%% You should probably cite draft-ietf-tls-extended-key-update-13 instead of this revision.
@techreport{ietf-tls-extended-key-update-08,
    number =    {draft-ietf-tls-extended-key-update-08},
    type =      {Internet-Draft},
    institution =   {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    publisher = {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    note =      {Work in Progress},
    url =       {https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-extended-key-update/08/},
    author =    {Hannes Tschofenig and Michael Tüxen and Tirumaleswar Reddy.K and Steffen Fries and Yaroslav Rosomakho},
    title =     {{Extended Key Update for Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.3}},
    pagetotal = 39,
    year =      ,
    month =     ,
    day =       ,
    abstract =  {TLS 1.3 ensures forward secrecy by performing an ephemeral Diffie- Hellman key exchange during the initial handshake, protecting past communications even if a party's long-term keys (typically a private key with a corresponding certificate) are later compromised. While the built-in KeyUpdate mechanism allows application traffic keys to be refreshed during a session, it does not incorporate fresh entropy from a new key exchange and therefore does not provide post- compromise security. This limitation can pose a security risk in long-lived sessions, such as those found in industrial IoT or telecommunications environments. To address this, this specification defines an extended key update mechanism that performs a fresh Diffie-Hellman exchange within an active session, thereby ensuring post-compromise security. By forcing attackers to exfiltrate new key material repeatedly, this approach mitigates the risks associated with static key compromise. Regular renewal of session keys helps contain the impact of such compromises. The extension is applicable to both TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.3.},
}