Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
draft-ietf-uta-rfc7525bis-06
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (uta WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Yaron Sheffer , Peter Saint-Andre , Thomas Fossati | ||
| Last updated | 2022-05-06 (Latest revision 2022-03-24) | ||
| Replaces | draft-sheffer-uta-bcp195bis, draft-sheffer-uta-rfc7525bis | ||
| Stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Formats | plain text html xml htmlized pdfized bibtex | ||
| Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | |
| Associated WG milestone |
|
||
| Document shepherd | Leif Johansson | ||
| Shepherd write-up | Show Last changed 2022-05-06 | ||
| IESG | IESG state | AD Evaluation | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Yes | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | Francesca Palombini | ||
| Send notices to | leifj@sunet.se |
draft-ietf-uta-rfc7525bis-06
UTA Working Group Y. Sheffer
Internet-Draft Intuit
Obsoletes: 7525 (if approved) P. Saint-Andre
Updates: 5288, 6066 (if approved) independent
Intended status: Best Current Practice T. Fossati
Expires: 25 September 2022 arm
24 March 2022
Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
draft-ietf-uta-rfc7525bis-06
Abstract
Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS) are widely used to protect data exchanged over application
protocols such as HTTP, SMTP, IMAP, POP, SIP, and XMPP. Over the
years, the industry has witnessed several serious attacks on TLS and
DTLS, including attacks on the most commonly used cipher suites and
their modes of operation. This document provides recommendations for
improving the security of deployed services that use TLS and DTLS.
The recommendations are applicable to the majority of use cases.
An earlier version of this document was published as RFC 7525 when
the industry was in the midst of its transition to TLS 1.2. Years
later this transition is largely complete and TLS 1.3 is widely
available. This document updates the guidance, given the new
environment. In addition, the document updates RFC 5288 and RFC 6066
in view of recent attacks.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 25 September 2022.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. General Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Protocol Versions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.1. SSL/TLS Protocol Versions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.2. DTLS Protocol Versions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.3. Fallback to Lower Versions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2. Strict TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3. Compression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.4. TLS Session Resumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.5. Renegotiation in TLS 1.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.6. Post-Handshake Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.7. Server Name Indication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.8. Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation . . . . . . . . . 11
3.9. Zero Round Trip Time (0-RTT) Data in TLS 1.3 . . . . . . 11
4. Recommendations: Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.1. General Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.2. Cipher Suites for TLS 1.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.2.1. Implementation Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.3. Cipher Suites for TLS 1.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.4. Limits on Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.5. Public Key Length . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.6. Truncated HMAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5. Applicability Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.1. Security Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.2. Opportunistic Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.1. Host Name Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.2. AES-GCM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7.2.1. Nonce Reuse in TLS 1.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7.3. Forward Secrecy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
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7.4. Diffie-Hellman Exponent Reuse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7.5. Certificate Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Appendix A. Differences from RFC 7525 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
B.1. draft-ietf-uta-rfc7525bis-06 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
B.2. draft-ietf-uta-rfc7525bis-05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
B.3. draft-ietf-uta-rfc7525bis-04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
B.4. draft-ietf-uta-rfc7525bis-03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
B.5. draft-ietf-uta-rfc7525bis-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
B.6. draft-ietf-uta-rfc7525bis-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
B.7. draft-ietf-uta-rfc7525bis-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
B.8. draft-sheffer-uta-rfc7525bis-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
B.9. draft-sheffer-uta-bcp195bis-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1. Introduction
Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Security Layer
(DTLS) are widely used to protect data exchanged over application
protocols such as HTTP, SMTP, IMAP, POP, SIP, and XMPP. Over the
years leading to 2015, the industry has witnessed serious attacks on
TLS and DTLS, including attacks on the most commonly used cipher
suites and their modes of operation. For instance, both the AES-CBC
[RFC3602] and RC4 [RFC7465] encryption algorithms, which together
were once the most widely deployed ciphers, have been attacked in the
context of TLS. A companion document [RFC7457] provides detailed
information about these attacks and will help the reader understand
the rationale behind the recommendations provided here. That
document has not been updated in concert with this one; instead,
newer attacks are described in this document, as are mitigations for
those attacks.
The TLS community reacted to these attacks in several ways:
* Detailed guidance was published on the use of TLS 1.2 [RFC5246]
and DTLS 1.2 [RFC6347], along with earlier protocol versions.
This guidance is included in the original [RFC7525] and mostly
retained in this revised version; note that this guidance was
mostly adopted by the industry since the publication of RFC 7525
in 2015.
* Versions of TLS earlier than 1.2 were deprecated [RFC8996].
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* Version 1.3 of TLS [RFC8446] was released and version 1.3 of DTLS
was finalized [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]; these versions largely
mitigate or resolve the described attacks.
Those who implement and deploy TLS and DTLS, in particular versions
1.2 or earlier of these protocols, need guidance on how TLS can be
used securely. This document provides guidance for deployed services
as well as for software implementations, assuming the implementer
expects his or her code to be deployed in environments defined in
Section 5. Concerning deployment, this document targets a wide
audience -- namely, all deployers who wish to add authentication (be
it one-way only or mutual), confidentiality, and data integrity
protection to their communications.
The recommendations herein take into consideration the security of
various mechanisms, their technical maturity and interoperability,
and their prevalence in implementations at the time of writing.
Unless it is explicitly called out that a recommendation applies to
TLS alone or to DTLS alone, each recommendation applies to both TLS
and DTLS.
This document attempts to minimize new guidance to TLS 1.2
implementations, and the overall approach is to encourage systems to
move to TLS 1.3. However this is not always practical. Newly
discovered attacks, as well as ecosystem changes, necessitated some
new requirements that apply to TLS 1.2 environments. Those are
summarized in Appendix A.
As noted, the TLS 1.3 specification resolves many of the
vulnerabilities listed in this document. A system that deploys TLS
1.3 should have fewer vulnerabilities than TLS 1.2 or below. This
document is being republished with this in mind, and with an explicit
goal to migrate most uses of TLS 1.2 into TLS 1.3.
These are minimum recommendations for the use of TLS in the vast
majority of implementation and deployment scenarios, with the
exception of unauthenticated TLS (see Section 5). Other
specifications that reference this document can have stricter
requirements related to one or more aspects of the protocol, based on
their particular circumstances (e.g., for use with a particular
application protocol); when that is the case, implementers are
advised to adhere to those stricter requirements. Furthermore, this
document provides a floor, not a ceiling, so stronger options are
always allowed (e.g., depending on differing evaluations of the
importance of cryptographic strength vs. computational load).
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Community knowledge about the strength of various algorithms and
feasible attacks can change quickly, and experience shows that a Best
Current Practice (BCP) document about security is a point-in-time
statement. Readers are advised to seek out any errata or updates
that apply to this document.
2. Terminology
A number of security-related terms in this document are used in the
sense defined in [RFC4949].
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. General Recommendations
This section provides general recommendations on the secure use of
TLS. Recommendations related to cipher suites are discussed in the
following section.
3.1. Protocol Versions
3.1.1. SSL/TLS Protocol Versions
It is important both to stop using old, less secure versions of SSL/
TLS and to start using modern, more secure versions; therefore, the
following are the recommendations concerning TLS/SSL protocol
versions:
* Implementations MUST NOT negotiate SSL version 2.
Rationale: Today, SSLv2 is considered insecure [RFC6176].
* Implementations MUST NOT negotiate SSL version 3.
Rationale: SSLv3 [RFC6101] was an improvement over SSLv2 and
plugged some significant security holes but did not support strong
cipher suites. SSLv3 does not support TLS extensions, some of
which (e.g., renegotiation_info [RFC5746]) are security-critical.
In addition, with the emergence of the POODLE attack [POODLE],
SSLv3 is now widely recognized as fundamentally insecure. See
[DEP-SSLv3] for further details.
* Implementations MUST NOT negotiate TLS version 1.0 [RFC2246].
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Rationale: TLS 1.0 (published in 1999) does not support many
modern, strong cipher suites. In addition, TLS 1.0 lacks a per-
record Initialization Vector (IV) for CBC-based cipher suites and
does not warn against common padding errors. This and other
recommendations in this section are in line with [RFC8996].
* Implementations MUST NOT negotiate TLS version 1.1 [RFC4346].
Rationale: TLS 1.1 (published in 2006) is a security improvement
over TLS 1.0 but still does not support certain stronger cipher
suites.
* Implementations MUST support TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] and MUST prefer to
negotiate TLS version 1.2 over earlier versions of TLS.
Rationale: Several stronger cipher suites are available only with
TLS 1.2 (published in 2008). In fact, the cipher suites
recommended by this document for TLS 1.2 (Section 4.2 below) are
only available in this version.
* Implementations SHOULD support TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] and, if
implemented, MUST prefer to negotiate TLS 1.3 over earlier
versions of TLS.
Rationale: TLS 1.3 is a major overhaul to the protocol and
resolves many of the security issues with TLS 1.2. We note that
as long as TLS 1.2 is still allowed by a particular
implementation, even if it defaults to TLS 1.3, implementers MUST
still follow all the recommendations in this document.
* Implementations of "greenfield" protocols or deployments, where
there is no need to support legacy endpoints, SHOULD support TLS
1.3, with no negotiation of earlier versions. Similarly, we
RECOMMEND that new protocol designs that embed the TLS mechanisms
(such as QUIC has done [RFC9001]) include TLS 1.3.
Rationale: secure deployment of TLS 1.3 is significantly easier
and less error prone than the secure deployment of TLS 1.2.
This BCP applies to TLS 1.2, 1.3 and to earlier versions. It is not
safe for readers to assume that the recommendations in this BCP apply
to any future version of TLS.
3.1.2. DTLS Protocol Versions
DTLS, an adaptation of TLS for UDP datagrams, was introduced when TLS
1.1 was published. The following are the recommendations with
respect to DTLS:
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* Implementations MUST NOT negotiate DTLS version 1.0 [RFC4347].
Version 1.0 of DTLS correlates to version 1.1 of TLS (see above).
* Implementations MUST support DTLS 1.2 [RFC6347] and MUST prefer to
negotiate DTLS version 1.2 over earlier versions of DTLS.
Version 1.2 of DTLS correlates to version 1.2 of TLS (see above).
(There is no version 1.1 of DTLS.)
* Implementations SHOULD support DTLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13] and,
if implemented, MUST prefer to negotiate DTLS version 1.3 over
earlier versions of DTLS.
Version 1.3 of DTLS correlates to version 1.3 of TLS (see above).
3.1.3. Fallback to Lower Versions
TLS/DTLS 1.2 clients MUST NOT fall back to earlier TLS versions,
since those versions have been deprecated [RFC8996]. We note that as
a result of that, the SCSV mechanism [RFC7507] is no longer needed
for clients. In addition, TLS 1.3 implements a new version
negotiation mechanism.
3.2. Strict TLS
The following recommendations are provided to help prevent SSL
Stripping (an attack that is summarized in Section 2.1 of [RFC7457]):
* In cases where an application protocol allows implementations or
deployments a choice between strict TLS configuration and dynamic
upgrade from unencrypted to TLS-protected traffic (such as
STARTTLS), clients and servers SHOULD prefer strict TLS
configuration.
* Application protocols typically provide a way for the server to
offer TLS during an initial protocol exchange, and sometimes also
provide a way for the server to advertise support for TLS (e.g.,
through a flag indicating that TLS is required); unfortunately,
these indications are sent before the communication channel is
encrypted. A client SHOULD attempt to negotiate TLS even if these
indications are not communicated by the server.
* HTTP client and server implementations MUST support the HTTP
Strict Transport Security (HSTS) header [RFC6797], in order to
allow Web servers to advertise that they are willing to accept
TLS-only clients.
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* Web servers SHOULD use HSTS to indicate that they are willing to
accept TLS-only clients, unless they are deployed in such a way
that using HSTS would in fact weaken overall security (e.g., it
can be problematic to use HSTS with self-signed certificates, as
described in Section 11.3 of [RFC6797]).
Rationale: Combining unprotected and TLS-protected communication
opens the way to SSL Stripping and similar attacks, since an initial
part of the communication is not integrity protected and therefore
can be manipulated by an attacker whose goal is to keep the
communication in the clear.
3.3. Compression
In order to help prevent compression-related attacks (summarized in
Section 2.6 of [RFC7457]), when using TLS 1.2 implementations and
deployments SHOULD disable TLS-level compression (Section 6.2.2 of
[RFC5246]), unless the application protocol in question has been
shown not to be open to such attacks. Note: this recommendation
applies to TLS 1.2 only, because compression has been removed from
TLS 1.3.
Rationale: TLS compression has been subject to security attacks, such
as the CRIME attack.
Implementers should note that compression at higher protocol levels
can allow an active attacker to extract cleartext information from
the connection. The BREACH attack is one such case. These issues
can only be mitigated outside of TLS and are thus outside the scope
of this document. See Section 2.6 of [RFC7457] for further details.
3.4. TLS Session Resumption
Session resumption drastically reduces the number of TLS handshakes
and thus is an essential performance feature for most deployments.
Stateless session resumption with session tickets is a popular
strategy. For TLS 1.2, it is specified in [RFC5077]. For TLS 1.3, a
more secure PSK-based mechanism is described in Section 4.6.1 of
[RFC8446]. See this post (https://blog.filippo.io/we-need-to-talk-
about-session-tickets/) by Filippo Valsorda for a comparison of TLS
1.2 and 1.3 session resumption, and [Springall16] for a quantitative
study of TLS cryptographic "shortcuts", including session resumption.
When it is used, the resumption information MUST be authenticated and
encrypted to prevent modification or eavesdropping by an attacker.
Further recommendations apply to session tickets:
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* A strong cipher suite MUST be used when encrypting the ticket (as
least as strong as the main TLS cipher suite).
* Ticket keys MUST be changed regularly, e.g., once every week, so
as not to negate the benefits of forward secrecy (see Section 7.3
for details on forward secrecy). Old ticket keys MUST be
destroyed shortly after a new key version is made available.
* For similar reasons, session ticket validity SHOULD be limited to
a reasonable duration (e.g., half as long as ticket key validity).
* TLS 1.2 does not roll the session key forward within a single
session. Thus, to prevent an attack where a stolen ticket key is
used to decrypt the entire content of a session (negating the
concept of forward secrecy), a TLS 1.2 server SHOULD NOT resume
sessions that are too old, e.g. sessions that have been open
longer than two ticket key rotation periods. Note that this
implies that some server implementations might need to abort
sessions after a certain duration.
Rationale: session resumption is another kind of TLS handshake, and
therefore must be as secure as the initial handshake. This document
(Section 4) recommends the use of cipher suites that provide forward
secrecy, i.e. that prevent an attacker who gains momentary access to
the TLS endpoint (either client or server) and its secrets from
reading either past or future communication. The tickets must be
managed so as not to negate this security property.
TLS 1.3 provides the powerful option of forward secrecy even within a
long-lived connection that is periodically resumed. Section 2.2 of
[RFC8446] recommends that clients SHOULD send a "key_share" when
initiating session resumption. In order to gain forward secrecy,
this document recommends that server implementations SHOULD respond
with a "key_share", to complete an ECDHE exchange on each session
resumption.
TLS session resumption introduces potential privacy issues where the
server is able to track the client, in some cases indefinitely. See
[Sy2018] for more details.
3.5. Renegotiation in TLS 1.2
The recommendations in this section apply to TLS 1.2 only, because
renegotiation has been removed from TLS 1.3.
TLS 1.2 clients and servers MUST implement the renegotiation_info
extension, as defined in [RFC5746].
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TLS 1.2 clients MUST send renegotiation_info in the Client Hello. If
the server does not acknowledge the extension, the client MUST
generate a fatal handshake_failure alert prior to terminating the
connection.
Rationale: It is not safe for a client to connect to a TLS 1.2 server
that does not support renegotiation_info, regardless of whether
either endpoint actually implements renegotiation. See also
Section 4.1 of [RFC5746].
A related attack resulting from TLS session parameters not properly
authenticated is Triple Handshake [triple-handshake]. To address
this attack, TLS 1.2 implementations SHOULD support the
extended_master_secret extension defined in [RFC7627].
3.6. Post-Handshake Authentication
Renegotiation in TLS 1.2 was replaced in TLS 1.3 by separate post-
handshake authentication and key update mechanisms. In the context
of protocols that multiplex requests over a single connection (such
as HTTP/2), post-handshake authentication has the same problems as
TLS 1.2 renegotiation. Multiplexed protocols SHOULD follow the
advice provided for HTTP/2 in [RFC8740].
3.7. Server Name Indication
TLS implementations MUST support the Server Name Indication (SNI)
extension defined in Section 3 of [RFC6066] for those higher-level
protocols that would benefit from it, including HTTPS. However, the
actual use of SNI in particular circumstances is a matter of local
policy. Implementers are strongly encouraged to support TLS
Encrypted Client Hello (formerly called Encrypted SNI) once
[I-D.ietf-tls-esni] has been standardized.
Rationale: SNI supports deployment of multiple TLS-protected virtual
servers on a single address, and therefore enables fine-grained
security for these virtual servers, by allowing each one to have its
own certificate. However, SNI also leaks the target domain for a
given connection; this information leak will be plugged by use of TLS
Encrypted Client Hello.
In order to prevent the attacks described in [ALPACA], a server that
does not recognize the presented server name SHOULD NOT continue the
handshake and instead SHOULD fail with a fatal-level
unrecognized_name(112) alert. Note that this recommendation updates
Section 3 of [RFC6066]: "If the server understood the ClientHello
extension but does not recognize the server name, the server SHOULD
take one of two actions: either abort the handshake by sending a
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fatal-level unrecognized_name(112) alert or continue the handshake."
It is also RECOMMENDED that clients abort the handshake if the server
acknowledges the SNI extension, but presents a certificate with a
different hostname than the one sent by the client.
3.8. Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation
TLS implementations (both client- and server-side) MUST support the
Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) extension [RFC7301].
In order to prevent "cross-protocol" attacks resulting from failure
to ensure that a message intended for use in one protocol cannot be
mistaken for a message for use in another protocol, servers should
strictly enforce the behavior prescribed in Section 3.2 of [RFC7301]:
"In the event that the server supports no protocols that the client
advertises, then the server SHALL respond with a fatal
no_application_protocol alert." It is also RECOMMENDED that clients
abort the handshake if the server acknowledges the ALPN extension,
but does not select a protocol from the client list. Failure to do
so can result in attacks such those described in [ALPACA].
Protocol developers are strongly encouraged to register an ALPN
identifier for their protocols. This applies to new protocols, as
well as well-established protocols such as SMTP.
3.9. Zero Round Trip Time (0-RTT) Data in TLS 1.3
The 0-RTT early data feature is new in TLS 1.3. It provides improved
latency when TLS connections are resumed, at the potential cost of
security. As a result, it requires special attention from
implementers on both the server and the client side. Typically this
extends to both the TLS library as well as protocol layers above it.
For use in HTTP-over-TLS, readers are referred to [RFC8470] for
guidance.
For QUIC-on-TLS, refer to Sec. 9.2 of [RFC9001].
For other protocols, generic guidance is given in Sec. 8 and
Appendix E.5 of [RFC8446]. To paraphrase Appendix E.5, applications
MUST avoid this feature unless an explicit specification exists for
the application protocol in question to clarify when 0-RTT is
appropriate and secure. This can take the form of an IETF RFC, a
non-IETF standard, or even documentation associated with a non-
standard protocol.
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4. Recommendations: Cipher Suites
TLS and its implementations provide considerable flexibility in the
selection of cipher suites. Unfortunately, the security of some of
these cipher suites has degraded over time to the point where some
are known to be insecure. Incorrectly configuring a server leads to
no or reduced security. This section includes recommendations on the
selection and negotiation of cipher suites.
4.1. General Guidelines
Cryptographic algorithms weaken over time as cryptanalysis improves:
algorithms that were once considered strong become weak. Such
algorithms need to be phased out over time and replaced with more
secure cipher suites. This helps to ensure that the desired security
properties still hold. SSL/TLS has been in existence for almost 20
years and many of the cipher suites that have been recommended in
various versions of SSL/TLS are now considered weak or at least not
as strong as desired. Therefore, this section modernizes the
recommendations concerning cipher suite selection.
* Implementations MUST NOT negotiate the cipher suites with NULL
encryption.
Rationale: The NULL cipher suites do not encrypt traffic and so
provide no confidentiality services. Any entity in the network
with access to the connection can view the plaintext of contents
being exchanged by the client and server.
Nevertheless, this document does not discourage software from
implementing NULL cipher suites, since they can be useful for
testing and debugging.
* Implementations MUST NOT negotiate RC4 cipher suites.
Rationale: The RC4 stream cipher has a variety of cryptographic
weaknesses, as documented in [RFC7465]. Note that DTLS
specifically forbids the use of RC4 already.
* Implementations MUST NOT negotiate cipher suites offering less
than 112 bits of security, including so-called "export-level"
encryption (which provide 40 or 56 bits of security).
Rationale: Based on [RFC3766], at least 112 bits of security is
needed. 40-bit and 56-bit security are considered insecure today.
TLS 1.1 and 1.2 never negotiate 40-bit or 56-bit export ciphers.
* Implementations SHOULD NOT negotiate cipher suites that use
algorithms offering less than 128 bits of security.
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Rationale: Cipher suites that offer between 112-bits and 128-bits
of security are not considered weak at this time; however, it is
expected that their useful lifespan is short enough to justify
supporting stronger cipher suites at this time. 128-bit ciphers
are expected to remain secure for at least several years, and
256-bit ciphers until the next fundamental technology
breakthrough. Note that, because of so-called "meet-in-the-
middle" attacks [Multiple-Encryption], some legacy cipher suites
(e.g., 168-bit 3DES) have an effective key length that is smaller
than their nominal key length (112 bits in the case of 3DES).
Such cipher suites should be evaluated according to their
effective key length.
* Implementations SHOULD NOT negotiate cipher suites based on RSA
key transport, a.k.a. "static RSA".
Rationale: These cipher suites, which have assigned values
starting with the string "TLS_RSA_WITH_*", have several drawbacks,
especially the fact that they do not support forward secrecy.
* Implementations SHOULD NOT negotiate cipher suites based on non-
ephemeral (static) finite-field Diffie-Hellman key agreement.
Rationale: These cipher suites, which have assigned values
prefixed by "TLS_DH_*", have several drawbacks, especially the
fact that they do not support forward secrecy.
* Implementations MUST support and prefer to negotiate cipher suites
offering forward secrecy. However, TLS 1.2 implementations SHOULD
NOT negotiate cipher suites based on ephemeral finite-field
Diffie-Hellman key agreement (i.e., "TLS_DHE_*" suites). This is
justified by the known fragility of the construction (see
[RACCOON]) and the limitation around negotiation -- including
using [RFC7919], which has seen very limited uptake.
Rationale: Forward secrecy (sometimes called "perfect forward
secrecy") prevents the recovery of information that was encrypted
with older session keys, thus limiting the amount of time during
which attacks can be successful. See Section 7.3 for a detailed
discussion.
4.2. Cipher Suites for TLS 1.2
Given the foregoing considerations, implementation and deployment of
the following cipher suites is RECOMMENDED:
* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
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* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
These cipher suites are supported only in TLS 1.2 and not in earlier
protocol versions, because they are authenticated encryption (AEAD)
algorithms [RFC5116].
Typically, in order to prefer these suites, the order of suites needs
to be explicitly configured in server software. (See [BETTERCRYPTO]
for helpful deployment guidelines, but note that its recommendations
differ from the current document in some details.) It would be ideal
if server software implementations were to prefer these suites by
default.
Some devices have hardware support for AES-CCM but not AES-GCM, so
they are unable to follow the foregoing recommendations regarding
cipher suites. There are even devices that do not support public key
cryptography at all, but they are out of scope entirely.
When using ECDSA signatures for authentication of TLS peers, it is
RECOMMENDED that implementations use the NIST curve P-256. In
addition, to avoid predictable or repeated nonces (that would allow
revealing the long term signing key), it is RECOMMENDED that
implementations implement "deterministic ECDSA" as specified in
[RFC6979] and in line with the recommendations in [RFC8446].
4.2.1. Implementation Details
Clients SHOULD include TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as the
first proposal to any server, unless they have prior knowledge that
the server cannot respond to a TLS 1.2 client_hello message.
Servers MUST prefer this cipher suite over weaker cipher suites
whenever it is proposed, even if it is not the first proposal.
Clients are of course free to offer stronger cipher suites, e.g.,
using AES-256; when they do, the server SHOULD prefer the stronger
cipher suite unless there are compelling reasons (e.g., seriously
degraded performance) to choose otherwise.
The previous version of this document implicitly allowed the old RFC
5246 mandatory-to-implement cipher suite,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA. At the time of writing, this cipher
suite does not provide additional interoperability, except with
extremely old clients. As with other cipher suites that do not
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provide forward secrecy, implementations SHOULD NOT support this
cipher suite. Other application protocols specify other cipher
suites as mandatory to implement (MTI).
[RFC8422] allows clients and servers to negotiate ECDH parameters
(curves). Both clients and servers SHOULD include the "Supported
Elliptic Curves" extension [RFC8422]. Clients and servers SHOULD
support the NIST P-256 (secp256r1) [RFC8422] and X25519 (x25519)
[RFC7748] curves. Note that [RFC8422] deprecates all but the
uncompressed point format. Therefore, if the client sends an
ec_point_formats extension, the ECPointFormatList MUST contain a
single element, "uncompressed".
4.3. Cipher Suites for TLS 1.3
This document does not specify any cipher suites for TLS 1.3.
Readers are referred to Sec. 9.1 of [RFC8446] for cipher suite
recommendations.
4.4. Limits on Key Usage
All ciphers have an upper limit on the amount of traffic that can be
securely protected with any given key. In the case of AEAD cipher
suites, two separate limits are maintained for each key:
1. Confidentiality limit (CL), i.e., the number of records that can
be encrypted.
2. Integrity limit (IL), i.e., the number of records that are
allowed to fail authentication.
The latter only applies to DTLS since TLS connections are torn down
on the first decryption failure.
When a sender is approaching CL, the implementation SHOULD initiate a
new handshake (or in TLS 1.3, a Key Update) to rotate the session
key.
When a receiver has reached IL, the implementation SHOULD close the
connection.
For all TLS 1.3 cipher suites, readers are referred to Section 5.5 of
[RFC8446] for the values of CL and IL. For all DTLS 1.3 cipher
suites, readers are referred to Section 4.5.3 of
[I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13].
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For all AES-GCM cipher suites recommended for TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2 in
this document, CL can be derived by plugging the corresponding
parameters into the inequalities in Section 6.1 of
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-aead-limits] that apply to random, partially implicit
nonces, i.e., the nonce construction used in TLS 1.2. Although the
obtained figures are slightly higher than those for TLS 1.3, it is
RECOMMENDED that the same limit of 2^24.5 records is used for both
versions.
For all AES-GCM cipher suites recommended for DTLS 1.2, IL (obtained
from the same inequalities referenced above) is 2^28.
4.5. Public Key Length
When using the cipher suites recommended in this document, two public
keys are normally used in the TLS handshake: one for the Diffie-
Hellman key agreement and one for server authentication. Where a
client certificate is used, a third public key is added.
With a key exchange based on modular exponential (MODP) Diffie-
Hellman groups ("DHE" cipher suites), DH key lengths of at least 2048
bits are REQUIRED.
Rationale: For various reasons, in practice, DH keys are typically
generated in lengths that are powers of two (e.g., 2^10 = 1024 bits,
2^11 = 2048 bits, 2^12 = 4096 bits). Because a DH key of 1228 bits
would be roughly equivalent to only an 80-bit symmetric key
[RFC3766], it is better to use keys longer than that for the "DHE"
family of cipher suites. A DH key of 1926 bits would be roughly
equivalent to a 100-bit symmetric key [RFC3766]. A DH key of 2048
bits (equivalent to a 112-bit symmetric key) is the minimum allowed
by the latest revision of [NIST.SP.800-56A], as of this writing (see
in particular Appendix D).
As noted in [RFC3766], correcting for the emergence of a TWIRL
machine would imply that 1024-bit DH keys yield about 65 bits of
equivalent strength and that a 2048-bit DH key would yield about 92
bits of equivalent strength. The Logjam attack [Logjam] further
demonstrates that 1024-bit Diffie Hellman parameters should be
avoided.
With regard to ECDH keys, implementers are referred to the IANA
"Supported Groups Registry" (former "EC Named Curve Registry"),
within the "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Parameters" registry
[IANA_TLS], and in particular to the "recommended" groups. Curves of
less than 224 bits MUST NOT be used. This recommendation is in-line
with the latest revision of [NIST.SP.800-56A].
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When using RSA, servers SHOULD authenticate using certificates with
at least a 2048-bit modulus for the public key. In addition, the use
of the SHA-256 hash algorithm is RECOMMENDED and SHA-1 or MD5 MUST
NOT be used ([RFC9155], and see [CAB-Baseline] for more details).
Clients MUST indicate to servers that they request SHA-256, by using
the "Signature Algorithms" extension defined in TLS 1.2.
4.6. Truncated HMAC
Implementations MUST NOT use the Truncated HMAC extension, defined in
Section 7 of [RFC6066].
Rationale: the extension does not apply to the AEAD cipher suites
recommended above. However it does apply to most other TLS cipher
suites. Its use has been shown to be insecure in [PatersonRS11].
5. Applicability Statement
The recommendations of this document primarily apply to the
implementation and deployment of application protocols that are most
commonly used with TLS and DTLS on the Internet today. Examples
include, but are not limited to:
* Web software and services that wish to protect HTTP traffic with
TLS.
* Email software and services that wish to protect IMAP, POP3, or
SMTP traffic with TLS.
* Instant-messaging software and services that wish to protect
Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) or Internet
Relay Chat (IRC) traffic with TLS.
* Realtime media software and services that wish to protect Secure
Realtime Transport Protocol (SRTP) traffic with DTLS.
This document does not modify the implementation and deployment
recommendations (e.g., mandatory-to-implement cipher suites)
prescribed by existing application protocols that employ TLS or DTLS.
If the community that uses such an application protocol wishes to
modernize its usage of TLS or DTLS to be consistent with the best
practices recommended here, it needs to explicitly update the
existing application protocol definition (one example is [RFC7590],
which updates [RFC6120]).
Designers of new application protocols developed through the Internet
Standards Process [RFC2026] are expected at minimum to conform to the
best practices recommended here, unless they provide documentation of
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compelling reasons that would prevent such conformance (e.g.,
widespread deployment on constrained devices that lack support for
the necessary algorithms).
5.1. Security Services
This document provides recommendations for an audience that wishes to
secure their communication with TLS to achieve the following:
* Confidentiality: all application-layer communication is encrypted
with the goal that no party should be able to decrypt it except
the intended receiver.
* Data integrity: any changes made to the communication in transit
are detectable by the receiver.
* Authentication: an endpoint of the TLS communication is
authenticated as the intended entity to communicate with.
With regard to authentication, TLS enables authentication of one or
both endpoints in the communication. In the context of opportunistic
security [RFC7435], TLS is sometimes used without authentication. As
discussed in Section 5.2, considerations for opportunistic security
are not in scope for this document.
If deployers deviate from the recommendations given in this document,
they need to be aware that they might lose access to one of the
foregoing security services.
This document applies only to environments where confidentiality is
required. It recommends algorithms and configuration options that
enforce secrecy of the data in transit.
This document also assumes that data integrity protection is always
one of the goals of a deployment. In cases where integrity is not
required, it does not make sense to employ TLS in the first place.
There are attacks against confidentiality-only protection that
utilize the lack of integrity to also break confidentiality (see, for
instance, [DegabrieleP07] in the context of IPsec).
This document addresses itself to application protocols that are most
commonly used on the Internet with TLS and DTLS. Typically, all
communication between TLS clients and TLS servers requires all three
of the above security services. This is particularly true where TLS
clients are user agents like Web browsers or email software.
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This document does not address the rarer deployment scenarios where
one of the above three properties is not desired, such as the use
case described in Section 5.2 below. As another scenario where
confidentiality is not needed, consider a monitored network where the
authorities in charge of the respective traffic domain require full
access to unencrypted (plaintext) traffic, and where users
collaborate and send their traffic in the clear.
5.2. Opportunistic Security
There are several important scenarios in which the use of TLS is
optional, i.e., the client decides dynamically ("opportunistically")
whether to use TLS with a particular server or to connect in the
clear. This practice, often called "opportunistic security", is
described at length in [RFC7435] and is often motivated by a desire
for backward compatibility with legacy deployments.
In these scenarios, some of the recommendations in this document
might be too strict, since adhering to them could cause fallback to
cleartext, a worse outcome than using TLS with an outdated protocol
version or cipher suite.
6. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
7. Security Considerations
This entire document discusses the security practices directly
affecting applications using the TLS protocol. This section contains
broader security considerations related to technologies used in
conjunction with or by TLS.
7.1. Host Name Validation
Application authors should take note that some TLS implementations do
not validate host names. If the TLS implementation they are using
does not validate host names, authors might need to write their own
validation code or consider using a different TLS implementation.
It is noted that the requirements regarding host name validation
(and, in general, binding between the TLS layer and the protocol that
runs above it) vary between different protocols. For HTTPS, these
requirements are defined by Sections 4.3.3, 4.3.4 and 4.3.5 of
[I-D.ietf-httpbis-semantics].
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Readers are referred to [RFC6125] for further details regarding
generic host name validation in the TLS context. In addition, that
RFC contains a long list of example protocols, some of which
implement a policy very different from HTTPS.
If the host name is discovered indirectly and in an insecure manner
(e.g., by an insecure DNS query for an MX or SRV record), it SHOULD
NOT be used as a reference identifier [RFC6125] even when it matches
the presented certificate. This proviso does not apply if the host
name is discovered securely (for further discussion, see [DANE-SRV]
and [DANE-SMTP]).
Host name validation typically applies only to the leaf "end entity"
certificate. Naturally, in order to ensure proper authentication in
the context of the PKI, application clients need to verify the entire
certification path in accordance with [RFC5280] (see also [RFC6125]).
7.2. AES-GCM
Section 4.2 above recommends the use of the AES-GCM authenticated
encryption algorithm. Please refer to Section 11 of [RFC5246] for
general security considerations when using TLS 1.2, and to Section 6
of [RFC5288] for security considerations that apply specifically to
AES-GCM when used with TLS.
7.2.1. Nonce Reuse in TLS 1.2
The existence of deployed TLS stacks that mistakenly reuse the AES-
GCM nonce is documented in [Boeck2016], showing there is an actual
risk of AES-GCM getting implemented in an insecure way and thus
making TLS sessions that use an AES-GCM cipher suite vulnerable to
attacks such as [Joux2006]. (See [CVE] records: CVE-2016-0270, CVE-
2016-10213, CVE-2016-10212, CVE-2017-5933.)
While this problem has been fixed in TLS 1.3, which enforces a
deterministic method to generate nonces from record sequence numbers
and shared secrets for all of its AEAD cipher suites (including AES-
GCM), TLS 1.2 implementations could still choose their own
(potentially insecure) nonce generation methods.
It is therefore RECOMMENDED that TLS 1.2 implementations use the
64-bit sequence number to populate the nonce_explicit part of the GCM
nonce, as described in the first two paragraphs of Section 5.3 of
[RFC8446]. Note that this stronger recommendation updates Section 3
of [RFC5288]: "The nonce_explicit MAY be the 64-bit sequence number."
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We note that at the time of writing there are no cipher suites
defined for nonce reuse resistant algorithms such as AES-GCM-SIV
[RFC8452].
7.3. Forward Secrecy
Forward secrecy (also called "perfect forward secrecy" or "PFS" and
defined in [RFC4949]) is a defense against an attacker who records
encrypted conversations where the session keys are only encrypted
with the communicating parties' long-term keys.
Should the attacker be able to obtain these long-term keys at some
point later in time, the session keys and thus the entire
conversation could be decrypted.
In the context of TLS and DTLS, such compromise of long-term keys is
not entirely implausible. It can happen, for example, due to:
* A client or server being attacked by some other attack vector, and
the private key retrieved.
* A long-term key retrieved from a device that has been sold or
otherwise decommissioned without prior wiping.
* A long-term key used on a device as a default key [Heninger2012].
* A key generated by a trusted third party like a CA, and later
retrieved from it either by extortion or compromise
[Soghoian2011].
* A cryptographic break-through, or the use of asymmetric keys with
insufficient length [Kleinjung2010].
* Social engineering attacks against system administrators.
* Collection of private keys from inadequately protected backups.
Forward secrecy ensures in such cases that it is not feasible for an
attacker to determine the session keys even if the attacker has
obtained the long-term keys some time after the conversation. It
also protects against an attacker who is in possession of the long-
term keys but remains passive during the conversation.
Forward secrecy is generally achieved by using the Diffie-Hellman
scheme to derive session keys. The Diffie-Hellman scheme has both
parties maintain private secrets and send parameters over the network
as modular powers over certain cyclic groups. The properties of the
so-called Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) allow the parties to
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derive the session keys without an eavesdropper being able to do so.
There is currently no known attack against DLP if sufficiently large
parameters are chosen. A variant of the Diffie-Hellman scheme uses
elliptic curves instead of the originally proposed modular
arithmetic. Given the current state of the art, elliptic-curve
Diffie-Hellman appears to be more efficient, permits shorter key
lengths, and allows less freedom for implementation errors than
finite-field Diffie-Hellman.
Unfortunately, many TLS/DTLS cipher suites were defined that do not
feature forward secrecy, e.g., TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256. This
document therefore advocates strict use of forward-secrecy-only
ciphers.
7.4. Diffie-Hellman Exponent Reuse
For performance reasons, many TLS implementations reuse Diffie-
Hellman and Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman exponents across multiple
connections. Such reuse can result in major security issues:
* If exponents are reused for too long (in some cases, even as
little as a few hours), an attacker who gains access to the host
can decrypt previous connections. In other words, exponent reuse
negates the effects of forward secrecy.
* TLS implementations that reuse exponents should test the DH public
key they receive for group membership, in order to avoid some
known attacks. These tests are not standardized in TLS at the
time of writing, although general guidance in this area is
provided by [NIST.SP.800-56A] and available in many protocol
implementations.
* Under certain conditions, the use of static finite-field DH keys,
or of ephemeral finite-field DH keys that are reused across
multiple connections, can lead to timing attacks (such as those
described in [RACCOON]) on the shared secrets used in Diffie-
Hellman key exchange.
* An "invalid curve" attack can be mounted against elliptic-curve DH
if the victim does not verify that the received point lies on the
correct curve. If the victim is reusing the DH secrets, the
attacker can repeat the probe varying the points to recover the
full secret (see [Antipa2003] and [Jager2015]).
To address these concerns:
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* TLS implementations SHOULD NOT use static finite-field DH keys and
SHOULD NOT reuse ephemeral finite-field DH keys across multiple
connections.
* Server implementations that want to reuse elliptic-curve DH keys
SHOULD either use a "safe curve" [SAFECURVES] (e.g., X25519), or
perform the checks described in [NIST.SP.800-56A] on the received
points.
7.5. Certificate Revocation
The following considerations and recommendations represent the
current state of the art regarding certificate revocation, even
though no complete and efficient solution exists for the problem of
checking the revocation status of common public key certificates
[RFC5280]:
* Certificate revocation is an important tool when recovering from
attacks on the TLS implementation, as well as cases of misissued
certificates. TLS implementations MUST implement a strategy to
distrust revoked certificates.
* Although Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) are the most widely
supported mechanism for distributing revocation information, they
have known scaling challenges that limit their usefulness, despite
workarounds such as partitioned CRLs and delta CRLs. The more
modern [CRLite] and the follow-on Let's Revoke [LetsRevoke] build
on the availability of Certificate Transparency [RFC9162] logs and
aggressive compression to allow practical use of the CRL
infrastructure, but at the time of writing, neither solution is
deployed for client-side revocation processing at scale.
* Proprietary mechanisms that embed revocation lists in the Web
browser's configuration database cannot scale beyond a small
number of the most heavily used Web servers.
* The On-Line Certification Status Protocol (OCSP) [RFC6960] in its
basic form presents both scaling and privacy issues. In addition,
clients typically "soft-fail", meaning that they do not abort the
TLS connection if the OCSP server does not respond. (However,
this might be a workaround to avoid denial-of-service attacks if
an OCSP responder is taken offline.). For an up-to-date survey of
the status of OCSP deployment in the Web PKI see [Chung18].
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* The TLS Certificate Status Request extension (Section 8 of
[RFC6066]), commonly called "OCSP stapling", resolves the
operational issues with OCSP. However, it is still ineffective in
the presence of a MITM attacker because the attacker can simply
ignore the client's request for a stapled OCSP response.
* [RFC7633] defines a certificate extension that indicates that
clients must expect stapled OCSP responses for the certificate and
must abort the handshake ("hard-fail") if such a response is not
available.
* OCSP stapling as used in TLS 1.2 does not extend to intermediate
certificates within a certificate chain. The Multiple Certificate
Status extension [RFC6961] addresses this shortcoming, but it has
seen little deployment and had been deprecated by [RFC8446]. As a
result, we no longer recommend this extension for TLS 1.2.
* TLS 1.3 (Section 4.4.2.1 of [RFC8446]) allows the association of
OCSP information with intermediate certificates by using an
extension to the CertificateEntry structure. However using this
facility remains impractical because many CAs either do not
publish OCSP for CA certificates or publish OCSP reports with a
lifetime that is too long to be useful.
* Both CRLs and OCSP depend on relatively reliable connectivity to
the Internet, which might not be available to certain kinds of
nodes. A common example is newly provisioned devices that need to
establish a secure connection in order to boot up for the first
time.
For the common use cases of public key certificates in TLS, servers
SHOULD support the following as a best practice given the current
state of the art and as a foundation for a possible future solution:
OCSP [RFC6960] and OCSP stapling using the status_request extension
defined in [RFC6066]. Note that the exact mechanism for embedding
the status_request extension differs between TLS 1.2 and 1.3. As a
matter of local policy, server operators MAY request that CAs issue
must-staple [RFC7633] certificates for the server and/or for client
authentication, but we recommend to review the operational conditions
before deciding on this approach.
The considerations in this section do not apply to scenarios where
the DANE-TLSA resource record [RFC6698] is used to signal to a client
which certificate a server considers valid and good to use for TLS
connections.
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8. Acknowledgments
Thanks to Alexey Melnikov, Andrei Popov, Christian Huitema, Daniel
Kahn Gillmor, David Benjamin, Eric Rescorla, Hannes Tschofenig,
Hubert Kario, Ilari Liusvaara, John Mattsson, John R Levine, Julien
Élie, Leif Johansson, Martin Thomson, Mohit Sahni, Nick Sullivan,
Nimrod Aviram, Rich Salz, Ryan Sleevi, Sean Turner, Valery Smyslov,
Viktor Dukhovni for helpful comments and discussions that have shaped
this document.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the contribution of Ralph Holz,
who was a coauthor of RFC 7525, the previous version of this
document.
See RFC 7525 for additional acknowledgments for the previous revision
of this document.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-httpbis-semantics]
Fielding, R. T., Nottingham, M., and J. Reschke, "HTTP
Semantics", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
httpbis-semantics-19, 12 September 2021,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-
semantics-19.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]
Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tls-
dtls13-43, 30 April 2021,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-tls-
dtls13-43.txt>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3766] Orman, H. and P. Hoffman, "Determining Strengths For
Public Keys Used For Exchanging Symmetric Keys", BCP 86,
RFC 3766, DOI 10.17487/RFC3766, April 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3766>.
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[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC5288] Salowey, J., Choudhury, A., and D. McGrew, "AES Galois
Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS", RFC 5288,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5288, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5288>.
[RFC5746] Rescorla, E., Ray, M., Dispensa, S., and N. Oskov,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication
Extension", RFC 5746, DOI 10.17487/RFC5746, February 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5746>.
[RFC6066] Eastlake 3rd, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Extensions: Extension Definitions", RFC 6066,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6066, January 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6066>.
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March
2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.
[RFC6176] Turner, S. and T. Polk, "Prohibiting Secure Sockets Layer
(SSL) Version 2.0", RFC 6176, DOI 10.17487/RFC6176, March
2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6176>.
[RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.
[RFC6979] Pornin, T., "Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature
Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA)", RFC 6979, DOI 10.17487/RFC6979, August
2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6979>.
[RFC7301] Friedl, S., Popov, A., Langley, A., and E. Stephan,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Application-Layer Protocol
Negotiation Extension", RFC 7301, DOI 10.17487/RFC7301,
July 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7301>.
[RFC7465] Popov, A., "Prohibiting RC4 Cipher Suites", RFC 7465,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7465, February 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7465>.
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[RFC7627] Bhargavan, K., Ed., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Pironti, A.,
Langley, A., and M. Ray, "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Session Hash and Extended Master Secret Extension",
RFC 7627, DOI 10.17487/RFC7627, September 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7627>.
[RFC7748] Langley, A., Hamburg, M., and S. Turner, "Elliptic Curves
for Security", RFC 7748, DOI 10.17487/RFC7748, January
2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7748>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8422] Nir, Y., Josefsson, S., and M. Pegourie-Gonnard, "Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer
Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier", RFC 8422,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8422, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8422>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
[RFC8740] Benjamin, D., "Using TLS 1.3 with HTTP/2", RFC 8740,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8740, February 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8740>.
[RFC8996] Moriarty, K. and S. Farrell, "Deprecating TLS 1.0 and TLS
1.1", BCP 195, RFC 8996, DOI 10.17487/RFC8996, March 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8996>.
[RFC9155] Velvindron, L., Moriarty, K., and A. Ghedini, "Deprecating
MD5 and SHA-1 Signature Hashes in TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2",
RFC 9155, DOI 10.17487/RFC9155, December 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9155>.
9.2. Informative References
[ALPACA] Brinkmann, M., Dresen, C., Merget, R., Poddebniak, D.,
Müller, J., Somorovsky, J., Schwenk, J., and S. Schinzel,
"ALPACA: Application Layer Protocol Confusion - Analyzing
and Mitigating Cracks in TLS Authentication", 30th USENIX
Security Symposium (USENIX Security 21) , 2021,
<https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/
presentation/brinkmann>.
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[Antipa2003]
Antipa, A., Brown, D.R.L., Menezes, A., Struik, R., and
S.A. Vanstone, "Validation of Elliptic Curve Public Keys",
Public Key Cryptography - PKC 2003 , 2003.
[BETTERCRYPTO]
bettercrypto.org, "Applied Crypto Hardening", April 2015,
<https://bettercrypto.org/>.
[Boeck2016]
Böck, H., Zauner, A., Devlin, S., Somorovsky, J., and P.
Jovanovic, "Nonce-Disrespecting Adversaries: Practical
Forgery Attacks on GCM in TLS", May 2016,
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/475.pdf>.
[CAB-Baseline]
CA/Browser Forum, "Baseline Requirements for the Issuance
and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates Version
1.1.6", 2013, <https://www.cabforum.org/documents.html>.
[Chung18] Chung, T., Lok, J., Chandrasekaran, B., Choffnes, D.,
Levin, D., Maggs, B., Mislove, A., Rula, J., Sullivan, N.,
and C. Wilson, "Is the Web Ready for OCSP Must-Staple?",
Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018,
DOI 10.1145/3278532.3278543, October 2018,
<https://doi.org/10.1145/3278532.3278543>.
[CRLite] Larisch, J., Choffnes, D., Levin, D., Maggs, B., Mislove,
A., and C. Wilson, "CRLite: A Scalable System for Pushing
All TLS Revocations to All Browsers", 2017 IEEE Symposium
on Security and Privacy (SP), DOI 10.1109/sp.2017.17, May
2017, <https://doi.org/10.1109/sp.2017.17>.
[CVE] MITRE, "Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures",
<https://cve.mitre.org>.
[DANE-SMTP]
Dukhovni, V. and W. Hardaker, "SMTP Security via
Opportunistic DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities
(DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7672,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7672, October 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7672>.
[DANE-SRV] Finch, T., Miller, M., and P. Saint-Andre, "Using DNS-
Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) TLSA Records
with SRV Records", RFC 7673, DOI 10.17487/RFC7673, October
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7673>.
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[DegabrieleP07]
Degabriele, J. and K. Paterson, "Attacking the IPsec
Standards in Encryption-only Configurations", 2007 IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP '07),
DOI 10.1109/sp.2007.8, May 2007,
<https://doi.org/10.1109/sp.2007.8>.
[DEP-SSLv3]
Barnes, R., Thomson, M., Pironti, A., and A. Langley,
"Deprecating Secure Sockets Layer Version 3.0", RFC 7568,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7568, June 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7568>.
[Heninger2012]
Heninger, N., Durumeric, Z., Wustrow, E., and J.A.
Halderman, "Mining Your Ps and Qs: Detection of Widespread
Weak Keys in Network Devices", Usenix Security
Symposium 2012, 2012.
[I-D.ietf-tls-esni]
Rescorla, E., Oku, K., Sullivan, N., and C. A. Wood, "TLS
Encrypted Client Hello", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-tls-esni-14, 13 February 2022,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-tls-esni-
14.txt>.
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-aead-limits]
Günther, F., Thomson, M., and C. A. Wood, "Usage Limits on
AEAD Algorithms", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
irtf-cfrg-aead-limits-04, 7 March 2022,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-irtf-cfrg-aead-
limits-04.txt>.
[IANA_TLS] IANA, "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Parameters",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters>.
[Jager2015]
Jager, T., Schwenk, J., and J. Somorovsky, "Practical
Invalid Curve Attacks on TLS-ECDH", European Symposium on
Research in Computer Security (ESORICS) 2015 , 2015.
[Joux2006] Joux, A., "Authentication Failures in NIST version of
GCM", 2006, <https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/projects/
block-cipher-techniques/documents/bcm/comments/800-38-
series-drafts/gcm/joux_comments.pdf>.
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[Kleinjung2010]
Kleinjung, T., Aoki, K., Franke, J., Lenstra, A., Thomé,
E., Bos, J., Gaudry, P., Kruppa, A., Montgomery, P.,
Osvik, D., te Riele, H., Timofeev, A., and P. Zimmermann,
"Factorization of a 768-Bit RSA Modulus", Advances in
Cryptology - CRYPTO 2010 pp. 333-350,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-14623-7_18, 2010,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14623-7_18>.
[LetsRevoke]
Smith, T., Dickinson, L., and K. Seamons, "Let's Revoke:
Scalable Global Certificate Revocation", Proceedings 2020
Network and Distributed System Security Symposium,
DOI 10.14722/ndss.2020.24084, 2020,
<https://doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2020.24084>.
[Logjam] Adrian, D., Bhargavan, K., Durumeric, Z., Gaudry, P.,
Green, M., Halderman, J., Heninger, N., Springall, D.,
Thomé, E., Valenta, L., VanderSloot, B., Wustrow, E.,
Zanella-Béguelin, S., and P. Zimmermann, "Imperfect
Forward Secrecy: How Diffie-Hellman Fails in Practice",
Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer
and Communications Security, DOI 10.1145/2810103.2813707,
October 2015, <https://doi.org/10.1145/2810103.2813707>.
[Multiple-Encryption]
Merkle, R. and M. Hellman, "On the security of multiple
encryption", Communications of the ACM Vol. 24, pp.
465-467, DOI 10.1145/358699.358718, July 1981,
<https://doi.org/10.1145/358699.358718>.
[NIST.SP.800-56A]
Barker, E., Chen, L., Roginsky, A., Vassilev, A., and R.
Davis, "Recommendation for pair-wise key-establishment
schemes using discrete logarithm cryptography", National
Institute of Standards and Technology report,
DOI 10.6028/nist.sp.800-56ar3, April 2018,
<https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.sp.800-56ar3>.
[PatersonRS11]
Paterson, K., Ristenpart, T., and T. Shrimpton, "Tag Size
Does Matter: Attacks and Proofs for the TLS Record
Protocol", Lecture Notes in Computer Science pp. 372-389,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-25385-0_20, 2011,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25385-0_20>.
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[POODLE] US-CERT, "SSL 3.0 Protocol Vulnerability and POODLE
Attack", October 2014,
<https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA14-290A>.
[RACCOON] Merget, R., Brinkmann, M., Aviram, N., Somorovsky, J.,
Mittmann, J., and J. Schwenk, "Raccoon Attack: Finding and
Exploiting Most-Significant-Bit-Oracles in TLS-DH(E)",
30th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 21) ,
2021, <https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/
presentation/merget>.
[RFC2026] Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision
3", BCP 9, RFC 2026, DOI 10.17487/RFC2026, October 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2026>.
[RFC2246] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",
RFC 2246, DOI 10.17487/RFC2246, January 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2246>.
[RFC3602] Frankel, S., Glenn, R., and S. Kelly, "The AES-CBC Cipher
Algorithm and Its Use with IPsec", RFC 3602,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3602, September 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3602>.
[RFC4346] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4346, April 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4346>.
[RFC4347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security", RFC 4347, DOI 10.17487/RFC4347, April 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4347>.
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.
[RFC5077] Salowey, J., Zhou, H., Eronen, P., and H. Tschofenig,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without
Server-Side State", RFC 5077, DOI 10.17487/RFC5077,
January 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5077>.
[RFC5116] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
Encryption", RFC 5116, DOI 10.17487/RFC5116, January 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5116>.
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[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC6101] Freier, A., Karlton, P., and P. Kocher, "The Secure
Sockets Layer (SSL) Protocol Version 3.0", RFC 6101,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6101, August 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6101>.
[RFC6120] Saint-Andre, P., "Extensible Messaging and Presence
Protocol (XMPP): Core", RFC 6120, DOI 10.17487/RFC6120,
March 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6120>.
[RFC6698] Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication
of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Protocol: TLSA", RFC 6698, DOI 10.17487/RFC6698, August
2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6698>.
[RFC6797] Hodges, J., Jackson, C., and A. Barth, "HTTP Strict
Transport Security (HSTS)", RFC 6797,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6797, November 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6797>.
[RFC6960] Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A.,
Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key
Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP",
RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6960>.
[RFC6961] Pettersen, Y., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Multiple Certificate Status Request Extension", RFC 6961,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6961, June 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6961>.
[RFC7435] Dukhovni, V., "Opportunistic Security: Some Protection
Most of the Time", RFC 7435, DOI 10.17487/RFC7435,
December 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7435>.
[RFC7457] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, "Summarizing
Known Attacks on Transport Layer Security (TLS) and
Datagram TLS (DTLS)", RFC 7457, DOI 10.17487/RFC7457,
February 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7457>.
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[RFC7507] Moeller, B. and A. Langley, "TLS Fallback Signaling Cipher
Suite Value (SCSV) for Preventing Protocol Downgrade
Attacks", RFC 7507, DOI 10.17487/RFC7507, April 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7507>.
[RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.
[RFC7590] Saint-Andre, P. and T. Alkemade, "Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) in the Extensible Messaging and Presence
Protocol (XMPP)", RFC 7590, DOI 10.17487/RFC7590, June
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7590>.
[RFC7633] Hallam-Baker, P., "X.509v3 Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Feature Extension", RFC 7633, DOI 10.17487/RFC7633,
October 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7633>.
[RFC7919] Gillmor, D., "Negotiated Finite Field Diffie-Hellman
Ephemeral Parameters for Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
RFC 7919, DOI 10.17487/RFC7919, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7919>.
[RFC8452] Gueron, S., Langley, A., and Y. Lindell, "AES-GCM-SIV:
Nonce Misuse-Resistant Authenticated Encryption",
RFC 8452, DOI 10.17487/RFC8452, April 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8452>.
[RFC8470] Thomson, M., Nottingham, M., and W. Tarreau, "Using Early
Data in HTTP", RFC 8470, DOI 10.17487/RFC8470, September
2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8470>.
[RFC9001] Thomson, M., Ed. and S. Turner, Ed., "Using TLS to Secure
QUIC", RFC 9001, DOI 10.17487/RFC9001, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9001>.
[RFC9162] Laurie, B., Messeri, E., and R. Stradling, "Certificate
Transparency Version 2.0", RFC 9162, DOI 10.17487/RFC9162,
December 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9162>.
[SAFECURVES]
Bernstein, D.J. and T. Lange, "SafeCurves: Choosing Safe
Curves for Elliptic-Curve Cryptography", December 2014,
<https://safecurves.cr.yp.to>.
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[Soghoian2011]
Soghoian, C. and S. Stamm, "Certified Lies: Detecting and
Defeating Government Interception Attacks Against SSL",
SSRN Electronic Journal, DOI 10.2139/ssrn.1591033, 2010,
<https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1591033>.
[Springall16]
Springall, D., Durumeric, Z., and J. Halderman, "Measuring
the Security Harm of TLS Crypto Shortcuts", Proceedings of
the 2016 Internet Measurement Conference,
DOI 10.1145/2987443.2987480, November 2016,
<https://doi.org/10.1145/2987443.2987480>.
[Sy2018] Sy, E., Burkert, C., Federrath, H., and M. Fischer,
"Tracking Users across the Web via TLS Session
Resumption", Proceedings of the 34th Annual Computer
Security Applications Conference,
DOI 10.1145/3274694.3274708, December 2018,
<https://doi.org/10.1145/3274694.3274708>.
[triple-handshake]
Bhargavan, K., Lavaud, A., Fournet, C., Pironti, A., and
P. Strub, "Triple Handshakes and Cookie Cutters: Breaking
and Fixing Authentication over TLS", 2014 IEEE Symposium
on Security and Privacy, DOI 10.1109/sp.2014.14, May 2014,
<https://doi.org/10.1109/sp.2014.14>.
Appendix A. Differences from RFC 7525
This revision of the Best Current Practices contains numerous
changes, and this section is focused on the normative changes.
* High level differences:
- Clarified items (e.g. renegotiation) that only apply to TLS
1.2.
- Changed status of TLS 1.0 and 1.1 from SHOULD NOT to MUST NOT.
- Added TLS 1.3 at a SHOULD level.
- Similar changes to DTLS, pending publication of DTLS 1.3.
- Specific guidance for multiplexed protocols.
- MUST-level implementation requirement for ALPN, and more
specific SHOULD-level guidance for ALPN and SNI.
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- Limits on key usage.
- New attacks since [RFC7457]: ALPACA, Raccoon, Logjam, "Nonce-
Disrespecting Adversaries".
- RFC 6961 (OCSP status_request_v2) has been deprecated.
* Differences specific to TLS 1.2:
- SHOULD-level guidance on AES-GCM nonce generation.
- SHOULD NOT use (static or ephemeral) finite-field DH key
agreement.
- SHOULD NOT reuse ephemeral finite-field DH keys across multiple
connections.
- 2048-bit DH now a MUST, ECDH minimal curve size is 224, vs. 192
previously.
- Support for extended_master_secret is a SHOULD. Also removed
other, more complicated, related mitigations.
- SHOULD-level restriction on the TLS session duration, depending
on the rotation period of an [RFC5077] ticket key.
- Drop TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES from the recommended ciphers
- Add TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES to the recommended ciphers
- SHOULD NOT use the old MTI cipher suite,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA.
- Recommend curve X25519 alongside NIST P-256
* Differences specific to TLS 1.3:
- New TLS 1.3 capabilities: 0-RTT.
- Removed capabilities: renegotiation, compression.
- Added mention of TLS Encrypted Client Hello, but no
recommendation to use until it is finalized.
- SHOULD-level requirement for forward secrecy in TLS 1.3 session
resumption.
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- Generic SHOULD-level guidance to avoid 0-RTT unless it is
documented for the particular protocol.
Appendix B. Document History
// Note to RFC Editor: please remove before publication.
B.1. draft-ietf-uta-rfc7525bis-06
* Addressed several I-D nits raised by the document shepherd.
B.2. draft-ietf-uta-rfc7525bis-05
* Addressed WG Last Call comments, specifically:
- More clarity and guidance on session resumption.
- Clarity on TLS 1.2 renegotiation.
- Wording on the 0-RTT feature aligned with RFC 8446.
- SHOULD NOT guidance on static and ephemeral finite field DH
cipher suites.
- Revamped the recommended TLS 1.2 cipher suites, removing DHE
and adding ECDSA. The latter due to the wide adoption of ECDSA
certificates and in line with RFC 8446.
- Recommendation to use deterministic ECDSA.
- Finally deprecated the old TLS 1.2 MTI cipher suite.
- Deeper discussion of ECDH public key reuse issues, and as a
result, recommended support of X25519.
- Reworded the section on certificate revocation and OCSP
following a long mailing list thread.
B.3. draft-ietf-uta-rfc7525bis-04
* No version fallback from TLS 1.2 to earlier versions, therefore no
SCSV.
B.4. draft-ietf-uta-rfc7525bis-03
* Cipher integrity and confidentiality limits.
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* Require extended_master_secret.
B.5. draft-ietf-uta-rfc7525bis-02
* Adjusted text about ALPN support in application protocols
* Incorporated text from draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate
B.6. draft-ietf-uta-rfc7525bis-01
* Many more changes, including:
- SHOULD-level requirement for forward secrecy in TLS 1.3 session
resumption.
- Removed TLS 1.2 capabilities: renegotiation, compression.
- Specific guidance for multiplexed protocols.
- MUST-level implementation requirement for ALPN, and more
specific SHOULD-level guidance for ALPN and SNI.
- Generic SHOULD-level guidance to avoid 0-RTT unless it is
documented for the particular protocol.
- SHOULD-level guidance on AES-GCM nonce generation in TLS 1.2.
- SHOULD NOT use static DH keys or reuse ephemeral DH keys across
multiple connections.
- 2048-bit DH now a MUST, ECDH minimal curve size is 224, up from
192.
B.7. draft-ietf-uta-rfc7525bis-00
* Renamed: WG document.
* Started populating list of changes from RFC 7525.
* General rewording of abstract and intro for revised version.
* Protocol versions, fallback.
* Reference to ECHO.
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B.8. draft-sheffer-uta-rfc7525bis-00
* Renamed, since the BCP number does not change.
* Added an empty "Differences from RFC 7525" section.
B.9. draft-sheffer-uta-bcp195bis-00
* Initial release, the RFC 7525 text as-is, with some minor
editorial changes to the references.
Authors' Addresses
Yaron Sheffer
Intuit
Email: yaronf.ietf@gmail.com
Peter Saint-Andre
independent
Email: stpeter@stpeter.im
Thomas Fossati
arm
Email: thomas.fossati@arm.com
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