Cryptographic Algorithms for the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO)
draft-ietf-tcpm-tcp-ao-crypto-03
Revision differences
Document history
Date | Rev. | By | Action |
---|---|---|---|
2012-08-22
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03 | (System) | post-migration administrative database adjustment to the No Objection position for Pasi Eronen |
2010-04-16
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03 | (System) | IANA Action state changed to RFC-Ed-Ack from Waiting on RFC Editor |
2010-04-16
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03 | (System) | IANA Action state changed to Waiting on RFC Editor from In Progress |
2010-04-16
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03 | (System) | IANA Action state changed to In Progress from Waiting on Authors |
2010-03-30
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03 | (System) | IANA Action state changed to Waiting on Authors from In Progress |
2010-03-25
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03 | Cindy Morgan | State Changes to RFC Ed Queue from Approved-announcement sent by Cindy Morgan |
2010-03-25
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03 | (System) | IANA Action state changed to In Progress |
2010-03-24
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03 | Cindy Morgan | IESG state changed to Approved-announcement sent |
2010-03-24
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03 | Cindy Morgan | IESG has approved the document |
2010-03-24
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03 | Cindy Morgan | Closed "Approve" ballot |
2010-03-24
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03 | Pasi Eronen | [Ballot Position Update] Position for Pasi Eronen has been changed to No Objection from Discuss by Pasi Eronen |
2010-03-24
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03 | Pasi Eronen | [Ballot comment] |
2010-03-24
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03 | Pasi Eronen | [Ballot discuss] I have reviewed draft-ietf-tcpm-tcp-ao-crypto-02, and have couple of small concerns that I'd like to discuss before recommending approval of the document: - … [Ballot discuss] I have reviewed draft-ietf-tcpm-tcp-ao-crypto-02, and have couple of small concerns that I'd like to discuss before recommending approval of the document: - In other contexts where manually configured pre-shared keys are used, it has been found useful to specify some minimum requirements for management interfaces -- i.e. how the human-readable/entered input is converted to the octet string. For example, here's what draft-ietf-bfd-base said about this: For interoperability, the management interface by which the password is configured MUST accept ASCII strings, and SHOULD also allow for the configuration of any arbitrary binary string in hexadecimal form. Other configuration methods MAY be supported. Something similar would be needed here, IMHO (and BTW, I don't think mandating support for UTF-8 or SASLprep is needed in this context). - It looks like many of the informative references need to be normative. At the very least, RFC 4493 (or NIST-SP800-38B, depending on which you prefer) and RFC 2104; and normative references to AES (FIPS 197) and SHA-1 (FIPS 180-3) are needed, too. - Section 3.1.1, "based on PRF-HMAC-SHA1 [RFC2404]": the pointer to RFC2404 here doesn't sound quite right (2404 doesn't define any PRFs; it's just one protocol that happens to use HMAC-SHA1). Perhaps just "based on HMAC-SHA1 [RFC2104][180-3]" would be sufficient? (also applies to pointers in 2.2, 3.1.1.1, and 3.2) - Section 3.1.1, "based on AES-CMAC-PRF-128 [RFC4615]": This is also confusing, since the PRF in RFC 4615 uses a very different construction. Perhaps just "based on AES-CMAC [800-38B][FIPS197]"? (also applies to pointer in 3.1.1.2 ) - Section 3.1.1: "not an even multiple of the output size" initially confused me (why an odd multiple is not allowed?). "exact multiple", perhaps? |
2010-03-24
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03 | (System) | Sub state has been changed to AD Follow up from New Id Needed |
2010-03-24
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03 | (System) | New version available: draft-ietf-tcpm-tcp-ao-crypto-03.txt |
2010-03-15
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03 | Samuel Weiler | Request for Last Call review by SECDIR Completed. Reviewer: Magnus Nystrom. |
2010-03-12
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03 | (System) | Removed from agenda for telechat - 2010-03-11 |
2010-03-11
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03 | Cindy Morgan | State Changes to IESG Evaluation::Revised ID Needed from IESG Evaluation by Cindy Morgan |
2010-03-11
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03 | Lisa Dusseault | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Lisa Dusseault |
2010-03-11
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03 | Jari Arkko | [Ballot comment] Its not traditional for the authors to thank themselves in the acknowledgments section. |
2010-03-11
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03 | Jari Arkko | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Jari Arkko |
2010-03-11
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03 | Dan Romascanu | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Dan Romascanu |
2010-03-11
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03 | Adrian Farrel | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Adrian Farrel |
2010-03-11
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03 | Alexey Melnikov | [Ballot comment] Agreeing with Pasi's DISCUSS on management interface for keys. 3.1.1. Concrete KDFs - "||": For any X || … [Ballot comment] Agreeing with Pasi's DISCUSS on management interface for keys. 3.1.1. Concrete KDFs - "||": For any X || Y, "||" represents a concatonation "concatenation"? operation of the binary strings X and Y. - Output_Length: The length in bits of the key that the KDF will produce. The Output_length is represented within two octets. This length must be the size required for the MAC algorithm that will use the PRF result as a seed. I assume this is in network byte order? It would be better to state this explicitly. |
2010-03-11
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03 | Tim Polk | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Tim Polk |
2010-03-10
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03 | Ross Callon | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Ross Callon |
2010-03-10
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03 | Cullen Jennings | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Cullen Jennings |
2010-03-10
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03 | Pasi Eronen | [Ballot comment] Idnits finds some missing/erronous references (which really ought to have been fixed before sending this to IETF last call...) |
2010-03-10
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03 | Pasi Eronen | [Ballot discuss] I have reviewed draft-ietf-tcpm-tcp-ao-crypto-02, and have couple of small concerns that I'd like to discuss before recommending approval of the document: - … [Ballot discuss] I have reviewed draft-ietf-tcpm-tcp-ao-crypto-02, and have couple of small concerns that I'd like to discuss before recommending approval of the document: - In other contexts where manually configured pre-shared keys are used, it has been found useful to specify some minimum requirements for management interfaces -- i.e. how the human-readable/entered input is converted to the octet string. For example, here's what draft-ietf-bfd-base said about this: For interoperability, the management interface by which the password is configured MUST accept ASCII strings, and SHOULD also allow for the configuration of any arbitrary binary string in hexadecimal form. Other configuration methods MAY be supported. Something similar would be needed here, IMHO (and BTW, I don't think mandating support for UTF-8 or SASLprep is needed in this context). - It looks like many of the informative references need to be normative. At the very least, RFC 4493 (or NIST-SP800-38B, depending on which you prefer) and RFC 2104; and normative references to AES (FIPS 197) and SHA-1 (FIPS 180-3) are needed, too. - Section 3.1.1, "based on PRF-HMAC-SHA1 [RFC2404]": the pointer to RFC2404 here doesn't sound quite right (2404 doesn't define any PRFs; it's just one protocol that happens to use HMAC-SHA1). Perhaps just "based on HMAC-SHA1 [RFC2104][180-3]" would be sufficient? (also applies to pointers in 2.2, 3.1.1.1, and 3.2) - Section 3.1.1, "based on AES-CMAC-PRF-128 [RFC4615]": This is also confusing, since the PRF in RFC 4615 uses a very different construction. Perhaps just "based on AES-CMAC [800-38B][FIPS197]"? (also applies to pointer in 3.1.1.2 ) - Section 3.1.1: "not an even multiple of the output size" initially confused me (why an odd multiple is not allowed?). "exact multiple", perhaps? |
2010-03-10
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03 | Pasi Eronen | [Ballot Position Update] New position, Discuss, has been recorded by Pasi Eronen |
2010-03-10
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03 | Russ Housley | [Ballot comment] The Gen-ART Review by Avshalom Houri on 2010-03-09 includes some editorial comments. Please consider them if an update to this document … [Ballot comment] The Gen-ART Review by Avshalom Houri on 2010-03-09 includes some editorial comments. Please consider them if an update to this document is needed for any reason. |
2010-03-10
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03 | Russ Housley | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Russ Housley |
2010-03-10
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03 | Robert Sparks | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Robert Sparks |
2010-03-10
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03 | Ralph Droms | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Ralph Droms |
2010-03-10
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03 | Magnus Westerlund | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Magnus Westerlund |
2010-03-10
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03 | Lars Eggert | State Changes to IESG Evaluation from Waiting for AD Go-Ahead by Lars Eggert |
2010-03-10
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03 | (System) | State has been changed to Waiting for AD Go-Ahead from In Last Call by system |
2010-03-09
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03 | Amanda Baber | IANA comments: QUESTION: The registration procedures for this registry are being described as "RFC Publication after Expert Review." When should the expert review take place? … IANA comments: QUESTION: The registration procedures for this registry are being described as "RFC Publication after Expert Review." When should the expert review take place? During Evaluation? After approval but before publication? Can this be stated more clearly in this document? As a side note, we are working on a document that more clearly defines the procedures for an Expert Review taking place during Last Call and other stages leading to RFC Publication. Upon approval of this document, IANA will create the following registry at http://www.iana.org/assignments/TBD Registry Name: Cryptographic Algorithms for TCP-AO Registration Procedure: RFC Publication after Expert Review Initial contents of this registry will be: Algorithm | Reference -----------------|---------- SHA1 | [RFC-tcpm-tcp-ao-crypto-02] AES | [RFC-tcpm-tcp-ao-crypto-02] We understand the above to be the only IANA Actions for this document. |
2010-03-06
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03 | Alexey Melnikov | [Ballot comment] 3.1.1. Concrete KDFs - "||": For any X || Y, "||" represents a concatonation "concatenation"? … [Ballot comment] 3.1.1. Concrete KDFs - "||": For any X || Y, "||" represents a concatonation "concatenation"? operation of the binary strings X and Y. - Output_Length: The length in bits of the key that the KDF will produce. The Output_length is represented within two octets. This length must be the size required for the MAC algorithm that will use the PRF result as a seed. I assume this is in network byte order? It would be better to state this explicitly. |
2010-03-06
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03 | Alexey Melnikov | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Alexey Melnikov |
2010-03-02
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03 | Ron Bonica | [Ballot Position Update] New position, Recuse, has been recorded by Ron Bonica |
2010-02-25
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03 | Samuel Weiler | Request for Last Call review by SECDIR is assigned to Magnus Nystrom |
2010-02-25
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03 | Samuel Weiler | Request for Last Call review by SECDIR is assigned to Magnus Nystrom |
2010-02-24
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03 | Cindy Morgan | Last call sent |
2010-02-24
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03 | Cindy Morgan | State Changes to In Last Call from Last Call Requested by Cindy Morgan |
2010-02-24
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03 | Lars Eggert | Placed on agenda for telechat - 2010-03-11 by Lars Eggert |
2010-02-24
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03 | Lars Eggert | [Ballot Position Update] New position, Yes, has been recorded for Lars Eggert |
2010-02-24
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03 | Lars Eggert | Ballot has been issued by Lars Eggert |
2010-02-24
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03 | Lars Eggert | Created "Approve" ballot |
2010-02-24
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03 | Lars Eggert | State Changes to Last Call Requested from AD Evaluation by Lars Eggert |
2010-02-24
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03 | Lars Eggert | Last Call was requested by Lars Eggert |
2010-02-24
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03 | (System) | Ballot writeup text was added |
2010-02-24
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03 | (System) | Last call text was added |
2010-02-24
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03 | (System) | Ballot approval text was added |
2010-02-24
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03 | Lars Eggert | State Changes to AD Evaluation from Publication Requested by Lars Eggert |
2010-02-24
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03 | Lars Eggert | [Note]: 'Wesley Eddy (Wesley.M.Eddy@nasa.gov) is the document shepherd.' added by Lars Eggert |
2010-02-22
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03 | Amy Vezza | draft-ietf-tcpm-tcp-ao-crypto-02 (1.a) Who is the Document Shepherd for this document? Has the Document Shepherd personally reviewed this version of … draft-ietf-tcpm-tcp-ao-crypto-02 (1.a) Who is the Document Shepherd for this document? Has the Document Shepherd personally reviewed this version of the document and, in particular, does he or she believe this version is ready for forwarding to the IESG for publication? Wesley Eddy (Wesley.M.Eddy@nasa.gov) is the document shepherd. He has personally reviewed this version and believes it is ready for forwarding to the IESG for publication. (1.b) Has the document had adequate review both from key WG members and from key non-WG members? Does the Document Shepherd have any concerns about the depth or breadth of the reviews that have been performed? The document has had review in the TCPM working group, as well as explicit participlation from the IETF Security Area. The document has been split out of the base TCP AO specification in order to allow the recommended crypto algorithms to evolve over time decoupled from the protocol specification. TCPM reviews have focused more on the protocol itself, whereas the security area has been looked to for particulars in this portion of the work. (1.c) Does the Document Shepherd have concerns that the document needs more review from a particular or broader perspective, e.g., security, operational complexity, someone familiar with AAA, internationalization or XML? There are no concerns in this regard that the document shepherd has; the security experts have been involved from the outset, and the operational requirements have been considered and brought up from that time too, given that the primary forseen users of this technology are BGP and LDP deployments. (1.d) Does the Document Shepherd have any specific concerns or issues with this document that the Responsible Area Director and/or the IESG should be aware of? For example, perhaps he or she is uncomfortable with certain parts of the document, or has concerns whether there really is a need for it. In any event, if the WG has discussed those issues and has indicated that it still wishes to advance the document, detail those concerns here. Has an IPR disclosure related to this document been filed? If so, please include a reference to the disclosure and summarize the WG discussion and conclusion on this issue. The shepherd has no concerns, however the companion document on the AO base spec had experienced some deal of controversy. (1.e) How solid is the WG consensus behind this document? Does it represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with others being silent, or does the WG as a whole understand and agree with it? There has been no opposition to this document or its contents expressed in the WG. (1.f) Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme discontent? If so, please summarise the areas of conflict in separate email messages to the Responsible Area Director. (It should be in a separate email because this questionnaire is entered into the ID Tracker.) No. (1.g) Has the Document Shepherd personally verified that the document satisfies all ID nits? (See the Internet-Drafts Checklist and http://tools.ietf.org/tools/idnits/). Boilerplate checks are not enough; this check needs to be thorough. Has the document met all formal review criteria it needs to, such as the MIB Doctor, media type and URI type reviews? idnits finds some spurious non-RFC3330-compliant IPv4 addresses (these are mistaken section headings) and several cases of unused, missing, outdated, or obsolete references. These can be easily worked out between the authors and the RFC Editor. (1.h) Has the document split its references into normative and informative? Are there normative references to documents that are not ready for advancement or are otherwise in an unclear state? If such normative references exist, what is the strategy for their completion? Are there normative references that are downward references, as described in [RFC3967]? If so, list these downward references to support the Area Director in the Last Call procedure for them [RFC3967]. The references are properly split. (1.i) Has the Document Shepherd verified that the document IANA consideration section exists and is consistent with the body of the document? If the document specifies protocol extensions, are reservations requested in appropriate IANA registries? Are the IANA registries clearly identified? If the document creates a new registry, does it define the proposed initial contents of the registry and an allocation procedure for future registrations? Does it suggest a reasonable name for the new registry? See [RFC5226]. If the document describes an Expert Review process has Shepherd conferred with the Responsible Area Director so that the IESG can appoint the needed Expert during the IESG Evaluation? The IANA Considerations are present. An IANA registry is described and its initial contents are laid out. (1.j) Has the Document Shepherd verified that sections of the document that are written in a formal language, such as XML code, BNF rules, MIB definitions, etc., validate correctly in an automated checker? Not Applicable. (1.k) The IESG approval announcement includes a Document Announcement Write-Up. Please provide such a Document Announcement Write-Up? Recent examples can be found in the "Action" announcements for approved documents. The approval announcement contains the following sections: Technical Summary Relevant content can frequently be found in the abstract and/or introduction of the document. If not, this may be an indication that there are deficiencies in the abstract or introduction. From abstract: The TCP Authentication Option, TCP-AO, relies on security algorithms to provide authentication between two end-points. There are many such algorithms available, and two TCP-AO systems cannot interoperate unless they are using the same algorithms. This document specifies the algorithms and attributes that can be used in TCP-AO's current manual keying mechanism. Working Group Summary Was there anything in WG process that is worth noting? For example, was there controversy about particular points or were there decisions where the consensus was particularly rough? N/A Document Quality Are there existing implementations of the protocol? Have a significant number of vendors indicated their plan to implement the specification? Are there any reviewers that merit special mention as having done a thorough review, e.g., one that resulted in important changes or a conclusion that the document had no substantive issues? If there was a MIB Doctor, Media Type or other expert review, what was its course (briefly)? In the case of a Media Type review, on what date was the request posted? Vendors have expressed support for this work and begun implementing it and sharing feedback with TCPM. |
2010-02-22
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03 | Amy Vezza | Draft Added by Amy Vezza in state Publication Requested |
2010-02-22
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03 | Amy Vezza | [Note]: 'Wesley Eddy (Wesley.M.Eddy@nasa.gov) is the document shepherd.' added by Amy Vezza |
2010-02-10
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02 | (System) | New version available: draft-ietf-tcpm-tcp-ao-crypto-02.txt |
2009-10-28
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01 | (System) | New version available: draft-ietf-tcpm-tcp-ao-crypto-01.txt |
2009-09-06
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00 | (System) | New version available: draft-ietf-tcpm-tcp-ao-crypto-00.txt |