PKIX over Secure HTTP (POSH)
draft-ietf-xmpp-posh-05

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Document Type Active Internet-Draft (xmpp WG)
Last updated 2015-09-01
Replaces draft-miller-posh
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XMPP Working Group                                             M. Miller
Internet-Draft                                       Cisco Systems, Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track                          P. Saint-Andre
Expires: March 2, 2016                                              &yet
                                                         August 30, 2015

                      PKIX over Secure HTTP (POSH)
                        draft-ietf-xmpp-posh-05

Abstract

   Experience has shown that it is difficult to deploy proper PKIX
   certificates for TLS in multi-tenant environments.  As a result,
   domains hosted in such environments often deploy applications using
   certificates that identify the hosting service, not the hosted
   domain.  Such deployments force end users and peer services to accept
   a certificate with an improper identifier, resulting in degraded
   security.  This document defines two methods that make it easier to
   deploy certificates for proper server identity checking in non-HTTP
   application protocols.  While these methods were developed for use in
   the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) as a Domain
   Name Association (DNA) prooftype, they might also be usable in other
   non-HTTP application protocols.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
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   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 2, 2016.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

Miller & Saint-Andre      Expires March 2, 2016                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                    POSH                       August 2015

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Obtaining Verification Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Source Domain Possesses PKIX Certificate Information  . .   5
     3.2.  Source Domain References PKIX Certificate . . . . . . . .   7
     3.3.  Performing Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   4.  Secure Delegation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   5.  Order of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   6.  Caching Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   7.  Guidance for Server Operators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   8.  Guidance for Protocol Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     9.1.  Well-Known URI  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     9.2.  POSH Service Names  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   11. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     11.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     11.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17

1.  Introduction

   We begin with a thought experiment.

   Imagine that you work on the operations team of a hosting company
   that provides instances of the hypothetical "Secure Protocol for
   Internet Content Exchange" (SPICE) service for ten thousand different
   customer organizations.  Each customer wants their instance to be
   identified by the customer's domain name (e.g., bar.example.com), not
   the hosting company's domain name (e.g., hosting.example.net).

   In order to properly secure each customer's SPICE instance via
   Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC5246], you need to obtain and
   deploy PKIX certificates [RFC5280] containing identifiers such as
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