Updated TLS Server Identity Check Procedure for Email Related Protocols
draft-ietf-uta-email-tls-certs-05
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (uta WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Alexey Melnikov | ||
| Last updated | 2015-12-04 (Latest revision 2015-09-20) | ||
| Stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Formats | plain text xml htmlized pdfized bibtex | ||
| Reviews |
OPSDIR Last Call review
Has Nits
SECDIR Last Call review
Has Nits
GENART Last Call review
Ready
|
||
| Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | |
| Document shepherd | Leif Johansson | ||
| Shepherd write-up | Show Last changed 2015-11-02 | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Waiting for Writeup | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | Stephen Farrell | ||
| Send notices to | "Leif Johansson" <leifj@sunet.se> | ||
| IANA | IANA review state | IANA OK - No Actions Needed |
draft-ietf-uta-email-tls-certs-05
Network Working Group A. Melnikov
Internet-Draft Isode Ltd
Updates: 2595, 3207, 3501, 5804 (if September 20, 2015
approved)
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: March 23, 2016
Updated TLS Server Identity Check Procedure for Email Related Protocols
draft-ietf-uta-email-tls-certs-05
Abstract
This document describes TLS server identity verification procedure
for SMTP Submission, IMAP, POP and ManageSieve clients. It replaces
Section 2.4 of RFC 2595, updates Section 4.1 of RFC 3207, updates
Section 11.1 of RFC 3501, updates Section 2.2.1 of RFC 5804.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on March 23, 2016.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Email Server Certificate Verification Rules . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Compliance Checklist for Certification Authorities . . . . . 4
5. Compliance Checklist for Mail Service Providers and
Certificate Signing Request generation tools . . . . . . . . 4
6. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Appendix B. Changes since draft-ietf-uta-email-tls-certs-00 . . 9
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction
Use of TLS by SMTP Submission, IMAP, POP and ManageSieve clients is
described in [RFC3207], [RFC3501], [RFC2595] and [RFC5804]
respectively. Each of the documents describes slightly different
rules for server certificate identity verification (or doesn't define
any rules at all). In reality, email client and server developers
implement many of these protocols at the same time, so it would be
good to define modern and consistent rules for verifying email server
identities using TLS.
This document describes the updated TLS server identity verification
procedure for SMTP Submission [RFC6409] [RFC3207], IMAP [RFC3501],
POP [RFC1939] and ManageSieve [RFC5804] clients. It replaces
Section 2.4 of RFC 2595.
Note that this document doesn't apply to use of TLS in MTA-to-MTA
SMTP.
The main goal of the document is to provide consistent TLS server
identity verification procedure across multiple email related
protocols. This should make it easier for Certification Authorities
and ISPs to deploy TLS for email use, and would enable email client
developers to write more secure code.
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2. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
The following terms or concepts are used through the document:
reference identifier: (as defined in [RFC6125]) One of the domain
names associated by the email (i.e., an SMTP, IMAP, POP3 or
ManageSieve) client with the destination email server and
optionally an application service type for performing name checks
on the server certificate. When name checks are applicable, at
least one of the reference identifiers MUST match an [RFC6125]
DNS-ID or SRV-ID (or if none are present the [RFC6125] CN-ID) of
the server certificate.
3. Email Server Certificate Verification Rules
During a TLS negotiation, an email client (i.e., an SMTP, IMAP, POP3
or ManageSieve client) MUST check its understanding of the server
hostname against the server's identity as presented in the server
Certificate message, in order to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks.
Matching is performed according to the rules specified in Section 6
of [RFC6125], including "certificate pinning" and the procedure on
failure to match. The following inputs are used by the verification
procedure used in [RFC6125]:
1. For DNS-ID and CN-ID identifier types the client MUST use one or
more of the following as "reference identifiers": (a) the right
hand side of the email address, (b) the hostname it used to open
the connection (without CNAME canonicalization). The client MAY
also use (c) a value securely derived from (a) or (b), such as
using "secure" DNSSEC validated lookup.
2. When using email service discovery procedure specified in
[RFC6186] the client MUST also use the right hand side of the
email address as another "reference identifier" to compare
against SRV-ID identifier in the server certificate.
The rules and guidelines defined in [RFC6125] apply to an email
server certificates, with the following supplemental rules:
1. Support for the DNS-ID identifier type (subjectAltName of dNSName
type [RFC5280]) is REQUIRED in Email client software
implementations.
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2. Support for the SRV-ID identifier type (subjectAltName of SRVName
type [RFC4985]) is REQUIRED for email client software
implementations that support [RFC6186]. List of SRV-ID types for
email services is specified in [RFC6186]. For the ManageSieve
protocol the service name "sieve" is used.
3. URI-ID identifier type (subjectAltName of
uniformResourceIdentifier type [RFC5280]) MUST NOT be used by
clients for server verification, as URI-ID were not historically
used for email.
4. For backward compatibility with deployed software CN-ID
identifier type (CN attribute from the subject name, see
[RFC6125]) MAY be used for server identity verification.
5. Email protocols allow use of certain wilcards in identifiers
presented by email servers. The "*" wildcard character MAY be
used as the left-most name component of DNS-ID or CN-ID in the
certificate. For example, a DNS-ID of *.example.com would match
a.example.com, foo.example.com, etc. but would not match
example.com. Note that the wildcard character MUST NOT be used
as a fragment of the left-most name component (e.g.,
*oo.example.com, f*o.example.com, or foo*.example.com).
4. Compliance Checklist for Certification Authorities
1. CA MUST support issuance of server certificates with DNS-ID
identifier type (subjectAltName of dNSName type [RFC5280]).
2. CA MUST support issuance of server certificates with SRV-ID
identifier type (subjectAltName of SRVName type [RFC4985]) for
each type of email service.
3. For backward compatibility with deployed client base, CA MUST
support issuance of server certificates with CN-ID identifier
type (CN attribute from the subject name, see [RFC6125]).
4. CA MAY allow "*" (wildcard) as the left-most name component of
DNS-ID or CN-ID in server certificates it issues.
5. Compliance Checklist for Mail Service Providers and Certificate
Signing Request generation tools
1. SHOULD include the DNS-ID identifier type (subjectAltName of
dNSName type [RFC5280]) in Certificate Signing Requests for both
the right hand side of served email addresses, as well as for the
host name where the email server(s) are running.
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2. If the email services provided are discoverable using DNS SRV as
specified in [RFC6186], the Mail Service Provider MUST include
the SRV-ID identifier type (subjectAltName of SRVName type
[RFC4985]) for each type of email service in Certificate Signing
Requests.
3. SHOULD include CN-ID identifier type (CN attribute from the
subject name, see [RFC6125]) for the host name where the email
server(s) is running in Certificate Signing Requests for backward
compatibility with deployed email clients. (Note, a certificate
can only include a single CN-ID, so if a mail service is running
on multiple hosts, either each host has to use different
certificate with its own CN-ID, a single certificate with
multiple DNS-IDs, or a single certificate with wildcard in CN-ID
can be used).
4. MAY include "*" (wildcard) as the left-most name component of
DNS-ID or CN-ID in Certificate Signing Requests.
6. Examples
Consider an IMAP-accessible email server which supports both IMAP and
IMAPS (IMAP-over-TLS) at the host "mail.example.net" servicing email
addresses of the form "user@example.net". A certificate for this
service needs to include DNS-IDs of "example.net" (because it is the
right hand side of emails) and "mail.example.net" (this is what a
user of this server enters manually, if not using [RFC6186]). It
might also include CN-IDs of "mail.example.net" for backward
compatibility with deployed infrastructure.
Consider the IMAP-accessible email server from the previous paragraph
which is additionally discoverable via DNS SRV lookups in domain
"example.net" (DNS SRV records "_imap._tcp.example.net" and
"_imaps._tcp.example.net"). In addition to DNS-ID/CN-ID identity
types specified above, a certificate for this service also needs to
include SRV-IDs of "_imap.example.net" (when STARTTLS is used on the
IMAP port) and "_imaps.example.net" (when TLS is used on IMAPS port).
See [RFC6186] for more details. (Note that unlike DNS SRV there is
no "_tcp" component in SRV-IDs).
Consider an SMTP Submission server at the host "submit.example.net"
servicing email addresses of the form "user@example.net" and
discoverable via DNS SRV lookups in domain "example.net" (DNS SRV
records "_submission._tcp.example.net"). A certificate for this
service needs to include SRV-IDs of "_submission.example.net" (see
[RFC6186]) along with DNS-IDs of "example.net" and
"submit.example.net". It might also include CN-IDs of
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"submit.example.net" for backward compatibility with deployed
infrastructure.
Consider a host "mail.example.net" servicing email addresses of the
form "user@example.net" and discoverable via DNS SRV lookups in
domain "example.net", which runs SMTP Submission, IMAPS and POP3S
(POP3-over-TLS) and ManageSieve services. Each of the servers can
use their own certificate specific to their service (see examples
above). Alternatively they can all share a single certificate that
would include SRV-IDs of "_submission.example.net",
"_imaps.example.net", "_pop3s.example.net" and "_sieve.example.net"
along with DNS-IDs of "example.net" and "mail.example.net". It might
also include CN-IDs of "mail.example.net" for backward compatibility
with deployed infrastructure.
7. IANA Considerations
This document doesn't require any action from IANA.
8. Security Considerations
The goal of this document is to improve interoperability and thus
security of email clients wishing to access email servers over TLS
protected email protocols, by specifying a consistent set of rules
that email service providers, email client writers and Certification
Authorities can use when creating server certificates.
TLS Server Identity Check for Email relies on use of trustworthy DNS
hostnames when constructing "reference identifiers" that are checked
against an email server certificate. Such trustworthy names are
either entered manually (for example if they are advertised on a Mail
Service Provider's website), explicitly confirmed by the user (e.g.
if they are a target of a DNS SRV lookup) or derived using a secure
third party service (e.g. DNSSEC-protected SRV records which are
verified by the client or trusted local resolver). Future work in
this area might benefit from integration with DANE [RFC6698], but it
is not covered by this document.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
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[RFC6409] Gellens, R. and J. Klensin, "Message Submission for Mail",
STD 72, RFC 6409, DOI 10.17487/RFC6409, November 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6409>.
[RFC3207] Hoffman, P., "SMTP Service Extension for Secure SMTP over
Transport Layer Security", RFC 3207, DOI 10.17487/RFC3207,
February 2002, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3207>.
[RFC3501] Crispin, M., "INTERNET MESSAGE ACCESS PROTOCOL - VERSION
4rev1", RFC 3501, DOI 10.17487/RFC3501, March 2003,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3501>.
[RFC1939] Myers, J. and M. Rose, "Post Office Protocol - Version 3",
STD 53, RFC 1939, DOI 10.17487/RFC1939, May 1996,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1939>.
[RFC5804] Melnikov, A., Ed. and T. Martin, "A Protocol for Remotely
Managing Sieve Scripts", RFC 5804, DOI 10.17487/RFC5804,
July 2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5804>.
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March
2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC4985] Santesson, S., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Subject Alternative Name for Expression of Service Name",
RFC 4985, DOI 10.17487/RFC4985, August 2007,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4985>.
[RFC6186] Daboo, C., "Use of SRV Records for Locating Email
Submission/Access Services", RFC 6186,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6186, March 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6186>.
9.2. Informative References
[RFC2595] Newman, C., "Using TLS with IMAP, POP3 and ACAP",
RFC 2595, DOI 10.17487/RFC2595, June 1999,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2595>.
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[RFC6698] Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication
of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Protocol: TLSA", RFC 6698, DOI 10.17487/RFC6698, August
2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6698>.
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Appendix A. Acknowledgements
Thank you to Chris Newman, Viktor Dukhovni and Sean Turner for
comments on this document.
The editor of this document copied lots of text from RFC 2595 and RFC
6125, so the hard work of editors of these document is appreciated.
Appendix B. Changes since draft-ietf-uta-email-tls-certs-00
[[Note to RFC Editor: Please delete this section before publication]]
Added another example, clarified that subjectAltName and DNS SRV are
using slightly different syntax.
As any certificate can only include one CN-ID, corrected examples.
Split rules to talk seperately about requirements on MUAs, CAs and
MSPs/CSR generation tools.
Updated Introduction section.
Author's Address
Alexey Melnikov
Isode Ltd
14 Castle Mews
Hampton, Middlesex TW12 2NP
UK
EMail: Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com
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