SMTP MTA Strict Transport Security
draft-ietf-uta-mta-sts-00

The information below is for an old version of the document
Document Type Active Internet-Draft (uta WG)
Last updated 2016-05-16
Replaces draft-brotman-mta-sts
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Using TLS in Applications                                    D. Margolis
Internet-Draft                                                 M. Risher
Intended status: Standards Track                           N. Lidzborski
Expires: November 13, 2016                                     W. Chuang
                                                                 B. Long
                                                             Google, Inc
                                                         B. Ramakrishnan
                                                             Yahoo!, Inc
                                                              A. Brotman
                                                            Comcast, Inc
                                                                J. Jones
                                                          Microsoft, Inc
                                                               F. Martin
                                                                LinkedIn
                                                               K. Umbach
                                                                M. Laber
                          1&1 Mail & Media Development & Technology GmbH
                                                            May 13, 2016

                   SMTP MTA Strict Transport Security
                       draft-ietf-uta-mta-sts-00

Abstract

   SMTP MTA-STS is a mechanism enabling mail service providers to
   declare their ability to receive TLS-secured connections, to declare
   particular methods for certificate validation, and to request that
   sending SMTP servers report upon and/or refuse to deliver messages
   that cannot be delivered securely.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on October 20, 2016.

Margolis, et al.        Expires October 20, 2016                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                   MTA-STS                      April 2016

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Related Technologies  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Differences from DANE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       2.1.1.  Advantages of SMTP MTA-STS when compared to DANE  . .   4
       2.1.2.  Advantages of DANE when compared to SMTP MTA-STS  . .   5
   3.  Policy Semantics  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.1.  Formal Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       3.1.1.  TXT Record  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       3.1.2.  SMTP MTA-STS Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.2.  Policy Expirations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       3.2.1.  Policy Updates  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.3.  Policy Discovery & Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.4.  Policy Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.5.  Policy Application  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   4.  Failure Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   7.  Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   8.  Appendix 1: Validation Pseudocode . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   9.  Appendix 2: Domain Owner STS example record . . . . . . . . .  12
     9.1.  Example 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   10. Appendix 3: DEEP Registration Elements  . . . . . . . . . . .  13
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