HTTP Transport for the Open Trust Protocol (OTrP)
draft-ietf-teep-otrp-over-http-01

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Last updated 2019-07-08
Replaces draft-thaler-teep-otrp-over-http
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TEEP WG                                                        D. Thaler
Internet-Draft                                                 Microsoft
Intended status: Informational                             July 08, 2019
Expires: January 9, 2020

           HTTP Transport for the Open Trust Protocol (OTrP)
                   draft-ietf-teep-otrp-over-http-01

Abstract

   This document specifies the HTTP transport for the Open Trust
   Protocol (OTrP), which is used to manage code and configuration data
   in a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE).  An implementation of this
   document can run outside of any TEE, but interacts with an OTrP
   implementation that runs inside a TEE.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 9, 2020.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Thaler                   Expires January 9, 2020                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft             OTrP HTTP Transport                 July 2019

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Use of Abstract APIs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Use of HTTP as a Transport  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  TEEP Broker Behavior  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     5.1.  Receiving a request to install a new Trusted Application    4
       5.1.1.  Session Creation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     5.2.  Getting a message buffer back from an TEEP Agent  . . . .   5
     5.3.  Receiving an HTTP response  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     5.4.  Handling checks for policy changes  . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     5.5.  Error handling  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  TAM Broker Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     6.1.  Receiving an HTTP POST request  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     6.2.  Getting an empty buffer back from the TAM . . . . . . . .   7
     6.3.  Getting a message buffer from the TAM . . . . . . . . . .   7
     6.4.  Error handling  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  Sample message flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11

1.  Introduction

   Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), including Intel SGX, ARM
   TrustZone, Secure Elements, and others, enforce that only authorized
   code can execute within the TEE, and any memory used by such code is
   protected against tampering or disclosure outside the TEE.  The Open
   Trust Protocol (OTrP) is designed to provision authorized code and
   configuration into TEEs.

   To be secure against malware, an OTrP implementation (referred to as
   an OTrP "Agent" on the client side, and a "Trusted Application
   Manager (TAM)" on the server side) must themselves run inside a TEE.
   However, the transport for OTrP, along with typical networking
   stacks, need not run inside a TEE.  This split allows the set of
   highly trusted code to be kept as small as possible, including
   allowing code (e.g., TCP/IP) that only sees encrypted messages to be
   kept out of the TEE.

   The OTrP specification [I-D.ietf-teep-opentrustprotocol] describes
   the behavior of TEEP Agents and TAMs, but does not specify the
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