Legacy RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 codepoints for TLS 1.3
draft-ietf-tls-tls13-pkcs1-07

Received changes through RFC Editor sync (changed state to RFC, created became rfc relationship between draft-ietf-tls-tls13-pkcs1 and RFC 9963, changed IESG state to RFC Published)

[Ballot comment]
Hi David and Andrei,

Thank you for the effort put into this specification.

I'm clearing my DISCUSS assuming that https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1399/files change will be implemented during AUTH48 of draft-ietf-tls-rfc8446bis.

==Inherited from the COMMENTs in my previous ballot, fwiw===

# FIPS 186-4

## Please add a reference

## s/with FIPS 186-4/with US FIPS 186-4

# TLS Registries

CURRENT:
  IANA is requested to create the following entries in the TLS
  SignatureScheme registry, defined in [RFC8446]. 

Isn’t draft-ietf-tls-rfc8447bis authoritative here for registry matters? I would replace the 8446 citation with draft-ietf-tls-rfc8447bis.

Cheers,
Med

[1] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/dimNOvXqeIaYflBK7s51J43p80U/

[Ballot discuss]
Hi David and Andrei,

Thank you for the effort put into this specification.

Updated the ballot [1] to take into account the feedback received so far (including off-list clarification from Paul; Thanks).

The only pending point is:

# Update RFC8446/RFC8446bis

The provisions in this draft relax what used to be disallowed in 8446/8446bis. This reads like an update.

Specifically, this part from RFC8446bis:

and

  In addition, the signature algorithm MUST be compatible with the key
  in the sender's end-entity certificate.  RSA signatures MUST use an
  RSASSA-PSS algorithm, regardless of whether RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5
  algorithms appear in "signature_algorithms".

[Ballot comment]
# FIPS 186-4

## Please add a reference

## s/with FIPS 186-4/with US FIPS 186-4

# TLS Registries

CURRENT:
  IANA is requested to create the following entries in the TLS
  SignatureScheme registry, defined in [RFC8446]. 

Isn’t draft-ietf-tls-rfc8447bis authoritative here for registry matters? I would replace the 8446 citation with draft-ietf-tls-rfc8447bis.

Cheers,
Med

[1] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/dimNOvXqeIaYflBK7s51J43p80U/

[Ballot discuss]
Hi David and Andrei,

Thank you for the effort put into this specification.

Please find some points for DISCUSSion:

# draft-ietf-tls-rfc8447bis says the following:

  N:  Indicates that the item has not been evaluated by the IETF and
      that the IETF has made no statement about the suitability of the
      associated mechanism.  This does not necessarily mean that the
      mechanism is flawed, only that no consensus exists.  The IETF
      might have consensus to leave an items marked as "N" on the basis
      of its having limited applicability or usage constraints.

  D:  Indicates that the item is discouraged.  This marking could be
      used to identify mechanisms that might result in problems if they
      are used, such as a weak cryptographic algorithm or a mechanism
      that might cause interoperability problems in deployment.  When
      marking a registry entry as “D”, either the References or the
      Comments Column MUST include sufficient information to determine
      why the marking has been applied.  Implementers and users SHOULD
      consult the linked references associated with the item to
      determine the conditions under which the item SHOULD NOT or MUST
      NOT be used.


Also, draft-ietf-tls-rfc8446bis has the following:

  Legacy algorithms:  Indicates algorithms which are being deprecated
      because they use algorithms with known weaknesses, specifically
      SHA-1 which is used in this context with either (1) RSA using
      RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 or (2) ECDSA.  These values refer solely to
      signatures which appear in certificates (see Section 4.4.2.2) and
      are not defined for use in signed TLS handshake messages, although
      they MAY appear in "signature_algorithms" and
      "signature_algorithms_cert" for backward compatibility with TLS
      1.2.  Endpoints SHOULD NOT negotiate these algorithms but are
      permitted to do so solely for backward compatibility.

Given there was a design choice to remove support in 8446/8446 bis and reading of the above definitions, it seems that we are more on the D side than the N side.

# Update RFC8446/RFC8446bis

The provisions in this draft relax what used to be disallowed in 8446/8446bis. This reads like an update.

Specifically,

  RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 algorithms:  Indicates a signature algorithm using
      RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 [RFC8017] with the corresponding hash algorithm
      as defined in [SHS].  These values refer solely to signatures
      which appear in certificates (see Section 4.4.2.2) and are not
      defined for use in signed TLS handshake messages, although they
      MAY appear in "signature_algorithms" and
      "signature_algorithms_cert" for backward compatibility with TLS
      1.2.

and

  In addition, the signature algorithm MUST be compatible with the key
  in the sender's end-entity certificate.  RSA signatures MUST use an
  RSASSA-PSS algorithm, regardless of whether RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5
  algorithms appear in "signature_algorithms".

[Ballot comment]
# Clear applicability Scope

I think that a clear/dedicated section to LOUDLY describe the applicability scope is needed here.

# FIPS 186-4

## Please add a reference

## s/with FIPS 186-4/with US FIPS 186-4

# Default

CURRENT:
  TLS implementations SHOULD disable these code points by default.  See
  Section 4.

## Wouldn’t MUST be appropriate here?

## Which part of Section 4 is relevant to this point? I failed to see the logic for that reference.

# TLS Registries

CURRENT:
  IANA is requested to create the following entries in the TLS
  SignatureScheme registry, defined in [RFC8446]. 

Isn’t draft-ietf-tls-rfc8447bis authoritative here for registry matters? I would replace the 8446 citation with draft-ietf-tls-rfc8447bis.

Cheers,
Med

[Ballot comment]
I've previously reviewed this document, and the changes are minor. It looks like a solid solution for these devices. I believe "N" is an appropriate value since that indicates the value "either has not been through the IETF consensus process, has limited applicability, or is intended only for specific use cases" -- this document clearly describes why, despite having IETF consensus, it falls into the latter two buckets.

However, it does seem clear that this document modifies restrictions in RFC8446(bis). While it defines new codepoints with differing behavior for the SignatureScheme enum and thus isn't changing the definition of those codepoints, it is modifying the requirement in CertificateVerify handling that `RSA signatures MUST use an RSASSA-PSS algorithm, regardless of whether RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 algorithms appear in "signature_algorithms".`

[Ballot comment]
Thanks to Rifaat Shekh-Yusef for their secdir review.

This specification needs to be PS so that TLS server implementations will modify their TLS offerings where client authentication is necessary.  The same situation is true for 'N' vs 'D'.

This specification allow clients using hardware storage devices (TPMs, Secure Elements, etc.) to migrate to TLS 1.3.

I support those positions.

[Ballot discuss]
Hi David and Andrei,

Thank you for the effort put into this specification.

Please find some points for DISCUSSion:

# PS for a non-recommended scheme?

CURRENT:
  The "Recommended" column should be set to "N"

I understand this is addressing a specific deployment case. I also understand that some interoperability is needed here to follow the guidance in the document. Still, this is about non-recommended scheme. Any reason why are we publishing this as PS?

# draft-ietf-tls-rfc8447bis says the following:

  N:  Indicates that the item has not been evaluated by the IETF and
      that the IETF has made no statement about the suitability of the
      associated mechanism.  This does not necessarily mean that the
      mechanism is flawed, only that no consensus exists.  The IETF
      might have consensus to leave an items marked as "N" on the basis
      of its having limited applicability or usage constraints.

  D:  Indicates that the item is discouraged.  This marking could be
      used to identify mechanisms that might result in problems if they
      are used, such as a weak cryptographic algorithm or a mechanism
      that might cause interoperability problems in deployment.  When
      marking a registry entry as “D”, either the References or the
      Comments Column MUST include sufficient information to determine
      why the marking has been applied.  Implementers and users SHOULD
      consult the linked references associated with the item to
      determine the conditions under which the item SHOULD NOT or MUST
      NOT be used.

Given there was a design choice to remove support in 8446/8446 bis and reading of the above definitions, it seems that we are more on the D side than the N side.

# Clear applicability Scope

I think that a clear/dedicated section to LOUDLY describe the applicability scope is needed here.

# Update RFC8446/RFC8446bis

The provisions in this draft relax what used to be disallowed in 8446/8446bis. This reads like an update.

[Ballot comment]
# FIPS 186-4

## Please add a reference

## s/with FIPS 186-4/with US FIPS 186-4

# Default

CURRENT:
  TLS implementations SHOULD disable these code points by default.  See
  Section 4.

## Wouldn’t MUST be appropriate here?

## Which part of Section 4 is relevant to this point? I failed to see the logic for that reference.

# TLS Registries

CURRENT:
  IANA is requested to create the following entries in the TLS
  SignatureScheme registry, defined in [RFC8446]. 

Isn’t draft-ietf-tls-rfc8447bis authoritative here for registry matters? I would replace the 8446 citation with draft-ietf-tls-rfc8447bis.

Cheers,
Med

IESG/Authors/WG Chairs:

IANA has completed its review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13-pkcs1-06. If any part of this review is inaccurate, please let us know.

IANA understands that, upon approval of this document, there is a single action which we must complete.

In the TLS SignatureScheme registry in the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Parameters registry group located at:

https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/

three early registrations will have their references changed to [ RFC-to-be ] as follows:

Value: 0x0420
Description: rsa_pkcs1_sha256_legacy
Recommended: N
Reference: [ RFC-to-be ]
Comment:

Value: 0x0520
Description: rsa_pkcs1_sha384_legacy
Recommended: N
Reference: [ RFC-to-be ]
Comment:

Value: 0x0620
Description: rsa_pkcs1_sha512_legacy
Recommended: N
Reference: [ RFC-to-be ]
Comment:

We understand that this is the only action required to be completed upon approval of this document.

NOTE: The action requested in this document will not be completed until the document has been approved for publication as an RFC. This message is meant only to confirm the action that will be performed.

For definitions of IANA review states, please see:

https://datatracker.ietf.org/help/state/draft/iana-review

Thank you,

David Dong
IANA Services Sr. Specialist

The following Last Call announcement was sent out (ends 2025-10-10):

From: The IESG
To: IETF-Announce
CC: draft-ietf-tls-tls13-pkcs1@ietf.org, paul.wouters@aiven.io, sean@sn3rd.com, tls-chairs@ietf.org, tls@ietf.org
Reply-To: last-call@ietf.org
Sender:
Subject: Last Call:  (Legacy RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 codepoints for TLS 1.3) to Proposed Standard


The IESG has received a request from the Transport Layer Security WG (tls) to
consider the following document: - 'Legacy RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 codepoints for
TLS 1.3'
  as Proposed Standard

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final
comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
last-call@ietf.org mailing lists by 2025-10-10. Exceptionally, comments may
be sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the beginning
of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract


  This document allocates code points for the use of RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5
  with client certificates in TLS 1.3.  This removes an obstacle for
  some deployments to migrate to TLS 1.3.


The file can be obtained via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-pkcs1/



No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.

## Document History

1. Does the working group (WG) consensus represent the strong concurrence of a
  few individuals, with others being silent, or did it reach broad agreement?

There was broad agreement to adopt this I-D; when we used to show of hands tool, there were roughly 40 people in favor of adopting the I-D.  As far as WGLC participation goes, there were only a few people who spoke up despite numerous requests for additional signs of support; however, I am comfortable progressing this to the AD (and IESG).

2. Was there controversy about particular points, or were there decisions where
  the consensus was particularly rough?

The biggest point of controversy, if you want to call it that, is whether to adopt the I-D at all. I am pretty sure that after ripping RSA signatures out of TLS 1.3 nobody wanted to add them back. In fact, I seem to remember groans as this I-D was presented at IETF 118, but people understood and accepted the reality of the situation as discussed in the I-D.

3. Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme discontent? If
  so, please summarize the areas of conflict in separate email messages to the
  responsible Area Director. (It should be in a separate email because this
  questionnaire is publicly available.)

There has been no threat of appeal.

4. For protocol documents, are there existing implementations of the contents of
  the document? Have a significant number of potential implementers indicated
  plans to implement? Are any existing implementations reported somewhere,
  either in the document itself (as [RFC 7942][3] recommends) or elsewhere
  (where)?

Implementations: Chromium/BoringSSL and Edge browsers; Web server: IIS/HTTP.SYS; HTTP client libraries WinInet, WinHTTP, .NET.

## Additional Reviews

5. Do the contents of this document closely interact with technologies in other
  IETF working groups or external organizations, and would it therefore benefit
  from their review? Have those reviews occurred? If yes, describe which
  reviews took place.

No.

6. Describe how the document meets any required formal expert review criteria,
  such as the MIB Doctor, YANG Doctor, media type, and URI type reviews.

N/A

7. If the document contains a YANG module, has the final version of the module
  been checked with any of the [recommended validation tools][4] for syntax and
  formatting validation? If there are any resulting errors or warnings, what is
  the justification for not fixing them at this time? Does the YANG module
  comply with the Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA) as specified
  in [RFC 8342][5]?

N/A

8. Describe reviews and automated checks performed to validate sections of the
  final version of the document written in a formal language, such as XML code,
  BNF rules, MIB definitions, CBOR's CDDL, etc.

N/A

## Document Shepherd Checks

9. Based on the shepherd's review of the document, is it their opinion that this
  document is needed, clearly written, complete, correctly designed, and ready
  to be handed off to the responsible Area Director?

Yes this I-D is well baked.  Frankly, there’s not much to cipher suite I-Ds.

10. Several IETF Areas have assembled [lists of common issues that their
reviewers encounter][6]. For which areas have such issues been identified
and addressed? For which does this still need to happen in subsequent
reviews?

ART N/A
INT N/A
OPS N/A
RTG N/A
SEC -> Always worth another set of eyes!
TSV N/A

11. What type of RFC publication is being requested on the IETF stream ([Best
Current Practice][12], [Proposed Standard, Internet Standard][13],
[Informational, Experimental or Historic][14])? Why is this the proper type
of RFC? Do all Datatracker state attributes correctly reflect this intent?

The Standards track was chosen because we are putting an algorithm back that was purposely removed from TLS 1.3.  Could it have gone informational … maybe.

12. Have reasonable efforts been made to remind all authors of the intellectual
property rights (IPR) disclosure obligations described in [BCP 79][7]? To
the best of your knowledge, have all required disclosures been filed? If
not, explain why. If yes, summarize any relevant discussion, including links
to publicly-available messages when applicable.

The Shepherd has confirmed that the authors have made all the necessary disclosures.

13. Has each author, editor, and contributor shown their willingness to be
listed as such? If the total number of authors and editors on the front page
is greater than five, please provide a justification.

The authors have acknowledged their willingness to be listed as authors.

14. Document any remaining I-D nits in this document. Simply running the [idnits
tool][8] is not enough; please review the ["Content Guidelines" on
authors.ietf.org][15]. (Also note that the current idnits tool generates
some incorrect warnings; a rewrite is underway.)

I-D nits complains about possible DOWNREFs for 5 of the normative references. One is to a NIST FIPS Pub, 2 are to TCG standards, and one is to an ITU IS - these are all fine. One potential DOWNREF is to RFC 8017, but it is already in the DOWNREF registry.

15. Should any informative references be normative or vice-versa? See the [IESG
Statement on Normative and Informative References][16].

No.

16. List any normative references that are not freely available to anyone. Did
the community have sufficient access to review any such normative
references?

N/A

17. Are there any normative downward references (see [RFC 3967][9] and [BCP
97][10]) that are not already listed in the [DOWNREF registry][17]? If so,
list them.

N/A

18. Are there normative references to documents that are not ready to be
submitted to the IESG for publication or are otherwise in an unclear state?
If so, what is the plan for their completion?

No.

19. Will publication of this document change the status of any existing RFCs? If
so, does the Datatracker metadata correctly reflect this and are those RFCs
listed on the title page, in the abstract, and discussed in the
introduction? If not, explain why and point to the part of the document
where the relationship of this document to these other RFCs is discussed.

No.

20. Describe the document shepherd's review of the IANA considerations section,
especially with regard to its consistency with the body of the document.
Confirm that all aspects of the document requiring IANA assignments are
associated with the appropriate reservations in IANA registries. Confirm
that any referenced IANA registries have been clearly identified. Confirm
that each newly created IANA registry specifies its initial contents,
allocations procedures, and a reasonable name (see [RFC 8126][11]).

As Shepherd, I specifically asked on the list whether the Recommended column should be “N” or “D”. The consensus was that it be “N”, as it is in the I-D.

21. List any new IANA registries that require Designated Expert Review for
future allocations. Are the instructions to the Designated Expert clear?
Please include suggestions of designated experts, if appropriate.

N/A

[1]: https://www.ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/
[2]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4858.html
[3]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7942.html
[4]: https://wiki.ietf.org/group/ops/yang-review-tools
[5]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8342.html
[6]: https://wiki.ietf.org/group/iesg/ExpertTopics
[7]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp79
[8]: https://www.ietf.org/tools/idnits/
[9]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3967.html
[10]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp97
[11]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8126.html
[12]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2026.html#section-5
[13]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2026.html#section-4.1
[14]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2026.html#section-4.2
[15]: https://authors.ietf.org/en/content-guidelines-overview
[16]: https://www.ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/statements/normative-informative-references/
[17]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/downref/

## Document History

1. Does the working group (WG) consensus represent the strong concurrence of a
  few individuals, with others being silent, or did it reach broad agreement?

There was broad agreement to adopt this I-D; when we used to show of hands tool, there were roughly 40 people in favor of adopting the I-D.  As far as WGLC participation goes, there were only a few people who spoke up despite numerous requests for additional signs of support; however, I am comfortable progressing this to the AD (and IESG).

2. Was there controversy about particular points, or were there decisions where
  the consensus was particularly rough?

The biggest point of controversy, if you want to call it that, is whether to adopt the I-D at all. I am pretty sure that after ripping RSA signatures out of TLS 1.3 nobody wanted to add them back. In fact, I seem to remember groans as this I-D was presented at IETF 118, but people understood and accepted the reality of the situation as discussed in the I-D.

3. Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme discontent? If
  so, please summarize the areas of conflict in separate email messages to the
  responsible Area Director. (It should be in a separate email because this
  questionnaire is publicly available.)

There has been no threat of appeal.

4. For protocol documents, are there existing implementations of the contents of
  the document? Have a significant number of potential implementers indicated
  plans to implement? Are any existing implementations reported somewhere,
  either in the document itself (as [RFC 7942][3] recommends) or elsewhere
  (where)?

Implementations: Chromium/BoringSSL and Edge browsers; Web server: IIS/HTTP.SYS; HTTP client libraries WinInet, WinHTTP, .NET.

## Additional Reviews

5. Do the contents of this document closely interact with technologies in other
  IETF working groups or external organizations, and would it therefore benefit
  from their review? Have those reviews occurred? If yes, describe which
  reviews took place.

No.

6. Describe how the document meets any required formal expert review criteria,
  such as the MIB Doctor, YANG Doctor, media type, and URI type reviews.

N/A

7. If the document contains a YANG module, has the final version of the module
  been checked with any of the [recommended validation tools][4] for syntax and
  formatting validation? If there are any resulting errors or warnings, what is
  the justification for not fixing them at this time? Does the YANG module
  comply with the Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA) as specified
  in [RFC 8342][5]?

N/A

8. Describe reviews and automated checks performed to validate sections of the
  final version of the document written in a formal language, such as XML code,
  BNF rules, MIB definitions, CBOR's CDDL, etc.

N/A

## Document Shepherd Checks

9. Based on the shepherd's review of the document, is it their opinion that this
  document is needed, clearly written, complete, correctly designed, and ready
  to be handed off to the responsible Area Director?

Yes this I-D is well baked.  Frankly, there’s not much to cipher suite I-Ds.

10. Several IETF Areas have assembled [lists of common issues that their
reviewers encounter][6]. For which areas have such issues been identified
and addressed? For which does this still need to happen in subsequent
reviews?

ART N/A
INT N/A
OPS N/A
RTG N/A
SEC -> Always worth another set of eyes!
TSV N/A

11. What type of RFC publication is being requested on the IETF stream ([Best
Current Practice][12], [Proposed Standard, Internet Standard][13],
[Informational, Experimental or Historic][14])? Why is this the proper type
of RFC? Do all Datatracker state attributes correctly reflect this intent?

The Standards track was chosen because we are putting an algorithm back that was purposely removed from TLS 1.3.  Could it have gone informational … maybe.

12. Have reasonable efforts been made to remind all authors of the intellectual
property rights (IPR) disclosure obligations described in [BCP 79][7]? To
the best of your knowledge, have all required disclosures been filed? If
not, explain why. If yes, summarize any relevant discussion, including links
to publicly-available messages when applicable.

The Shepherd has confirmed that the authors have made all the necessary disclosures.

13. Has each author, editor, and contributor shown their willingness to be
listed as such? If the total number of authors and editors on the front page
is greater than five, please provide a justification.

The authors have acknowledged their willingness to be listed as authors.

14. Document any remaining I-D nits in this document. Simply running the [idnits
tool][8] is not enough; please review the ["Content Guidelines" on
authors.ietf.org][15]. (Also note that the current idnits tool generates
some incorrect warnings; a rewrite is underway.)

I-D nits complains about possible DOWNREFs for 5 of the normative references. One is to a NIST FIPS Pub, 2 are to TCG standards, and one is to an ITU IS - these are all fine. One potential DOWNREF is to RFC 8017, but it is already in the DOWNREF registry.

15. Should any informative references be normative or vice-versa? See the [IESG
Statement on Normative and Informative References][16].

No.

16. List any normative references that are not freely available to anyone. Did
the community have sufficient access to review any such normative
references?

N/A

17. Are there any normative downward references (see [RFC 3967][9] and [BCP
97][10]) that are not already listed in the [DOWNREF registry][17]? If so,
list them.

N/A

18. Are there normative references to documents that are not ready to be
submitted to the IESG for publication or are otherwise in an unclear state?
If so, what is the plan for their completion?

No.

19. Will publication of this document change the status of any existing RFCs? If
so, does the Datatracker metadata correctly reflect this and are those RFCs
listed on the title page, in the abstract, and discussed in the
introduction? If not, explain why and point to the part of the document
where the relationship of this document to these other RFCs is discussed.

No.

20. Describe the document shepherd's review of the IANA considerations section,
especially with regard to its consistency with the body of the document.
Confirm that all aspects of the document requiring IANA assignments are
associated with the appropriate reservations in IANA registries. Confirm
that any referenced IANA registries have been clearly identified. Confirm
that each newly created IANA registry specifies its initial contents,
allocations procedures, and a reasonable name (see [RFC 8126][11]).

As Shepherd, I specifically asked on the list whether the Recommended column should be “N” or “D”. The consensus was that it be “N”, as it is in the I-D.

21. List any new IANA registries that require Designated Expert Review for
future allocations. Are the instructions to the Designated Expert clear?
Please include suggestions of designated experts, if appropriate.

N/A

[1]: https://www.ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/
[2]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4858.html
[3]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7942.html
[4]: https://wiki.ietf.org/group/ops/yang-review-tools
[5]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8342.html
[6]: https://wiki.ietf.org/group/iesg/ExpertTopics
[7]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp79
[8]: https://www.ietf.org/tools/idnits/
[9]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3967.html
[10]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp97
[11]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8126.html
[12]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2026.html#section-5
[13]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2026.html#section-4.1
[14]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2026.html#section-4.2
[15]: https://authors.ietf.org/en/content-guidelines-overview
[16]: https://www.ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/statements/normative-informative-references/
[17]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/downref/

## Document History

1. Does the working group (WG) consensus represent the strong concurrence of a
  few individuals, with others being silent, or did it reach broad agreement?

There was broad agreement to adopt this I-D; when we used to show of hands tool, there were roughly 40 people in favor of adopting the I-D.  As far as WGLC participation goes, there were only a few people who spoke up despite numerous requests for additional signs of support; however, I am comfortable progressing this to the AD (and IESG).

2. Was there controversy about particular points, or were there decisions where
  the consensus was particularly rough?

The biggest point of controversy, if you want to call it that, is whether to adopt the I-D at all. I am pretty sure that after ripping RSA signatures out of TLS 1.3 nobody wanted to add them back. In fact, I seem to remember groans as this I-D was presented at IETF 118, but people understood and accepted the reality of the situation as discussed in the I-D.

3. Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme discontent? If
  so, please summarize the areas of conflict in separate email messages to the
  responsible Area Director. (It should be in a separate email because this
  questionnaire is publicly available.)

There has been no threat of appeal.

4. For protocol documents, are there existing implementations of the contents of
  the document? Have a significant number of potential implementers indicated
  plans to implement? Are any existing implementations reported somewhere,
  either in the document itself (as [RFC 7942][3] recommends) or elsewhere
  (where)?

Implementations: Edge browsers; Web server: IIS/HTTP.SYS; HTTP client libraries WinInet, WinHTTP, .NET.

Chromium and BoringSSL; see: https://issues.chromium.org/347047841.

## Additional Reviews

5. Do the contents of this document closely interact with technologies in other
  IETF working groups or external organizations, and would it therefore benefit
  from their review? Have those reviews occurred? If yes, describe which
  reviews took place.

No.

6. Describe how the document meets any required formal expert review criteria,
  such as the MIB Doctor, YANG Doctor, media type, and URI type reviews.

N/A

7. If the document contains a YANG module, has the final version of the module
  been checked with any of the [recommended validation tools][4] for syntax and
  formatting validation? If there are any resulting errors or warnings, what is
  the justification for not fixing them at this time? Does the YANG module
  comply with the Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA) as specified
  in [RFC 8342][5]?

N/A

8. Describe reviews and automated checks performed to validate sections of the
  final version of the document written in a formal language, such as XML code,
  BNF rules, MIB definitions, CBOR's CDDL, etc.

N/A

## Document Shepherd Checks

9. Based on the shepherd's review of the document, is it their opinion that this
  document is needed, clearly written, complete, correctly designed, and ready
  to be handed off to the responsible Area Director?

Yes this I-D is well baked.  Frankly, there’s not much to cipher suite I-Ds.

10. Several IETF Areas have assembled [lists of common issues that their
reviewers encounter][6]. For which areas have such issues been identified
and addressed? For which does this still need to happen in subsequent
reviews?

ART N/A
INT N/A
OPS N/A
RTG N/A
SEC -> Always worth another set of eyes!
TSV N/A

11. What type of RFC publication is being requested on the IETF stream ([Best
Current Practice][12], [Proposed Standard, Internet Standard][13],
[Informational, Experimental or Historic][14])? Why is this the proper type
of RFC? Do all Datatracker state attributes correctly reflect this intent?

The Standards track was chosen because we are putting an algorithm back that was purposely removed from TLS 1.3.  Could it have gone informational … maybe.

12. Have reasonable efforts been made to remind all authors of the intellectual
property rights (IPR) disclosure obligations described in [BCP 79][7]? To
the best of your knowledge, have all required disclosures been filed? If
not, explain why. If yes, summarize any relevant discussion, including links
to publicly-available messages when applicable.

The Shepherd has confirmed that the authors have made all the necessary disclosures.

13. Has each author, editor, and contributor shown their willingness to be
listed as such? If the total number of authors and editors on the front page
is greater than five, please provide a justification.

The authors have acknowledged their willingness to be listed as authors.

14. Document any remaining I-D nits in this document. Simply running the [idnits
tool][8] is not enough; please review the ["Content Guidelines" on
authors.ietf.org][15]. (Also note that the current idnits tool generates
some incorrect warnings; a rewrite is underway.)

I-D nits complains about possible DOWNREFs for 5 of the normative references. One is to a NIST FIPS Pub, 2 are to TCG standards, and one is to an ITU IS - these are all fine. One potential DOWNREF is to RFC 8017, but it is already in the DOWNREF registry.

15. Should any informative references be normative or vice-versa? See the [IESG
Statement on Normative and Informative References][16].

No.

16. List any normative references that are not freely available to anyone. Did
the community have sufficient access to review any such normative
references?

N/A

17. Are there any normative downward references (see [RFC 3967][9] and [BCP
97][10]) that are not already listed in the [DOWNREF registry][17]? If so,
list them.

N/A

18. Are there normative references to documents that are not ready to be
submitted to the IESG for publication or are otherwise in an unclear state?
If so, what is the plan for their completion?

No.

19. Will publication of this document change the status of any existing RFCs? If
so, does the Datatracker metadata correctly reflect this and are those RFCs
listed on the title page, in the abstract, and discussed in the
introduction? If not, explain why and point to the part of the document
where the relationship of this document to these other RFCs is discussed.

No.

20. Describe the document shepherd's review of the IANA considerations section,
especially with regard to its consistency with the body of the document.
Confirm that all aspects of the document requiring IANA assignments are
associated with the appropriate reservations in IANA registries. Confirm
that any referenced IANA registries have been clearly identified. Confirm
that each newly created IANA registry specifies its initial contents,
allocations procedures, and a reasonable name (see [RFC 8126][11]).

As Shepherd, I specifically asked on the list whether the Recommended column should be “N” or “D”. The consensus was that it be “N”, as it is in the I-D.

21. List any new IANA registries that require Designated Expert Review for
future allocations. Are the instructions to the Designated Expert clear?
Please include suggestions of designated experts, if appropriate.

N/A

[1]: https://www.ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/
[2]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4858.html
[3]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7942.html
[4]: https://wiki.ietf.org/group/ops/yang-review-tools
[5]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8342.html
[6]: https://wiki.ietf.org/group/iesg/ExpertTopics
[7]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp79
[8]: https://www.ietf.org/tools/idnits/
[9]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3967.html
[10]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp97
[11]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8126.html
[12]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2026.html#section-5
[13]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2026.html#section-4.1
[14]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2026.html#section-4.2
[15]: https://authors.ietf.org/en/content-guidelines-overview
[16]: https://www.ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/statements/normative-informative-references/
[17]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/downref/

## Document History

1. Does the working group (WG) consensus represent the strong concurrence of a
  few individuals, with others being silent, or did it reach broad agreement?

There was broad agreement to adopt this I-D; when we used to show of hands tool, there were roughly 40 people in favor of adopting the I-D.  As far as WGLC participation goes, there were only a few people who spoke up despite numerous requests for additional signs of support. I am comfortable progressing this to the AD (and IESG) because cipher suite I-Ds do not usually generate lots of interest; also, see #2.

2. Was there controversy about particular points, or were there decisions where
  the consensus was particularly rough?

The biggest point of controversy, if you want to call it that, is whether to adopt the I-D at all. I am pretty sure that after ripping RSA signatures out of TLS1.3 nobody wanted to add it back. In fact, I seem to remember groans as this I-D was presented at IETF 118, but people understood and accepted the reality of the situation as discussed in the I-D.

3. Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme discontent? If
  so, please summarize the areas of conflict in separate email messages to the
  responsible Area Director. (It should be in a separate email because this
  questionnaire is publicly available.)

There has been no threat of appeal.

4. For protocol documents, are there existing implementations of the contents of
  the document? Have a significant number of potential implementers indicated
  plans to implement? Are any existing implementations reported somewhere,
  either in the document itself (as [RFC 7942][3] recommends) or elsewhere
  (where)?

Implementations: Edge browsers; Web server: IIS/HTTP.SYS; HTTP client libraries WinInet, WinHTTP, .NET.

Soon to be in Chromium and BoringSSL. Chromium and BoringSSL; see: https://issues.chromium.org/347047841.

## Additional Reviews

5. Do the contents of this document closely interact with technologies in other
  IETF working groups or external organizations, and would it therefore benefit
  from their review? Have those reviews occurred? If yes, describe which
  reviews took place.

No.

6. Describe how the document meets any required formal expert review criteria,
  such as the MIB Doctor, YANG Doctor, media type, and URI type reviews.

N/A

7. If the document contains a YANG module, has the final version of the module
  been checked with any of the [recommended validation tools][4] for syntax and
  formatting validation? If there are any resulting errors or warnings, what is
  the justification for not fixing them at this time? Does the YANG module
  comply with the Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA) as specified
  in [RFC 8342][5]?

N/A

8. Describe reviews and automated checks performed to validate sections of the
  final version of the document written in a formal language, such as XML code,
  BNF rules, MIB definitions, CBOR's CDDL, etc.

N/A

## Document Shepherd Checks

9. Based on the shepherd's review of the document, is it their opinion that this
  document is needed, clearly written, complete, correctly designed, and ready
  to be handed off to the responsible Area Director?

Yes this I-D is well baked.  Frankly, there’s not much to cipher suite I-Ds.

10. Several IETF Areas have assembled [lists of common issues that their
reviewers encounter][6]. For which areas have such issues been identified
and addressed? For which does this still need to happen in subsequent
reviews?

ART N/A
INT N/A
OPS N/A
RTG N/A
SEC -> Always worth another set of eyes!
TSV N/A

11. What type of RFC publication is being requested on the IETF stream ([Best
Current Practice][12], [Proposed Standard, Internet Standard][13],
[Informational, Experimental or Historic][14])? Why is this the proper type
of RFC? Do all Datatracker state attributes correctly reflect this intent?

The Standards track was chosen because we are putting an algorithm back that was purposely removed from TLS 1.3.  Could it have gone informational … maybe.

12. Have reasonable efforts been made to remind all authors of the intellectual
property rights (IPR) disclosure obligations described in [BCP 79][7]? To
the best of your knowledge, have all required disclosures been filed? If
not, explain why. If yes, summarize any relevant discussion, including links
to publicly-available messages when applicable.

The Shepherd has confirmed that the authors have made all the necessary disclosures.

13. Has each author, editor, and contributor shown their willingness to be
listed as such? If the total number of authors and editors on the front page
is greater than five, please provide a justification.

The authors have acknowledged their willingness to be listed as authors.

14. Document any remaining I-D nits in this document. Simply running the [idnits
tool][8] is not enough; please review the ["Content Guidelines" on
authors.ietf.org][15]. (Also note that the current idnits tool generates
some incorrect warnings; a rewrite is underway.)

I-D nits complains about possible DOWNREFs for 4 of the normative references. One is to a NIST FIPS Pub, 2 are to TCGs standards, and one is to an ITU IS - these are fine.

15. Should any informative references be normative or vice-versa? See the [IESG
Statement on Normative and Informative References][16].

No.

16. List any normative references that are not freely available to anyone. Did
the community have sufficient access to review any such normative
references?

N/A

17. Are there any normative downward references (see [RFC 3967][9] and [BCP
97][10]) that are not already listed in the [DOWNREF registry][17]? If so,
list them.

N/A

18. Are there normative references to documents that are not ready to be
submitted to the IESG for publication or are otherwise in an unclear state?
If so, what is the plan for their completion?

No.

19. Will publication of this document change the status of any existing RFCs? If
so, does the Datatracker metadata correctly reflect this and are those RFCs
listed on the title page, in the abstract, and discussed in the
introduction? If not, explain why and point to the part of the document
where the relationship of this document to these other RFCs is discussed.

No.

20. Describe the document shepherd's review of the IANA considerations section,
especially with regard to its consistency with the body of the document.
Confirm that all aspects of the document requiring IANA assignments are
associated with the appropriate reservations in IANA registries. Confirm
that any referenced IANA registries have been clearly identified. Confirm
that each newly created IANA registry specifies its initial contents,
allocations procedures, and a reasonable name (see [RFC 8126][11]).

As Shepherd, I specifically asked on the list whether the Recommended column should be “N” or “D”. The consensus was that it be “N”, as it is in the I-D.

Based on the above, it is fine that this I-D pop out before draft-ietf-tls-rfc8447bis because “N” for the Recommended column already appears in RFC 8447.  In other words, there’s no need to make the cluster bigger.

21. List any new IANA registries that require Designated Expert Review for
future allocations. Are the instructions to the Designated Expert clear?
Please include suggestions of designated experts, if appropriate.

N/A

[1]: https://www.ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/
[2]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4858.html
[3]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7942.html
[4]: https://wiki.ietf.org/group/ops/yang-review-tools
[5]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8342.html
[6]: https://wiki.ietf.org/group/iesg/ExpertTopics
[7]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp79
[8]: https://www.ietf.org/tools/idnits/
[9]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3967.html
[10]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp97
[11]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8126.html
[12]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2026.html#section-5
[13]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2026.html#section-4.1
[14]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2026.html#section-4.2
[15]: https://authors.ietf.org/en/content-guidelines-overview
[16]: https://www.ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/statements/normative-informative-references/
[17]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/downref/

Need to send this to the formal analysis triage team (FATT). Currently -8773bis and -rrc are in front of this specification.  Will update this note as we move along.

## Document History

1. Does the working group (WG) consensus represent the strong concurrence of a
  few individuals, with others being silent, or did it reach broad agreement?

There was broad agreement to adopt this I-D; when we used to show of hands tool, there were roughly 40 people in favor of adopting the I-D.  As far as WGLC participation goes, there were only a few people who spoke up despite numerous requests for additional signs of support. I am comfortable progressing this to the AD (and IESG) because cipher suite I-Ds do not usually generate lots of interest; also, see #2.

2. Was there controversy about particular points, or were there decisions where
  the consensus was particularly rough?

The biggest point of controversy, if you want to call it that, is whether to adopt the I-D at all. I am pretty sure that after ripping RSA signatures out of TLS1.3 nobody wanted to add it back. In fact, I seem to remember groans as this I-D was presented at IETF 118, but people understood and accepted the reality of the situation as discussed in the I-D.

3. Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme discontent? If
  so, please summarize the areas of conflict in separate email messages to the
  responsible Area Director. (It should be in a separate email because this
  questionnaire is publicly available.)

There has been no threat of appeal.

4. For protocol documents, are there existing implementations of the contents of
  the document? Have a significant number of potential implementers indicated
  plans to implement? Are any existing implementations reported somewhere,
  either in the document itself (as [RFC 7942][3] recommends) or elsewhere
  (where)?

Implementations: Chrome and Edge browsers; Web server: IIS/HTTP.SYS; HTTP client libraries WinInet, WinHTTP, .NET.

## Additional Reviews

5. Do the contents of this document closely interact with technologies in other
  IETF working groups or external organizations, and would it therefore benefit
  from their review? Have those reviews occurred? If yes, describe which
  reviews took place.

No.

6. Describe how the document meets any required formal expert review criteria,
  such as the MIB Doctor, YANG Doctor, media type, and URI type reviews.

N/A

7. If the document contains a YANG module, has the final version of the module
  been checked with any of the [recommended validation tools][4] for syntax and
  formatting validation? If there are any resulting errors or warnings, what is
  the justification for not fixing them at this time? Does the YANG module
  comply with the Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA) as specified
  in [RFC 8342][5]?

N/A

8. Describe reviews and automated checks performed to validate sections of the
  final version of the document written in a formal language, such as XML code,
  BNF rules, MIB definitions, CBOR's CDDL, etc.

N/A

## Document Shepherd Checks

9. Based on the shepherd's review of the document, is it their opinion that this
  document is needed, clearly written, complete, correctly designed, and ready
  to be handed off to the responsible Area Director?

Yes this I-D is well baked.  Frankly, there’s not much to cipher suite I-Ds.

10. Several IETF Areas have assembled [lists of common issues that their
reviewers encounter][6]. For which areas have such issues been identified
and addressed? For which does this still need to happen in subsequent
reviews?

ART N/A
INT N/A
OPS N/A
RTG N/A
SEC -> Always worth another set of eyes!
TSV N/A

11. What type of RFC publication is being requested on the IETF stream ([Best
Current Practice][12], [Proposed Standard, Internet Standard][13],
[Informational, Experimental or Historic][14])? Why is this the proper type
of RFC? Do all Datatracker state attributes correctly reflect this intent?

The Standards track was chosen because we are putting an algorithm back that was purposely removed from TLS 1.3.  Could it have gone informational … maybe.

12. Have reasonable efforts been made to remind all authors of the intellectual
property rights (IPR) disclosure obligations described in [BCP 79][7]? To
the best of your knowledge, have all required disclosures been filed? If
not, explain why. If yes, summarize any relevant discussion, including links
to publicly-available messages when applicable.

The Shepherd has confirmed that the authors have made all the necessary disclosures.

13. Has each author, editor, and contributor shown their willingness to be
listed as such? If the total number of authors and editors on the front page
is greater than five, please provide a justification.

The authors have acknowledged their willingness to be listed as authors.

14. Document any remaining I-D nits in this document. Simply running the [idnits
tool][8] is not enough; please review the ["Content Guidelines" on
authors.ietf.org][15]. (Also note that the current idnits tool generates
some incorrect warnings; a rewrite is underway.)

I-D nits complains about possible DOWNREFs for 4 of the normative references. One is to a NIST FIPS Pub, 2 are to TCGs standards, and one is to an ITU IS - these are fine.

15. Should any informative references be normative or vice-versa? See the [IESG
Statement on Normative and Informative References][16].

No.

16. List any normative references that are not freely available to anyone. Did
the community have sufficient access to review any such normative
references?

N/A

17. Are there any normative downward references (see [RFC 3967][9] and [BCP
97][10]) that are not already listed in the [DOWNREF registry][17]? If so,
list them.

N/A

18. Are there normative references to documents that are not ready to be
submitted to the IESG for publication or are otherwise in an unclear state?
If so, what is the plan for their completion?

No.

19. Will publication of this document change the status of any existing RFCs? If
so, does the Datatracker metadata correctly reflect this and are those RFCs
listed on the title page, in the abstract, and discussed in the
introduction? If not, explain why and point to the part of the document
where the relationship of this document to these other RFCs is discussed.

No.

20. Describe the document shepherd's review of the IANA considerations section,
especially with regard to its consistency with the body of the document.
Confirm that all aspects of the document requiring IANA assignments are
associated with the appropriate reservations in IANA registries. Confirm
that any referenced IANA registries have been clearly identified. Confirm
that each newly created IANA registry specifies its initial contents,
allocations procedures, and a reasonable name (see [RFC 8126][11]).

As Shepherd, I specifically asked on the list whether the Recommended column should be “N” or “D”. The consensus was that it be “N”, as it is in the I-D.

Based on the above, it is fine that this I-D pop out before draft-ietf-tls-rfc8447bis because “N” for the Recommended column already appears in RFC 8447.  In other words, there’s no need to make the cluster bigger.

21. List any new IANA registries that require Designated Expert Review for
future allocations. Are the instructions to the Designated Expert clear?
Please include suggestions of designated experts, if appropriate.

N/A

[1]: https://www.ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/
[2]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4858.html
[3]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7942.html
[4]: https://wiki.ietf.org/group/ops/yang-review-tools
[5]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8342.html
[6]: https://wiki.ietf.org/group/iesg/ExpertTopics
[7]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp79
[8]: https://www.ietf.org/tools/idnits/
[9]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3967.html
[10]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp97
[11]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8126.html
[12]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2026.html#section-5
[13]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2026.html#section-4.1
[14]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2026.html#section-4.2
[15]: https://authors.ietf.org/en/content-guidelines-overview
[16]: https://www.ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/statements/normative-informative-references/
[17]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/downref/