Large Record Sizes for TLS and DTLS with Reduced Overhead
draft-ietf-tls-super-jumbo-record-limit-00

Transport Layer Security                               J. Preuß Mattsson
Internet-Draft                                                  Ericsson
Intended status: Standards Track                           H. Tschofenig
Expires: 16 May 2025                                             Siemens
                                                                M. Tüxen
                                       Münster Univ. of Applied Sciences
                                                        12 November 2024

       Large Record Sizes for TLS and DTLS with Reduced Overhead
               draft-ietf-tls-super-jumbo-record-limit-00

Abstract

   TLS 1.3 records limit the inner plaintext (TLSInnerPlaintext) size to
   2^14 + 1 bytes, which includes one byte for the content type.
   Records also have a 3-byte overhead due to the fixed opaque_type and
   legacy_record_version fields.  This document defines a TLS extension
   that allows endpoints to negotiate a larger maximum inner plaintext
   size, up to 2^32 - 256 bytes, while reducing overhead.

About This Document

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   The latest revision of this draft can be found at
   https://tlswg.github.io/super-jumbo-record-limit/draft-ietf-tls-
   super-jumbo-record-limit.html.  Status information for this document
   may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-
   super-jumbo-record-limit/.

   Discussion of this document takes place on the Transport Layer
   Security Working Group mailing list (mailto:tls@ietf.org), which is
   archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/tls/.  Subscribe
   at https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls/.

   Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
   https://github.com/tlswg/super-jumbo-record-limit.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Preuß Mattsson, et al.     Expires 16 May 2025                  [Page 1]
Internet-Draft         Large Record Sizes for TLS          November 2024

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 16 May 2025.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  The "large_record_size_limit" Extension . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Limits on Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Change Log  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8

1.  Introduction

   TLS 1.3 records limit the inner plaintext (TLSInnerPlaintext) size to
   2^14 + 1 bytes, which includes one byte for the content type.
   Records also have a 3-byte overhead due to the fixed opaque_type and
   legacy_record_version fields.  TLS-based protocols are increasingly
   used to secure long-lived interfaces in critical infrastructure, such
   as telecommunication networks.  In some infrastructure use cases, the
   upper layer of DTLS expects a message oriented service and uses
   message sizes much larger than 2^14-bytes.  In these cases, the
   2^14-byte limit in TLS necessitates an additional protocol layer for
   fragmentation, resulting in increased CPU and memory consumption and

Preuß Mattsson, et al.     Expires 16 May 2025                  [Page 2]
Internet-Draft         Large Record Sizes for TLS          November 2024

   additional complexity.  Allowing 2^32-byte records would eliminate
   additional fragmentation in almost all use cases.  In [RFC6083] (DTLS
   over SCTP), the 2^14-byte limit is a severe restriction.

   This document defines a "large_record_size_limit" extension that
   allows endpoints to negotiate a larger maximum inner plaintext
   (TLSInnerPlaintext) size.  This extension is valid in TLS 1.3 and
   DTLS 1.3.  The extension works similarly to the "record_size_limit"
   extension defined in [RFC8449].  Additionally, this document defines
   new TLS 1.3 TLSLargeCiphertext and DTLS 1.3 unified_hdr structures to
   enable inner plaintexts up to 2^32 - 256 bytes with reduced overhead.
   For example, inner plaintexts up to 2^16 - 256 bytes can be supported
   with 3 bytes less overhead, which is useful in constrained IoT
   environments.  The "large_record_size_limit" extension is
   incompatible with middleboxes expecting TLS 1.2 records.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

3.  The "large_record_size_limit" Extension

   The ExtensionData of the "large_record_size_limit" extension is
   LargeRecordSizeLimit:

      uint32 LargeRecordSizeLimit;

   LargeRecordSizeLimit denotes the maximum size, in bytes, of inner
   plaintexts that the endpoint is willing to receive.  It includes the
   content type and padding (i.e., the complete length of
   TLSInnerPlaintext).  AEAD expansion is not included.

   The large record size limit only applies to records sent toward the
   endpoint that advertises the limit.  An endpoint can send records
   that are larger than the limit it advertises as its own limit.  A TLS
   endpoint that receives a record larger than its advertised limit MUST
   generate a fatal "record_overflow" alert; a DTLS endpoint that
   receives a record larger than its advertised limit MAY either
   generate a fatal "record_overflow" alert or discard the record.  An
   endpoint MUST NOT add padding to records that would cause the length
   of TLSInnerPlaintext to exceed the limit advertised by the other
   endpoint.

Preuß Mattsson, et al.     Expires 16 May 2025                  [Page 3]
Internet-Draft         Large Record Sizes for TLS          November 2024

   Endpoints MUST NOT send a "large_record_size_limit" extension with a
   value smaller than 64 or larger than 2^32 - 256.  An endpoint MUST
   treat receipt of a smaller or larger value as a fatal error and
   generate an "illegal_parameter" alert.

   The server sends the "large_record_size_limit" extension in the
   EncryptedExtensions message.  During resumption, the limit is
   renegotiated.  Records are subject to the limits that were set in the
   handshake that produces the keys that are used to protect those
   records.  This admits the possibility that the extension might not be
   negotiated during resumption.

   Unprotected messages and records protected with early_traffic_secret
   or handshake_traffic_secret are not subject to the large record size
   limit.

   When the "large_record_size_limit" extension is negotiated:

   *  All TLS 1.3 records protected with application_traffic_secret MUST
      use the TLSLargeCiphertext structure instead of the TLSCiphertext
      structure.  The size of the length field depends on the limit
      advertised by the receiver.  If the limit is less than 2^16 - 255
      an uint16 is used, if the limit is larger than 2^24 - 256 an
      uint32 is used, and otherwise an uint24 is used.  The length is
      fixed for the connection.  Different lengths might be used in
      different directions.

      enum { u16(0), u24(1), u32(2) } Length;

      struct {
          select (Length.type) {
              case u16: uint16;
              case u24: uint24;
              case u32: uint32;
          };
       } VarLength;

      struct {
          VarLength length;
          opaque encrypted_record[TLSLargeCiphertext.length];
      } TLSLargeCiphertext;

   *  All DTLS 1.3 records protected with application_traffic_secret and
      with length present MUST use a unified_hdr structure with a length
      equal to the TLS 1.3 length field defined above.

Preuß Mattsson, et al.     Expires 16 May 2025                  [Page 4]
Internet-Draft         Large Record Sizes for TLS          November 2024

       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |0|0|1|C|S|L|E E|
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      | Connection ID |   Legend:
      | (if any,      |
      /  length as    /   C   - Connection ID (CID) present
      |  negotiated)  |   S   - Sequence number length
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+   L   - Length present
      |  8 or 16 bit  |   E   - Epoch
      |Sequence Number|
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      | 16, 24, or 32 |
      |  bit Length   |
      | (if present)  |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   *  An endpoint MAY generate records protected with
      application_traffic_secret with inner plaintext that is equal to
      or smaller than the LargeRecordSizeLimit value it receives from
      its peer.  An endpoint MUST NOT generate a protected record with
      inner plaintext that is larger than the LargeRecordSizeLimit value
      it receives from its peer.

   The "large_record_size_limit" extension is not compatible with
   middleboxes expecting TLS 1.2 records and SHOULD NOT be negotiated
   where such middleboxes are expected.  A server MUST NOT send
   extension responses to more than one of "large_record_size_limit",
   "record_size_limit", and "max_fragment_length".  A client MUST treat
   receipt of more than one of "large_record_size_limit",
   "record_size_limit", and "max_fragment_length" as a fatal error, and
   it SHOULD generate an "illegal_parameter" alert.

   The Path Maximum Transmission Unit (PMTU) in DTLS also limits the
   size of records.  The record size limit does not affect PMTU
   discovery and SHOULD be set independently.  The record size limit is
   fixed during the handshake and so should be set based on constraints
   at the endpoint and not based on the current network environment.  In
   comparison, the PMTU is determined by the network path and can change
   dynamically over time.

Preuß Mattsson, et al.     Expires 16 May 2025                  [Page 5]
Internet-Draft         Large Record Sizes for TLS          November 2024

4.  Limits on Key Usage

   The maximum record size limit is an input to the AEAD limits
   calculations in TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] and DTLS 1.3 [RFC9147].  Increasing
   the maximum record size to more than 2^14 + 256 bytes while keeping
   the same confidentiality and integrity advantage per write key
   therefore requires lower AEAD limits.  When the "large_record_size"
   has been negotiated record size limit larger than 2^14 + 1 bytes,
   existing AEAD limits SHALL be decreased by a factor of
   (LargeRecordSizeLimit) / (2^14-256).  For example, when AES-CGM is
   used in TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] with a 64 kB record limit, only arounf
   2^22.5 records (about 6 million) may be encrypted on a given
   connection.

5.  Security Considerations

   Large record sizes might require more memory allocation for senders
   and receivers.  Additionally, larger record sizes also means that
   more processing is done before verification of non-authentic records
   fails.

   The use of larger record sizes can either simplify or complicate
   traffic analysis, depending on the application.  The
   LargeRecordSizeLimit is just an upper limit and it is still the
   sender that decides the size of the inner plaintexts up to that
   limit.

6.  IANA Considerations

   IANA is requested to assign a new value in the TLS ExtensionType
   Values registry defined by [RFC8447]:

   *  The Extension Name should be large_record_size_limit

   *  The TLS 1.3 value should be CH, EE

   *  The DTLS-Only value should be N

   *  The Recommended value should be Y

   *  The Reference should be this document

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

Preuß Mattsson, et al.     Expires 16 May 2025                  [Page 6]
Internet-Draft         Large Record Sizes for TLS          November 2024

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446>.

   [RFC8447]  Salowey, J. and S. Turner, "IANA Registry Updates for TLS
              and DTLS", RFC 8447, DOI 10.17487/RFC8447, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8447>.

   [RFC8449]  Thomson, M., "Record Size Limit Extension for TLS",
              RFC 8449, DOI 10.17487/RFC8449, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8449>.

   [RFC9147]  Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
              Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
              1.3", RFC 9147, DOI 10.17487/RFC9147, April 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9147>.

7.2.  Informative References

   [RFC6083]  Tuexen, M., Seggelmann, R., and E. Rescorla, "Datagram
              Transport Layer Security (DTLS) for Stream Control
              Transmission Protocol (SCTP)", RFC 6083,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6083, January 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6083>.

Change Log

   This section is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   Changes from -04 to -05:

   *  Grammar and comprehension tweaks.

   *  Added change log

   Changes from -03 to -04:

   *  Corrected uint24 to uint32.

Preuß Mattsson, et al.     Expires 16 May 2025                  [Page 7]
Internet-Draft         Large Record Sizes for TLS          November 2024

   Changes from -02 to -03:

   *  Major rewrite based on discussions at IETF 119

   *  New independant extension instead of flag extension used together
      with record_size_limit

   *  New record format without opaque_type and legacy_record_version
      fields.  This reduces overhead

   *  Support inner plaintext size up to 2^32 - 256 bytes

Acknowledgments

   The authors would like to thank Stephen Farrell, Benjamin Kaduk, and
   Martin Thomson for their valuable comments and feedback.  Some of the
   text were inspired by and borrowed from [RFC8449].

Authors' Addresses

   John Preuß Mattsson
   Ericsson
   Email: john.mattsson@ericsson.com

   Hannes Tschofenig
   Siemens
   Email: hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net

   Michael Tüxen
   Münster Univ. of Applied Sciences
   Email: tuexen@fh-muenster.de

Preuß Mattsson, et al.     Expires 16 May 2025                  [Page 8]