Return Routability Check for DTLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.3
draft-ietf-tls-dtls-rrc-15

TLS                                                   H. Tschofenig, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                                     H-BRS
Intended status: Standards Track                                A. Kraus
Expires: 13 December 2025                                               
                                                              T. Fossati
                                                                  Linaro
                                                            11 June 2025

           Return Routability Check for DTLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.3
                       draft-ietf-tls-dtls-rrc-15

Abstract

   This document specifies a return routability check for use in context
   of the Connection ID (CID) construct for the Datagram Transport Layer
   Security (DTLS) protocol versions 1.2 and 1.3.

Discussion Venues

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   Discussion of this document takes place on the Transport Layer
   Security Working Group mailing list (tls@ietf.org), which is archived
   at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/tls/.

   Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
   https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-rrc.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 13 December 2025.

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2025 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
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   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  RRC Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  RRC and CID Interplay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Return Routability Check Message Types  . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  Attacker Model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     5.1.  Amplification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       5.1.1.  Mitigation Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.2.  Off-Path Packet Forwarding  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       5.2.1.  Mitigation Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  Path Validation Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     6.1.  Basic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     6.2.  Enhanced  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     6.3.   Path Challenge Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     6.4.  Path Response/Drop Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     6.5.  Timer Choice  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   7.  Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   9.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   10. Operational Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     10.1.  Logging Anomalous Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     10.2.  Middlebox Interference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     11.1.  New TLS ContentType  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     11.2.   New TLS ExtensionType . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     11.3.  New RRC Message Type Sub-registry  . . . . . . . . . . .  20
       11.3.1.  Designated Expert Instructions . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   12. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   13. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     13.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     13.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23

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1.  Introduction

   A Connection ID (CID) is an identifier carried in the record layer
   header of a DTLS datagram that gives the receiver additional
   information for selecting the appropriate security context.  The CID
   mechanism has been specified in [RFC9146] for DTLS 1.2 and in
   [RFC9147] for DTLS 1.3.

   Section 6 of [RFC9146] describes how the use of CID increases the
   attack surface of DTLS 1.2 and 1.3 by providing both on-path and off-
   path attackers an opportunity for (D)DoS.  It also describes the
   steps a DTLS principal must take when a record with a CID is received
   that has a source address (and/or port) different from the one
   currently associated with the DTLS connection.  However, the actual
   mechanism for ensuring that the new peer address is willing to
   receive and process DTLS records is left open.  To address the gap,
   this document defines a return routability check (RRC) sub-protocol
   for DTLS 1.2 and 1.3.

   The return routability check is performed by the receiving endpoint
   before the CID-address binding is updated in that endpoint's session
   state.  This is done in order to give the receiving endpoint
   confidence that the sending peer is in fact reachable at the source
   address (and port) indicated in the received datagram.

   Section 6.1 of this document explains the fundamental mechanism that
   aims to reduce the DDoS attack surface.  Additionally, in
   Section 6.2, a more advanced address validation mechanism is
   discussed.  This mechanism is designed to counteract off-path
   attackers trying to place themselves on-path by racing packets that
   trigger address rebinding at the receiver.  To gain a detailed
   understanding of the attacker model, please refer to Section 5.

   Apart from of its use in the context of CID-address binding updates,
   the path validation capability offered by RRC can be used at any time
   by either endpoint.  For instance, an endpoint might use RRC to check
   that a peer is still reachable at its last known address after a
   period of quiescence.

2.  Conventions and Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

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   This document assumes familiarity with the CID format and protocol
   defined for DTLS 1.2 [RFC9146] and for DTLS 1.3 [RFC9147].  The
   presentation language used in this document is described in Section 4
   of [RFC8446].

   This document reuses the definition of "anti-amplification limit"
   from [RFC9000] to mean three times the amount of data received from
   an unvalidated address.  This includes all DTLS records originating
   from that source address, excluding discarded ones.

   The terms "peer" and "endpoint" are defined in Section 1.1 of
   [RFC8446].

3.  RRC Extension

   The use of RRC is negotiated via the rrc extension.  The rrc
   extension is only defined for DTLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.3.  On connecting,
   a client wishing to use RRC includes the rrc extension in its
   ClientHello.  If the server is capable of meeting this requirement,
   it responds with a rrc extension in its ServerHello.  The
   extension_type value for this extension is TBD1 and the
   extension_data field of this extension is empty.  The client and
   server MUST NOT use RRC unless both sides have successfully exchanged
   rrc extensions.  A client offering the rrc extension MUST also offer
   the connection_id extension [RFC9146].  A client offering the
   connection_id extension SHOULD also offer the rrc extension, unless
   the application using DTLS has its own address validation mechanism.

3.1.  RRC and CID Interplay

   RRC offers an in-protocol mechanism to perform peer address
   validation that complements the "peer address update" procedure
   described in Section 6 of [RFC9146].  Specifically, when both CID
   [RFC9146] and RRC have been successfully negotiated for the session,
   if a record with CID is received that has the source address and/or
   source port number of the enclosing UDP datagram different from what
   is currently associated with that CID value, the receiver SHOULD
   perform a return routability check as described in Section 6, unless
   an application layer specific address validation mechanism can be
   triggered instead (e.g., CoAP Echo [RFC9175]).

4.  Return Routability Check Message Types

   This document defines the return_routability_check content type
   (Figure 1) to carry Return Routability Check messages.

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   The RRC sub-protocol consists of three message types: path_challenge,
   path_response and path_drop that are used for path validation and
   selection as described in Section 6.

   Each message carries a Cookie, an 8-byte field containing 64 bits of
   entropy (e.g., obtained from the CSPRNG used by the TLS
   implementation, see Appendix C.1 of [RFC8446]).

   The return_routability_check message MUST be authenticated and
   encrypted using the currently active security context.

   enum {
       invalid(0),
       change_cipher_spec(20),
       alert(21),
       handshake(22),
       application_data(23),
       heartbeat(24),  /* RFC 6520 */
       tls12_cid(25),  /* RFC 9146, DTLS 1.2 only */
       return_routability_check(TBD2), /* NEW */
       (255)
   } ContentType;

   uint64 Cookie;

   enum {
       path_challenge(0),
       path_response(1),
       path_drop(2),
       (255)
   } rrc_msg_type;

   struct {
       rrc_msg_type msg_type;
       select (return_routability_check.msg_type) {
           case path_challenge: Cookie;
           case path_response:  Cookie;
           case path_drop:      Cookie;
       };
   } return_routability_check;

                 Figure 1: Return Routability Check Message

   Future extensions to the Return Routability Check sub-protocol may
   define new message types.  Implementations MUST be able to parse and
   understand the three RRC message types defined in this document.  In
   addition, implementations MUST be able to parse and gracefully ignore
   messages with an unknown msg_type.

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5.  Attacker Model

   We define two classes of attackers, off-path and on-path, with
   increasing capabilities (see Figure 2) partly following terminology
   introduced in QUIC (Section 21.1 of [RFC9000]:

   *  An off-path attacker is not on the original path between the DTLS
      peers, but is able to observe packets on the original path and has
      faster routing compared to the DTLS peers, which allows it to make
      copies of the observed packets, race its copies to either peer and
      consistently win the race.

   *  An on-path attacker is on the original path between the DTLS peers
      and is therefore capable, compared to the off-path attacker, to
      also drop and delay records at will.

   Note that, in general, attackers cannot craft DTLS records in a way
   that would successfully pass verification, due to the cryptographic
   protections applied by the DTLS record layer.

              .--> .------------------------------------. <--.
              |    | Inspect un-encrypted portions      |    |
              |    +------------------------------------+    |
              |    | Inject                             |    |
          off-path +------------------------------------+    |
              |    | Reorder                            |    |
              |    +------------------------------------+    |
              |    | Modify un-authenticated portions   | on-path
              '--> +------------------------------------+    |
                   | Delay                              |    |
                   +------------------------------------+    |
                   | Drop                               |    |
                   +------------------------------------+    |
                   | Manipulate the packetization layer |    |
                   '------------------------------------' <--'

                      Figure 2: Attacker capabilities

   RRC is designed to defend against the following attacks:

   *  On-path and off-path attackers that try to create an amplification
      attack by spoofing the source address of the victim (Section 5.1).

   *  Off-path attackers that try to put themselves on-path
      (Section 5.2), provided that the enhanced path validation
      algorithm is used (Section 6.2).

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5.1.  Amplification

   Both on-path and off-path attackers can send a packet (either by
   modifying it on the fly, or by copying, injecting, and racing it,
   respectively) with the source address modified to that of a victim
   host.  If the traffic generated by the server in response is larger
   compared to the received packet (e.g., a CoAP server returning an
   MTU's worth of data from a 20-bytes GET request
   [I-D.irtf-t2trg-amplification-attacks]) the attacker can use the
   server as a traffic amplifier toward the victim.

5.1.1.  Mitigation Strategy

   When receiving a packet with a known CID that has a source address
   different from the one currently associated with the DTLS connection,
   an RRC-capable endpoint will not send a (potentially large) response
   but instead a small path_challenge message to the victim host.  Since
   the host is not able to decrypt it and generate a valid
   path_response, the address validation fails, which in turn keeps the
   original address binding unaltered.

   Note that in case of an off-path attacker, the original packet still
   reaches the intended destination; therefore, an implementation could
   use a different strategy to mitigate the attack.

5.2.  Off-Path Packet Forwarding

   An off-path attacker that can observe packets might forward copies of
   genuine packets to endpoints over a different path.  If the copied
   packet arrives before the genuine packet, this will appear as a path
   change, like in a genuine NAT rebinding occurrence.  Any genuine
   packet will be discarded as a duplicate.  If the attacker is able to
   continue forwarding packets, it might be able to cause migration to a
   path via the attacker.  This places the attacker on-path, giving it
   the ability to observe or drop all subsequent packets.

   This style of attack relies on the attacker using a path that has the
   same or better characteristics (e.g., due to a more favourable
   service level agreements) as the direct path between endpoints.  The
   attack is more effective if relatively few packets are sent or if
   packet loss coincides with the attempted attack.

   A data packet received on the original path that increases the
   maximum received packet number will cause the endpoint to move back
   to that path.  Therefore, eliciting packets on this path increases
   the likelihood that the attack is unsuccessful.  Note however that,
   unlike QUIC, DTLS has no "non-probing" packets so this would require
   application specific mechanisms.

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5.2.1.  Mitigation Strategy

   Figure 3 illustrates the case where a receiver receives a packet with
   a new source IP address and/or new port number.  In order to
   determine that this path change was not triggered by an off-path
   attacker, the receiver will send a RRC message of type path_challenge
   (1) on the old path.

                             new                  old
                             path  .----------.  path
                                   |          |
                             .-----+ Receiver +-----.
                             |     |          |     |
                             |     '----------'     |
                             |                      |
                             |                      |
                             |                      |
                        .----+------.               |
                       / Attacker? /                |
                      '------+----'                 |
                             |                      |
                             |                      |
                             |                      |
                             |     .----------.     |
                             |     |          |     |
                             '-----+  Sender  +-----'
                                   |          |
                                   '----------'

               Figure 3: Off-Path Packet Forwarding Scenario

   Three cases need to be considered:

   Case 1: The old path is dead (e.g., due to a NAT rebinding), which
   leads to a timeout of (1).

   As shown in Figure 4, a path_challenge (2) needs to be sent on the
   new path.  If the sender replies with a path_response on the new path
   (3), the switch to the new path is considered legitimate.

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                       new                      old
                       path    .----------.    path
                       .------>|          +-------.
                       | .-----+ Receiver +...... |
                       | | .---+          |     . |
                       | | |   '----------'     . |
              path-    3 | |                    . 1 path-
              response | | |                    . | challenge
                       | | |                    . |
                    .--|-+-|----------------------v--.
                   /   |   |       NAT            X / timeout
                  '----|-+-|-----------------------'
                       | | |                    .
                       | | 2 path-              .
                       | | | challenge          .
                       | | |   .----------.     .
                       | | '-->|          |     .
                       | '-----+  Sender  +.....'
                       '-------+          |
                               '----------'

                         Figure 4: Old path is dead

   Case 2: The old path is alive but not preferred.

   This case is shown in Figure 5 whereby the sender replies with a
   path_drop message (2) on the old path.  This triggers the receiver to
   send a path_challenge (3) on the new path.  The sender will reply
   with a path_response (4) on the new path, thus providing confirmation
   for the path migration.

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                       new                      old
                       path    .----------.    path
                       .------>|          |<------.
                       | .-----+ Receiver +-----. |
                       | | .---+          +---. | |
                       | | |   '----------'   | | |
              path-    4 | |        path-     1 | |
              response | | |        challenge | | |
                       | | |                  | | |
             .---------|-+-|----.          .--|-+-|-----------.
            / AP/NAT A |   |   /          /   |   | AP/NAT B /
           '-----------|---|--'          '----|-+-|---------'
                       | | |                  | | |
                       | | 3 path-            | | 2 path-
                       | | | challenge        | | | drop
                       | | |   .----------.   | | |
                       | | '-->|          |<--' | |
                       | '-----+  Sender  +-----' |
                       '-------+          +-------'
                               '----------'

                    Figure 5: Old path is not preferred

   Case 3: The old path is alive and preferred.

   This is most likely the result of an off-path attacker trying to
   place itself on path.  The receiver sends a path_challenge on the old
   path and the sender replies with a path_response (2) on the old path.
   The interaction is shown in Figure 6.  This results in the connection
   not being migrated to the new path, thus thwarting the attack.

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                       new                    old
                       path  .----------.    path
                             |          +-------.
                       .-----+ Receiver +-----. |
                       |     |          |<--. | |
                       |     '----------'   | | |
                       |                    | | 1 path-
                       |                    | | | challenge
                       |                    | | |
                   .---+------.          .--|-+-|-----.
                  / off-path /          / AP| / |NAT /
                 / attacker /          '----|-+-|---'
                '------+---'                | | |
                       |                    | | |
                       |           path-    2 | |
                       |           response | | |
                       |     .----------.   | | |
                       |     |          +---' | |
                       '-----+  Sender  +-----' |
                             |          |<------'
                             '----------'

                      Figure 6: Old path is preferred

   Note that this defense is imperfect, but this is not considered a
   serious problem.  If the path via the attacker is reliably faster
   than the old path despite multiple attempts to use that old path, it
   is not possible to distinguish between an attack and an improvement
   in routing.

   An endpoint could also use heuristics to improve detection of this
   style of attack.  For instance, NAT rebinding is improbable if
   packets were recently received on the old path; similarly, rebinding
   is rare on IPv6 paths.  Endpoints can also look for duplicated
   packets.  Conversely, a change in connection ID is more likely to
   indicate an intentional migration rather than an attack.  Note that
   changes in connection IDs are supported in DTLS 1.3 but not in DTLS
   1.2.

6.  Path Validation Procedure

   The receiver that observes the peer's address or port change MUST
   stop sending any buffered application data, or limit the data sent to
   the unvalidated address to the anti-amplification limit.  It then
   initiates the return routability check.

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   This document describes two kinds of checks: basic (Section 6.1) and
   enhanced (Section 6.2).  The choice of one or the other depends on
   whether the off-path attacker scenario described in Section 5.2 is to
   be considered.  (The decision on what strategy to choose depends
   mainly on the threat model, but may also be influenced by other
   considerations.  Examples of impacting factors include: the need to
   minimise implementation complexity, privacy concerns, and the need to
   reduce the time it takes to switch path.  The choice may be offered
   as a configuration option to the user of the TLS implementation.)

   After the path validation procedure is completed, any pending send
   operation is resumed to the bound peer address.

   Section 6.3 and Section 6.4 list the requirements for the initiator
   and responder roles, broken down per protocol phase.

6.1.  Basic

   The basic return routability check comprises the following steps:

   1.  The receiver (i.e., the initiator) creates a
       return_routability_check message of type path_challenge and
       places the unpredictable cookie into the message.

   2.  The message is sent to the observed new address and a timer T
       (see Section 6.5) is started.

   3.  The peer (i.e., the responder) cryptographically verifies the
       received return_routability_check message of type path_challenge
       and responds by echoing the cookie value in a
       return_routability_check message of type path_response.

   4.  When the initiator receives the return_routability_check message
       of type path_response and verifies that it contains the sent
       cookie, it updates the peer address binding.

   5.  If T expires the peer address binding is not updated.

6.2.  Enhanced

   The enhanced return routability check comprises the following steps:

   1.  The receiver (i.e., the initiator) creates a
       return_routability_check message of type path_challenge and
       places the unpredictable cookie into the message.

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   2.  The message is sent to the previously valid address, which
       corresponds to the old path.  Additionally, a timer T is started,
       see Section 6.5.

   3.  If the path is still functional, the peer (i.e., the responder)
       cryptographically verifies the received return_routability_check
       message of type path_challenge.  The action to be taken depends
       on whether the path through which the message was received is the
       preferred one or not anymore:

       *  If the path through which the message was received is
          preferred, a return_routability_check message of type
          path_response MUST be returned.

       *  If the path through which the message was received is not
          preferred, a return_routability_check message of type
          path_drop MUST be returned.  In either case, the peer echoes
          the cookie value in the response.

   4.  The initiator receives and verifies that the
       return_routability_check message contains the previously sent
       cookie.  The actions taken by the initiator differ based on the
       received message:

       *  When a return_routability_check message of type path_response
          was received, the initiator MUST continue using the previously
          valid address, i.e., no switch to the new path takes place and
          the peer address binding is not updated.

       *  When a return_routability_check message of type path_drop was
          received, the initiator MUST perform a return routability
          check on the observed new address, as described in
          Section 6.1.

   5.  If T expires the peer address binding is not updated.  In this
       case, the initiator MUST perform a return routability check on
       the observed new address, as described in Section 6.1.

6.3.   Path Challenge Requirements

   *  The initiator MAY send multiple return_routability_check messages
      of type path_challenge to cater for packet loss on the probed
      path.

      -  Each path_challenge SHOULD go into different transport packets.
         (Note that the DTLS implementation may not have control over
         the packetization done by the transport layer.)

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      -  The transmission of subsequent path_challenge messages SHOULD
         be paced to decrease the chance of loss.

      -  Each path_challenge message MUST contain random data.

   *  The initiator MAY use padding using the record padding mechanism
      available in DTLS 1.3 (and in DTLS 1.2, when CID is enabled on the
      sending direction) up to the anti-amplification limit to probe if
      the path MTU (PMTU) for the new path is still acceptable.

6.4.  Path Response/Drop Requirements

   *  The responder MUST NOT delay sending an elicited path_response or
      path_drop messages.

   *  The responder MUST send exactly one path_response or path_drop
      message for each received path_challenge.

   *  The responder MUST send the path_response or the path_drop on the
      path where the corresponding path_challenge has been received, so
      that validation succeeds only if the path is functional in both
      directions.  The initiator MUST NOT enforce this behaviour.

   *  The initiator MUST silently discard any invalid path_response or
      path_drop it receives.

   Note that RRC does not cater for PMTU discovery on the reverse path.
   If the responder wants to do PMTU discovery using RRC, it should
   initiate a new path validation procedure.

6.5.  Timer Choice

   When setting T, implementations are cautioned that the new path could
   have a longer round-trip time (RTT) than the original.

   In settings where there is external information about the RTT of the
   active path, implementations SHOULD use T = 3xRTT.

   If an implementation has no way to obtain information regarding the
   RTT of the active path, T SHOULD be set to 1s.

   Profiles for specific deployment environments -- for example,
   constrained networks [I-D.ietf-uta-tls13-iot-profile] -- MAY specify
   a different, more suitable value for T.

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7.  Example

   In the example DTLS 1.3 handshake shown in Figure 7, a client and a
   server successfully negotiate support for both CID and the RRC
   extension.

       Client                                           Server

Key  ^ ClientHello
Exch | + key_share
     | + signature_algorithms
     | + rrc
     v + connection_id=empty
                               -------->
                                                  ServerHello  ^ Key
                                                 +  key_share  | Exch
                                          + connection_id=100  |
                                                        + rrc  v
                                        {EncryptedExtensions}  ^  Server
                                         {CertificateRequest}  v  Params
                                                {Certificate}  ^
                                          {CertificateVerify}  | Auth
                               <--------           {Finished}  v

     ^ {Certificate}
Auth | {CertificateVerify}
     v {Finished}              -------->
       [Application Data]      <------->  [Application Data]

              +  Indicates noteworthy extensions sent in the
                 previously noted message.

              *  Indicates optional or situation-dependent
                 messages/extensions that are not always sent.

              {} Indicates messages protected using keys
                 derived from a [sender]_handshake_traffic_secret.

              [] Indicates messages protected using keys
                 derived from [sender]_application_traffic_secret_N.

            Figure 7: Message Flow for Full DTLS Handshake

   Once a connection has been established, the client and the server
   exchange application payloads protected by DTLS with a unilaterally
   used CID.  In our case, the client is requested to use CID 100 for
   records sent to the server.

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   At some point in the communication interaction, the IP address used
   by the client changes and, thanks to the CID usage, the security
   context to interpret the record is successfully located by the
   server.  However, the server wants to test the reachability of the
   client at its new IP address.

   Figure 8 shows the server initiating a "basic" RRC exchange (see
   Section 6.1) that establishes reachability of the client at the new
   IP address.

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         Client                                             Server
         ------                                             ------

         Application Data            ========>
         <CID=100>
         Src-IP=A
         Dst-IP=Z
                                     <========        Application Data
                                                          Src-IP=Z
                                                          Dst-IP=A

                                 <<------------->>
                                 <<   Some      >>
                                 <<   Time      >>
                                 <<   Later     >>
                                 <<------------->>

         Application Data            ========>
         <CID=100>
         Src-IP=B
         Dst-IP=Z

                                                <<< Unverified IP
                                                    Address B >>

                                     <--------  Return Routability Check
                                                path_challenge(cookie)
                                                       Src-IP=Z
                                                       Dst-IP=B

         Return Routability Check    -------->
         path_response(cookie)
         Src-IP=B
         Dst-IP=Z

                                                <<< IP Address B
                                                    Verified >>

                                     <========        Application Data
                                                          Src-IP=Z
                                                          Dst-IP=B

                Figure 8: "Basic" Return Routability Example

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8.  Security Considerations

   Note that the return routability checks do not protect against
   flooding of third-parties if the attacker is on-path, as the attacker
   can redirect the return routability checks to the real peer (even if
   those datagrams are cryptographically authenticated).  On-path
   adversaries can, in general, pose a harm to connectivity.

9.  Privacy Considerations

   When using DTLS 1.3, peers SHOULD avoid using the same CID on
   multiple network paths, in particular when initiating connection
   migration or when probing a new network path, as described in
   Section 6, as an adversary can otherwise correlate the communication
   interaction across those different paths.  DTLS 1.3 provides
   mechanisms to ensure that a new CID can always be used.  In general,
   an endpoint should proactively send a RequestConnectionId message to
   ask for new CIDs as soon as the pool of spare CIDs is depleted (or
   goes below a threshold).  Also, in case a peer might have exhausted
   available CIDs, a migrating endpoint could include NewConnectionId in
   packets sent on the new path to make sure that the subsequent path
   validation can use fresh CIDs.

   Note that DTLS 1.2 does not offer the ability to request new CIDs
   during the session lifetime since CIDs have the same life-span of the
   connection.  Therefore, deployments that use DTLS in multihoming
   environments SHOULD refuse to use CIDs with DTLS 1.2 and switch to
   DTLS 1.3 if the correlation privacy threat is a concern.

10.  Operational Considerations

10.1.  Logging Anomalous Events

   Logging of RRC operations at both ends of the protocol can be
   generally useful for the users of an implementation.  In particular,
   for security information and event management (SIEM) and
   troubleshooting purposes, it is strongly advised that implementations
   collect statistics about any unsuccessful RRC operations, as they
   could represent security-relevant events when they coincide with
   attempts by an attacker to interfere with the end-to-end path.

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10.2.  Middlebox Interference

   Since the DTLS 1.3 encrypted packet's record type is opaque to on-
   path observers, RRC messages are immune to middlebox interference
   when using DTLS 1.3.  In contrast, DTLS 1.2 RRC messages that are not
   wrapped in the tls12_cid record (e.g., in the server-to-client
   direction if the server didn't negotiate a CID or it negotiated a
   zero-length CID) have the return_routability_check content type in
   plain text, making them susceptible to interference (e.g., dropping
   of path_challenge messages), which would hinder the RRC functionality
   altogether.  Therefore, when using RRC in DTLS 1.2, it is recommended
   to enable CID in both directions.

11.  IANA Considerations

   // RFC Editor: please replace RFCthis with this RFC number and remove
   // this note.

11.1.  New TLS ContentType

   IANA is requested to allocate an entry to the TLS ContentType
   registry, for the return_routability_check(TBD2) message defined in
   this document.  IANA is requested to set the DTLS_OK column to Y and
   to add the following note prior to the table:

      NOTE: The return_routability_check content type is only applicable
      to DTLS 1.2 and 1.3.

11.2.   New TLS ExtensionType

   IANA is requested to allocate the extension code point (TBD1) for the
   rrc extension to the TLS ExtensionType Values registry as described
   in Table 1.

   +=====+=========+===+===========+=============+===========+=======+
   |Value|Extension|TLS| DTLS-Only | Recommended | Reference |Comment|
   |     |Name     |1.3|           |             |           |       |
   +=====+=========+===+===========+=============+===========+=======+
   |TBD1 |rrc      |CH,| Y         | N           | RFCthis   |       |
   |     |         |SH |           |             |           |       |
   +-----+---------+---+-----------+-------------+-----------+-------+

       Table 1: rrc entry in the TLS ExtensionType Values registry

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11.3.  New RRC Message Type Sub-registry

   IANA is requested to create a new registry for RRC Message Types
   within the TLS Parameters registry group [IANA.tls-parameters].  This
   registry will be administered under the "Expert Review" policy
   (Section 4.5 of [RFC8126]).

   Follow the procedures in Section 16 of [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8447bis] to
   submit registration requests.

   Each entry in the registry must include the following fields:

   Value:
      A (decimal) number in the range 0 to 253

   Description:
      A brief description of the RRC message

   DTLS-Only:
      Whether the message applies only to DTLS.  Since RRC is only
      available in DTLS, this column will be set to Y for all the
      entries in this registry

   Recommended:
      Whether the message is recommended for implementations to support.
      The semantics for this field is defined in Section 5 of [RFC8447]
      and updated in Section 3 of [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8447bis]

   Reference:
      A reference to a publicly available specification for the value

   Comment:
      Any relevant notes or comments that relate to this entry

   The initial state of this sub-registry is as follows:

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   +=======+================+=========+=============+=========+=======+
   |Value  | Description    |DTLS-Only| Recommended |Reference|Comment|
   +=======+================+=========+=============+=========+=======+
   |0      | path_challenge |Y        | Y           |RFCthis  |       |
   +-------+----------------+---------+-------------+---------+-------+
   |1      | path_response  |Y        | Y           |RFCthis  |       |
   +-------+----------------+---------+-------------+---------+-------+
   |2      | path_drop      |Y        | Y           |RFCthis  |       |
   +-------+----------------+---------+-------------+---------+-------+
   |3-253  | Unassigned     |         |             |         |       |
   +-------+----------------+---------+-------------+---------+-------+
   |254-255| Reserved for   |Y        |             |RFCthis  |       |
   |       | Private Use    |         |             |         |       |
   +-------+----------------+---------+-------------+---------+-------+

          Table 2: Initial Entries in RRC Message Type registry

   IANA is requested to add the following note for additional
   information regarding the use of RRC message codepoints in
   experiments:

   Note:  As specified in [RFC8126], assignments made in the Private Use
      space are not generally useful for broad interoperability.  Those
      making use of the Private Use range are responsible for ensuring
      that no conflicts occur within the intended scope of use.  For
      widespread experiments, provisional registrations (Section 4.13 of
      [RFC8126]) are available.

11.3.1.  Designated Expert Instructions

   To enable a broadly informed review of registration decisions, it is
   recommended that multiple Designated Experts be appointed who are
   able to represent the perspectives of both the transport and security
   areas.

   In cases where a registration decision could be perceived as creating
   a conflict of interest for a particular Expert, that Expert SHOULD
   defer to the judgment of the other Experts.

12.  Acknowledgments

   We would like to thank Eric Rescorla, Hanno Becker, Hanno Böck, Joe
   Clarke, Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard, Marco Tiloca, Martin Thomson, Mike
   Ounsworth, Mohit Sahni, Rich Salz, Russ Housley, Sean Turner, and
   Yaron Sheffer for their input to this document.

13.  References

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13.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8447bis]
              Salowey, J. A. and S. Turner, "IANA Registry Updates for
              TLS and DTLS", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              ietf-tls-rfc8447bis-13, 29 May 2025,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-
              rfc8447bis-13>.

   [IANA.tls-parameters]
              IANA, "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Parameters",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

   [RFC8126]  Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
              Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
              RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8126>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446>.

   [RFC8447]  Salowey, J. and S. Turner, "IANA Registry Updates for TLS
              and DTLS", RFC 8447, DOI 10.17487/RFC8447, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8447>.

   [RFC9146]  Rescorla, E., Ed., Tschofenig, H., Ed., Fossati, T., and
              A. Kraus, "Connection Identifier for DTLS 1.2", RFC 9146,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9146, March 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9146>.

   [RFC9147]  Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
              Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
              1.3", RFC 9147, DOI 10.17487/RFC9147, April 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9147>.

13.2.  Informative References

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   [I-D.ietf-uta-tls13-iot-profile]
              Tschofenig, H., Fossati, T., and M. Richardson, "TLS/DTLS
              1.3 Profiles for the Internet of Things", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-uta-tls13-iot-
              profile-14, 5 May 2025,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-uta-
              tls13-iot-profile-14>.

   [I-D.irtf-t2trg-amplification-attacks]
              Mattsson, J. P., Selander, G., and C. Amsüss,
              "Amplification Attacks Using the Constrained Application
              Protocol (CoAP)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              irtf-t2trg-amplification-attacks-04, 8 December 2024,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-t2trg-
              amplification-attacks-04>.

   [RFC9000]  Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based
              Multiplexed and Secure Transport", RFC 9000,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9000, May 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000>.

   [RFC9175]  Amsüss, C., Preuß Mattsson, J., and G. Selander,
              "Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP): Echo, Request-
              Tag, and Token Processing", RFC 9175,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9175, February 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9175>.

Authors' Addresses

   Hannes Tschofenig (editor)
   University of Applied Sciences Bonn-Rhein-Sieg
   Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net

   Achim Kraus
   Email: achimkraus@gmx.net

   Thomas Fossati
   Linaro
   Email: thomas.fossati@linaro.org

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