Exported Authenticators in TLS
draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator-13
TLS N. Sullivan
Internet-Draft Cloudflare Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track June 26, 2020
Expires: December 28, 2020
Exported Authenticators in TLS
draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator-13
Abstract
This document describes a mechanism in Transport Layer Security (TLS)
for peers to provide a proof of ownership of an identity, such as an
X.509 certificate. This proof can be exported by one peer,
transmitted out-of-band to the other peer, and verified by the
receiving peer.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
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and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 28, 2020.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Internet-Draft TLS Exported Authenticator June 2020
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Message Sequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Authenticator Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Authenticator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.1. Authenticator Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.2. Authenticator Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.2.1. Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.2.2. CertificateVerify . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2.3. Finished . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.2.4. Authenticator Creation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Empty Authenticator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. API considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.1. The "request" API . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.2. The "get context" API . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.3. The "authenticate" API . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.4. The "validate" API . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.1. Update of the TLS ExtensionType Registry . . . . . . . . 12
8.2. Update of the TLS Exporter Labels Registry . . . . . . . 12
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1. Introduction
This document provides a way to authenticate one party of a Transport
Layer Security (TLS) connection to its peer using a Certificate
message after the session has been established. This allows both the
client and server to prove ownership of additional identities at any
time after the handshake has completed. This proof of authentication
can be exported and transmitted out-of-band from one party to be
validated by its peer.
This mechanism provides two advantages over the authentication that
TLS natively provides:
multiple identities - Endpoints that are authoritative for multiple
identities - but do not have a single certificate that includes
all of the identities - can authenticate additional identities
over a single connection.
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