Out-of-Band Public Key Validation for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
draft-ietf-tls-oob-pubkey-09

The information below is for an old version of the document
Document Type Active Internet-Draft (tls WG)
Last updated 2013-08-16 (latest revision 2013-07-30)
Replaces draft-wouters-tls-oob-pubkey
Stream IETF
Intended RFC status Proposed Standard
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Document shepherd J. Salowey
IESG IESG state Waiting for Writeup
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Responsible AD spt
IESG note Joe Salowey (jsalowey@cisco.com) is the Document Shepherd
Send notices to tls-chairs@tools.ietf.org, draft-ietf-tls-oob-pubkey@tools.ietf.org
IANA IANA review state IANA OK - Actions Needed
IANA action state None
TLS                                                      P. Wouters, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                                   Red Hat
Intended status: Standards Track                      H. Tschofenig, Ed.
Expires: January 31, 2014                         Nokia Siemens Networks
                                                              J. Gilmore

                                                               S. Weiler
                                                            SPARTA, Inc.
                                                              T. Kivinen
                                                               AuthenTec
                                                           July 30, 2013

  Out-of-Band Public Key Validation for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
                    draft-ietf-tls-oob-pubkey-09.txt

Abstract

   This document specifies a new certificate type and two TLS
   extensions, one for the client and one for the server, for exchanging
   raw public keys in Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram
   Transport Layer Security (DTLS) for use with out-of-band public key
   validation.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 31, 2014.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents

Wouters, et al.         Expires January 31, 2014                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft        TLS OOB Public Key Validation            July 2013

   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  New TLS Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  TLS Handshake Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.1.  Client Hello  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.2.  Server Hello  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.3.  Certificate Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.4.  Other Handshake Messages  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.5.  Client authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   5.  Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   8.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Appendix A.  Example Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

1.  Introduction

   Traditionally, TLS client and server public keys are obtained in PKIX
   containers in-band using the TLS handshake and validated using trust
   anchors based on a [PKIX] certification authority (CA).  This method
   can add a complicated trust relationship that is difficult to
   validate.  Examples of such complexity can be seen in
   [Defeating-SSL].

   Alternative methods are available that allow a TLS clients/servers to
   obtain the TLS servers/client public key:

   o  TLS clients can obtain the TLS server public key from a DNSSEC
      secured resource records using DANE [RFC6698].

   o  The TLS client or server public key is obtained from a [PKIX]
      certificate chain from an Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
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