HTTP Transport for Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning: Agent-to- TAM Communication
draft-ietf-teep-otrp-over-http-03

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Last updated 2019-11-04
Replaces draft-thaler-teep-otrp-over-http
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TEEP WG                                                        D. Thaler
Internet-Draft                                                 Microsoft
Intended status: Informational                         November 04, 2019
Expires: May 7, 2020

HTTP Transport for Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning: Agent-to-
                           TAM Communication
                   draft-ietf-teep-otrp-over-http-03

Abstract

   The Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP) Protocol is
   used to manage code and configuration data in a Trusted Execution
   Environment (TEE).  This document specifies the HTTP transport for
   TEEP communication where a Trusted Application Manager (TAM) service
   is used to manage TEEs in devices that can initiate communication to
   the TAM.  An implementation of this document can (if desired) run
   outside of any TEE, but interacts with a TEEP implementation that
   runs inside a TEE.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 7, 2020.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect

Thaler                     Expires May 7, 2020                  [Page 1]
Internet-Draft             TEEP HTTP Transport             November 2019

   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  TEEP Broker Models  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Use of Abstract APIs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Use of HTTP as a Transport  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  TEEP/HTTP Client Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.1.  Receiving a request to install a new Trusted Application    7
       5.1.1.  Session Creation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.2.  Getting a message buffer back from a TEEP implementation    8
     5.3.  Receiving an HTTP response  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.4.  Handling checks for policy changes  . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.5.  Error handling  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   6.  TEEP/HTTP Server Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     6.1.  Receiving an HTTP POST request  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     6.2.  Getting an empty buffer back from the TEEP implementation  10
     6.3.  Getting a message buffer from the TEEP implementation . .  10
     6.4.  Error handling  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   7.  Sample message flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

1.  Introduction

   Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), including environments based
   on Intel SGX, ARM TrustZone, Secure Elements, and others, enforce
   that only authorized code can execute within the TEE, and any memory
   used by such code is protected against tampering or disclosure
   outside the TEE.  The Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning
   (TEEP) protocol is designed to provision authorized code and
   configuration into TEEs.

   To be secure against malware, a TEEP implementation (referred to as a
   TEEP "Agent" on the client side, and a "Trusted Application Manager
   (TAM)" on the server side) must themselves run inside a TEE.
   However, the transport for TEEP, along with the underlying TCP/IP
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