Simple Group Keying Protocol TRILL Use Profiles
draft-ietf-trill-link-gk-profiles-08
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Active Internet-Draft (individual)
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Donald Eastlake
,
Dacheng Zhang
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Last updated |
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2021-11-28
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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
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Proposed Standard
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Susan Hares
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Susan Hares <shares@ndzh.com>
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INTERNET-DRAFT D. Eastlake
Intended status: Proposed Standard Futurewei Technologies
D. Zhang
Huawei Technologies
Expires: May 22, 2022 November 28, 2021
Simple Group Keying Protocol TRILL Use Profiles
<draft-ietf-trill-link-gk-profiles-08.txt>
Abstract
This document specifies use profiles for the application of the
simple group keying protocol (SGKP) to multi-destination TRILL
Extended RBridge Channel message security (RFC 7978) and TRILL over
IP packet security (draft-ietf-trill-over-ip).
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Distribution of this document is unlimited. Comments should be sent
to the authors or the TRILL working group mailing list:
trill@ietf.org.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
https://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html. The list of Internet-Draft
Shadow Directories can be accessed at
https://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction............................................3
1.1 Terminology and Acronyms..............................3
2. DTLS: Extended RBridge Channel Group Keyed Security.....5
2.1 Transmission of Group Keying Messages..................5
2.2 Transmission of Protected Multi-destination Data.......6
3. TRILL Over IP Group Keyed Security......................7
3.1 Transmission of Group Keying Messages..................7
3.2 Transmission of Protected Multi-destination Data.......8
4. Security Considerations.................................9
5. IANA Considerations....................................10
5.1 Group Keying RBridge Channel Protocol Numbers.........10
5.2 Group Secured Extended RBridge Channel SType..........10
Normative References......................................11
Informative References....................................12
Acknowledgements..........................................13
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1. Introduction
This document specifies use profiles for the application of the
simple group keying protocol (SGKP) [SGKP] to the use of DTLS
[RFC6347] formatted TRILL [RFC6325] [RFC7780] Extended RBridge
Channel message security [RFC7178] [RFC7978] and to the use of IPsec
formatted TRILL over IP [TRILLoverIP]. It is anticipated that there
will be other uses for the group keying protocol.
1.1 Terminology and Acronyms
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] [RFC8174]
when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
This document uses terminology and acronyms defined in [RFC6325] and
[RFC7178]. Some of these are repeated below for convenience along
with additional new terms and acronyms.
Data Label - VLAN or FGL.
DTLS - Datagram Transport Level Security [RFC6347].
FGL - Fine Grained Label [RFC7172].
GKd - A distinguished station in a group that is in charge of
which group keying (Section 2) is in use [SGKP].
GKs - Stations in a group other than GKd (Section 2) [SGKP].
HKDF - Hash based Key Derivation Function [RFC5869].
IS-IS - Intermediate System to Intermediate System [RFC7176].
keying material - The set of a Key ID, a secret key, and a cypher
suite.
PDU - Protocol Data Unit.
QoS - Quality of Service.
RBridge - An alternative term for a TRILL switch.
SHA - Secure Hash Algorithm [RFC6234].
TRILL - Transparent Interconnection of Lots of Links or Tunneled
Routing in the Link Layer.
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TRILL switch - A device that implements the TRILL protocol
[RFC6325] [RFC7780], sometimes referred to as an RBridge.
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2. DTLS: Extended RBridge Channel Group Keyed Security
This section specifies a profile of the simple group keying protocol
(SGKP) specified in [SGKP]. This profile provides shared secret
keying to secure multi-destination Extended RBridge Channel messages
[RFC7978] as described in Setction 2.2.
For this SKGP use profile, a group is identified by TRILL Data Label
(VLAN or FGL [RFC7172]) and consists of the data reachable [RFC7780]
RBridges with interest in that Data Label. GKd is the RBridge in the
group that, of those group members supporting the Group Keying
Protocol, is the highest priority to be a TRILL distribution tree
root as specified in Section 4.5 of [RFC6325]. If not all members of
the group support the Group Keying Protocol, then there are two cases
of destinations for multi-destination Channel Tunnel RBridge Channel
messages:
(1) If the sender and at least two other group members support the
Group Keying Protocol, it SHOULD, for efficiency, send a secured
multi-destination RBridge Channel message to cover the group and
serially unicast to the group members not supporting the Group
Keying Protocol.
(2) In other cases the sender serially transmits the data to the
group members using pairwise security.
2.1 Transmission of Group Keying Messages
Keying messages themselves are sent as unicast Extended RBridge
Channel messages carrying a Group Keying protocol (see Section 5.1)
RBridge Channel message. Such messages MUST use DTLS Pairwise or
Composite (STypes 2 or 3) security [RFC7978].
The Group Keying profile for this Group Keying Use Type is as
follows:
Priority of Group Keying messages for this SHOULD be 6 unless the
network manager chooses to use a lower priority after
determining that such lower priority group keying messages
will yield acceptable performance. Priority 7 SHOULD NOT be
used as it may cause interference with the establishment and
maintenance of adjacency.
Use Type = 1
KeyID1 Length = 2, KeyID1 is an [RFC5310] key ID.
CypherSuiteLng = 2, CypherSuite is the cypher suite used in
groupcast extended RBridge Channel data messages for the
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corresponding KeyID2. This is a DTLS [RFC6347] cypher suite.
KeyID2 Length = 1, KeyID2 is the index under which a group key is
set. Group keys are, in effect, indexed by this KeyID2 and
the nickname of the GKd as used in the Ingress Nickname
field of the TRILL Header of Group Keying messages.
2.2 Transmission of Protected Multi-destination Data
Protected Extended RBridge Channel [RFC7978] messages are multicast
(M bit set to one in the TRILL Header) and set the SType field to a
new value TBD2 for "Group Secured" (see Section 5.2). Since there
could be multiple group keys distribued and enabled for use, data is
formatted as two bytes of Key ID followed by data formatted as TLS
1.3 [RFC8446] application_data using the cyphersuite and keying
material stored under the Key ID. Such a message on the wire looks
like the following:
+---------------------------+
| Link Header |
+---------------------------+
| TRILL Header |
+---------------------------+
| RBridge Channel Header |
| snd Extension |
+---------------------------+
| RBridge Channel Payload |
| +----------------------+ |
| | 2-byte Key ID | |
| +----------------------+ |
| | DTLS formatted | |
| | application data | |
| +----------------------+ |
+---------------------------+
| Link Trailer |
+---------------------------+
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3. TRILL Over IP Group Keyed Security
The SGKP usage profile specified in this section provides shared
secret keying to secure TRILL over IP messages [TRILLoverIP]. The
keys put in place by the group keying protocol are available for use
as IPSEC keys.
For this use profile, a group is identified by an IP multicast
address and consists of the RBridges adjacent [RFC7177] to the sender
reachable with that multicast address over a TRILL over IP link. GKd
is the RBridge in the group that, of those group members supporting
the Group Keying Protocol, has the highest priority to be a TRILL
distribution tree root as specified in Section 4.5 of [RFC6325]. If
not all members of the group support the Group Keying Protocol, then
there are two cases for multi-destination TRILL over IP messages:
(1) If the sender and at least two other group members support SGKP,
it SHOULD, for efficiency, send a secured IPSEC message to cover
the group and serially unicast to the group members not
supporting the Group Keying Protocol.
(2) In other cases the sender serially transmits the data to the
group members using pairwise security.
3.1 Transmission of Group Keying Messages
Keying messages themselves are sent as unicast Extended RBridge
Channel messages carrying a Group Keying protocol (see Section 5.1)
RBridge Channel message. Such messages MUST use DTLS Pairwise or
Composite (STypes 2 or 3) security [RFC7978].
The Group Keying profile for this Group Keying Use Type is as
follows:
Priority of Group Keying messages for this SHOULD be 6 unless the
network manager chooses to use a lower priority after
determining that such lower priority group keying messages
will yield acceptable performance. Priority 7 SHOULD NOT be
used as it may cause interference with the establishment and
maintenance of adjacency.
Use Type = 2
KeyID1 Length = 2, KeyID1 is an [RFC5310] key ID.
CypherSuiteLng = variable, CypherSuite is an IKEv2 crypto
algorithm "proposal" [RFC7296].
KeyID2 Length = 4, KeyID2 is the IPsec multicast SA. It is the
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index under which a group key is set. Group keys are indexed
by this KeyID2 and the nickname of the GKd as used in the
Ingress Nickname field of the TRILL Header of Group Keying
messages.
3.2 Transmission of Protected Multi-destination Data
Multi-destination TRILL over IP data packets are formatted as
multicast IPsec ESP tunnel mode [RFC4303] packets. The key and crpto
algorithms in use are indicated by the multicast SA.
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4. Security Considerations
See [SGKP] for Simple Group Keying Protocol security considerations.
See [RFC7978] for Extended RBridge Channel security considerations.
See [RFC7457] in connection with TLS and DTLS security
considerations.
See [TRILLoverIP] for TRILL over IP secrity considerations.
See [RFC4303] for IPsec ESP security considerations.
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5. IANA Considerations
This section gives IANA Considerations.
5.1 Group Keying RBridge Channel Protocol Numbers
IANA is requested to assign, from the range assigned by Standards
Action, TBD1 as the TRILL RBridge Channel protocol number for use
when the "Group Keying" protocol is transmitted over Extended RBridge
Channel messages.
The added RBridge Channel protocols registry entry on the TRILL
Parameters web page is as follows:
Protocol Description Reference
-------- -------------- ------------------
TBD1 Group Keying Section 2 of [this document]
5.2 Group Secured Extended RBridge Channel SType
IANA is requested to assign TBD2 as the Group Secured SType in the
"Extended RBridge Channel Security Types Subregistry" on the TRILL
Parameters web page as follows:
SType Description Reference
----- ------------- ----------
TBD2 Group Secured Section 2.2 of [this document]
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Normative References
[RFC2119] - BBradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119,
March 1997, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4303] - Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC
4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc4303>.
[RFC5310] - Bhatia, M., Manral, V., Li, T., Atkinson, R., White, R.,
and M. Fanto, "IS-IS Generic Cryptographic Authentication", RFC
5310, DOI 10.17487/RFC5310, February 2009, <http://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc5310>.
[RFC5869] - Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-
Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869, May 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5869>.
[RFC6325] - Perlman, R., Eastlake 3rd, D., Dutt, D., Gai, S., and A.
Ghanwani, "Routing Bridges (RBridges): Base Protocol
Specification", RFC 6325, DOI 10.17487/RFC6325, July 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6325>.
[RFC6347] - Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, January 2012, <http://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc6347>.
[RFC7172] - Eastlake 3rd, D., Zhang, M., Agarwal, P., Perlman, R.,
and D. Dutt, "Transparent Interconnection of Lots of Links
(TRILL): Fine-Grained Labeling", RFC 7172, DOI
10.17487/RFC7172, May 2014, <http://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc7172>.
[RFC7176] - Eastlake 3rd, D., Senevirathne, T., Ghanwani, A., Dutt,
D., and A. Banerjee, "Transparent Interconnection of Lots of
Links (TRILL) Use of IS-IS", RFC 7176, May 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7176>.
[RFC7177] - Eastlake 3rd, D., Perlman, R., Ghanwani, A., Yang, H.,
and V. Manral, "Transparent Interconnection of Lots of Links
(TRILL): Adjacency", RFC 7177, DOI 10.17487/RFC7177, May 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7177>.
[RFC7178] - Eastlake 3rd, D., Manral, V., Li, Y., Aldrin, S., and D.
Ward, "Transparent Interconnection of Lots of Links (TRILL):
RBridge Channel Support", RFC 7178, DOI 10.17487/RFC7178, May
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7178>.
[RFC7296] - Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
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Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)",
STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.
[RFC7780] - Eastlake 3rd, D., Zhang, M., Perlman, R., Banerjee, A.,
Ghanwani, A., and S. Gupta, "Transparent Interconnection of
Lots of Links (TRILL): Clarifications, Corrections, and
Updates", RFC 7780, DOI 10.17487/RFC7780, February 2016,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7780>.
[RFC7978] - Eastlake 3rd, D., Umair, M., and Y. Li, "Transparent
Interconnection of Lots of Links (TRILL): RBridge Channel
Header Extension", RFC 7978, DOI 10.17487/RFC7978, September
2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7978>.
[RFC8174] - Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May
2017, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8446] - Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Protocol Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August
2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
[TRILLoverIP] - M. Cullen, D. Eastlake, M. Zhang, D. Zhang,
"Transparent Interconnection of Lots of Links (TRILL) over IP",
draft-ietf-trill-over-ip, work in progress.
[SGKP] - D. Eastlake, D. Zhang, "Simple Group Keying Protocol
(SGKP)", draft-ietf-trill-group-keying, work in progress.
Informative References
[RFC6234] - Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash
Algorithms (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234, DOI
10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011, <http://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc6234>.
[RFC7457] - Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, "Summarizing
Known Attacks on Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram
TLS (DTLS)", RFC 7457, February 2015, <http://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc7457>.
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Acknowledgements
The contributions of the following are hereby gratefully
acknowledged:
TBD
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Authors' Addresses
Donald E. Eastlake, 3rd
Futurewei Technologies
2386 Panoramic Circle
Apopka, FL 32703 USA
Phone: +1-508-333-2270
EMail: d3e3e3@gmail.com
Dacheng Zhang
Huawei Technologies
Email: dacheng.zhang@huawei.com
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