Firmware Encryption with SUIT Manifests
draft-ietf-suit-firmware-encryption-02
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (suit WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Hannes Tschofenig , Russ Housley , Brendan Moran | ||
| Last updated | 2021-10-25 | ||
| Replaces | draft-tschofenig-suit-firmware-encryption | ||
| Stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Formats | plain text html xml htmlized pdfized bibtex | ||
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draft-ietf-suit-firmware-encryption-02
SUIT H. Tschofenig
Internet-Draft Arm Limited
Intended status: Standards Track R. Housley
Expires: April 28, 2022 Vigil Security
B. Moran
Arm Limited
October 25, 2021
Firmware Encryption with SUIT Manifests
draft-ietf-suit-firmware-encryption-02
Abstract
This document specifies a firmware update mechanism where the
firmware image is encrypted. Firmware encryption uses the IETF SUIT
manifest with key establishment provided by the hybrid public-key
encryption (HPKE) scheme and the AES Key Wrap (AES-KW) with a pre-
shared key-encryption key. Encryption of the firmware image is
encrypted using AES-GCM or AES-CCM.
Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. SUIT Envelope and SUIT Manifest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. AES Key Wrap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Hybrid Public-Key Encryption (HPKE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. CEK Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8. Complete Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1. Introduction
Vulnerabilities with Internet of Things (IoT) devices have raised the
need for a reliable and secure firmware update mechanism that is also
suitable for constrained devices. To protect firmware images the
SUIT manifest format was developed [I-D.ietf-suit-manifest]. The
SUIT manifest provides a bundle of metadata about the firmware for an
IoT device, where to find the firmware image, and the devices to
which it applies.
The SUIT information model [I-D.ietf-suit-information-model] details
the information that has to be offered by the SUIT manifest format.
In addition to offering protection against modification, which is
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provided by a digital signature or a message authentication code, the
firmware image may also be afforded confidentiality using encryption.
Encryption prevents third parties, including attackers, from gaining
access to the firmware binary. Hackers typically need intimate
knowledge of the target firmware to mount their attacks. For
example, return-oriented programming (ROP) requires access to the
binary and encryption makes it much more difficult to write exploits.
The SUIT manifest provides the data needed for authorized recipients
of the firmware image to decrypt it. The firmware image is encrypted
using a symmetric key. This symmetric cryptographic key is
established for encryption and decryption, and that key can be
applied to a SUIT manifest, firmware images, or personalization data,
depending on the encryption choices of the firmware author.
A symmetric key can be established using a variety of mechanisms;
this document defines two approaches for use with the IETF SUIT
manifest, namely:
- hybrid public-key encryption (HPKE), and
- AES Key Wrap (AES-KW) using a pre-shared key-encryption key (KEK).
These choices reduce the number of possible key establishment options
and thereby help increase interoperability between different SUIT
manifest parser implementations.
The document also contains a number of examples.
2. Conventions and Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
This document assumes familiarity with the IETF SUIT manifest
[I-D.ietf-suit-manifest], the SUIT information model
[I-D.ietf-suit-information-model] and the SUIT architecture
[RFC9019].
The terms sender and recipient are defined in [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hpke]
and have the following meaning:
- Sender: Role of entity which sends an encrypted message.
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- Recipient: Role of entity which receives an encrypted message.
Additionally, the following abbreviations are used in this document:
- Key Wrap (KW), defined in RFC 3394 [RFC3394] for use with AES.
- Key-encryption key (KEK), a term defined in RFC 4949 [RFC4949].
- Content-encryption key (CEK), a term defined in RFC 2630
[RFC2630].
- Hybrid Public Key Encryption (HPKE), defined in
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-hpke].
3. Architecture
[RFC9019] describes the architecture for distributing firmware images
and manifests from the author to the firmware consumer. It does,
however, not detail the use of encrypted firmware images.
This document enhances the SUIT architecutre to include firmware
encryption. Figure 1 shows the distribution system, which represents
the firmware server and the device management infrastructure. The
distribution system is aware of the individual devices to which a
firmware update has to be delivered.
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+----------+
| |
| Author |
| |
+----------+ +----------+
| Device |---+ |
|(Firmware | | | Firmware +
| Consumer)| | | Manifest
+----------+ | |
| |
| +--------------+
| | |
+----------+ | Firmware + Manifest | Distribution |
| Device |---+------------------------| System |
|(Firmware | | | |
| Consumer)| | | |
+----------+ | +--------------+
|
|
+----------+ |
| Device +---+
|(Firmware |
| Consumer)|
+----------+
Figure 1: Firmware Encryption Architecture.
Firmware encryption requires the sender to know the firmware
consumers and the respective credentials used by the key distribution
mechanism. For AES-KW the KEK needs to be known and, in case of
HPKE, the sender needs to be in possession of the public key of the
recipient.
The firmware author may have knowledge about all devices that need to
receive an encrypted firmware image but in most cases this will not
be likely. The distribution system certainly has the knowledge about
the recipients to perform firmware encryption.
To offer confidentiality protection for firmware images two
deployment variants need to be supported:
- The firmware author acts as the sender and the recipient is the
firmware consumer (or the firmware consumers).
- The firmware author encrypts the firmware image with the
distribution system as the initial recipient. Then, the
distribution system decrypts and re-encrypts the firmware image
towards the firmware consumer(s). Delegating the task of re-
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encrypting the firmware image to the distribution system offers
flexiblity when the number of devices that need to receive
encrypted firmware images changes dynamically or when updates to
KEKs or recipient public keys are necessary. As a downside, the
author needs to trust the distribution system with performing the
re-encryption of the firmware image.
Irrespectively of the two variants, the key distribution data (in
form of the COSE_Encrypt structure) is included in the SUIT envelope
rather than in the SUIT manifest since the manifest will be digitally
signed (or MACed) by the firmware author.
Since the SUIT envelope is not protected cryptographically an
adversary could modify the COSE_Encrypt structure. For example, if
the attacker alters the key distribution data then a recipient will
decrypt the firmware image with an incorrect key. This will lead to
expending energy and flash cycles until the failure is detected. To
mitigate this attack, the optional suit-cek-verification parameter is
added to the manifest. Since the manifest is protected by a digital
signature (or a MAC), an adversary cannot successfully modify this
value. This parameter allows the recipient to verify whether the CEK
has successfully been derived.
Details about the changes to the envelope and the manifest can be
found in the next section.
4. SUIT Envelope and SUIT Manifest
This specification introduces two extensions to the SUIT envelope and
the manifest structure, as motivated in Section 3.
The SUIT envelope is enhanced with a key exchange payload, which is
carried inside the suit-protection-wrappers parameter, see Figure 2.
One or multiple SUIT_Encryption_Info payload(s) are carried within
the suit-protection-wrappers parameter. The content of the
SUIT_Encryption_Info payload is explained in Section 5 (for AES-KW)
and in Section 6 (for HPKE). When the encryption capability is used,
the suit-protection-wrappers parameter MUST be included in the
envelope.
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SUIT_Envelope_Tagged = #6.107(SUIT_Envelope)
SUIT_Envelope = {
suit-authentication-wrapper => bstr .cbor SUIT_Authentication,
suit-manifest => bstr .cbor SUIT_Manifest,
SUIT_Severable_Manifest_Members,
suit-protection-wrappers => bstr .cbor {
*(int/str) => [+ SUIT_Encryption_Info]
}
* SUIT_Integrated_Payload,
* SUIT_Integrated_Dependency,
* $$SUIT_Envelope_Extensions,
* (int => bstr)
}
Figure 2: SUIT Envelope CDDL.
The manifest is extended with a CEK verification parameter (called
suit-cek-verification), see Figure 3. This parameter is optional and
is utilized in environments where battery exhaustion attacks are a
concern. Details about the CEK verification can be found in
Section 7.
SUIT_Manifest = {
suit-manifest-version => 1,
suit-manifest-sequence-number => uint,
suit-common => bstr .cbor SUIT_Common,
? suit-reference-uri => tstr,
? suit-cek-verification => bstr,
SUIT_Severable_Members_Choice,
SUIT_Unseverable_Members,
* $$SUIT_Manifest_Extensions,
}
Figure 3: SUIT Manifest CDDL.
5. AES Key Wrap
The AES Key Wrap (AES-KW) algorithm is described in RFC 3394
[RFC3394], and it can be used to encrypt a randomly generated
content-encryption key (CEK) with a pre-shared key-encryption key
(KEK). The COSE conventions for using AES-KW are specified in
Section 12.2.1 of [RFC8152]. The encrypted CEK is carried in the
COSE_recipient structure alongside the information needed for AES-KW.
The COSE_recipient structure, which is a substructure of the
COSE_Encrypt structure, contains the CEK encrypted by the KEK.
When the firmware image is encrypted for use by multiple recipients,
there are three options. We use the following notation KEK(R1,S) is
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the KEK shared between recipient R1 and the sender S. Likewise,
CEK(R1,S) is shared between R1 and S. If a single CEK or a single
KEK is shared with all authorized recipients R by a given sender S in
a certain context then we use CEK(_,S) or KEK(_,S), respectively.
The notation ENC(plaintext, key) refers to the encryption of
plaintext with a given key.
- If all authorized recipients have access to the KEK, a single
COSE_recipient structure contains the encrypted CEK. This means
KEK(*,S) ENC(CEK,KEK), and ENC(firmware,CEK).
- If recipients have different KEKs, then multiple COSE_recipient
structures are included but only a single CEK is used. Each
COSE_recipient structure contains the CEK encrypted with the KEKs
appropriate for the recipient. In short, KEK_1(R1, S), ...,
KEK_n(Rn, S), ENC(CEK, KEK_i) for i=1 to n, and ENC(firmware,CEK).
The benefit of this approach is that the firmware image is
encrypted only once with a CEK while there is no sharing of the
KEK accross recipients. Hence, authorized recipients still use
their individual KEKs to decrypt the CEK and to subsequently
obtain the plaintext firmware.
- The third option is to use different CEKs encrypted with KEKs of
the authorized recipients. Assume there are KEK_1(R1, S),...,
KEK_n(Rn, S), and for i=1 to n the following computations need to
be made: ENC(CEK_i, KEK_i) and ENC(firmware,CEK_i). This approach
is appropriate when no benefits can be gained from encrypting and
transmitting firmware images only once. For example, firmware
images may contain information unique to a device instance.
Note that the AES-KW algorithm, as defined in Section 2.2.3.1 of
[RFC3394], does not have public parameters that vary on a per-
invocation basis. Hence, the protected structure in the
COSE_recipient is a byte string of zero length.
The COSE_Encrypt conveys information for encrypting the firmware
image, which includes information like the algorithm and the IV, even
though the firmware image is not embedded in the
COSE_Encrypt.ciphertext itself since it conveyed as detached content.
The CDDL for the COSE_Encrypt_Tagged structure is shown in Figure 4.
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COSE_Encrypt_Tagged = #6.96(COSE_Encrypt)
SUIT_Encryption_Info = COSE_Encrypt_Tagged
COSE_Encrypt = [
protected : bstr .cbor outer_header_map_protected,
unprotected : outer_header_map_unprotected,
ciphertext : null, ; because of detached ciphertext
recipients : [ + COSE_recipient ]
]
outer_header_map_protected =
{
1 => int, ; algorithm identifier
* label =values ; extension point
}
outer_header_map_unprotected =
{
5 => bstr, ; IV
* label =values ; extension point
}
COSE_recipient = [
protected : bstr .size 0,
unprotected : recipient_header_map,
ciphertext : bstr ; CEK encrypted with KEK
]
recipient_header_map =
{
1 => int, ; algorithm identifier
4 => bstr, ; key identifier
* label =values ; extension point
}
Figure 4: CDDL for AES Key Wrap Encryption
The COSE specification requires a consistent byte stream for the
authenticated data structure to be created, which is shown in
Figure 5.
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Enc_structure = [
context : "Encrypt",
protected : empty_or_serialized_map,
external_aad : bstr
]
Figure 5: CDDL for Enc_structure Data Structure
As shown in Figure 4, there are two protected fields: one protected
field in the COSE_Encrypt structure and a second one in the
COSE_recipient structure. The 'protected' field in the
Enc_structure, see Figure 5, refers to the content of the protected
field from the COSE_Encrypt structure.
The value of the external_aad MUST be set to null.
The following example illustrates the use of the AES-KW algorithm
with AES-128.
We use the following parameters in this example:
- IV: 0x26, 0x68, 0x23, 0x06, 0xd4, 0xfb, 0x28, 0xca, 0x01, 0xb4,
0x3b, 0x80
- KEK: "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"
- KID: "kid-1"
- Plaintext Firmware: "This is a real firmware image."
- Firmware (hex):
546869732069732061207265616C206669726D7761726520696D6167652E
The COSE_Encrypt structure, in hex format, is (with a line break
inserted):
D8608443A10101A1054C26682306D4FB28CA01B43B80F68340A2012204456B69642D
315818AF09622B4F40F17930129D18D0CEA46F159C49E7F68B644D
The resulting COSE_Encrypt structure in a dignostic format is shown
in Figure 6.
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96(
[
// protected field with alg=AES-GCM-128
h'A10101',
{
// unprotected field with iv
5: h'26682306D4FB28CA01B43B80'
},
// null because of detached ciphertext
null,
[ // recipients array
h'', // protected field
{ // unprotected field
1: -3, // alg=A128KW
4: h'6B69642D31' // key id
},
// CEK encrypted with KEK
h'AF09622B4F40F17930129D18D0CEA46F159C49E7F68B644D'
]
]
)
Figure 6: COSE_Encrypt Example for AES Key Wrap
The CEK, in hex format, was "4C805F1587D624ED5E0DBB7A7F7FA7EB" and
the encrypted firmware (with a line feed added) was:
A8B6E61EF17FBAD1F1BF3235B3C64C06098EA512223260
F9425105F67F0FB6C92248AE289A025258F06C2AD70415
6. Hybrid Public-Key Encryption (HPKE)
Hybrid public-key encryption (HPKE) [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hpke] is a scheme
that provides public key encryption of arbitrary-sized plaintexts
given a recipient's public key.
For use with firmware encryption the scheme works as follows: HPKE,
which internally utilizes a non-interactive ephemeral-static Diffie-
Hellman exchange to derive a shared secret, is used to encrypt a CEK.
This CEK is subsequently used to encrypt the firmware image. Hence,
the plaintext passed to HPKE is the randomly generated CEK. The
output of the HPKE SealBase function is therefore the encrypted CEK
along with HPKE encapsulated key (i.e. the ephemeral ECDH public
key).
Only the holder of recipient's private key can decapsulate the CEK to
decrypt the firmware. Key generation in HPKE is influced by
additional parameters, such as identity information.
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This approach allows all recipients to use the same CEK to encrypt
the firmware image, in case there are multiple recipients, to fulfill
a requirement for the efficient distribution of firmware images using
a multicast or broadcast protocol.
[cose-hpke] defines the use of HPKE with COSE and this specification
profiles it.
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COSE_Encrypt_Tagged = #6.96(COSE_Encrypt)
SUIT_Encryption_Info = COSE_Encrypt_Tagged
; Layer 0
COSE_Encrypt = [
protected : bstr .cbor header_map, ; must contain alg
unprotected : header_map, ; must contain iv
ciphertext : null, ; because of detached ciphertext
recipients : [+COSE_recipient_outer]
]
; Layer 1
COSE_recipient_outer = [
protected : bstr .size 0,
unprotected : header_map, ; must contain alg
encCEK : bstr, ; CEK encrypted based on HPKE algo
recipients : [ + COSE_recipient_inner ]
]
; Layer 2
COSE_recipient_inner = [
protected : bstr .cbor header_map, ; must contain HPKE alg
unprotected : header_map, ; must contain kid and ephemeral public key
empty : null,
empty : null
]
header_map = {
Generic_Headers,
* label =values,
}
Generic_Headers = (
? 1 => int, ; algorithm identifier
? 2 => crv, ; EC identifier
? 4 => bstr, ; key identifier
? 5 => bstr ; IV
)
Figure 7: CDDL for HPKE-based COSE_Encrypt Structure
The COSE_Encrypt structure (layer 0) contains algorithm parameters
for encryption of the firmware image. The protected field MUST
contain the 'alg' parameter and the unprotected field MUST contain
the 'iv' parameter. The ciphertext is always detached.
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The COSE_recipient_outer structure (layer 1) contains the encrypted
CEK. The protected structure MUST be empty and the unprotected
structure MUST contain the 'alg' parameter, which carries the
algorithm information for protecting the CEK.
The COSE_recipient_inner structure (layer 2) contains the HPKE-
related information. The protected structure MUST contain the 'alg'
parameter set to the algorithm values in Section 6 of [cose-hpke] and
the unprotected structure MUST contain the 'kid' and the 'ephemeral'
parameter.
To populate the SUIT_Encryption_Info structure the sender creates a
CEK randomly. The CEK is used to encrypt the firmware image with the
selected algorithm.
The HPKE SealBase function takes various input parameters, as
explained in [cose-hpke]. The most important input parameters are
the plaintext (CEK in our case) and the public key of the recipient.
If successful, SealBase will return the encrypted CEK and the
ephemeral public key.
The recipient receives the ephemeral public key and the encrypted CEK
from the sender. It then uses the HPKE OpenBase function to decrypt
the ciphertext (which contains the CEK).
If the HPKE OpenBase function is successful, the recipient obtains
the CEK and can decrypt the firmware. The decryption operation is
shown in Figure 4 of [cose-hpke].
An example of the COSE_Encrypt structure using the HPKE scheme is
shown in Figure 8. It uses the following algorithm combination:
- AES-GCM-128 for encryption of the firmware image.
- AES-GCM-128 for encrytion of the CEK.
- Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM): NIST P-256
- Key Derivation Function (KDF): HKDF-SHA256
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96(
[
// protected field with alg=AES-GCM-128
h'A10101',
{ // unprotected field with iv
5: h'26682306D4FB28CA01B43B80'
},
// null because of detached ciphertext
null,
[ // COSE_recipient_outer
h'', // empty protected field
{ // unprotected field with ...
1: 1 // alg=A128GCM
},
// Encrypted CEK
h'FA55A50CF110908DA6443149F2C2062011A7D8333A72721A',
[ // COSE_recipient_inner
// protected field with alg HPKE/P-256+HKDF-256 (new)
h'A1013818',
{ // unprotected field with ...
// HPKE encapsulated key
-1: h'A4010220012158205F...979D51687187510C445',
// kid for recipient static ECDH public key
4: h'6B69642D31'
},
// empty ciphertext
null
]
]
]
)
Figure 8: COSE_Encrypt Example for HPKE
7. CEK Verification
The suit-cek-verification parameter contains a byte string resulting
from the encryption of 8 bytes of 0xA5 using the CEK.
[[Editor's Note: Guidance about the selection of an IV needs to be
added here.]]
8. Complete Examples
[[Editor's Note: Add examples for a complete manifest here (including
a digital signature), multiple recipients, encryption of manifests
(in comparison to firmware images).]]
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9. Security Considerations
The algorithms described in this document assume that the party
performing the firmware encryption
- shares a key-encryption key (KEK) with the firmware consumer (for
use with the AES-Key Wrap scheme), or
- is in possession of the public key of the firmware consumer (for
use with HPKE).
Both cases require some upfront communication interaction, which is
not part of the SUIT manifest. This interaction is likely provided
by an IoT device management solution, as described in [RFC9019].
For AES-Key Wrap to provide high security it is important that the
KEK is of high entropy, and that implementations protect the KEK from
disclosure. Compromise of the KEK may result in the disclosure of
all key data protected with that KEK.
Since the CEK is randomly generated, it must be ensured that the
guidelines for random number generations are followed, see [RFC8937].
In some cases third party companies analyse binaries for known
security vulnerabilities. With encrypted firmware images this type
of analysis is prevented. Consequently, these third party companies
either need to be given access to the plaintext binary before
encryption or they need to become authorized recipients of the
encrypted firmware images. In either case, it is necessary to
explicitly consider those third parties in the software supply chain
when such a binary analysis is desired.
10. IANA Considerations
This document does not require any actions by IANA.
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[cose-hpke]
Tschofenig, H., Housley, R., and B. Moran, "Use of Hybrid
Public-Key Encryption (HPKE) with CBOR Object Signing and
Encryption (COSE)", October 2021,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-tschofenig-cose-hpke-00>.
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[I-D.ietf-suit-manifest]
Arm Limited, Arm Limited, Fraunhofer SIT, and Inria, "A
Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)-based
Serialization Format for the Software Updates for Internet
of Things (SUIT) Manifest", draft-ietf-suit-manifest-14
(work in progress), July 2021.
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-hpke]
Cisco, Inria, Inria, and Cloudflare, "Hybrid Public Key
Encryption", draft-irtf-cfrg-hpke-12 (work in progress),
September 2021.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3394] Schaad, J. and R. Housley, "Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) Key Wrap Algorithm", RFC 3394, DOI 10.17487/RFC3394,
September 2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3394>.
[RFC8152] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
11.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-suit-information-model]
Arm Limited, Arm Limited, and Fraunhofer SIT, "A Manifest
Information Model for Firmware Updates in IoT Devices",
draft-ietf-suit-information-model-13 (work in progress),
July 2021.
[RFC2630] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax", RFC 2630,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2630, June 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2630>.
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.
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[RFC8937] Cremers, C., Garratt, L., Smyshlyaev, S., Sullivan, N.,
and C. Wood, "Randomness Improvements for Security
Protocols", RFC 8937, DOI 10.17487/RFC8937, October 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8937>.
[RFC9019] Moran, B., Tschofenig, H., Brown, D., and M. Meriac, "A
Firmware Update Architecture for Internet of Things",
RFC 9019, DOI 10.17487/RFC9019, April 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9019>.
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Appendix A. Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Henk Birkholz for his feedback on the CDDL
description in this document. Additionally, we would like to thank
Michael Richardson and Carsten Bormann for their review feedback.
Finally, we would like to thank Dick Brooks for making us aware of
the challenges firmware encryption imposes on binary analysis.
Authors' Addresses
Hannes Tschofenig
Arm Limited
EMail: hannes.tschofenig@arm.com
Russ Housley
Vigil Security, LLC
EMail: housley@vigilsec.com
Brendan Moran
Arm Limited
EMail: Brendan.Moran@arm.com
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