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TRILL: ARP/ND Optimization
draft-ietf-trill-arp-optimization-06

The information below is for an old version of the document.
Document Type
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft that was ultimately published as RFC 8302.
Authors Yizhou Li , Donald E. Eastlake 3rd , Linda Dunbar , Radia Perlman
Last updated 2016-08-24 (Latest revision 2016-04-22)
Replaces draft-yizhou-trill-arp-optimization, draft-trill-trill-arp-optimization
RFC stream Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
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Revised I-D Needed - Issue raised by IESG
Document shepherd Susan Hares
Shepherd write-up Show Last changed 2016-03-17
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Responsible AD Alia Atlas
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IANA IANA review state IANA OK - No Actions Needed
draft-ietf-trill-arp-optimization-06
TRILL Working Group                                                Y. Li
INTERNET-DRAFT                                               D. Eastlake
Intended Status: Standard Track                                L. Dunbar
                                                     Huawei Technologies
                                                              R. Perlman
                                                                     EMC
Expires: October 25, 2016                                 April 23, 2016

                       TRILL: ARP/ND Optimization
                  draft-ietf-trill-arp-optimization-06

Abstract

   This document describes mechanisms to optimize the ARP (Address
   Resolution Protocol) and ND (Neighbor Discovery) traffic in TRILL
   campus. Such optimization reduces packet flooding over a TRILL
   campus.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as
   Internet-Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html

Copyright and License Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors. All rights reserved.

 

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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document. Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2 IP/MAC Address Mappings  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3 Handling ARP/ND Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     3.1 Get Sender's IP/MAC Mapping Information for Non-zero IP  . .  5
     3.2 Determine How to Reply to ARP/ND . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.3 Determine How to Handle the ARP/ND Response  . . . . . . . .  7
   4 Handling RARP (Reverse Address Resolution Protocol) Messages . .  7
   5 Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   6 IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   7 Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   8 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     8.1 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     8.2 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9

 

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1 Introduction

   ARP [RFC826] and ND [RFC4861] are normally sent by broadcast and
   multicast respectively. To reduce the burden on a TRILL campus caused
   by these multi-destination messages, RBridges MAY implement an
   "optimized ARP/ND response", as specified herein, when the target's
   location is known by the ingress RBridge or can be obtained from a
   directory. This avoids ARP/ND query flooding.

1.1  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   [RFC2119].

   The acronyms and terminology in [RFC6325] are used herein. Some of
   these are listed below for convenience  along with some additions:

   APPsub-TLV     Application sub-Type-Length-Values

   ARP            Address Resolution Protocol [RFC826]

   Campus         A TRILL network consisting of RBridges, links, and
   possibly bridges bounded by end stations and IP routers.

   DAD            Duplicate Address Detection

   Data Label     VLAN or FGL

   ESADI          End Station Address Distribution Information [RFC7357]

   FGL            Fine-Grained Label [RFC7172]

   IA             Interface Addresses, a TRILL APPsub-TLV [IA-draft]

   IP             Internet Protocol

   MAC            Media Access Control 

   ND             Neighbor Discovery [RFC4861]

   RBridge        A contraction of "Routing Bridge". A device
   implementing the TRILL protocol.

   SEND           secure neighbor discovery [RFC3971]
 

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   TRILL          Transparent Interconnection of Lots of Links or
   Tunneled Routing in the Link Layer.

2 IP/MAC Address Mappings

   By default, an RBridge [RFC6325] [RFC7172] learns MAC Address and
   Data Label (VLAN or FGL) to egress nickname mapping information from
   TRILL data frames it receives. No IP address information is learned
   directly from the TRILL data frame. Interface Addresses (IA) APPsub-
   TLV [IA-draft] enhances the TRILL base protocol by allowing IP and
   MAC address mappings to be distributed in the control plane by any
   RBridge. This APPsub-TLV appears inside the TRILL GENINFO TLV in
   ESADI [RFC7357] but the value data structure it specifies may also
   occur in other application contexts. Edge Directory Assist Mechanisms
   [DirMech] makes use of this APPsub-TLV for its push model and uses
   the value data structure it specifies in its pull model. 

   An RBridge can easily know the IP/MAC address mappings of the local
   end stations that it is attached to it via its access ports by
   receiving ARP [RFC826] or ND [RFC4861] messages. If the RBridge has
   extracted the sender's IP/MAC address pair from the received data
   packet (either ARP or ND), it MAY save the information and use the IA
   APPsub-TLV to distribute it to other RBridges through ESADI. Then the
   relevant remote RBridges (normally those interested in the same Data
   Label as the original ARP/ND messages) also receive and save such
   mapping information. There are others ways that RBridges save IP/MAC
   address mappings in advance, e.g. import from management system and
   distribution by directory servers [DirMech]. 

   The examples given above show that RBridges might have saved an end
   station's triplet of {IP address, MAC address, ingress nickname} for
   a given Data Label (VLAN or FGL) before that end station sends or
   receives any real data packet. Note such information might or might
   not be a complete list and might or might not exist on all RBridges.
   The information could possibly be from different sources. RBridges
   can then use the Flags Field in IA APPsub-TLV to identify if the
   source is a directory server or local observation by the sender. A
   different confidence level MAY also be used to indicate the
   reliability of the mapping information.  

3 Handling ARP/ND Messages

   A native frame that is an ARP [RFC826] message is detected by its
   Ethertype of 0x0806. A native frame that is an ND [RFC4861] is
   detected by being one of five different ICMPv6 packet types. ARP/ND
   is commonly used on a link to (1) query for the MAC address
 

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   corresponding to an IPv4 or IPv6 address, (2) test if an IPv4/IPv6
   address is already in use, or (3) to announce the new or updated info
   on any of IPv4/IPv6 address, MAC address, and/or point of attachment.
   

   To simplify the text, we use the following terms in this section.

     1) IP address - indicated protocol address that is normally an IPv4
     address in ARP or an IPv6 address in ND.

     2) sender's IP/MAC address - sender IP/MAC address in ARP, source
     IP address and source link-layer address in ND

     3) target's IP/MAC address - target IP/MAC address in ARP, target
     address and target link-layer address in ND 

   When an ingress RBridge receives an ARP/ND message, it can perform
   the steps described in the sub-sections below.

3.1 Get Sender's IP/MAC Mapping Information for Non-zero IP 

   o   If the sender's IP has not been saved by the ingress RBridge
   before, populate the information of sender's IP/MAC in its ARP/ND
   table;

   o   else if the sender's IP has been saved before but with a
   different MAC address mapped or a different ingress nickname
   associated with the same pair of IP/MAC, the RBridge SHOULD verify if
   a duplicate IP address has already been in use or an end station has
   changed its attaching RBridge. The RBridge MAY use different
   strategies to do so. For example, the RBridge might ask an
   authoritative entity like directory servers or it might encapsulate
   and unicast the ARP/ND message to the location where it believes the
   address is in use. RBridge SHOULD update the saved triplet of {IP
   address, MAC address, ingress nickname} based on the verification.

   The ingress RBridge MAY use the IA APPsub-TLV [IA-draft] with the
   Local flag set in ESADI [RFC7357] to distribute any new or updated
   triplet of {IP address, MAC address, ingress nickname} information
   obtained in this step. If a push directory server is used, such
   information can be distributed as per [DirMech].

3.2 Determine How to Reply to ARP/ND

   a) If the message is a generic ARP/ND request and the ingress RBridge
   knows the target's IP address, the ingress RBridge MAY take one or a
   combination of the following actions: 
 

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     a.1. Send an ARP/ND response directly to the querier, with the
     target's MAC address, as known by the ingress RBridge. 

     a.2. Encapsulate the ARP/ND request to the target's Designated
     RBridge, and have the egress RBridge for the target forward the
     query to the target. This behavior has the advantage that a
     response to the request is authoritative. If the request does not
     reach the target, then the querier does not get a response. 

     a.3. Block ARP/ND requests that occur for some time after a request
     to the same target has been launched, and then respond to the
     querier when the response to the recently-launched query to that
     target is received.

     a.4. Pull the most up-to-date records if a pull directory server is
     available [DirMech] and reply to the querier.

     a.5. Flood the request as per [RFC6325].

   b) If the message is a generic ARP request and the ingress RBridge
   does not know target's IP address, the ingress RBridge MAY take one
   of the following actions.

     b.1. Flood the message as per [RFC6325].

     b.2. Use directory server to pull the information [DirMech] and
     reply to the querier.

     b.3. Drop the message.

   c) If the message is a gratuitous ARP which can be identified by the
   same sender's and target's "protocol" address fields or an
   Unsolicited Neighbor Advertisements [RFC4861] in ND:

   The RBridge MAY use an IA APPsub-TLV [IA-draft] with the Local flag
   set to distribute the sender's MAC and IP mapping information. When
   one or more directory servers are deployed and complete Push
   Directory information is used by all the RBridges in the Data Label,
   a gratuitous ARP or unsolicited NA SHOULD be discarded rather than
   ingressed. Otherwise, they are either ingressed and flooded as per
   [RFC6325] or discarded depending on local policy.

   d) If the message is a Address Probe ARP Query [RFC5227] which can be
   identified by the sender's protocol (IPv4) address field being zero
   and the target's protocol address field being the IPv4 address to be
   tested or a Neighbor Solicitation for DAD (Duplicate Address
   Detection) which has the unspecified source address [RFC4862]: it
 

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   SHOULD be handled as the generic ARP message as in a) and b).

   Note that in the case of secure neighbor discovery (SEND) [RFC3971],
   cryptography would prevent local reply by the ingress RBridge, since
   the RBridge would not be able to sign the response with the target's
   private key. 

   It is not essential that all RBridges use the same strategy for which
   option to select for a particular ARP/ND query. It is up to the
   implementation.

3.3 Determine How to Handle the ARP/ND Response

   If the ingress RBridge R1 decides to unicast the ARP/ND request to
   the target's egress RBridge R2 as discussed in subsection 3.2 item a)
   or to flood the request as per [RFC6325], then R2 decapsulates the
   query, and initiates an ARP/ND query on the target's link. When/if
   the target responds, R2 encapsulates and unicasts the response to R1,
   which decapsulates the response and sends it to the querier. R2
   SHOULD initiate a link state update to inform all the other RBridges
   of the target's location, layer 3 address, and layer 2 address, in
   addition to forwarding the reply to the querier. The update message
   can be carried by an IA APPsub-TLV [IA-draft] with the Local flag set
   in ESADI [RFC7357] or as per [DirMech] if push directory server is in
   use.

4 Handling RARP (Reverse Address Resolution Protocol) Messages

   RARP [RFC903] uses the same packet format as ARP but a different
   Ethertype (0x8035) and opcode values. Its use is similar to the
   generic ARP Request/Response as described in 3.2 a) and b).  The
   difference is that it is intended to query for the target "protocol"
   (IP) address corresponding to the target "hardware" (MAC) address
   provided. It SHOULD be handled by doing a local cache or directory
   server lookup on the target "hardware" address provided to find a
   mapping to the desired "protocol" address. Normally, it is used to
   look up a MAC address to find the corresponding IP address.

5 Security Considerations

   ARP and ND messages can be easily forged. Therefore the learning of
   MAC/IP addresses from them should not be considered as reliable.
   RBridge can use the confidence level in IA APPsub-TLV information
   received via ESADI or pull directory retrievals to determine the
   reliability of MAC/IP address mapping. ESADI information can be
   secured as provide in [RFC7357] and pull directory information can be
   secured as provide in [DirMech]. The implementation decides if an
 

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   RBridge will distribute the IP and MAC address mappings received from
   local native ARP/ND messages to other RBridges in the same Data
   Label.

   The ingress RBridge SHOULD also rate limit the ARP/ND queries for the
   same target to be injected into the TRILL campus to prevent possible
   denial of service attacks.

6 IANA Considerations

   No IANA action is required. RFC Editor: please delete this section
   before publication.

7 Acknowledgments

   The authors would like to thank Igor Gashinsky for his contributions.

8 References

8.1 Normative References

   [RFC826]  Plummer, D., "An Ethernet Address Resolution Protocol", RFC
              826, November 1982.

   [RFC903]  Finlayson, R., Mann, T., Mogul, J., and M. Theimer, "A
              Reverse Address Resolution Protocol", STD 38, RFC 903,
              June 1984

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC4861]  Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,
              "Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861,
              September 2007.

   [RFC4862]  Thomson, S., Narten, T., and T. Jinmei, "IPv6 Stateless
              Address Autoconfiguration", RFC 4862, September 2007.

   [RFC6325]  Perlman, R., et.al. "RBridge: Base Protocol
              Specification", RFC 6325, July 2011.

   [RFC7172] Eastlake 3rd, D., Zhang, M., Agarwal, P., Perlman, R., and
              D. Dutt, "Transparent Interconnection of Lots of Links
              (TRILL): Fine-Grained Labeling", RFC 7172, May 2014,
 

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              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7172>.

8.2 Informative References

   [RFC3971]  Arkko, J., Ed., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander,
              "SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971, March 2005.

   [RFC5227]  Cheshire, S., "IPv4 Address Conflict Detection", RFC 5227,
              July 2008.

   [RFC7357]  Zhai, H., Hu, F., Perlman, P., Eastlake, D., and Stokes,
              O., "Transparent Interconnection of Lots of Links (TRILL):
              End Station Address Distribution Information(ESADI)
              Protocol", RFC 7357, September 2014.

   [IA-draft] Eastlake, D., Li Y., R. Perlman, "TRILL: Interface
              Addresses APPsub-TLV", draft-ietf-trill-ia-appsubtlv, work
              in progress.

   [DirMech] Dunbar, L., Eastlake 3rd, D., Perlman, R., I. Gashinsky.
              and Li Y., TRILL: Edge Directory Assist Mechanisms",
              draft-ietf-trill-directory-assist-mechanisms, work in
              progress.

Authors' Addresses

   Yizhou Li
   Huawei Technologies
   101 Software Avenue,
   Nanjing 210012
   China

   Phone: +86-25-56625375
   EMail: liyizhou@huawei.com

   Donald Eastlake
   Huawei R&D USA
   155 Beaver Street
   Milford, MA 01757 USA

   Phone: +1-508-333-2270
   EMail: d3e3e3@gmail.com

   Linda Dunbar
   Huawei Technologies
   5430 Legacy Drive, Suite #175
 

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   Plano, TX 75024, USA

   Phone: +1-469-277-5840
   EMail: ldunbar@huawei.com

   Radia Perlman
   EMC
   2010 256th Avenue NE, #200
   Bellevue, WA 98007
   USA

   EMail: Radia@alum.mit.edu

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