Deprecating Secure Sockets Layer Version 3.0
draft-ietf-tls-sslv3-diediedie-03

[Ballot comment]
The abstract says (as it should) that this updates all versions of TLS... yet the metadata only updates 1.2.  For most situations I'd think that appropriate (no need to update the ones that are obsoleted), but in this case the deployment of earlier versions is sufficiently widespread (and, after all, you do have them as normative references) that I think we should add 2246 and 4346 to the "updates" list.  Note, though, that this is not a DISCUSS, so I'll leave it to y'all to decide what's best.

I think prohibiting-rc4 doesn't need to be a normative reference; I'd make it informative.  I think the same is true for RFC 4492.

-- Section 3 --
Pretty short litany, here, really.  I guess it's not the whole megillah.  Jus' sayin'.

[Ballot comment]
Thank you for writing this. Even the transport dorks know it matters. I wish you had used the word "die" in the draft name more than three times, but you're the experts :-)

I'm not parsing this text the way I think you want me to:

  The predecessor of SSLv3, SSL version 2 [RFC6101], is no longer
  considered secure [RFC6176].  SSLv3 now follows.
 
I'm struggling with "is no longer considered secure" in the present tense, describing an action taken several years ago.

Is the point that negotiating SSLv2 was prohibited in 2011 because SSLv2 was no longer considered secure, and negotiating SSLv3 is now being prohibited in the same way, for the reasons listed in this document?

If so, saying something like that might be clearer ...

IESG/Authors/WG Chairs:

IANA has reviewed draft-ietf-tls-sslv3-diediedie-02, which is currently in Last Call, and has the following comments:

We understand that this document doesn't require any IANA actions.

While it is helpful for the IANA Considerations section of the document to remain in place upon publication, if the authors prefer to remove it, IANA doesn't object.

If this assessment is not accurate, please respond as soon as possible.

The following Last Call announcement was sent out:

From: The IESG
To: IETF-Announce
CC:
Reply-To: ietf@ietf.org
Sender:
Subject: Last Call:  (Deprecating Secure Sockets Layer Version 3.0) to Best Current Practice


The IESG has received a request from the Transport Layer Security WG
(tls) to consider the following document:
- 'Deprecating Secure Sockets Layer Version 3.0'
  as Best Current Practice

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2015-03-30. Exceptionally, comments may be
sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the
beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract


  Secure Sockets Layer version 3.0 (SSLv3) is no longer secure.  This
  document requires that SSLv3 not be used.  The replacement versions,
  in particular Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.2, are considerably
  more secure and capable protocols.

  This document updates the backward compatibility sections of the TLS
  RFCs to prohibit fallback to SSLv3.




The file can be obtained via
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-sslv3-diediedie/

IESG discussion can be tracked via
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-sslv3-diediedie/ballot/


No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.

- ID nits says we should say in the abstract that we're
updating 5246 and that prohibiting-rc4 is now RFC 7465.
It also wants us to add the usual 2119 boilerplate. Those
will be taken care of after IETF LC.

1. Summary

Joseph Salowey is the document shepherd and Stephen Farrell is the responsible AD for this document. 

This document is a standards track document that deprecates the use of SSLv3 as it has significant security flaws. 

2. Review and Consensus

This document has been actively reviewed by the TLS working group.  There is strong community consensus behind the document.  Many deployments and implementations have already started disabling SSLv3. 

3. Intellectual Property

No IPR declarations have been filed and none are expected. 

4. Other Points

The document contains downrefs to versions of TLS documents.  This follows what was done in RFC 6176 (Prohibiting Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) Version 2.0).