Transport Layer Security (TLS) False Start
draft-ietf-tls-falsestart-00

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Document Type Active Internet-Draft (tls WG)
Last updated 2015-10-14 (latest revision 2015-05-07)
Replaces draft-bmoeller-tls-falsestart
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Intended RFC status Experimental
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TLS Working Group                                             A. Langley
Internet-Draft                                               N. Modadugu
Intended status: Experimental                                 B. Moeller
Expires: November 8, 2015                                         Google
                                                             May 7, 2015

               Transport Layer Security (TLS) False Start
                      draft-ietf-tls-falsestart-00

Abstract

   This document specifies an optional behavior of TLS implementations,
   dubbed False Start.  It affects only protocol timing, not on-the-wire
   protocol data, and can be implemented unilaterally.  The TLS False
   Start feature leads to a latency reduction of one round trip for
   certain handshakes.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on November 8, 2015.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of

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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Requirements Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  False Start Compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Client-side False Start . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Server-side False Start . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     6.1.  Symmetric Cipher  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     6.2.  Protocol Version  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     6.3.  Key Exchange and Client Certificate Type  . . . . . . . .   8
   7.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Appendix A.  Implementation Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10

1.  Requirements Notation

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

2.  Introduction

   A full TLS handshake as specified in [RFC5246] requires two full
   protocol rounds (four flights) before the handshake is complete and
   the protocol parties may begin to send application data.  Thus, using
   TLS can add a latency penalty of two network round-trip times for
   application protocols in which the client sends data first, such as
   HTTP [RFC2616].  An abbreviated handshake (resuming an earlier TLS
   session) is complete after three flights, thus adding just one round-
   trip time if the client sends application data first.

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      Client                                               Server

      ClientHello                  -------->
                                                      ServerHello
                                                     Certificate*
                                               ServerKeyExchange*
                                              CertificateRequest*
                                   <--------      ServerHelloDone
      Certificate*
      ClientKeyExchange
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