Secure Password Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
draft-ietf-tls-pwd-02

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Document Type Active Internet-Draft (tls WG)
Last updated 2013-11-23
Replaced by draft-harkins-tls-dragonfly, rfc8492
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Transport Layer Security                                 D. Harkins, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                            Aruba Networks
Intended status: Standards Track                          D. Halasz, Ed.
Expires: May 27, 2014                                    Halasz Ventures
                                                       November 23, 2013

    Secure Password Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
                         draft-ietf-tls-pwd-02

Abstract

   This memo defines several new ciphersuites for the Transport Layer
   Security (TLS) protocol to support certificate-less, secure
   authentication using only a simple, low-entropy, password.  The
   ciphersuites are all based on an authentication and key exchange
   protocol that is resistant to off-line dictionary attack.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 27, 2014.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as

Harkins & Halasz          Expires May 27, 2014                  [Page 1]
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  The Case for Certificate-less Authentication . . . . . . .  3
     1.2.  Resistance to Dictionary Attack  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Keyword Definitions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     3.1.  Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     3.2.  Discrete Logarithm Cryptography  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       3.2.1.  Elliptic Curve Cryptography  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       3.2.2.  Finite Field Cryptography  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.3.  Instantiating the Random Function  . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.4.  Passwords  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.5.  Assumptions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   4.  Specification of the TLS-PWD Handshake . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     4.1.  Fixing the Password Element  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       4.1.1.  Computing an ECC Password Element  . . . . . . . . . . 10
       4.1.2.  Computing an FFC Password Element  . . . . . . . . . . 11
     4.2.  Changes to Handshake Message Contents  . . . . . . . . . . 12
       4.2.1.  Client Hello Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       4.2.2.  Server Key Exchange Changes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
         4.2.2.1.  Generation of ServerKeyExchange  . . . . . . . . . 14
         4.2.2.2.  Processing of ServerKeyExchange  . . . . . . . . . 15
       4.2.3.  Client Key Exchange Changes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
         4.2.3.1.  Generation of Client Key Exchange  . . . . . . . . 16
         4.2.3.2.  Processing of Client Key Exchange  . . . . . . . . 16
     4.3.  Computing the Premaster Secret . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   5.  Ciphersuite Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   6.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
   7.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
   8.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
   9.  Implementation Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
   10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
     10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
     10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
   Appendix A.  Example Exchange  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

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