PAID were never used
for dialog matching, and so in environments where PAID is used, it
can be altered more dynamically than the From (moreover, [RFC3261],
by introducing tag parameters to the To and From header field values,
eliminated the need for stability in From values for dialog
identification some time ago). For retargeting that utilizes the
[RFC4916] "from-change" option tag, see Section 10.
5.1. Mid-dialog Requests
Implementations compliant with this specification MUST validate the
"div" chain back to the "rsp" PASSporT on any Identity header field
values received in responses. The dialog initiator can then treat
the certificate that signed that "rsp" PASSporT as the appropriate
certificate to sign any further mid-dialog or dialog-terminating
requests received in the backwards direction. Furthermore, the
"dest" element value in any requests or responses sent in the
backwards direction during this dialog MUST be the same as the "dest"
element value in the first response to the dialog-forming request
that contains a PASSporT - unless the "from-change" extension is
used, per Section 10.
6. Connected Identity in Mid-Dialog and Dialog-Terminating Requests
The use of the connected identity mechanism here specified is not
limited to provisional dialog requests. Once a dialog has been
established with connected identity, any re-INVITEs from either the
originating and terminating side, as well as any BYE requests, MUST
contain Identity headers with valid PASSporTs. This prevents third-
parties from spoofing any mid-dialog requests in order to redirect
media or similarly interfere with communications, as well as
preventing denial of service teardowns by attackers.
Theoretically, any SIP requests in a dialog could be signed in this
fashion, though it is unclear how valuable it would be for some (e.g.
OPTIONS). Requests with specialized payloads such as INFO or
MESSAGE, however, would require additional specification for how
integrity protection for their bodies could be implemented. Some
work has been done toward that for MESSAGE (see
[I-D.ietf-stir-messaging]. This specification thus does not mandate
PASSporTs for any requests sent in a dialog other than INVITE,
UPDATE, and BYE.
It might seem tempting to require that, if an INVITE has been sent
with an Identity header containing a PASSporT, any CANCEL request
received for the dialog initiated by that INVITE must also contain an
Identity header with a PASSporT. However, CANCEL requests can also
sent be sent by stateful proxy servers engaged in parallel forking;
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for example, when branches need to be canceled because a final
response has been received from a UAS. It is however REQUIRED by
this specification that if a UAC sends a CANCEL for its own PASSporT-
protected INVITE request, that it include an Identity header with a
valid PASSporT in the CANCEL. UAS policy will have to determine the
instances where it will accept unsigned CANCEL requests for a dialog
initiated with a signed INVITE.
7. Authorization Policy for Callers
In a traditional telephone call, the called party receives an
alerting signal and can make a decision about whether or not to pick
up a phone. They may have access to displayed information, like
"Caller ID", to help them arrive at an authorization decision. The
situation is more complicated for callers, however: callers typically
expect to be connected to the proper destination and are often
holding telephones in a position that would not enable them to see
displayed information, if any were available for them to review--and
moreover, their most direct response to a security breach would be to
hang up the call they were in the middle of placing.
While this specification does not prescribe any user experience
associated with placing a call, it assumes that callers might have
some way to a set an authorization posture that will result in the
right thing happening when the connected identity is not expected.
This is analogous to a situation where SRTP negotiation fails because
the keys exchanges at the media layer do not match fingerprints
exchanged at the signaling layer: when a user requests
confidentiality services, and they are unavailable, media should not
be exchanged. Thus we assume that users have a way in their
interface to require this criticality, on a per-call basis, or
perhaps on a per-destination basis, that would cause their user agent
to send the INVITE with a Require for 100rel. Similarly, users will
not always place calls where the connected identity is crucial, but
when they do, they should have a way to tell their devices that the
call should not be completed if it arrives at an unexpected party.
8. Creating Pre-Association with Destinations
Any connected identity mechanism will work best if the user knows
before initiating a call that connected identity is supported by the
destination side. Not every institution that a user wants to connect
to securely will support STIR and connected identity out of the gate.
Some sort of directory service might exist advertising support for
connected identity which institutions could use to inform potential
callers that, if connected identity is supported when reaching them
with SIP, there is a potential security problem. Similarly, user
devices might keep some sort of log recording that a destination
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previously supported connected identity, so that if support is
unavailable later, calling users could be alerted to a potential
security problem.
8.1. Media-less Dialogs for Connected Identity
The user interface of modern smartphones support an address book from
which users select telephone numbers to dial. Even when dialing a
number manually, the interface frequently checks the address book and
will display to users any provisioned name for the target of the call
if one exists. Similarly, when clicking on a telephone number viewed
on a web page, or similar service, smartphones often prompt users
approve the access to the outbound dialer. These sorts of decision
points, when the user is still interacting with the user interface
before a call is placed, provide an opportunity to probe what
identity would be reached as a destination, and potentially even to
exchange STIR PASSporTs in order to validate whether or not the
expected destination can be reached securely. Again, this is
probably most meaningful for contacting financial, government, or
emergency services, for cases where reaching an unintended
destination may have serious consequences.
The establishment of media-less dialogs has long been specified as a
component of third-party call control in SIP [RFC3375], in which an
INVITE is sent with no SDP. Similar media-less dialogs have been
proposed for certain automata per [RFC5552]. In the STIR context, a
media-less dialog is established by sending an INVITE with an
Identity header but no SDP. STIR-aware UAS's that support this
specification, upon receiving an INVITE with no SDP, carrying a
PASSporT, with a 100rel in the Require header field value, SHOULD
follow the mechanism described in Section 10 to send a provisional
response and then an UPDATE carrying a PASSporT in the backwards
direction. The PASSporT received in the backwards direction could be
rendered to the originating user to help them decide if they want to
place the call.
9. The 'rsp' PASSporT Type
This specification defines a "rsp" PASSporT type that is sent only in
SIP responses; it MUST NOT be sent in SIP requests.
The header of a "rsp" PASSporT shows a "ppt" of "rsp":
{ "typ":"passport",
"ppt":"rsp",
"alg":"ES256",
"x5u":"https://www.example.com/cert.cer" }
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The payload of an "rsp" PASSporT looks entirely like a normal
PASSporT - the only difference is in semantics, as the certificate
signs for the "dest" header field rather than the "orig".
{ "orig":{"tn":"12155551212"},
"dest":{"tn":["12155551214"]},
"iat":1443208345 }
No restrictions are placed here on additional elements appearing in
the payload of an "rsp" type PASSporT.
10. UPDATE Procedures for Provisional Dialogs
[RFC4916] identified a means of sending Identity header field values
in the backwards direction before a final response to a dialog has
been received by the UAC. It relied on negotiating support for
"from-change" options tags on both sides, followed by the use of the
UPDATE method to send the connected identity in the backwards
direction. This can only happen after the UAS has received and
responded to a PRACK [RFC3262] from the UAC, which would in turn have
been triggered by a provisional 1xx response sent earlier by the UAC.
[RFC4916] permits the From header field of the UPDATE to change the
address of record of the recipient: if the original INVITE had been
sent with a To header field value of "sip:bob@example.com", the UAS
in its UPDATE could set the From header field value to
"sip:carol@example.com." For STIR, this is a very important
property, as Carol might not even possess a credential that can
legitimately sign for Bob.
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For some use cases, it may be desirbale to change the From header
field value as [RFC4916] originally stipulated: including cases where
the UAC requires connected identity in order to proceed with a call,
need reliable delivery of provisional responses, and so on. In these
cases, UACs MUST send a Require header field with the option tag
100rel in INVITEs (per [RFC3262]), and a Supported "from-change"
option tag, in addition to an Identity header field value containing
a PASSporT. UAS's that support this mechanism will first send a
Require header field with the option tag 100rel in 1xx class
responses to INVITEs that they receive, along with the necessary RSeq
header field. The UAC will send a PRACK when it receives the
reliable 1xx response from the UAS; the UAS, upon receiving a PRACK,
responds with a 200 OK. At this point, the terminating UA is free to
send an UPDATE [RFC3311] request in the backwards direction to the
originating UA. This update will contain an Identity header, with a
PASSporT that signs for the connected identity in its "orig" claim,
which typically corresponds to the From header field value of the
UPDATE request. If the PASSporT is valid, the originating UA will
respond with an OK, and may perform any behaviors associated with the
updated identity (see Section 7).
Even if connected identity is not required by the originator of an
INVITE request, it can still be solicited if available by sending the
100rel option tag in a Supported header field when sending an INVITE
with an Identity header, which will trigger the preceding flow if the
UAS supports connected identity.
10.1. Examples
10.1.1. Connected Identity During Normal Call Setup
The following example shows the basic call flow of connected identity
as sent during call setup. For the purposes of this example, assume
the authentication service acts on behalf of both Alice and Bob; more
likely, they will each of their own authentication service. Note
that responses (183 and 200) are shown here going past the
authentication service; since they are not requests, they cannot be
signed.
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Alice's UA Bob's UA
Authentication
Service
INVITE INVITE
----------------> ---------------->
183
<-----------------------------------
PRACK PRACK
----------------> ---------------->
200 200
<-----------------------------------
UPDATE UPDATE
<---------------- <----------------
200
------------------------------------>
[Message details TBD.]
Once the UPDATE has been received at Alice's UA, Alice responds with
a 200 OK acknowledging receipt of the connected identity from Bob. As
in this case, reaching Bob was the intended desintation, Alice can
proceed with the call.
10.1.2. Connected Identity During Retargeted Call Setup
The following example shows the basic call flow of connected identity
as sent during call setup when retargeting has occurred. For the
purposes of this example, assume that Alice intended to reach Bob,
but the call has been forwarded to Carol. Also assume the
authentication service acts on behalf of both Alice and Carol; more
likely, they will each of their own authentication service. Note
that responses (183 and 200) are shown here going past the
authentication service; since they are not requests, they cannot be
signed.
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Alice's UA Carol's UA
Authentication
Service
INVITE INVITE
----------------> ---------------->
183
<-----------------------------------
PRACK PRACK
----------------> ---------------->
200
<-----------------------------------
UPDATE UPDATE
<---------------- <----------------
200
------------------------------------>
[Message details TBD.]
Once the UPDATE has been received at Alice's UA, Alice responds with
a 200 OK acknowledging receipt of the connected identity from Carol.
Alice can then make any necessary policy decision about treating this
call based on the fact that it arrived at Carol rather than Bob.
11. Updates to RFC4916
[TBD - ways that UPDATEs in the backwards direction can carry
additional information in support of the above]
Added Identity in SIP responses, and "rsp" PASSporT type
In general, the guidance of RFC4916 remains valid for RFC8224.
The deprecation of the Identity-Info header has a number of
implications for RFC4916; all of the protocol examples need to be
updated to reflect that.
12. Acknowledgments
We would like to thank YOU for your contributions to this
specification.
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13. IANA Considerations
This specification defines a new PASSporT type for the PASSport
Extensions Registry defined in [RFC8225], which resides at
https://www.iana.org/assignments/passport/passport.xhtml#passport-
extensions:
"rsp" as defined in [RFCThis] Section 9
14. Security Considerations
TBD.
15. References
15.1. Informative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, June 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261>.
[RFC3262] Rosenberg, J. and H. Schulzrinne, "Reliability of
Provisional Responses in Session Initiation Protocol
(SIP)", RFC 3262, DOI 10.17487/RFC3262, June 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3262>.
[RFC3311] Rosenberg, J., "The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
UPDATE Method", RFC 3311, DOI 10.17487/RFC3311, October
2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3311>.
[RFC3325] Jennings, C., Peterson, J., and M. Watson, "Private
Extensions to the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) for
Asserted Identity within Trusted Networks", RFC 3325,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3325, November 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3325>.
[RFC3375] Hollenbeck, S., "Generic Registry-Registrar Protocol
Requirements", RFC 3375, DOI 10.17487/RFC3375, September
2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3375>.
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[RFC4474] Peterson, J. and C. Jennings, "Enhancements for
Authenticated Identity Management in the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 4474,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4474, August 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4474>.
[RFC4916] Elwell, J., "Connected Identity in the Session Initiation
Protocol (SIP)", RFC 4916, DOI 10.17487/RFC4916, June
2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4916>.
[RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.
[RFC7340] Peterson, J., Schulzrinne, H., and H. Tschofenig, "Secure
Telephone Identity Problem Statement and Requirements",
RFC 7340, DOI 10.17487/RFC7340, September 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7340>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8224] Peterson, J., Jennings, C., Rescorla, E., and C. Wendt,
"Authenticated Identity Management in the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 8224,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8224, February 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8224>.
[RFC8225] Wendt, C. and J. Peterson, "PASSporT: Personal Assertion
Token", RFC 8225, DOI 10.17487/RFC8225, February 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8225>.
[RFC8396] Peterson, J. and T. McGarry, "Managing, Ordering,
Distributing, Exposing, and Registering Telephone Numbers
(MODERN): Problem Statement, Use Cases, and Framework",
RFC 8396, DOI 10.17487/RFC8396, July 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8396>.
[RFC8816] Rescorla, E. and J. Peterson, "Secure Telephone Identity
Revisited (STIR) Out-of-Band Architecture and Use Cases",
RFC 8816, DOI 10.17487/RFC8816, February 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8816>.
[RFC8862] Peterson, J., Barnes, R., and R. Housley, "Best Practices
for Securing RTP Media Signaled with SIP", BCP 228,
RFC 8862, DOI 10.17487/RFC8862, January 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8862>.
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[RFC8946] Peterson, J., "Personal Assertion Token (PASSporT)
Extension for Diverted Calls", RFC 8946,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8946, February 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8946>.
15.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-stir-messaging]
Peterson, J. and C. Wendt, "Messaging Use Cases and
Extensions for STIR", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-stir-messaging-06, 23 October 2022,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-stir-
messaging-06.txt>.
[RFC5552] Burke, D. and M. Scott, "SIP Interface to VoiceXML Media
Services", RFC 5552, DOI 10.17487/RFC5552, May 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5552>.
[RFC6116] Bradner, S., Conroy, L., and K. Fujiwara, "The E.164 to
Uniform Resource Identifiers (URI) Dynamic Delegation
Discovery System (DDDS) Application (ENUM)", RFC 6116,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6116, March 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6116>.
Authors' Addresses
Jon Peterson
Neustar, Inc.
Email: jon.peterson@team.neustar
Chris Wendt
Somos
Email: chris-ietf@chriswendt.net
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