TLS/DTLS 1.3 Profiles for the Internet of Things
draft-ietf-uta-tls13-iot-profile-21
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Active".
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Hannes Tschofenig , Thomas Fossati , Michael Richardson , Daniel Migault | ||
| Last updated | 2026-06-09 (Latest revision 2026-05-25) | ||
| Replaces | draft-tschofenig-uta-tls13-profile | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Reviews |
IOTDIR Telechat review
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by Mohit Sethi
On the right track
TSVART IETF Last Call review
by Martin Duke
Ready w/nits
ARTART Telechat Review due 2026-08-04
Incomplete
SECDIR IETF Last Call Review due 2026-06-09
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|
||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | |
| Associated WG milestone |
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||
| Document shepherd | Renzo Navas | ||
| Shepherd write-up | Show Last changed 2026-02-25 | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Waiting for AD Go-Ahead | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Yes | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | Deb Cooley | ||
| Send notices to | renzoefra@gmail.com | ||
| IANA | IANA review state | IANA OK - No Actions Needed |
draft-ietf-uta-tls13-iot-profile-21
UTA H. Tschofenig
Internet-Draft UniBw M.
Updates: 7925 (if approved) T. Fossati
Intended status: Standards Track Linaro
Expires: 26 November 2026 M. Richardson
Sandelman Software Works
D. Migault
Ericsson
25 May 2026
TLS/DTLS 1.3 Profiles for the Internet of Things
draft-ietf-uta-tls13-iot-profile-21
Abstract
RFC 7925 offers guidance to developers on using TLS/DTLS 1.2 for
Internet of Things (IoT) devices with resource constraints. This
document is a companion to RFC 7925, defining TLS/DTLS 1.3 profiles
for IoT devices. Additionally, it updates RFC 7925 with respect to
the X.509 certificate profile and ciphersuite requirements.
Discussion Venues
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/thomas-fossati/draft-tls13-iot.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 26 November 2026.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Credential Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Error Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Session Resumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Compression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. Forward Secrecy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. Authentication and Integrity-only Cipher Suites . . . . . . . 7
9. Keep-Alive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10. Timers and ACKs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
11. Random Number Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
12. Server Name Indication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
13. Maximum Fragment Length Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
14. Crypto Agility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
15. Key Length Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
16. 0-RTT Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
17. Certificate Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
17.1. All Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
17.1.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
17.1.2. Serial Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
17.1.3. Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
17.1.4. Issuer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
17.1.5. Validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
17.1.6. Subject Public Key Info . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
17.1.7. Certificate Revocation Checks . . . . . . . . . . . 14
17.2. Root CA Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
17.2.1. Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
17.2.2. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
17.2.3. Subject Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
17.2.4. Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
17.2.5. Basic Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
17.3. Subordinate CA Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
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17.3.1. Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
17.3.2. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
17.3.3. Subject Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
17.3.4. Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
17.3.5. Basic Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
17.3.6. CRL Distribution Point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
17.3.7. Authority Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
17.4. End Entity Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
17.4.1. Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
17.4.2. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
17.4.3. Subject Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
17.4.4. Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
18. Update of Trust Anchors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
19. Certificate Overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
20. Ciphersuites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
21. Fault Attacks on Deterministic Signature Schemes . . . . . . 24
22. Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) Considerations . . . . . . . 24
23. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
24. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
25. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
26. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
26.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
26.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1. Introduction
| Note to RFC Editor: Once RFC 9846 (RFC 8446bis) is published,
| all references to RFC 8446 must be updated to refer to RFC
| 9846. All section references must also be updated accordingly.
In the rapidly evolving Internet of Things (IoT) ecosystem,
communication security is a critical requirement. The Transport
Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
protocols have been foundational for ensuring encryption, integrity,
and authenticity in communications. However, the constraints of a
certain class of IoT devices render conventional, off-the-shelf TLS/
DTLS implementations suboptimal for many IoT use cases. This
document addresses these limitations by specifying TLS 1.3 and DTLS
1.3 profiles that are optimized for resource-constrained IoT devices.
Note that IoT devices vary widely in terms of capabilities. While
some are highly resource-constrained, others offer performance
comparable to regular desktop computers but operate without end-user
interfaces. For a detailed description of the different classes of
IoT devices, please refer to [RFC7228] and [I-D.ietf-iotops-7228bis].
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It is crucial for developers to thoroughly assess the limitations of
their IoT devices and communication technologies to implement the
most suitable optimizations. The profiles in this document aim to
balance strong security with the hardware and software limitations of
IoT devices.
TLS 1.3 has been re-designed and several previously defined
extensions are not applicable to the new version of TLS/DTLS anymore.
The following features changed with the transition from TLS 1.2 to
1.3:
* TLS 1.3 introduced the concept of post-handshake authentication
messages, which partially replaced the need for the re-negotiation
feature [RFC5746] available in earlier TLS versions. However, the
rekeying mechanism defined in Section 4.6.3 of [RFC8446] does not
provide post-compromise security (see Appendix E.1.5 of
[RFC8446]). Furthermore, post-handshake authentication defined in
Section 4.6.2 of [RFC8446] only offers client authentication
(client-to-server). The "Exported Authenticator" specification,
see [RFC9261], added support for mutual post-handshake
authentication, but this requires the Certificate,
CertificateVerify and the Finished messages to be conveyed by the
application layer protocol, as it is exercised for HTTP/2 and
HTTP/3 in [I-D.ietf-httpbis-secondary-server-certs]. Therefore,
the application layer protocol must be enhanced whenever this
feature is required.
* Rekeying of the application traffic secret does not lead to an
update of the exporter secret (see Section 7.5 of [RFC8446]) since
the derived export secret is based on the exporter_master_secret
and not on the application traffic secret.
* Flight #4, which was used by EAP-TLS 1.2 [RFC5216], does not exist
in TLS 1.3. As a consequence, EAP-TLS 1.3 [RFC9190] introduced a
placeholder message.
* [RFC4279] introduced PSK-based authentication to TLS, a feature
re-designed in TLS 1.3. The "PSK identity hint" defined in
[RFC4279], which is used by the server to help the client in
selecting which PSK identity to use, is, however, not available
anymore in TLS 1.3.
* Finally, ciphersuites were deprecated and the RSA-based key
transport is not supported in TLS 1.3. As a consequence, only a
Diffie-Hellman-based key exchange is available for non-PSK-based
(i.e., certificate-based) authentication. (For PSK-based
authentication the use of Diffie-Hellman is optional.)
The profiles in this specification are designed to be adaptable to
the broad spectrum of IoT applications, from low-power consumer
devices to large-scale industrial deployments. It provides
guidelines for implementing TLS/DTLS 1.3 in diverse networking
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contexts, including reliable, connection-oriented transport via TCP
for TLS, and lightweight, connectionless communication via UDP for
DTLS. In particular, DTLS is emphasized for scenarios where low-
latency communication is paramount, such as multi-hop mesh networks
and low-power wide-area networks, where the amount of data exchanged
needs to be minimized.
This document offers comprehensive guidance for deploying secure
communication in resource-constrained IoT environments. It outlines
best practices for configuring TLS/DTLS 1.3 to meet the unique needs
of IoT devices, ensuring robust security without overwhelming their
limited processing, memory, and power resources. The document aims
to facilitate the development of secure and efficient IoT deployments
and promote the broad adoption of secure communication standards.
This document updates [RFC7925] with respect to the X.509 certificate
profile (Section 17) and ciphersuite requirements (Section 20).
2. Conventions and Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
This document reuses the terms "SHOULD+", "SHOULD-" and "MUST-" from
[RFC8221].
3. Credential Types
TLS/DTLS allow different credential types to be used. These include
X.509 certificates and raw public keys, pre-shared keys (PSKs), and
passwords. The extensions used in TLS/DTLS differ depending on the
credential types supported. Self-signed X.509 certificates are still
X.509, not raw public keys; raw public keys are conveyed via the
raw_public_key extension.
This profile considers three authentication modes for IoT devices:
(1) certificate-based, (2) raw public key-based and (3) external PSK-
based. PSK with (EC)DHE is optional and not assumed by default.
TLS/DTLS 1.3 supports PSK-based authentication, wherein PSKs can be
established via session tickets from prior connections or via some
external, out-of-band mechanism. To distinguish the two modes, the
former is called resumption PSK and the latter external PSK. For
performance reasons the support for resumption PSKs is often found in
implementations that use X.509 certificates for authentication.
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Implementations that only support external PSKs are common in
constrained devices; implementations using certificates often also
support resumption PSKs for performance.
A "plain" PSK-based TLS/DTLS client or server, which only implements
support for external PSKs as its long-term credential, MUST implement
the following extensions:
* Supported Versions,
* Cookie,
* Server Name Indication (SNI),
* Pre-Shared Key,
* PSK Key Exchange Modes, and
* Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN).
Note that these extensions may also appear in ECDHE or resumption
handshakes; the requirement here is that external PSK-only endpoints
MUST support them.
For external pre-shared keys, [RFC9258] recommends that applications
SHOULD provision separate PSKs for (D)TLS 1.3 and prior versions.
Where possible, the importer interface defined in [RFC9258] MUST be
used for external PSKs. This ensures that external PSKs used in
(D)TLS 1.3 are bound to a specific key derivation function (KDF) and
hash function.
SNI is discussed in Section 12; the justification for implementing
and using the ALPN extension can be found in [RFC9325].
An implementation supporting authentication based on certificates and
raw public keys MUST support digital signatures with
ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256. A compliant implementation MUST support the
key exchange with secp256r1 (NIST P-256) and SHOULD support key
exchange with X25519.
For TLS/DTLS clients and servers implementing raw public keys and/or
certificates the guidance for mandatory-to-implement extensions
described in Section 9.2 of [RFC8446] MUST be followed. In addition,
compliant implementations MUST implement the Record Size Limit (RSL)
extension; see Section 13.
Entities deploying IoT devices may select credential types based on
security characteristics, operational requirements, cost, and other
factors. Consequently, this specification does not prescribe a
single credential type but provides guidance on considerations
relevant to the use of particular types.
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4. Error Handling
TLS 1.3 simplified the Alert protocol but the underlying challenge in
an embedded context remains unchanged, namely what should an IoT
device do when it encounters an error situation. The classical
approach used in a desktop environment where the user is prompted is
often not applicable with unattended devices. Hence, it is more
important for a developer to find out from which error cases a device
can recover from.
5. Session Resumption
TLS 1.3 has built-in support for session resumption by utilizing PSK-
based credentials established in an earlier exchange.
6. Compression
TLS 1.3 does not define compression of application data traffic, as
offered by previous versions of TLS. Applications are therefore
responsible for transmitting payloads that are either compressed or
use a more efficient encoding otherwise.
With regards to the handshake itself, various strategies have been
applied to reduce the size of the exchanged payloads. TLS and DTLS
1.3 use less overhead, depending on the type of key confirmations,
when compared to previous versions of the protocol.
7. Forward Secrecy
RFC 8446 has removed Static RSA and Static Diffie-Hellman cipher
suites, therefore all public-key-based key exchange mechanisms
available in TLS 1.3 provide forward secrecy.
Pre-shared keys (PSKs) can be used with (EC)DHE key exchange to
provide forward secrecy or can be used alone, at the cost of losing
forward secrecy for the application data. For PSK use, endpoints
SHOULD use (EC)DHE to achieve forward secrecy; PSK-only SHOULD be
avoided unless the application can tolerate the loss of forward
secrecy.
8. Authentication and Integrity-only Cipher Suites
For a few, very specific Industrial IoT use cases [RFC9150] defines
two cipher suites that provide data authenticity, but not data
confidentiality. For details and use constraints, defer to [RFC9150]
(especially Section 9 of [RFC9150]). Implementations may not support
these suites; deployments should not assume availability. This
document does not add new guidance beyond [RFC9150]. Profiling the
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use of authentication- and integrity-only cipher suites is out of
scope for this specification.
9. Keep-Alive
The discussion in Section 10 of [RFC7925] is applicable.
10. Timers and ACKs
Compared to DTLS 1.2 timeout-based whole flight retransmission, DTLS
1.3 ACKs sensibly decrease the risk of congestion collapse which was
the basis for the very conservative recommendations given in
Section 11 of [RFC7925].
The recommendations in Section 7.3 of [RFC9147] regarding ACKs apply.
In particular,
| When DTLS 1.3 is used in deployments with lossy networks, such as
| low-power, long-range radio networks as well as low-power mesh
| networks, the use of ACKs is recommended.
ACKs provide explicit feedback on which handshake messages have been
received. This enables endpoints to detect a lack of progress more
quickly and to trigger selective or early retransmission, leading to
more efficient use of bandwidth and memory.
Due to the vast range of network technologies used in IoT
deployments, from wired LAN to GSM-SMS, it's not possible to provide
a universal recommendation for an initial timeout. Therefore, it is
RECOMMENDED that DTLS 1.3 implementations allow developers to
explicitly set the initial timer value. Developers SHOULD set the
initial timeout to be twice the expected round-trip time (RTT), but
no less than 1000ms, which is a conservative default aligned with the
guidance in Section 11 of [RFC7925]. For specific application/
network combinations, a sub-second initial timeout MAY be set. In
cases where no RTT estimates are available, a 1000ms initial timeout
is suitable for the general Internet.
Regarding the timers used by the Return Routability Check (RRC)
functionality, the recommendations in Section 5.5 of
[I-D.ietf-tls-dtls-rrc] apply. Just like the handshake initial
timers, it is RECOMMENDED that DTLS 1.2 and 1.3 implementations offer
an option for their developers to explicitly set the RRC timer.
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11. Random Number Generation
The discussion in Section 12 of [RFC7925] is applicable with one
exception: the ClientHello and the ServerHello messages in TLS 1.3 do
not contain gmt_unix_time component anymore. For entropy generation
and randomness considerations, implementers should also consult
[RFC8937].
12. Server Name Indication
To support edge-to-cloud communication, this specification mandates
the implementation of the Server Name Indication (SNI) extension for
IoT devices acting as clients. This functionality is not strictly
required for constrained-to-constrained communication and could be
disabled in such cases. However, figuring out how to deactivate SNI
can be difficult in some libraries. Furthermore, in a multi-vendor
IoT deployment, some devices may not be aware of whether they are
communicating with another device or a cloud service. Therefore, it
is best to leave SNI as MTI for all clients.
Where privacy requirements necessitate it, the ECH (Encrypted Client
Hello) extension [RFC9849] prevents an on-path attacker from
determining the domain name the client is trying to connect to.
Since the ECH extension requires the use of Hybrid Public Key
Encryption (HPKE) [RFC9180], and additional protocols require further
protocol exchanges and cryptographic operations, there is a certain
overhead associated with this privacy feature. Note that in
industrial IoT deployments, the use of ECH may be disabled because
network administrators routinely inspect the SNI to detect malicious
behavior. Furthermore, to avoid leaking DNS lookups to network
inspection altogether, additional protocols are needed, including
DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) [RFC8484], DNS-over-TLS (DoT) [RFC7858], and
DNS-over-QUIC (DoQ) [RFC9250].
Where IoT devices are accepting (D)TLS connections (i.e., they are
acting as a server), it is unlikely that there will be a useful name
placed into the SNI by the connecting client. Since an IoT server
cannot rely on a client to provide a correct SNI, IoT devices in a
responding (server) mode SHOULD ignore SNI. In the rare event that
an IoT device has multiple server instances responding with different
server certificates, the device SHOULD use different IP addresses or
port numbers rather than relying on SNI.
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13. Maximum Fragment Length Negotiation
The Maximum Fragment Length Negotiation (MFL) extension has been
superseded by the Record Size Limit (RSL) extension [RFC8449].
Implementations in compliance with this specification MUST implement
the RSL extension and SHOULD use it to indicate their RAM
limitations.
14. Crypto Agility
The recommendations in Section 19 of [RFC7925] are applicable.
15. Key Length Recommendations
The recommendations in Section 20 of [RFC7925] are applicable.
16. 0-RTT Data
Appendix E.5 of [RFC8446] establishes that:
| Application protocols MUST NOT use 0-RTT data without a profile
| that defines its use. That profile needs to identify which
| messages or interactions are safe to use with 0-RTT and how to
| handle the situation when the server rejects 0-RTT and falls back
| to 1-RTT.
For any application protocol, 0-RTT MUST NOT be used unless a
protocol-specific profile exists. At the time of writing, no such
profile has been defined for CoAP [CoAP]. Therefore, 0-RTT MUST NOT
be used by CoAP applications.
17. Certificate Profile
This section contains updates and clarifications to the certificate
profile defined in [RFC7925]. The content of Table 1 of [RFC7925]
has been split by certificate "type" in order to clarify exactly what
requirements and recommendations apply to which entity in the PKI
hierarchy.
This profile does not define a specific certificate policy OID;
deployments MAY define one if needed for local policy enforcement.
The terminology used in this section is not intended to restrict the
scope of this profile to IEEE 802.1AR deployments. It is used
because it conveniently distinguishes between manufacturer-
provisioned and operational credentials, which is important in many
IoT deployments.
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A Device Identifier (DevID) consists of:
* a private key,
* a certificate containing the public key and the identifier
certified by the certificate issuer, and
* a certificate chain leading up to a trust anchor (typically the
root certificate).
The IEEE 802.1AR specification [IEEE-802.1AR] introduces the concept
of DevIDs and defines two specialized versions:
* Initial Device Identifiers (IDevIDs): Provisioned during
manufacturing to provide a unique, stable identity for the
lifetime of the device.
* Locally Significant Device Identifiers (LDevIDs): Provisioned
after deployment and typically used for operational purposes
within a specific domain.
The IDevID is typically provisioned by a manufacturer and signed by
the manufacturer CA. It is then used to obtain operational
certificates, the LDevIDs, from the operator or owner of the device.
Some protocols also introduce an additional hierarchy with
application instance certificates, which are obtained for use with
specific applications.
IDevIDs are intended for device identity and initial onboarding or
bootstrapping protocols, such as the Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
Infrastructure (BRSKI) protocol [RFC8995] or LwM2M Bootstrap
[LwM2M-T] [LwM2M-C]. The use of IDevIDs is intentionally limited to
such onboarding scenarios even though they often have a long
lifetime, or do not expire at all.
There are, however, multiple onboarding and bootstrapping approaches
in use. Some of them use TLS and therefore use the IDevID for client
authentication, while others, such as FIDO Device Onboarding (FDO)
[FDO], do not use TLS/DTLS for client authentication. In many cases,
the IDevID profile and content are defined by those specifications.
For these reasons, this specification focuses on the description of
operational certificates such as LDevIDs.
This document uses the terminology and some of the rules for
populating certificate content defined in IEEE 802.1AR. However,
this specification does not claim conformance to IEEE 802.1AR, which
is broader and mandates hardware, security, and process requirements
outside the constraints of many IoT deployments. This profile
borrows terminology and selected certificate fields from IEEE 802.1AR
but intentionally omits those broader requirements.
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17.1. All Certificates
This section outlines the requirements for X.509 certificates that
apply to all PKI entities. These requirements apply to certificates
issued within the IoT device PKI (i.e., root, subordinate and end
entity certificates used to authenticate IoT devices), rather than to
public WebPKI server certificates. The section focuses on X.509 v3
certificates.
17.1.1. Version
Certificates MUST be of type X.509 v3.
17.1.2. Serial Number
The serial number MUST be unique for each certificate issued by a
given CA (i.e., the issuer name and the serial number uniquely
identify a certificate). [RFC5280] limits this field to a maximum of
20 octets. To reduce the risk of predictable serial numbers, CAs
SHOULD generate serial numbers of at least eight (8) octets using a
cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator.
17.1.3. Signature
The signature MUST be ecdsa-with-SHA256 or stronger [RFC5758].
Note: In contrast to IEEE 802.1AR this specification does not require
end entity certificates, subordinate CA certificates, and CA
certificates to use the same signature algorithm. Furthermore, this
specification does not utilize RSA for use with constrained IoT
devices and networks. For certificates expected to be validated by
constrained IoT devices, CAs SHOULD select signature algorithms
supported by those devices to ensure successful validation (e.g.,
ECDSA P-256). Different certificates in the same chain MAY use
different signature algorithms when the relying devices support
validation of the resulting chain.
17.1.4. Issuer
The issuer field MUST contain a non-empty distinguished name (DN) of
the entity that has signed and issued the certificate in accordance
with [RFC5280].
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17.1.5. Validity
Vendors must determine the expected lifespan of their IoT devices.
This decision directly affects how long firmware and software updates
are provided for, as well as the level of maintenance that customers
can expect. It also affects the maximum validity period of
certificates.
Constrained devices often lack precise UTC time; implementations
SHOULD treat time checks with coarse granularity (e.g., day- or hour-
level) and ignore leap seconds when validating notAfter. For devices
without a reliable source of time we advise the use of a device
management solution, which typically includes a certificate
management protocol, to manage certificates used by the device over
their lifecycle. While this approach does not utilize certificates
to its widest extent, it is a solution that extends the capabilities
offered by a raw public key approach.
In many IoT deployments, IDevIDs are provisioned with an unlimited
lifetime, as described in [IEEE-802.1AR]. This helps prevent devices
from being accidentally bricked due to certificate expiration. A
real-world example occurred in 2018, when Oculus Rift headsets became
unusable after an Oculus certificate expired
[Toms-Hardware-Oculus-Rift-2018]. Oculus later issued a manual
patch, as the expired certificate also blocked the standard software
update path.
For this purpose, the special GeneralizedTime value 99991231235959Z
is used in the notAfter field, as described in Section 4.1.2.5 of
[RFC5280]. However, the CA certificate and subordinate CA
certificates in the certification path may still have finite validity
periods. Careful consideration is therefore required before issuing
IDevID certificates with no maximum validity period, since an
effectively unlimited certificate lifetime is only useful if the
relevant certification path remains usable for the intended lifetime
of the device.
LDevID certificates are, however, issued by the operator or owner,
and may be renewed at a regular interval using protocols, such as
Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST) [RFC7030] or Certificate
Management Protocol (CMP) [RFC9810] [RFC9483]. It is therefore
RECOMMENDED to limit the lifetime of these LDevID certificates using
the notBefore and notAfter fields, as described in Section 4.1.2.5 of
[RFC5280]. Values MUST be expressed in Greenwich Mean Time (Zulu)
and MUST include seconds even where the number of seconds is zero.
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Note that the validity period is defined as the period of time from
notBefore through notAfter, inclusive. This means that a
hypothetical certificate with a notBefore date of 9 June 2021 at
03:42:01 and a notAfter date of 7 September 2021 at 03:42:01 becomes
valid at the beginning of the :01 second, and only becomes invalid at
the :02 second, a period that is 90 days plus 1 second. So for a
90-day, notAfter must actually be 03:42:00.
17.1.6. Subject Public Key Info
The subjectPublicKeyInfo field indicates the algorithm and any
associated parameters for the ECC public key. This profile uses the
id-ecPublicKey algorithm identifier for ECDSA signature keys, as
defined and specified in [RFC5480]. This specification assumes that
devices support one of the following algorithms:
* id-ecPublicKey with secp256r1,
* id-ecPublicKey with secp384r1, and
* id-ecPublicKey with secp521r1.
There is no requirement to use CA certificates and certificates of
subordinate CAs to use the same algorithm as the end entity
certificate. Certificates with longer lifetime may well use a
cryptographically stronger algorithm. However, CAs (or their
administrators) that issue certificates intended to be validated by
constrained IoT devices SHOULD select algorithms supported by those
devices to ensure successful validation. Longer-lived CA
certificates MAY intentionally use stronger or different algorithms
if the target devices are expected to validate such chains
successfully.
17.1.7. Certificate Revocation Checks
Constrained IoT devices often lack the resources to perform
traditional Certificate Revocation List (CRL) or Online Certificate
Status Protocol (OCSP) checks. Consistent with the guidance in
Section 4.4.3 of [RFC7925], neither OCSP nor CRLs are used by
constrained IoT devices during the TLS handshake.
Instead, IoT deployments generally rely on short-lived end-entity
certificates managed via automated onboarding and management
protocols (such as Lightweight Machine-to-Machine [LwM2M-T]
[LwM2M-C]). Because these protocols can distribute and update
certificates on demand, they make real-time revocation checks largely
unnecessary.
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Since these checks are bypassed, the CRL Distribution Points
extension and the Authority Information Access (AIA) extension for
OCSP SHOULD NOT be included in IoT device certificates. If they are
present, they MUST NOT be marked critical. However, the AIA
extension MAY be used to provide the caIssuer access method, enabling
peers with sufficient resources to fetch certificate chains.
When designing the application layer, developers must account for the
fact that updating a certificate does not automatically affect
existing, long-lived TLS sessions. TLS alone does not mandate
continuous validity checks once a connection is established.
Furthermore, TLS 1.3 natively supports only client-to-server post-
handshake authentication. Achieving mutual post-handshake
authentication requires Exported Authenticators [RFC9261], which
requires the application-layer protocol to carry the authentication
payload. Therefore, if continuous validation is strictly required
for a long-lived connection, it is the application's responsibility
to enforce this policy by actively triggering re-authentication or
tearing down and re-establishing the TLS session.
Ultimately, instead of attempting to perform revocation checks
directly on the constrained device, it is RECOMMENDED to delegate
this responsibility to the IoT device operator, who can take the
necessary administrative actions (such as deploying updated
certificates) to keep the network secure and operational. While the
above recommendation is valid in most cases, it should be considered
carefully on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the security
risks associated with not re-authenticating peers and the cost/
complexity of implementing an application-layer solution.
17.2. Root CA Certificate
This section outlines the requirements for root CA certificates.
17.2.1. Subject
[RFC5280] mandates that Root CA certificates MUST have a non-empty
subject field. The subject field MUST contain the commonName, the
organizationName, and the countryName attribute and MAY contain an
organizationalUnitName attribute. If a subjectAltName extension is
present, it SHOULD be set to a value consistent with the subject and
SHOULD NOT be marked critical.
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17.2.2. Authority Key Identifier
Section 4.2.1.1 of [RFC5280] defines the Authority Key Identifier as
follows: "The authority key identifier extension provides a means of
identifying the public key corresponding to the private key used to
sign a certificate. This extension is used where an issuer has
multiple signing keys."
The Authority Key Identifier extension SHOULD be set to aid path
construction. If it is set, it MUST NOT be marked critical, and MUST
contain the subjectKeyIdentifier of this certificate.
17.2.3. Subject Key Identifier
Section 4.2.1.2 of [RFC5280] defines the SubjectKeyIdentifier as
follows: "The subject key identifier extension provides a means of
identifying certificates that contain a particular public key."
The Subject Key Identifier extension MUST be set, MUST NOT be marked
critical, and MUST contain the key identifier of the public key
contained in the subject public key info field.
The subjectKeyIdentifier is used by path construction algorithms to
identify which CA has signed a subordinate certificate.
17.2.4. Key Usage
[RFC5280] defines the key usage field as follows: "The key usage
extension defines the purpose (e.g., encipherment, signature,
certificate signing) of the key contained in the certificate."
The Key Usage extension SHOULD be set; if it is set, it MUST be
marked critical, and the keyCertSign purpose MUST be set. If the
Root CA issues CRLs, the cRLSign purpose MUST also be set.
Additional key usages MAY be set depending on the intended usage of
the public key. The digitalSignature purpose is not required for a
Root CA certificate.
[RFC5280] defines the extended key usage as follows: "This extension
indicates one or more purposes for which the certified public key may
be used, in addition to or in place of the basic purposes indicated
in the key usage extension."
This extendedKeyUsage extension MUST NOT be set in CA certificates.
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17.2.5. Basic Constraints
[RFC5280] states that "The Basic Constraints extension identifies
whether the subject of the certificate is a CA and the maximum depth
of valid certification paths that include this certificate. The cA
boolean indicates whether the certified public key may be used to
verify certificate signatures."
For the pathLenConstraint RFC 5280 makes further statements:
* "The pathLenConstraint field is meaningful only if the cA boolean
is asserted and the key usage extension, if present, asserts the
keyCertSign bit. In this case, it gives the maximum number of
non-self-issued intermediate certificates that may follow this
certificate in a valid certification path."
* "A pathLenConstraint of zero indicates that no non-self-issued
intermediate CA certificates may follow in a valid certification
path."
* "Where pathLenConstraint does not appear, no limit is imposed."
* "Conforming CAs MUST include this extension in all CA certificates
that contain public keys used to validate digital signatures on
certificates and MUST mark the extension as critical in such
certificates."
The Basic Constraints extension MUST be set, MUST be marked critical,
the cA flag MUST be set to true and the pathLenConstraint MUST be
omitted.
Omitting pathLenConstraint follows common root CA practice but is not
meant to encourage arbitrarily deep certification hierarchies in IoT
deployments. Shallow hierarchies remain preferable for constrained
devices.
17.3. Subordinate CA Certificate
This section outlines the requirements for subordinate CA
certificates.
17.3.1. Subject
The subject field MUST be set and MUST contain the commonName, the
organizationName, and the countryName attribute and MAY contain an
organizationalUnitName attribute.
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17.3.2. Authority Key Identifier
The Authority Key Identifier extension MUST be set, MUST NOT be
marked critical, and MUST contain the subjectKeyIdentifier of the CA
that issued this certificate.
17.3.3. Subject Key Identifier
The Subject Key Identifier extension MUST be set, MUST NOT be marked
critical, and MUST contain the key identifier of the public key
contained in the subject public key info field.
17.3.4. Key Usage
The Key Usage extension MUST be set, MUST be marked critical, the
keyCertSign or cRLSign purposes MUST be set, and the digitalSignature
purpose SHOULD be set.
Subordinate certification authorities SHOULD NOT have any
extendedKeyUsage. [RFC5280] reserves EKUs to be meaningful only in
end entity certificates.
17.3.5. Basic Constraints
The Basic Constraints extension MUST be set, MUST be marked critical,
the cA flag MUST be set to true and the pathLenConstraint SHOULD be
omitted.
17.3.6. CRL Distribution Point
The CRL Distribution Point extension SHOULD NOT be set. If it is
set, it MUST NOT be marked critical and MUST identify the CRL
relevant for this certificate.
17.3.7. Authority Information Access
The Authority Information Access (AIA) extension SHOULD NOT be set.
If it is set, it MUST NOT be marked critical and MUST identify the
location of the certificate of the CA that issued this certificate
and the location it provides an online certificate status service
(OCSP).
17.4. End Entity Certificate
This section outlines the requirements for end entity certificates.
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17.4.1. Subject
This section describes the use of end entity certificate primarily
for (D)TLS clients running on IoT devices. Operating (D)TLS servers
on IoT devices is possible but less common.
[RFC9525], Section 2 mandates that the subject field not be used to
identify a service. However, certain IoT applications (for example,
[I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-voucher], [IEEE-802.1AR]) use the subject
field to encode the device serial number.
The requirement in Section 4.4.2 of [RFC7925] to only use EUI-64 for
end entity certificates as a subject field is lifted.
Two fields are typically used to encode a device identifier, namely
the Subject and the subjectAltName fields. Protocol specifications
tend to offer recommendations about what identifiers to use and the
deployment situation is fragmented.
The subject field MAY include a unique device serial number. If a
serial number is included in the Subject DN, it MUST be encoded in
the X520SerialNumber attribute. If the serial number is used as an
identifier, it SHOULD also be placed in the subjectAltName (e.g., as
a URI). e.g., [RFC8995] use requires a serial number in IDevID
certificates.
[RFC5280] defines: "The subject alternative name extension allows
identities to be bound to the subject of the certificate. These
identities may be included in addition to or in place of the identity
in the subject field of the certificate."
The subject alternative name extension MAY be set. If it is set, it
MUST NOT be marked critical, except when the subject DN contains an
empty sequence.
If the EUI-64 format is used to identify the subject of an end entity
certificate, it MUST be encoded as a Subject DN using the
X520SerialNumber attribute. The contents of the field is a string of
the form HH-HH-HH-HH-HH-HH-HH-HH where 'H' is one of the symbols
'0'-'9' or 'A'-'F'.
Per [RFC9525] domain names MUST NOT be encoded in the subject
commonName. Instead they MUST be encoded in a subjectAltName of type
DNS-ID. Domain names MUST NOT contain wildcard (*) characters. The
subjectAltName MUST NOT contain multiple names.
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Note: The IEEE 802.1AR recommends to encode information about a
Trusted Platform Module (TPM), if present, in the HardwareModuleName
(Section 5 of [RFC4108]). This specification does not follow this
recommendation.
17.4.2. Authority Key Identifier
The Authority Key Identifier extension MUST be set, MUST NOT be
marked critical, and MUST contain the subjectKeyIdentifier of the CA
that issued this certificate.
17.4.3. Subject Key Identifier
The Subject Key Identifier MUST NOT be included in end entity
certificates, as it can be calculated from the public key, so it just
takes up space. End entity certificates are not used in path
construction, so there is no ambiguity regarding which certificate
chain to use, as there can be with subordinate CAs.
17.4.4. Key Usage
The key usage extension MUST be set and MUST be marked as critical.
For signature verification keys the digitialSignature key usage
purpose MUST be specified. Other key usages are set according to the
intended usage of the key.
As specified in [IEEE-802.1AR], the extendedKeyUsage SHOULD NOT be
present in IDevID certificates, as it reduces the utility of the
IDevID. For locally assigned LDevID certificates to be usable with
TLS, the extendedKeyUsage MUST contain at least one of the following:
id-kp-serverAuth or id-kp-clientAuth. The selected EKUs MUST match
the intended TLS role of the device or service using the certificate.
18. Update of Trust Anchors
Since the publication of RFC 7925 the need for firmware update
mechanisms has been reinforced and the work on standardizing a secure
and interoperable firmware update mechanism has made substantial
progress, see [RFC9019]. RFC 7925 recommends to use a software /
firmware update mechanism to provision devices with new trust
anchors. This approach only addresses the distribution of trust
anchors and not end entity certificates or certificates of
subordinate CAs.
As an alternative, certificate management protocols like CMP and EST
have also offered ways to update trust anchors. See, for example,
Section 2.1 of [RFC7030] for an approach to obtaining CA certificates
via EST.
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19. Certificate Overhead
In a public key-based key exchange, certificates and public keys are
a major contributor to the size of the overall handshake. For
example, in a regular TLS 1.3 handshake with minimal ECC certificates
and no subordinate CA utilizing the secp256r1 curve with mutual
authentication, around 40% of the entire handshake payload is
consumed by the two exchanged certificates.
Hence, it is not surprising that there is a strong desire to reduce
the size of certificates and certificate chains. This has led to
various standardization efforts. Below is a brief summary of what
options an implementer has to reduce the bandwidth requirements of a
public key-based key exchange. Note that many of the standardized
extensions are not readily available in TLS/DTLS stacks since
optimizations typically get implemented last.
* Use elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) instead of RSA-based
certificate due to the smaller certificate size. This document
recommends the use of elliptic curve cryptography only.
* Avoid deep and complex CA hierarchies to reduce the number of
subordinate CA certificates that need to be transmitted and
processed. See [I-D.irtf-t2trg-taxonomy-manufacturer-anchors] for
a discussion about CA hierarchies. Most security requirements can
be satisfied with a PKI depth of 3 (root CA, one subordinate CA,
and end entity certificates).
* Pay attention to the amount of information conveyed inside
certificates.
* Use session resumption to reduce the number of times a full
handshake is needed. Use Connection IDs [RFC9146], when possible,
to enable long-lasting connections.
* Use the TLS cached info [RFC7924] extension to avoid sending
certificates with every full handshake.
* Use client certificate URLs Section 5 of [RFC6066] instead of full
certificates for clients. When applications perform TLS client
authentication via DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities
(DANE) TLSA records then the [I-D.ietf-dance-tls-clientid]
specification may be used to reduce the packets on the wire.
Note: The term "TLSA" does not stand for anything; it is just the
name of the RRtype, as explained in [RFC6698].
* Use certificate compression as defined in [RFC8879].
* Use alternative certificate formats, where possible, such as raw
public keys [RFC7250] or CBOR-encoded certificates
[I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert].
The use of certificate handles is a form of caching or compressing
certificates as well.
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Although the TLS specification does not explicitly prohibit a server
from including trust anchors in the Certificate message - and some
implementations do - trust anchors SHOULD NOT be transmitted in this
way. Trust anchors are intended to be provisioned through out-of-
band mechanisms, and any trust anchor included in the TLS Certificate
message cannot be assumed trustworthy by the client. Including them
therefore serves no functional purpose and unnecessarily consumes
bandwidth.
However, due to limited or asymmetric knowledge between client and
server, omitting trust anchors entirely is not always
straightforward. Several scenarios highlight this challenge:
* Pinned Server Certificates: In many device-to-cloud deployments
(see Section 2.2 of [RFC7452]), clients pin a specific server
certificate. If the client has pinned the server certificate,
retransmitting it is unnecessary - but the server cannot reliably
determine this.
* Root Key Transitions: During root key rollover events (see
Section 4.4 of [RFC9810]), new trust anchors may not yet be fully
distributed across all devices. This is especially relevant in
device-to-device communication Section 2.1 of [RFC7452]), where
server roles are determined dynamically and trust anchor
distribution may be inconsistent.
* Non-Root Trust Anchors: In some deployments, the client's trust
anchor may be an intermediate CA rather than a root certificate.
The server, lacking knowledge of the client's trust store, cannot
always select a certificate chain that aligns with the client's
trust anchor. To mitigate this, the client MAY include the
Trusted CA Indication extension (see Section 6 of [RFC6066]) in
its ClientHello to signal the set of trust anchors it supports.
[RFC9810] assumes the presence of a shared directory service for
certificate retrieval. In constrained or isolated IoT environments,
this assumption does not hold. Trust anchors are often distributed
via firmware updates or fetched periodically using certificate
management protocols, such as EST (e.g., the /cacerts endpoint).
To support transitional trust states during trust anchor updates,
devices MUST handle both:
* newWithOld: a certificate where the new trust anchor is signed by
the old one, enabling communication with peers that have not yet
received the update.
* oldWithNew: a certificate where the old trust anchor is signed by
the new one, enabling verification of peers that still rely on the
older anchor.
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These certificates may be presented as an unordered set, and devices
may not be able to distinguish their roles without additional
metadata.
A complication arises when the client's trust anchor is not a widely
trusted root CA. In that case, the server cannot determine in
advance which trust anchors the client has. To address this, the
client MAY include the Trusted CA Indication extension [RFC6066] in
its ClientHello to signal the set of trust anchors it supports,
allowing the server to select an appropriate certificate chain.
Whether to utilize any of the above extensions or a combination of
them depends on the anticipated deployment environment, the
availability of code, and the constraints imposed by already deployed
infrastructure (e.g., CA infrastructure, tool support).
20. Ciphersuites
According to Section 4.5.3 of [RFC9147], the use of AES-CCM with
8-octet authentication tags (CCM_8) is considered unsuitable for
general use with DTLS. This is because it has low integrity limits
(i.e., high sensitivity to forgeries) which makes endpoints that
negotiate ciphersuites based on such AEAD vulnerable to a trivial DoS
attack. See also Sections 5.3 and 5.4 of [I-D.irtf-cfrg-aead-limits]
for further discussion on this topic, as well as references to the
analysis supporting these conclusions.
Specifically, [RFC9147] warns that:
| TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 MUST NOT be used in DTLS without
| additional safeguards against forgery. Implementations MUST set
| usage limits for AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8 based on an understanding of
| any additional forgery protections that are used.
Since all the ciphersuites required by [RFC7925] and [CoAP] rely on
CCM_8, there is no alternate ciphersuite available for applications
that aim to eliminate the security and availability threats related
to CCM_8 while retaining interoperability with the larger ecosystem.
In order to ameliorate the situation, it is RECOMMENDED that
implementations support the following two ciphersuites for TLS 1.3:
* TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
* TLS_AES_128_CCM
and offer them as their first choice. These ciphersuites provide
confidentiality and integrity limits that are considered acceptable
in the most general settings. For the details on the exact bounds of
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both ciphersuites see Section 4.5.3 of [RFC9147]. Note that the GCM-
based ciphersuite offers superior interoperability with cloud
services at the cost of a slight increase in the wire and peak RAM
footprints.
TLS 1.3 enforces deterministic nonce generation for all AEAD cipher
suites. However, this is not the case for TLS 1.2. Therefore, when
using the GCM-based cipher suite with TLS 1.2, the recommendations in
Section 7.2.1 of [RFC9325] relating to deterministic nonce generation
apply. In addition, the integrity limits on key usage detailed in
Section 4.4 of [RFC9325] also apply.
Table 1 summarizes the recommendations regarding ciphersuites:
+==========================+=================+
| Ciphersuite | MTI Requirement |
+==========================+=================+
| TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 | MUST- |
+--------------------------+-----------------+
| TLS_AES_128_CCM | SHOULD+ |
+--------------------------+-----------------+
| TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | SHOULD+ |
+--------------------------+-----------------+
Table 1: TLS 1.3 Ciphersuite Requirements
21. Fault Attacks on Deterministic Signature Schemes
A number of passive side-channel attacks as well as active fault-
injection attacks (e.g., [Ambrose2017]) have been demonstrated to be
successful in allowing a malicious third party to gain information
about the signing key if a fully deterministic signature scheme
(e.g., ECDSA [RFC6979] or EdDSA [RFC8032]) is used.
Most of these attacks assume physical access to the device and are
therefore especially relevant to smart cards as well as IoT
deployments with poor or non-existent physical security.
In this security model, it is recommended to combine both randomness
and determinism, for example, as described in
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise].
22. Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) Considerations
This section is informational and provides deployment guidance only;
it does not add normative requirements to this profile.
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The recommendations and ciphersuites in this profile are based on
classical cryptography and are not quantum-resistant.
As detailed in [I-D.ietf-pquip-pqc-engineers], the IETF is actively
working to address the challenges of adopting PQC in various
protocols, including TLS. The document highlights key aspects
engineers must consider, such as algorithm selection, performance
impacts, and deployment strategies. It emphasizes the importance of
gradual integration of PQC to ensure secure communication while
accounting for the increased computational, memory, and bandwidth
requirements of PQC algorithms. These challenges are especially
relevant in the context of IoT, where device constraints limit the
adoption of larger key sizes and more complex cryptographic
operations [PQC-PERF]. Besides, any choice need to careful evaluate
the associated energy requirements [PQC-ENERGY].
The work of incorporating PQC into TLS [I-D.ietf-uta-pqc-app]
[I-D.ietf-pquip-pqc-hsm-constrained] is still ongoing, with key
exchange message sizes increasing due to larger public keys. These
larger keys demand more flash storage and higher RAM usage,
presenting significant obstacles for resource-constrained IoT
devices. The transition from classical cryptographic algorithms to
PQC will be a significant challenge for constrained IoT devices,
requiring careful planning to select hardware suitable for the task
considering the lifetime of an IoT product.
23. Privacy Considerations
The privacy considerations in Section 22 of [RFC7925] largely
continue to apply. However, compared to TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2, TLS
1.3 and DTLS 1.3 encrypt a larger portion of the handshake, which
reduces the amount of identity and credential metadata observable on
the wire by passive attackers. Extensions, such as the encrypted
ClientHello, further increase privacy protection.
Certificate fields can expose stable device identifiers and other
metadata. In particular, IDevIDs and LDevIDs may reveal manufacturer
identity, device serial numbers, or other information to peers.
Protection against passive observers is, however, substantially
improved since certificates are not transmitted in the clear in TLS
1.3 and DTLS 1.3.
Some deployments use the mechanisms discussed in the Certificate
Overhead section, such as certificate URLs or external certificate
retrieval, instead of always transmitting full certificates in the
handshake. In these cases, the privacy properties differ because
stable identifiers may be exposed to retrieval services, directories,
or to observers of those retrieval transactions.
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Where privacy is a deployment requirement, implementations and PKI
profiles should include only the minimum identity information needed
for authorization and interoperability.
When Connection IDs are used with DTLS 1.3, CID negotiation in post-
handshake messages is encrypted and integrity protected. In
addition, record sequence numbers are encrypted. Compared to DTLS
1.2 CID, this makes tracking by on-path adversaries more difficult
and improves privacy in multi-home and mobile deployments (Section 11
of [RFC9147]).
24. Security Considerations
This entire document is about security. One specific trade-off
concerns root certificates that are either very long-lived or never
expire. While they can reduce maintenance pressure in long-lived IoT
deployments, they also increase the consequences of key compromise,
policy errors and inadequate rollover planning. Furthermore, they
can make cryptographic transitions more operationally expensive.
25. IANA Considerations
This document makes no requests to IANA.
26. References
26.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-tls-dtls-rrc]
Tschofenig, H., Kraus, A., and T. Fossati, "Return
Routability Check for DTLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.3", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tls-dtls-rrc-20, 14
July 2025, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
ietf-tls-dtls-rrc-20>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280>.
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[RFC5480] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,
"Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
Information", RFC 5480, DOI 10.17487/RFC5480, March 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5480>.
[RFC5758] Dang, Q., Santesson, S., Moriarty, K., Brown, D., and T.
Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure:
Additional Algorithms and Identifiers for DSA and ECDSA",
RFC 5758, DOI 10.17487/RFC5758, January 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5758>.
[RFC7925] Tschofenig, H., Ed. and T. Fossati, "Transport Layer
Security (TLS) / Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
Profiles for the Internet of Things", RFC 7925,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7925, July 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7925>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8221] Wouters, P., Migault, D., Mattsson, J., Nir, Y., and T.
Kivinen, "Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation
Requirements and Usage Guidance for Encapsulating Security
Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH)", RFC 8221,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8221, October 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8221>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446>.
[RFC8449] Thomson, M., "Record Size Limit Extension for TLS",
RFC 8449, DOI 10.17487/RFC8449, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8449>.
[RFC9147] Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
1.3", RFC 9147, DOI 10.17487/RFC9147, April 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9147>.
[RFC9258] Benjamin, D. and C. A. Wood, "Importing External Pre-
Shared Keys (PSKs) for TLS 1.3", RFC 9258,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9258, July 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9258>.
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[RFC9325] Sheffer, Y., Saint-Andre, P., and T. Fossati,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 9325, DOI 10.17487/RFC9325, November
2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9325>.
[RFC9525] Saint-Andre, P. and R. Salz, "Service Identity in TLS",
RFC 9525, DOI 10.17487/RFC9525, November 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9525>.
26.2. Informative References
[Ambrose2017]
Ambrose, C., Bos, J. W., Fay, B., Joye, M., Lochter, M.,
and B. Murray, "Differential Attacks on Deterministic
Signatures", 2017, <https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/975.pdf>.
[CoAP] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7252>.
[FDO] FIDO Alliance, "FIDO Device Onboard Specification 1.1",
April 2022, <https://fidoalliance.org/specifications/
download-iot-specifications/>.
[I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-voucher]
Richardson, M., Van der Stok, P., Kampanakis, P., and E.
Dijk, "Constrained Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
Infrastructure (cBRSKI)", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-ietf-anima-constrained-voucher-30, 27
February 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-ietf-anima-constrained-voucher-30>.
[I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert]
Mattsson, J. P., Selander, G., Raza, S., Höglund, J.,
Furuhed, M., and L. Liao, "CBOR Encoded X.509 Certificates
(C509 Certificates)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert-19, 11 May 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-cose-
cbor-encoded-cert-19>.
[I-D.ietf-dance-tls-clientid]
Huque, S. and V. Dukhovni, "TLS Extension for DANE Client
Identity", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
dance-tls-clientid-07, 17 September 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-dance-
tls-clientid-07>.
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[I-D.ietf-httpbis-secondary-server-certs]
Gorbaty, E. and M. Bishop, "Secondary Certificate
Authentication of HTTP Servers", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-httpbis-secondary-server-certs-
01, 12 October 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-
secondary-server-certs-01>.
[I-D.ietf-iotops-7228bis]
Bormann, C., Ersue, M., Keränen, A., and C. Gomez,
"Terminology for Constrained-Node Networks", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-iotops-7228bis-08, 15
May 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
ietf-iotops-7228bis-08>.
[I-D.ietf-pquip-pqc-engineers]
Banerjee, A., Reddy.K, T., Schoinianakis, D., Hollebeek,
T., and M. Ounsworth, "Post-Quantum Cryptography for
Engineers", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
pquip-pqc-engineers-14, 25 August 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-pquip-
pqc-engineers-14>.
[I-D.ietf-pquip-pqc-hsm-constrained]
Reddy.K, T., Wing, D., S, B., and K. Kwiatkowski,
"Adapting Constrained Devices for Post-Quantum
Cryptography", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-pquip-pqc-hsm-constrained-05, 1 April 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-pquip-
pqc-hsm-constrained-05>.
[I-D.ietf-uta-pqc-app]
Reddy.K, T. and H. Tschofenig, "Post-Quantum Cryptography
Recommendations for TLS-based Applications", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-uta-pqc-app-01, 24
February 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-ietf-uta-pqc-app-01>.
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-aead-limits]
Günther, F., Thomson, M., and C. A. Wood, "Usage Limits on
AEAD Algorithms", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
irtf-cfrg-aead-limits-11, 4 December 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-
aead-limits-11>.
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise]
Mattsson, J. P., Thormarker, E., and S. Ruohomaa, "Hedged
ECDSA and EdDSA Signatures", Work in Progress, Internet-
Tschofenig, et al. Expires 26 November 2026 [Page 29]
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Draft, draft-irtf-cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise-05, 3 March
2025, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-
cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise-05>.
[I-D.irtf-t2trg-taxonomy-manufacturer-anchors]
Richardson, M., "A Taxonomy of operational security
considerations for manufacturer installed keys and Trust
Anchors", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-irtf-
t2trg-taxonomy-manufacturer-anchors-16, 22 April 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-t2trg-
taxonomy-manufacturer-anchors-16>.
[IEEE-802.1AR]
"ISO/IEC/IEEE International Standard for
Telecommunications and exchange between information
technology systems--Requirements for local and
metropolitan area networks--Part 1AR:Secure device
identity", IEEE, DOI 10.1109/ieeestd.2020.9052099,
ISBN ["9781504465885"], March 2020,
<https://doi.org/10.1109/ieeestd.2020.9052099>.
[LwM2M-C] OMA SpecWorks, "Lightweight Machine to Machine (LwM2M)
V.1.2.2 Technical Specification: Core", June 2024,
<https://www.openmobilealliance.org/release/
LightweightM2M/V1_2_2-20240613-A/>.
[LwM2M-T] OMA SpecWorks, "Lightweight Machine to Machine (LwM2M)
V.1.2.2 Technical Specification: Transport Bindings", June
2024, <https://www.openmobilealliance.org/release/
LightweightM2M/V1_2_2-20240613-A/>.
[PQC-ENERGY]
Tasopoulos, G., Dimopoulos, C., Fournaris, A., Zhao, R.,
Sakzad, A., and R. Steinfeld, "Energy Consumption
Evaluation of Post-Quantum TLS 1.3 for Resource-
Constrained Embedded Devices", ACM, Proceedings of the
20th ACM International Conference on Computing
Frontiers pp. 366-374, DOI 10.1145/3587135.3592821, May
2023, <https://doi.org/10.1145/3587135.3592821>.
[PQC-PERF] Tasopoulos, G., Li, J., Fournaris, A., Zhao, R., Sakzad,
A., and R. Steinfeld, "Performance Evaluation of Post-
Quantum TLS 1.3 on Resource-Constrained Embedded Systems",
Springer International Publishing, Lecture Notes in
Computer Science pp. 432-451,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-031-21280-2_24, ISBN ["9783031212796",
"9783031212802"], 2022,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21280-2_24>.
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[RFC4108] Housley, R., "Using Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) to
Protect Firmware Packages", RFC 4108,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4108, August 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4108>.
[RFC4279] Eronen, P., Ed. and H. Tschofenig, Ed., "Pre-Shared Key
Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
RFC 4279, DOI 10.17487/RFC4279, December 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4279>.
[RFC5216] Simon, D., Aboba, B., and R. Hurst, "The EAP-TLS
Authentication Protocol", RFC 5216, DOI 10.17487/RFC5216,
March 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5216>.
[RFC5746] Rescorla, E., Ray, M., Dispensa, S., and N. Oskov,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication
Extension", RFC 5746, DOI 10.17487/RFC5746, February 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5746>.
[RFC6066] Eastlake 3rd, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Extensions: Extension Definitions", RFC 6066,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6066, January 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6066>.
[RFC6698] Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication
of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Protocol: TLSA", RFC 6698, DOI 10.17487/RFC6698, August
2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6698>.
[RFC6979] Pornin, T., "Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature
Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA)", RFC 6979, DOI 10.17487/RFC6979, August
2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6979>.
[RFC7030] Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed.,
"Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7030>.
[RFC7228] Bormann, C., Ersue, M., and A. Keranen, "Terminology for
Constrained-Node Networks", RFC 7228,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7228, May 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7228>.
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[RFC7250] Wouters, P., Ed., Tschofenig, H., Ed., Gilmore, J.,
Weiler, S., and T. Kivinen, "Using Raw Public Keys in
Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport
Layer Security (DTLS)", RFC 7250, DOI 10.17487/RFC7250,
June 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7250>.
[RFC7452] Tschofenig, H., Arkko, J., Thaler, D., and D. McPherson,
"Architectural Considerations in Smart Object Networking",
RFC 7452, DOI 10.17487/RFC7452, March 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7452>.
[RFC7858] Hu, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., Wessels, D.,
and P. Hoffman, "Specification for DNS over Transport
Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7858, DOI 10.17487/RFC7858, May
2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7858>.
[RFC7924] Santesson, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Cached Information Extension", RFC 7924,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7924, July 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7924>.
[RFC8032] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8032>.
[RFC8484] Hoffman, P. and P. McManus, "DNS Queries over HTTPS
(DoH)", RFC 8484, DOI 10.17487/RFC8484, October 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8484>.
[RFC8879] Ghedini, A. and V. Vasiliev, "TLS Certificate
Compression", RFC 8879, DOI 10.17487/RFC8879, December
2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8879>.
[RFC8937] Cremers, C., Garratt, L., Smyshlyaev, S., Sullivan, N.,
and C. Wood, "Randomness Improvements for Security
Protocols", RFC 8937, DOI 10.17487/RFC8937, October 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8937>.
[RFC8995] Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Eckert, T., Behringer, M.,
and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
Infrastructure (BRSKI)", RFC 8995, DOI 10.17487/RFC8995,
May 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8995>.
[RFC9019] Moran, B., Tschofenig, H., Brown, D., and M. Meriac, "A
Firmware Update Architecture for Internet of Things",
RFC 9019, DOI 10.17487/RFC9019, April 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9019>.
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[RFC9146] Rescorla, E., Ed., Tschofenig, H., Ed., Fossati, T., and
A. Kraus, "Connection Identifier for DTLS 1.2", RFC 9146,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9146, March 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9146>.
[RFC9150] Cam-Winget, N. and J. Visoky, "TLS 1.3 Authentication and
Integrity-Only Cipher Suites", RFC 9150,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9150, April 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9150>.
[RFC9180] Barnes, R., Bhargavan, K., Lipp, B., and C. Wood, "Hybrid
Public Key Encryption", RFC 9180, DOI 10.17487/RFC9180,
February 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9180>.
[RFC9190] Preuß Mattsson, J. and M. Sethi, "EAP-TLS 1.3: Using the
Extensible Authentication Protocol with TLS 1.3",
RFC 9190, DOI 10.17487/RFC9190, February 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9190>.
[RFC9250] Huitema, C., Dickinson, S., and A. Mankin, "DNS over
Dedicated QUIC Connections", RFC 9250,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9250, May 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9250>.
[RFC9261] Sullivan, N., "Exported Authenticators in TLS", RFC 9261,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9261, July 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9261>.
[RFC9483] Brockhaus, H., von Oheimb, D., and S. Fries, "Lightweight
Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Profile", RFC 9483,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9483, November 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9483>.
[RFC9810] Brockhaus, H., von Oheimb, D., Ounsworth, M., and J. Gray,
"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure -- Certificate
Management Protocol (CMP)", RFC 9810,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9810, July 2025,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9810>.
[RFC9849] Rescorla, E., Oku, K., Sullivan, N., and C. A. Wood, "TLS
Encrypted Client Hello", RFC 9849, DOI 10.17487/RFC9849,
March 2026, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9849>.
[Toms-Hardware-Oculus-Rift-2018]
Colaner, S., "How To Patch Your Oculus Rift", March 2018,
<https://www.tomshardware.com/news/oculus-rift-runtime-
error-fix%2C36629.html>.
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Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Henk Birkholz, Hendrik Brockhaus, Ben Kaduk,
John Mattsson, Daniel Migault, Tiru Reddy, Rich Salz, and Marco
Tiloca.
Furthermore, we would like to thank our security area director Deb
Cooley for her detailed review comments.
Contributors
Juliusz Sosinowicz
Achim Kraus
Authors' Addresses
Hannes Tschofenig
University of the Bundeswehr Munich
85577 Neubiberg
Germany
Email: hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net
Thomas Fossati
Linaro
Email: Thomas.Fossati@linaro.org
Michael Richardson
Sandelman Software Works
Email: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca
Daniel Migault
Ericsson
Canada
Email: daniel.migault@ericsson.com
Tschofenig, et al. Expires 26 November 2026 [Page 34]