TLS 1.3 Extension for Certificate-based Authentication with an External Pre-Shared Key
draft-ietf-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk-04

The information below is for an old version of the document
Document Type Active Internet-Draft (tls WG)
Last updated 2019-12-19
Replaces draft-housley-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk
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Intended RFC status Experimental
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Shepherd write-up Show (last changed 2019-07-01)
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Send notices to Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net>
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Network Working Group                                         R. Housley
Internet-Draft                                            Vigil Security
Intended status: Experimental                          December 19, 2019
Expires: June 21, 2020

TLS 1.3 Extension for Certificate-based Authentication with an External
                             Pre-Shared Key
              draft-ietf-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk-04

Abstract

   This document specifies a TLS 1.3 extension that allows a server to
   authenticate with a combination of a certificate and an external pre-
   shared key (PSK).

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on June 21, 2020.

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   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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1.  Introduction

   The TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] handshake protocol provides two mutually
   exclusive forms of server authentication.  First, the server can be
   authenticated by providing a signature certificate and creating a
   valid digital signature to demonstrate that it possesses the
   corresponding private key.  Second, the server can be authenticated
   by demonstrating that it possesses a pre-shared key (PSK) that was
   established by a previous handshake.  A PSK that is established in
   this fashion is called a resumption PSK.  A PSK that is established
   by any other means is called an external PSK.  This document
   specifies a TLS 1.3 extension permitting certificate-based server
   authentication to be combined with an external PSK as an input to the
   TLS 1.3 key schedule.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

3.  Motivation and Design Rationale

   The development of a large-scale quantum computer would pose a
   serious challenge for the cryptographic algorithms that are widely
   deployed today, including the digital signature algorithms that are
   used to authenticate the server in the TLS 1.3 handshake protocol.
   It is an open question whether or not it is feasible to build a
   large-scale quantum computer, and if so, when that might happen.
   However, if such a quantum computer is invented, many of the
   cryptographic algorithms and the security protocols that use them
   would become vulnerable.

   The TLS 1.3 handshake protocol employs key agreement algorithms and
   digital signature algorithms that could be broken by the development
   of a large-scale quantum computer [I-D.hoffman-c2pq].  The key
   agreement algorithms include Diffie-Hellman (DH) [DH1977] and
   Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) [IEEE1363]; the digital
   signature algorithms inclue RSA [RFC8017] and Elliptic Curve Digital
   Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [FIPS186].  As a result, an adversary
   that stores a TLS 1.3 handshake protocol exchange today could decrypt
   the associated encrypted communications in the future when a large-
   scale quantum computer becomes available.

   In the near-term, this document describes TLS 1.3 extension to
   protect today's communications from the future invention of a large-

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   scale quantum computer by providing a strong external PSK as an input
   to the TLS 1.3 key schedule while preserving the authentication
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