Operational Neighbor Discovery Problems
draft-ietf-v6ops-v6nd-problems-04

The information below is for an old version of the document
Document Type Active Internet-Draft (v6ops WG)
Last updated 2012-03-05 (latest revision 2012-02-03)
Replaces draft-gashinsky-v6ops-v6nd-problems
Stream IETF
Intended RFC status Informational
Formats pdf htmlized bibtex
Reviews
Stream WG state In WG Last Call
Doc Shepherd Follow-up Underway
Document shepherd Fred Baker
IESG IESG state RFC Ed Queue
Consensus Boilerplate Unknown
Telechat date
Responsible AD Ron Bonica
IESG note Fred Baker (fred@cisco.com) is the document shepherd.
Send notices to v6ops-chairs@tools.ietf.org, draft-ietf-v6ops-v6nd-problems@tools.ietf.org
v6ops                                                       I. Gashinsky
Internet-Draft                                                    Yahoo!
Intended status: Informational                                J. Jaeggli
Expires: August 5, 2012                                            Zynga
                                                               W. Kumari
                                                              Google Inc
                                                       February 02, 2012

                Operational Neighbor Discovery Problems
                   draft-ietf-v6ops-v6nd-problems-04

Abstract

   In IPv4, subnets are generally small, made just large enough to cover
   the actual number of machines on the subnet.  In contrast, the
   default IPv6 subnet size is a /64, a number so large it covers
   trillions of addresses, the overwhelming number of which will be
   unassigned.  Consequently, simplistic implementations of Neighbor
   Discovery (ND) can be vulnerable to deliberate or accidental denial
   of service, whereby they attempt to perform address resolution for
   large numbers of unassigned addresses.  Such denial of attacks can be
   launched intentionally (by an attacker), or result from legitimate
   operational tools or accident conditions.  As a result of these
   vulnerabilities, new devices may not be able to "join" a network, it
   may be impossible to establish new IPv6 flows, and existing IPv6
   transported flows may be interrupted.

   This document describes the potential for DOS in detail and suggests
   possible implementation improvements as well as operational
   mitigation techniques that can in some cases be used to protect
   against or at least alleviate the impact of such attacks.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

Gashinsky, et al.        Expires August 5, 2012                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft           Operational ND Problems           February 2012

   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 5, 2012.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Gashinsky, et al.        Expires August 5, 2012                 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft           Operational ND Problems           February 2012

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.1.  Applicability  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  The Problem  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   4.  Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   5.  Neighbor Discovery Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   6.  Operational Mitigation Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     6.1.  Filtering of unused address space. . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     6.2.  Minimal Subnet Sizing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     6.3.  Routing Mitigation.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     6.4.  Tuning of the NDP Queue Rate Limit.  . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   7.  Recommendations for Implementors.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     7.1.  Prioritize NDP Activities  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     7.2.  Queue Tuning.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   8.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   9.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
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