PKIX over Secure HTTP (POSH)
draft-ietf-xmpp-posh-04

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Document Type Active Internet-Draft (xmpp WG)
Last updated 2015-08-06 (latest revision 2015-02-23)
Replaces draft-miller-posh
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XMPP Working Group                                             M. Miller
Internet-Draft                                       Cisco Systems, Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track                          P. Saint-Andre
Expires: August 27, 2015                                            &yet
                                                       February 23, 2015

                      PKIX over Secure HTTP (POSH)
                        draft-ietf-xmpp-posh-04

Abstract

   Experience has shown that it is extremely difficult to deploy proper
   PKIX certificates for TLS in multi-tenanted environments.  As a
   result, domains hosted in such environments often deploy applications
   using certificates that identify the hosting service, not the hosted
   domain.  Such deployments force end users and peer services to accept
   a certificate with an improper identifier, resulting in obvious
   security implications.  This document defines two methods that make
   it easier to deploy certificates for proper server identity checking
   in non-HTTP application protocols.  While these methods developed for
   use in the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) as a
   Domain Name Association (DNA) prooftype, they might also be usable in
   other non-HTTP application protocols.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 27, 2015.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

Miller & Saint-Andre     Expires August 27, 2015                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                    POSH                     February 2015

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Obtaining Verification Materials  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Source Domain Possesses PKIX Certificate Information  . .   5
     3.2.  Source Domain References PKIX Certificate . . . . . . . .   7
     3.3.  Performing Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   4.  Secure Delegation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   5.  Order of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  Caching Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   7.  Alternates and Roll-over  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   8.  Guidelines for Protocols that Use POSH  . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   11. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     11.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     11.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

1.  Introduction

   We begin with a thought experiment.

   Imagine that you work on the operations team of a hosting company
   that provides the "SPICE" service (or email or instant messaging or
   social networking service) for ten thousand different customer
   organizations.  Each customer wants their service to be identified by
   the customer's domain name (e.g., bar.example.com), not the hosting
   company's domain name (e.g., hosting.example.net).

   In order to properly secure each customer's "SPICE" service via
   Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC5246], you need to obtain PKIX
   certificates [RFC5280] containing identifiers such as
   bar.example.com, as explained in the "CertID" specification
   [RFC6125].  Unfortunately, you can't obtain such certificates
   because:
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