Skip to main content

CPace, a balanced composable PAKE
draft-irtf-cfrg-cpace-03

The information below is for an old version of the document.
Document Type
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Active".
Authors Michel Abdalla , Björn Haase , Julia Hesse
Last updated 2021-11-15
Replaces draft-haase-cpace
RFC stream Internet Research Task Force (IRTF)
Formats
Additional resources Mailing list discussion
Stream IRTF state Active RG Document
Consensus boilerplate Yes
Document shepherd (None)
IESG IESG state I-D Exists
Telechat date (None)
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)
draft-irtf-cfrg-cpace-03
Network Working Group                                         M. Abdalla
Internet-Draft                                          DFINITY - Zurich
Intended status: Informational                                  B. Haase
Expires: 19 May 2022        Endress + Hauser Liquid Analysis - Gerlingen
                                                                J. Hesse
                                            IBM Research Europe - Zurich
                                                        15 November 2021

                   CPace, a balanced composable PAKE
                        draft-irtf-cfrg-cpace-03

Abstract

   This document describes CPace which is a protocol for two parties
   that share a low-entropy secret (password) to derive a strong shared
   key without disclosing the secret to offline dictionary attacks.
   This method was tailored for constrained devices, is compatible with
   any group of both prime- and non-prime order, and comes with a
   security proof providing composability guarantees.

Discussion Venues

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   Discussion of this document takes place on the Crypto Forum Research
   Group mailing list (cfrg@ietf.org), which is archived at
   https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/search/?email_list=cfrg.

   Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
   https://github.com/cfrg/draft-irtf-cfrg-cpace.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 19 May 2022.

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                  [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text
   as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   2.  Requirements Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  Definition CPace  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.1.  Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       3.1.1.  Hash function H . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       3.1.2.  Group environment G . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.2.  Inputs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.3.  Notation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       3.3.1.  Notation for group operations . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   4.  The CPace protocol  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.1.  Session identifier establishment  . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.2.  Protocol flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.3.  CPace protocol instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   5.  CPace cipher suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   6.  Implementation of recommended CPace cipher suites . . . . . .  12
     6.1.  Common function for computing generators  . . . . . . . .  12
     6.2.  CPace group objects G_X25519 and G_X448 for
           single-coordinate Ladders on Montgomery curves  . . . . .  13
       6.2.1.  Verification tests  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     6.3.  CPace group objects G_Ristretto255 and G_Decaf448 for
           prime-order group abstractions  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       6.3.1.  Verification tests  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     6.4.  CPace group objects for curves in Short-Weierstrass
           representation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       6.4.1.  Curves and associated functions . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       6.4.2.  Suitable encode_to_curve methods  . . . . . . . . . .  17
       6.4.3.  Definition of the group environment G for
               Short-Weierstrass curves  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       6.4.4.  Verification tests  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   7.  Implementation verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     8.1.  Party identifiers and relay attacks . . . . . . . . . . .  20

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                  [Page 2]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

     8.2.  Sampling of scalars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     8.3.  Hashing and key derivation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     8.4.  Single-coordinate CPace on Montgomery curves  . . . . . .  21
     8.5.  Nonce values  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     8.6.  Side channel attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     8.7.  Quantum computers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   10. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   11. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     11.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     11.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   Appendix A.  CPace function definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     A.1.  Definition and test vectors for string utility
           functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
       A.1.1.  prepend_len function  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
       A.1.2.  prepend_len test vectors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
       A.1.3.  prefix_free_cat function  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
       A.1.4.  Testvector for prefix_free_cat()  . . . . . . . . . .  25
     A.2.  Definition of generator_string function.  . . . . . . . .  25
     A.3.  Definitions and test vector ordered concatenation . . . .  25
       A.3.1.  Definitions ordered concatenation . . . . . . . . . .  25
       A.3.2.  Test vectors ordered concatenation  . . . . . . . . .  26
     A.4.  Decoding and Encoding functions according to RFC7748  . .  26
     A.5.  Elligator 2 reference implementation  . . . . . . . . . .  26
   Appendix B.  Test vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
     B.1.  Test vector for CPace using group X25519 and hash
           SHA-512 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
       B.1.1.  Test vectors for calculate_generator with group
               X25519  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
       B.1.2.  Test vector for MSGa  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
       B.1.3.  Test vector for MSGb  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
       B.1.4.  Test vector for secret points K . . . . . . . . . . .  29
       B.1.5.  Test vector for ISK calculation initiator/
               responder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
       B.1.6.  Test vector for ISK calculation parallel execution  .  29
       B.1.7.  Corresponding ANSI-C initializers . . . . . . . . . .  30
       B.1.8.  Test vectors for G_X25519.scalar_mult_vfy: low order
               points  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
     B.2.  Test vector for CPace using group X448 and hash
           SHAKE-256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
       B.2.1.  Test vectors for calculate_generator with group
               X448  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
       B.2.2.  Test vector for MSGa  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
       B.2.3.  Test vector for MSGb  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
       B.2.4.  Test vector for secret points K . . . . . . . . . . .  34
       B.2.5.  Test vector for ISK calculation initiator/
               responder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
       B.2.6.  Test vector for ISK calculation parallel execution  .  35

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                  [Page 3]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

       B.2.7.  Corresponding ANSI-C initializers . . . . . . . . . .  35
       B.2.8.  Test vectors for G_X448.scalar_mult_vfy: low order
               points  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
     B.3.  Test vector for CPace using group ristretto255 and hash
           SHA-512 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38
       B.3.1.  Test vectors for calculate_generator with group
               ristretto255  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38
       B.3.2.  Test vector for MSGa  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
       B.3.3.  Test vector for MSGb  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
       B.3.4.  Test vector for secret points K . . . . . . . . . . .  40
       B.3.5.  Test vector for ISK calculation initiator/
               responder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
       B.3.6.  Test vector for ISK calculation parallel execution  .  40
       B.3.7.  Corresponding ANSI-C initializers . . . . . . . . . .  41
       B.3.8.  Test case for scalar_mult with valid inputs . . . . .  42
       B.3.9.  Invalid inputs for scalar_mult_vfy  . . . . . . . . .  43
     B.4.  Test vector for CPace using group decaf448 and hash
           SHAKE-256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43
       B.4.1.  Test vectors for calculate_generator with group
               decaf448  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43
       B.4.2.  Test vector for MSGa  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44
       B.4.3.  Test vector for MSGb  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44
       B.4.4.  Test vector for secret points K . . . . . . . . . . .  45
       B.4.5.  Test vector for ISK calculation initiator/
               responder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45
       B.4.6.  Test vector for ISK calculation parallel execution  .  46
       B.4.7.  Corresponding ANSI-C initializers . . . . . . . . . .  46
       B.4.8.  Test case for scalar_mult with valid inputs . . . . .  48
       B.4.9.  Invalid inputs for scalar_mult_vfy  . . . . . . . . .  48
     B.5.  Test vector for CPace using group NIST P-256 and hash
           SHA-256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48
       B.5.1.  Test vectors for calculate_generator with group NIST
               P-256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48
       B.5.2.  Test vector for MSGa  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49
       B.5.3.  Test vector for MSGb  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49
       B.5.4.  Test vector for secret points K . . . . . . . . . . .  50
       B.5.5.  Test vector for ISK calculation initiator/
               responder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50
       B.5.6.  Test vector for ISK calculation parallel execution  .  51
       B.5.7.  Corresponding ANSI-C initializers . . . . . . . . . .  52
       B.5.8.  Test case for scalar_mult_vfy with correct inputs . .  53
       B.5.9.  Invalid inputs for scalar_mult_vfy  . . . . . . . . .  54
     B.6.  Test vector for CPace using group NIST P-384 and hash
           SHA-384 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54
       B.6.1.  Test vectors for calculate_generator with group NIST
               P-384 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54
       B.6.2.  Test vector for MSGa  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  55
       B.6.3.  Test vector for MSGb  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  55

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                  [Page 4]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

       B.6.4.  Test vector for secret points K . . . . . . . . . . .  56
       B.6.5.  Test vector for ISK calculation initiator/
               responder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  56
       B.6.6.  Test vector for ISK calculation parallel execution  .  57
       B.6.7.  Corresponding ANSI-C initializers . . . . . . . . . .  58
       B.6.8.  Test case for scalar_mult_vfy with correct inputs . .  60
       B.6.9.  Invalid inputs for scalar_mult_vfy  . . . . . . . . .  60
     B.7.  Test vector for CPace using group NIST P-521 and hash
           SHA-512 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  61
       B.7.1.  Test vectors for calculate_generator with group NIST
               P-521 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  61
       B.7.2.  Test vector for MSGa  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  61
       B.7.3.  Test vector for MSGb  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62
       B.7.4.  Test vector for secret points K . . . . . . . . . . .  62
       B.7.5.  Test vector for ISK calculation initiator/
               responder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  63
       B.7.6.  Test vector for ISK calculation parallel execution  .  64
       B.7.7.  Corresponding ANSI-C initializers . . . . . . . . . .  64
       B.7.8.  Test case for scalar_mult_vfy with correct inputs . .  66
       B.7.9.  Invalid inputs for scalar_mult_vfy  . . . . . . . . .  67
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  67

1.  Introduction

   This document describes CPace which is a protocol for two parties for
   deriving a strong shared secret from a shared low-entropy secret
   (password) without exposing the secret to offline dictionary attacks.
   The CPace design was tailored for efficiency on constrained devices
   such as secure-element chipsets and considers mitigations with
   respect to adversaries that might become capable of breaking the
   discrete logarithm problem on elliptic curves by quantum computers.
   CPace comes with both game-based and simulation-based proofs, where
   the latter provides composability guarantees that let CPace run
   securely in concurrent settings.

2.  Requirements Notation

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

3.  Definition CPace

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                  [Page 5]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

3.1.  Setup

   For CPace both communication partners need to agree on a common
   cipher suite.  Cipher suites consist of a combination of a hash
   function H and an elliptic curve environment G.  We assume both G and
   H to come with associated constants and functions as detailed below.
   To access these we use an object-style notation such as, e.g.,
   H.b_in_bytes and G.sample_scalar().

3.1.1.  Hash function H

   With H we denote a hash function.  Common choices for H are SHA-512
   [RFC6234] or SHAKE-256 [FIPS202].  (I.e. the hash function outputs
   octet strings, and _not_ group elements.)  For considering both,
   variable-output-length hashes and fixed-length output hashes, we use
   the following convention.  In case that the hash function is
   specified for a fixed-size output, we define H.hash(m,l) such that it
   returns the first l octets of the output.

   We use the following notation for referring to the specific
   properties of a hash function H:

   *  H.hash(m,l) is a function that operates on an input octet string m
      and returns a hashing result of l octets.

   *  H.b_in_bytes denotes the _default_ output size in bytes
      corresponding to the symmetric security level of the hash
      function.  E.g.  H.b_in_bytes = 64 for SHA-512 and SHAKE-256 and
      H.b_in_bytes = 32 for SHA-256 and SHAKE-128.  We use the notation
      H.hash(m) = H.hash(m, H.b_in_bytes) and let the hash operation
      output the default length if no explicit length parameter is
      given.

   *  H.bmax_in_bytes denotes the _maximum_ output size in octets
      supported by the hash function.  In case of fixed-size hashes such
      as SHA-256, this is the same as H.b_in_bytes, while there is no
      such limit for hash functions such as SHAKE-256.

   *  H.s_in_bytes denotes the _input block size_ used by H.  For
      instance, for SHA-512 the input block size s_in_bytes is 128,
      while for SHAKE-256 the input block size amounts to 136 bytes.

3.1.2.  Group environment G

   The group environment G specifies an elliptic curve group (also
   denoted G for convenience) and associated constants and functions as
   detailed below.  In this document we use multiplicative notation for
   the group operation.

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                  [Page 6]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

   *  G.calculate_generator(H,PRS,CI,sid) denotes a function that
      outputs a representation of a generator (referred to as
      "generator" from now on) of the group which is derived from input
      octet strings PRS, CI, and sid and with the help of the hash
      function H.

   *  G.sample_scalar() is a function returning a representation of a
      scalar (referred to as "scalar" from now on) appropriate as a
      private Diffie-Hellman key for the group.

   *  G.scalar_mult(y,g) is a function operating on a scalar y and a
      group element g.  It returns an octet string representation of the
      group element Y = g^y.

   *  G.I denotes a unique octet string representation of the neutral
      element of the group.  G.I is used for detecting and signaling
      certain error conditions.

   *  G.scalar_mult_vfy(y,g) is a function operating on a scalar y and a
      group element g.  It returns an octet string representation of the
      group element g^y.  Additionally, scalar_mult_vfy specifies
      validity conditions for y,g and g^y and outputs G.I in case they
      are not met.

   *  G.DSI denotes a domain-separation identifier string which SHALL be
      uniquely identifying the group environment G.

3.2.  Inputs

   *  PRS denotes a password-related octet string which is a MANDATORY
      input for all CPace instantiations and needs to be available to
      both parties.  Typically PRS is derived from a low-entropy secret
      such as a user-supplied password (pw) or a personal identification
      number, e.g. by use of a password-based key derivation function
      PRS = PBKDF(pw).

   *  CI denotes an OPTIONAL octet string identifying a communication
      channel that needs to be available to both parties.  CI can be
      used for binding a CPace execution to one specific channel.
      Typically CI is obtained by concatenating strings that uniquely
      identify the protocol partner's identities, such as their
      networking addresses.

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                  [Page 7]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

   *  sid denotes an OPTIONAL octet string serving as session identifier
      that needs to be available to both parties.  In application
      scenarios where a higher-level protocol has established a unique
      sid value, this parameter can be used to ensure strong
      composability guarantees of CPace, and to bind a CPace execution
      to the application.

   *  ADa and ADb denote OPTIONAL octet strings containing arbitrary
      associated data, each available to one of the parties.  They are
      not required to be equal, and are publicly transmitted as part of
      the protocol flow.  ADa and ADb can for instance include party
      identifiers or protocol version information (to avoid, e.g.,
      downgrade attacks).  In a setting with initiator and responder
      roles, the information ADa sent by the initiator can be used by
      the responder for identifying which among possibly several
      different PRS to use for the CPace session.

3.3.  Notation

   *  str1 || str2 denotes concatenation of octet strings.

   *  oCat(str1,str2) denotes _ordered_ concatenation of octet strings
      as specified in the appendix.

   *  concat(MSGa,MSGb) denotes a concatenation method allows both
      parties to concatenate CPace's protocol messages in the same way.
      In applications where CPace is used without clear initiator and
      responder roles, i.e. where the ordering of messages is not
      enforced by the protocol flow, concat(MSGa,MSGb) = oCat(MSGa,MSGb)
      SHALL be used.  In settings where the protocol flow enforces
      ordering, concat(MSGa,MSGb) SHOULD BE implemented such that the
      _later_ message is appended to the _earlier_ message, i.e.,
      concat(MSGa,MSGb) = MSGa||MSGb if MSGa is sent first.

   *  len(S) denotes the number of octets in a string S.

   *  nil denotes an empty octet string, i.e., len(nil) = 0.

   *  prepend_len(octet_string) denotes the octet sequence that is
      obtained from prepending the length of the octet string to the
      string itself.  The length shall be prepended by using an UTF-8
      encoding of the length.  This will result in a single-byte
      encoding for values below 128.  (Test vectors and reference
      implementations are given in the appendix.)

   *  prefix_free_cat(a0,a1, ...) denotes a function that outputs the
      prefix-free encoding of all input octet strings as the
      concatenation of the individual strings with their respective

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                  [Page 8]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

      length prepended: prepend_len(a0) || prepend_len(a1) || ... . Such
      prefix-free encoding of multiple substrings allows for parsing
      individual subcomponents of a network message.  (Test vectors and
      reference implementations are given in the appendix.)

   *  sample_random_bytes(n) denotes a function that returns n octets
      uniformly distributed between 0 and 255.

   *  zero_bytes(n) denotes a function that returns n octets with value
      0.

3.3.1.  Notation for group operations

   We use multiplicative notation for the group, i.e., X^2 denotes the
   element that is obtained by computing X*X, for group element X and
   group operation *.

4.  The CPace protocol

   CPace is a one round protocol between two parties, A and B.  At
   invocation, A and B are provisioned with PRS,G,H and OPTIONAL public
   CI,sid,ADa (for A) and ADb (for B).  A sends a message MSGa to B.
   MSGa contains the public share Ya and OPTIONAL associated data ADa
   (i.e. an ADa field that MAY have a length of 0 bytes).  Likewise, B
   sends a message MSGb to A.  MSGb contains the public share Yb and
   OPTIONAL associated data ADb (i.e. an ADb field that MAY have a
   length of 0 bytes).  Both A and B use the received messages for
   deriving a shared intermediate session key, ISK.  Naming of this key
   as "intermediate" session key highlights the fact that it is
   RECOMMENDED to process ISK by use of a suitable strong key derivation
   function KDF (such as defined in [RFC5869]) first, before using the
   key in a higher-level protocol.

4.1.  Session identifier establishment

   It is RECOMMENDED to establish a unique session identifier sid in the
   course of the higher-level protocol that invokes CPace, by
   concatenating random bytes produced by A with random bytes produced
   by B.  In settings where such establishment is not an option, we can
   let initiator A choose a fresh random sid and send it to B together
   with the first message.  This method works whenever the message
   produced by party A comes first.

   The sid string SHOULD HAVE a length of at least 8 bytes and it MAY
   also be the empty string, nil.  I.e., use of the sid string is
   OPTIONAL.

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                  [Page 9]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

4.2.  Protocol flow

   Optional parameters and messages are denoted with [].

               public: G, H, [CI], [sid]

     A: PRS,[ADa]                    B: PRS,[ADb]
       ---------------------------------------
    compute Ya   |     Ya, [ADa]    |  compute Yb
                 |----------------->|
                 |     Yb, [ADb]    |
                 |<-----------------|
    verify data  |                  |  verify data
    derive ISK   |                  |  derive ISK
       ---------------------------------------
    output ISK                         output ISK

4.3.  CPace protocol instructions

   A computes a generator g = G.calculate_generator(H,PRS,CI,sid),
   scalar ya = G.sample_scalar() and group element Ya = G.scalar_mult
   (ya,g).  A then transmits MSGa = prefix_free_cat(Ya, ADa) with
   optional associated data ADa to B.  ADa MAY have length zero.

   B computes a generator g = G.calculate_generator(H,PRS,CI,sid),
   scalar yb = G.sample_scalar() and group element Yb =
   G.scalar_mult(yb,g).  B sends MSGb = prefix_free_cat(Yb, ADb) to A.

   Upon reception of MSGa, B parses MSGa as Ya and ADa using the
   prepended lengths of the substrings added by the prefix_free_cat()
   function.  B then computes K = G.scalar_mult_vfy(yb,Ya).  B MUST
   abort if K=G.I.  Otherwise B returns ISK =
   H.hash(prefix_free_cat(G.DSI || "_ISK", sid, K)||concat(MSGa, MSGb)).
   B returns ISK and terminates.

   Upon reception of MSGb, A parses MSGb as Yb and ADb using the
   prepended lengths of the substrings added by the prefix_free_cat()
   function.  A then computes K = G.scalar_mult_vfy(ya,Yb).  A MUST
   abort if K=G.I.  Otherwise A returns ISK =
   H.hash(prefix_free_cat(G.DSI || "_ISK", sid, K) || concat(MSGa,
   MSGb).  A returns ISK and terminates.

   The session key ISK returned by A and B is identical if and only if
   the supplied input parameters PRS, CI and sid match on both sides and
   transcript view (containing of MSGa and MSGb) of both parties match.

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

   We note that the above protocol instructions implement a parallel
   setting with no specific initiator/responder and no assumptions about
   the order in which messages arrive.  If implemented as initiator-
   responder protocol, the responder, say, B, starts with computation of
   the generator only upon reception of MSGa.

5.  CPace cipher suites

   This section documents RECOMMENDED CPace cipher suite configurations.
   Any cipher suite configuration for CPace is REQUIRED to specify

   *  A group environment G specified by

      -  Functions G.sample_scalar(), G.scalar_mult(),
         G.scalar_mult_vfy() and G.calculate_generator()

      -  A neutral element G.I

      -  A domain separation identifier string G.DSI unique for this
         cipher suite.

   *  A hash function H specified by

      -  Function H.hash()

      -  Constants H.b_in_bytes, H.bmax_in_bytes and H.s_in_bytes

   For naming cipher suites we use the convention "CPACE-G-H".
   Currently, test vectors are available for the following RECOMMENDED
   cipher suites:

   *  CPACE-X25519-SHA512.  This suite uses curve G_X25519 defined in
      Section 6.2 and SHA-512 as hash function.

   *  CPACE-X448-SHAKE256.  This suite uses curve G_X448 defined in
      Section 6.2 and SHAKE-256 as hash function.

   *  CPACE-P256_XMD:SHA-256_SSWU_NU_-SHA256.  This suite instantiates G
      as specified in Section 6.4 using the encode_to_curve function
      P256_XMD:SHA-256_SSWU_NU_ from [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve] on
      curve NIST-P256, and hash function SHA-256.

   *  CPACE-P384_XMD:SHA-384_SSWU_NU_-SHA384.  This suite instantiates G
      as specified in Section 6.4 using the encode_to_curve function
      P384_XMD:SHA-384_SSWU_NU_ from [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve] on
      curve NIST-P384 with H = SHA-384.

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

   *  CPACE-P521_XMD:SHA-512_SSWU_NU_-SHA512.  This suite instantiates G
      as specified in Section 6.4 using the encode_to_curve function
      P521_XMD:SHA-384_SSWU_NU_ from [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve] on
      curve NIST-P384 with H = SHA-512.

   *  CPACE-RISTR255-SHA512.  This suite uses G_ristretto255 defined in
      Section 6.3 and H = SHA-512.

   *  CPACE-DECAF448-SHAKE256 This suite uses G_decaf448 defined in
      Section 6.3 and H = SHAKE-256.

   CPace can securely be implemented on further elliptic curves when
   following the guidance given in Section 8.

6.  Implementation of recommended CPace cipher suites

6.1.  Common function for computing generators

   The different cipher suites for CPace defined in the upcoming
   sections share the same method for deterministically combining the
   individual strings PRS, CI, sid and the domain-separation identifier
   DSI to a generator string that we describe here.  Let CPACE-G-H
   denote the cipher suite.

   *  generator_string(G.DSI, PRS, CI, sid, s_in_bytes) denotes a
      function that returns the string prefix_free_cat(G.DSI, PRS,
      zero_bytes(len_zpad), CI, sid).

   *  len_zpad = MAX(0, s_in_bytes - len(prepend_len(PRS)) -
      len(prepend_len(G.DSI)) - 1)

   The zero padding of length len_zpad is designed such that the
   encoding of G.DSI and PRS together with the zero padding field
   completely fills the first input block (of length s_in_bytes) of the
   hash.  As a result the number of bytes to hash becomes independent of
   the actual length of the password (PRS).  (A reference implementation
   and test vectors are provided in the appendix.)

   The introduction of a zero-padding within the generator string also
   helps mitigating attacks of a side-channel adversary that analyzes
   correlations between publicly known variable information with the
   low-entropy PRS string.  Note that the hash of the first block is
   intentionally made independent of session-specific inputs, such as
   sid or CI.

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

6.2.  CPace group objects G_X25519 and G_X448 for single-coordinate
      Ladders on Montgomery curves

   In this section we consider the case of CPace when using the X25519
   and X448 Diffie-Hellman functions from [RFC7748] operating on the
   Montgomery curves Curve25519 and Curve448 [RFC7748].  CPace
   implementations using single-coordinate ladders on further Montgomery
   curves SHALL use the definitions in line with the specifications for
   X25519 and X448 and review the guidance given in Section 8.

   For the group environment G_X25519 the following definitions apply:

   *  G_X25519.field_size_bytes = 32

   *  G_X25519.field_size_bits = 255

   *  G_X25519.sample_scalar() = sample_random_bytes(G.field_size_bytes)

   *  G_X25519.scalar_mult(y,g) = G.scalar_mult_vfy(y,g) = X25519(y,g)

   *  G_X25519.I = zero_bytes(G.field_size_bytes)

   *  G_X25519.DSI = "CPace255"

   CPace cipher suites using G_X25519 MUST use a hash function producing
   at least H.b_max_in_bytes >= 32 bytes of output.  It is RECOMMENDED
   to use G_X25519 in combination with SHA-512.

   For X448 the following definitions apply:

   *  G_X448.field_size_bytes = 56

   *  G_X448.field_size_bits = 448

   *  G_X448.sample_scalar() = sample_random_bytes(G.field_size_bytes)

   *  G_X448.scalar_mult(y,g) = G.scalar_mult_vfy(y,g) = X448(y,g)

   *  G_X448.I = zero_bytes(G.field_size_bytes)

   *  G_X448.DSI = "CPace448"

   CPace cipher suites using G_X448 MUST use a hash function producing
   at least H.b_max_in_bytes >= 56 bytes of output.  It is RECOMMENDED
   to use G_X25519 in combination with SHAKE-256.

   For both G_X448 and G_X25519 the G.calculate_generator(H, PRS,sid,CI)
   function shall be implemented as follows.

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

   *  First gen_str = generator_string(G.DSI,PRS,CI,sid, H.s_in_bytes)
      SHALL BE calculated using the input block size of the chosen hash
      function.

   *  This string SHALL then BE hashed to the required length
      gen_str_hash = H.hash(gen_str, G.field_size_bytes).  Note that
      this implies that the permissible output length H.maxb_in_bytes
      MUST BE larger or equal to the field size of the group G for
      making a hashing function suitable.

   *  This result is then considered as a field coordinate using the u =
      decodeUCoordinate(gen_str_hash, G.field_size_bits) function from
      [RFC7748] which we repeat in the appendix for convenience.

   *  The result point g is then calculated as (g,v) =
      map_to_curve_elligator2(u) using the function from
      [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve].  Note that the v coordinate
      produced by the map_to_curve_elligator2 function is not required
      for CPace and discarded.  The appendix repeats the definitions
      from [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve] for convenience.

   In the appendix we show sage code that can be used as reference
   implementation.

6.2.1.  Verification tests

   For single-coordinate Montgomery ladders on Montgomery curves
   verification tests according to Section 7 SHALL consider the u
   coordinate values that encode a low-order point on either, the curve
   or the quadratic twist.

   In addition to that in case of G_X25519 the tests SHALL also verify
   that the implementation of G.scalar_mult_vfy(y,g) produces the
   expected results for non-canonical u coordinate values with bit #255
   set, which also encode low-order points.

   Corresponding test vectors are provided in the appendix.

6.3.  CPace group objects G_Ristretto255 and G_Decaf448 for prime-order
      group abstractions

   In this section we consider the case of CPace using the Ristretto255
   and Decaf448 group abstractions
   [I-D.draft-irtf-cfrg-ristretto255-decaf448].  These abstractions
   define an encode and decode function, group operations using an
   internal encoding and a one-way-map.  With the group abstractions
   there is a distinction between an internal representation of group
   elements and an external encoding of the same group element.  In

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

   order to distinguish between these different representations, we
   prepend an underscore before values using the internal representation
   within this section.

   For Ristretto255 the following definitions apply:

   *  G_Ristretto255.DSI = "CPaceRistretto255"

   *  G_Ristretto255.field_size_bytes = 32

   *  G_Ristretto255.group_size_bits = 252

   *  G_Ristretto255.group_order = 2^252 +
      27742317777372353535851937790883648493

   CPace cipher suites using G_Ristretto255 MUST use a hash function
   producing at least H.b_max_in_bytes >= 64 bytes of output.  It is
   RECOMMENDED to use G_Ristretto255 in combination with SHA-512.

   For decaf448 the following definitions apply:

   *  G_Decaf448.DSI = "CPaceDecaf448"

   *  G_Decaf448.field_size_bytes = 56

   *  G_Decaf448.group_size_bits = 445

   *  G_Decaf448.group_order = l = 2^446 -
      1381806680989511535200738674851542
      6880336692474882178609894547503885

   CPace cipher suites using G_Decaf448 MUST use a hash function
   producing at least H.b_max_in_bytes >= 112 bytes of output.  It is
   RECOMMENDED to use G_Decaf448 in combination with SHAKE-256.

   For both abstractions the following definitions apply:

   *  It is RECOMMENDED to implement G.sample_scalar() as follows.

      -  Set scalar = sample_random_bytes(G.group_size_bytes).

      -  Then clear the most significant bits larger than
         G.group_size_bits.

      -  Interpret the result as the little-endian encoding of an
         integer value and return the result.

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

   *  Alternatively, G.sample_scalar() MAY also implement uniform
      sampling between 1 and (G.group_order - 1).  (The more complex
      uniform sampling process might provide a larger side-channel
      attack surface for embedded systems in hostile environments.)

   *  G.scalar_mult(y,_g) SHALL operate on a scalar y and a group
      element _g in the internal representation of the group abstraction
      environment.  It returns the value Y = encode((_g)^y), i.e. it
      returns a value using the public encoding.

   *  G.I = is the public encoding representation of the identity
      element.

   *  G.scalar_mult_vfy(y,X) operates on a value using the public
      encoding and a scalar and is implemented as follows.  If the
      decode(X) function fails, it returns G.I.  Otherwise it returns
      encode( decode(X)^y ).

   *  The G.calculate_generator(H, PRS,sid,CI) function SHALL return a
      decoded point and SHALL BE implemented as follows.

      -  First gen_str = generator_string(G.DSI,PRS,CI,sid,
         H.s_in_bytes) is calculated using the input block size of the
         chosen hash function.

      -  This string is then hashed to the required length gen_str_hash
         = H.hash(gen_str, 2 * G.field_size_bytes).  Note that this
         implies that the permissible output length H.maxb_in_bytes MUST
         BE larger or equal to twice the field size of the group G for
         making a hash function suitable.

      -  Finally the internal representation of the generator _g is
         calculated as _g = one_way_map(gen_str_hash) using the one-way
         map function from the abstraction.

   Note that with these definitions the scalar_mult function operates on
   a _decoded_ point _g and returns an encoded point, while the
   scalar_mult_vfy(y,X) function operates on an encoded point X (and
   also returns an encoded point).

6.3.1.  Verification tests

   For group abstractions verification tests according to Section 7
   SHALL consider encodings of the neutral element and an octet string
   that does not decode to a valid group element.

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

6.4.  CPace group objects for curves in Short-Weierstrass representation

   The group environment objects G defined in this section for use with
   Short-Weierstrass curves, are parametrized by the choice of an
   elliptic curve and by choice of a suitable encode_to_curve(str)
   function. encode_to_curve(str) must map an octet string str to a
   point on the curve.

6.4.1.  Curves and associated functions

   Elliptic curves in Short-Weierstrass form are considered in
   [IEEE1363].  [IEEE1363] allows for both, curves of prime and non-
   prime order.  However, for the procedures described in this section
   any suitable group MUST BE of prime order.

   The specification for the group environment objects specified in this
   section closely follow the ECKAS-DH1 method from [IEEE1363].  I.e. we
   use the same methods and encodings and protocol substeps as employed
   in the TLS [RFC5246] [RFC8446] protocol family.

   For CPace only the uncompressed full-coordinate encodings from [SEC1]
   (x _and_ y coordinate) SHOULD be used.  Commonly used curve groups
   are specified in [SEC2] and [RFC5639].  A typical representative of
   such a Short-Weierstrass curve is NIST-P256.  Point verification as
   used in ECKAS-DH1 is described in Annex A.16.10. of [IEEE1363].

   For deriving Diffie-Hellman shared secrets ECKAS-DH1 from [IEEE1363]
   specifies the use of an ECSVDP-DH method.  ECSVDP-DH either returns
   "error" or the x-coordinate of the Diffie-Hellman shared secret.

6.4.2.  Suitable encode_to_curve methods

   All the encode_to_curve methods specified in
   [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve] are suitable for CPace.  For Short-
   Weierstrass curves it is RECOMMENDED to use the non-uniform variant
   of the SSWU mapping primitive from [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve] if a
   SSWU mapping is available for the chosen curve.

6.4.3.  Definition of the group environment G for Short-Weierstrass
        curves

   In this paragraph we use the following notation for defining the
   group object G for a selected curve and encode_to_curve method:

   *  With group_order we denote the order of the elliptic curve which
      MUST BE a prime.

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

   *  With is_valid(X) we denote a method which operates on an octet
      stream according to [SEC1] of a point on the group and returns
      true if the point is valid or false otherwise.  This G.is_valid(X)
      method SHALL be implemented according to Annex A.16.10. of
      [IEEE1363].  I.e. it shall return false if X encodes either the
      neutral element on the group or does not form a valid encoding of
      a point on the group.

   *  With encode_to_curve(str) we denote a selected mapping function
      from [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve].  I.e. a function that maps
      octet string str to a point on the group.
      [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve] considers both, uniform and non-
      uniform mappings based on several different strategies.  It is
      RECOMMENDED to use the nonuniform variant of the SSWU mapping
      primitive within [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve].

   *  G.DSI denotes a domain-separation identifier string.  G.DSI which
      SHALL BE obtained by the concatenation of "CPace" and the
      associated name of the cipher suite used for the encode_to_curve
      function as specified in [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve].  E.g. when
      using the map with the name "P384_XMD:SHA-384_SSWU_NU_" on curve
      NIST-P384 the resulting value SHALL BE G.DSI = "CPaceP384_XMD:SHA-
      384_SSWU_NU_".

   Using the above definitions, the CPace functions required for the
   group object G are defined as follows.

   *  G.sample_scalar() SHALL return a value between 1 and
      (G.group_order - 1).  The value sampling MUST BE uniformly random.
      It is RECOMMENDED to use rejection sampling for converting a
      uniform bitstring to a uniform value between 1 and (G.group_order
      - 1).

   *  G.calculate_generator(H, PRS,sid,CI) function SHALL be implemented
      as follows.

      -  First gen_str = generator_string(G.DSI,PRS,CI,sid,
         H.s_in_bytes) is calculated.

      -  Then the output of a call to encode_to_curve(gen_str) is
         returned, using the selected function from
         [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve].

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 18]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

   *  G.scalar_mult(s,X) is a function that operates on a scalar s and
      an input point X.  The input X shall use the same encoding as
      produced by the G.calculate_generator method above.
      G.scalar_mult(s,X) SHALL return an encoding of the point X^s
      according to [SEC1].  It SHOULD use the full-coordinate format
      without compression that encodes both, x and y coordinates of the
      result point.

   *  G.scalar_mult_vfy(s,X) merges verification of point X according to
      [IEEE1363] A.16.10. and the the ECSVDP-DH procedure from
      [IEEE1363].  It SHALL BE implemented as follows:

      -  If is_valid(X) = False then G.scalar_mult_vfy(s,X) SHALL return
         "error".

      -  Otherwise G.scalar_mult_vfy(s,X) SHALL return the result of the
         ECSVDP-DH procedure from [IEEE1363] (section 7.2.1).  I.e. it
         shall either return "error" (in case that X^s is the neutral
         element) or the secret shared value "z" (otherwise). "z" SHALL
         be encoded by using the big-endian encoding of the x-coordinate
         of the result point X^s according to [SEC1].

   *  We represent the neutral element G.I by using the encoding of the
      "error" result case from the G.scalar_mult_vfy method above.

6.4.4.  Verification tests

   For Short-Weierstrass curves verification tests according to
   Section 7 SHALL consider encodings of the point at infinity and an
   encoding of a point not on the group.

7.  Implementation verification

   Any CPace implementation MUST be tested against invalid or weak point
   attacks.  Implementation MUST be verified to abort upon conditions
   where G.scalar_mult_vfy functions outputs G.I.  For testing an
   implementation it is RECOMMENDED to include weak or invalid points in
   MSGa and MSGb and introduce this in a protocol run.  It SHALL be
   verified that the abort condition is properly handled.

   Corresponding test vectors are given in the appendix for all
   recommended cipher suites.

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 19]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

8.  Security Considerations

   A security proof of CPace is found in [CPacePaper].  This proof
   covers all recommended cipher suites included in this document.  In
   the following sections we describe how to protect CPace against
   several attack families, such as relay-, length extension- or side
   channel attacks.  We also describe aspects to consider when deviating
   from recommended cipher suites.

8.1.  Party identifiers and relay attacks

   If unique strings identifying the protocol partners are included
   either as part of the channel identifier CI, the session id sid or
   the associated data fields ADa, ADb, the ISK will provide implicit
   authentication also regarding the party identities.  Incorporating
   party identifier strings is important for fending off relay attacks.
   Such attacks become relevant in a setting where several parties, say,
   A, B and C, share the same password PRS.  An adversary might relay
   messages from a honest user A, who aims at interacting with user B,
   to a party C instead.  If no party identifier strings are used, and B
   and C use the same PRS value, A might be establishing a common ISK
   key with C while assuming to interact with party B.  Including and
   checking party identifiers can fend off such relay attacks.

8.2.  Sampling of scalars

   For curves over fields F_p where p is a prime close to a power of
   two, we recommend sampling scalars as a uniform bit string of length
   field_size_bits.  We do so in order to reduce both, complexity of the
   implementation and reducing the attack surface with respect to side-
   channels for embedded systems in hostile environments.  The effect of
   non-uniform sampling on security was demonstrated to be begning in
   [CPacePaper] for the case of Curve25519 and Curve448.  This analysis
   however does not transfer to most curves in Short-Weierstrass form.
   As a result, we recommend rejection sampling if G is as in
   Section 6.4.

8.3.  Hashing and key derivation

   In order to prevent analysis of length extension attacks on hash
   functions, all hash input strings in CPace are designed to be prefix-
   free strings which have the length of individual substrings
   prepended, enforced by the prefix_free_cat() function.  This choice
   was made in order to make CPace suitable also for hash function
   instantiations using Merkle-Damgard constructions such as SHA-2 or
   SHA-512 along the lines of [CDMP05].  In case that an application
   whishes to use another form of encoding, the guidance given in
   [CDMP05] SHOULD BE considered.

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 20]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

   Although already K is a shared value, it MUST NOT itself be used as
   an application key.  Instead, ISK MUST BE used.  Leakage of K to an
   adversary can lead to offline dictionary attacks.

8.4.  Single-coordinate CPace on Montgomery curves

   The recommended cipher suites for the Montgomery curves Curve25519
   and Curve448 in Section 6.2 rely on the following properties
   [CPacePaper]:

   *  The curve has order (p * c) with p prime and c a small cofactor.
      Also the curve's quadratic twist must be of order (p' * c') with
      p' prime and c' a cofactor.

   *  The cofactor c' of the twist MUST BE EQUAL to or an integer
      multiple of the cofactor c of the curve.

   *  Both field order q and group order p MUST BE close to a power of
      two along the lines of [CPacePaper], Appendix E.

   *  The representation of the neutral element G.I MUST BE the same for
      both, the curve and its twist.

   *  The implementation of G.scalar_mult_vfy(y,X) MUST map all c low-
      order points on the curve and all c' low-order points on the twist
      to G.I.

   Montgomery curves other than the ones recommended here can use the
   specifications given in Section 6.2, given that the above properties
   hold.

8.5.  Nonce values

   Secret scalars ya and yb MUST NOT be reused.  Values for sid SHOULD
   NOT be reused since the composability guarantees established by the
   simulation-based proof rely on the uniqueness of session ids
   [CPacePaper].

   If CPace is used in a concurrent system, it is RECOMMENDED that a
   unique sid is generated by the higher-level protocol and passed to
   CPace.  One suitable option is that sid is generated by concatenating
   ephemeral random strings contributed by both parties.

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 21]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

8.6.  Side channel attacks

   All state-of-the art methods for realizing constant-time execution
   SHOULD be used.  In case that side channel attacks are to be
   considered practical for a given application, it is RECOMMENDED to
   pay special attention on computing the secret generator
   G.calculate_generator(PRS,CI,sid).  The most critical substep to
   consider might be the processing of the first block of the hash that
   includes the PRS string.  The zero-padding introduced when hashing
   the sensitive PRS string can be expected to make the task for a side-
   channel attack somewhat more complex.  Still this feature alone is
   not sufficient for ruling out power analysis attacks.

8.7.  Quantum computers

   CPace is proven secure under the hardness of the computational
   Simultaneous Diffie-Hellmann (SDH) assumption in the group G (as
   defined in [CPacePaper]).  This assumption is not expected to hold
   any longer when large-scale quantum computers (LSQC) are available.
   Still, even in case that LSQC emerge, it is reasonable to assume that
   discrete-logarithm computations will remain costly.  CPace with
   ephemeral session id values sid forces the adversary to solve one
   computational Diffie-Hellman problem per password guess
   [CPacePaper2].  In this sense, using the wording suggested by Steve
   Thomas on the CFRG mailing list, CPace is "quantum-annoying".

9.  IANA Considerations

   No IANA action is required.

10.  Acknowledgements

   Thanks to the members of the CFRG for comments and advice.  Any
   comment and advice is appreciated.

11.  References

11.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.draft-irtf-cfrg-ristretto255-decaf448]
              Valence, H. D., Grigg, J., Tankersley, G., Valsorda, F.,
              Lovecruft, I., and M. Hamburg, "The ristretto255 and
              decaf448 Groups", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              irtf-cfrg-ristretto255-decaf448-01, 4 August 2021,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-
              ristretto255-decaf448-01>.

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 22]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

   [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve]
              Faz-Hernandez, A., Scott, S., Sullivan, N., Wahby, R. S.,
              and C. A. Wood, "Hashing to Elliptic Curves", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-
              13, 10 November 2021,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-
              hash-to-curve-13>.

   [IEEE1363] "Standard Specifications for Public Key Cryptography, IEEE
              1363", 2000.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

   [RFC7748]  Langley, A., Hamburg, M., and S. Turner, "Elliptic Curves
              for Security", RFC 7748, DOI 10.17487/RFC7748, January
              2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7748>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

   [SEC1]     Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group (SECG), "SEC 1:
              Elliptic Curve Cryptography", May 2009,
              <http://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf>.

11.2.  Informative References

   [CDMP05]   Coron, J-S., Dodis, Y., Malinaud, C., and P. Puniya,
              "Merkle-Damgaard Revisited: How to Construct a Hash
              Function", In Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2005,
              pages 430-448, DOI 10.1007/11535218_26, 2005,
              <https://doi.org/10.1007/11535218_26>.

   [CPacePaper]
              Abdalla, M., Haase, B., and J. Hesse, "Security analysis
              of CPace", n.d., <https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/114>.

   [CPacePaper2]
              Eaton, E. and D. Stebila, "The 'quantum annoying' property
              of password-authenticated key exchange protocols.", n.d.,
              <https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/696>.

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 23]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

   [FIPS202]  National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
              "SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-
              Output Functions", August 2015,
              <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
              NIST.FIPS.202.pdf>.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5246>.

   [RFC5639]  Lochter, M. and J. Merkle, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography
              (ECC) Brainpool Standard Curves and Curve Generation",
              RFC 5639, DOI 10.17487/RFC5639, March 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5639>.

   [RFC5869]  Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand
              Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5869, May 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5869>.

   [RFC6234]  Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
              (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6234>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446>.

   [SEC2]     Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group (SECG), "SEC 2:
              Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters", January
              2010, <http://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf>.

Appendix A.  CPace function definitions

A.1.  Definition and test vectors for string utility functions

A.1.1.  prepend_len function

     def prepend_len(data):
         length_as_utf8_string = chr(len(data)).encode('utf-8')
         return (length_as_utf8_string + data)

A.1.2.  prepend_len test vectors

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 24]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

     prepend_len(b""): (length: 1 bytes)
       00
     prepend_len(b"1234"): (length: 5 bytes)
       0431323334
     prepend_len(bytes(range(127))): (length: 128 bytes)
       7f000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b
       1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738
       393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455
       565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172
       737475767778797a7b7c7d7e
     prepend_len(bytes(range(128))): (length: 130 bytes)
       c280000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a
       1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f3031323334353637
       38393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f5051525354
       55565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f7071
       72737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f

A.1.3.  prefix_free_cat function

     def prefix_free_cat(*args):
         result = b""
         for arg in args:
             result += prepend_len(arg)
         return result

A.1.4.  Testvector for prefix_free_cat()

     prefix_free_cat(b"1234",b"5",b"",b"6789"):
     (length: 13 bytes)
       04313233340135000436373839

A.2.  Definition of generator_string function.

def generator_string(DSI,PRS,CI,sid,s_in_bytes):
    # Concat all input fields with prepended length information.
    # Add zero padding in the first hash block after DSI and PRS.
    len_zpad = max(0,s_in_bytes - 1 - len(prepend_len(PRS))
                     - len(prepend_len(DSI)))
    return (prefix_free_cat(DSI, PRS, zero_bytes(len_zpad), CI, sid), len_zpad)

A.3.  Definitions and test vector ordered concatenation

A.3.1.  Definitions ordered concatenation

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 25]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

     def oCat(str1,str2):
         if str1 > str2:
             return str1 + str2
         else:
             return str2 + str1

A.3.2.  Test vectors ordered concatenation

     string comparison for oCat:
       b"\0" > b"\0\0" == False
       b"\1" > b"\0\0" == True
       b"\0\0" > b"\0" == True
       b"\0\0" > b"\1" == False
       b"\0\1" > b"\1" == False
       b"ABCD" > b"BCD" == False

     oCat(b"ABCD",b"BCD"): (length: 7 bytes)
       42434441424344
     oCat(b"BCD",b"ABCDE"): (length: 8 bytes)
       4243444142434445

A.4.  Decoding and Encoding functions according to RFC7748

      def decodeLittleEndian(b, bits):
          return sum([b[i] << 8*i for i in range((bits+7)/8)])

      def decodeUCoordinate(u, bits):
          u_list = [ord(b) for b in u]
          # Ignore any unused bits.
          if bits % 8:
              u_list[-1] &= (1<<(bits%8))-1
          return decodeLittleEndian(u_list, bits)

      def encodeUCoordinate(u, bits):
          u = u % p
          return ''.join([chr((u >> 8*i) & 0xff)
                          for i in range((bits+7)/8)])

A.5.  Elligator 2 reference implementation

   The Elligator 2 map requires a non-square field element Z which shall
   be calculated as follows.

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 26]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

       def find_z_ell2(F):
           # Find nonsquare for Elligator2
           # Argument: F, a field object, e.g., F = GF(2^255 - 19)
           ctr = F.gen()
           while True:
               for Z_cand in (F(ctr), F(-ctr)):
                   # Z must be a non-square in F.
                   if is_square(Z_cand):
                       continue
                   return Z_cand
               ctr += 1

   The following code maps a field element r to an encoded field element
   which is a valid u-coordinate of a Montgomery curve with curve
   parameter A.

      def elligator2(r, q, A, field_size_bits):
          # Inputs: field element r, field order q,
          #         curve parameter A and field size in bits
          Fq = GF(q); A = Fq(A); B = Fq(1);

          # calculate non-square z as specified in the hash2curve draft.
          z = Fq(find_z_ell2(Fq))
          powerForLegendreSymbol = floor((q-1)/2)

          v = - A / (1 + z * r^2)
          epsilon = (v^3 + A * v^2 + B * v)^powerForLegendreSymbol
          x = epsilon * v - (1 - epsilon) * A/2
          return encodeUCoordinate(Integer(x), field_size_bits)

Appendix B.  Test vectors

B.1.  Test vector for CPace using group X25519 and hash SHA-512

B.1.1.  Test vectors for calculate_generator with group X25519

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 27]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

     Inputs
       H   = SHA-512 with input block size 128 bytes.
       PRS = b'Password' ; ZPAD length: 109 ; DSI = b'CPace255'
       CI = b'\nAinitiator\nBresponder'
       CI = 0a41696e69746961746f720a42726573706f6e646572
       sid = 7e4b4791d6a8ef019b936c79fb7f2c57
     Outputs
       generator_string(G.DSI,PRS,CI,sid,H.s_in_bytes):
       (length: 168 bytes)
         0843506163653235350850617373776f72646d000000000000000000
         00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
         00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
         00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
         00000000000000000000000000000000160a41696e69746961746f72
         0a42726573706f6e646572107e4b4791d6a8ef019b936c79fb7f2c57
       hash generator string: (length: 32 bytes)
         10047198e8c4cacf0ab8a6d0ac337b8ae497209d042f7f3a50945863
         94e821fc
       decoded field element of 255 bits: (length: 32 bytes)
         10047198e8c4cacf0ab8a6d0ac337b8ae497209d042f7f3a50945863
         94e8217c
       generator g: (length: 32 bytes)
         4e6098733061c0e8486611a904fe5edb049804d26130a44131a6229e
         55c5c321

B.1.2.  Test vector for MSGa

     Inputs
       ADa = b'ADa'
       ya (little endian): (length: 32 bytes)
         45acf93116ae5d3dae995a7c627df2924321a8e857d9a200807131e3
         8839b0c2
     Outputs
       Ya: (length: 32 bytes)
         6f7fd31863b18b0cc9830fc842c60dea80120ccf2fd375498225e45a
         52065361
       MSGa: (length: 37 bytes)
         206f7fd31863b18b0cc9830fc842c60dea80120ccf2fd375498225e4
         5a5206536103414461

B.1.3.  Test vector for MSGb

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 28]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

     Inputs
       ADb = b'ADb'
       yb (little endian): (length: 32 bytes)
         a145e914b347002d298ce2051394f0ed68cf3623dfe5db082c78ffa5
         a667acdc
     Outputs
       Yb: (length: 32 bytes)
         e1b730a4956c0f853d96c5d125cebeeea46952c07c6f66da65bd9ffd
         2f71a462
       MSGb: (length: 37 bytes)
         20e1b730a4956c0f853d96c5d125cebeeea46952c07c6f66da65bd9f
         fd2f71a46203414462

B.1.4.  Test vector for secret points K

       scalar_mult_vfy(ya,Yb): (length: 32 bytes)
         2a905bc5f0b93ee72ac4b6ea8723520941adfc892935bf6f86d9e199
         befa6024
       scalar_mult_vfy(yb,Ya): (length: 32 bytes)
         2a905bc5f0b93ee72ac4b6ea8723520941adfc892935bf6f86d9e199
         befa6024

B.1.5.  Test vector for ISK calculation initiator/responder

       unordered cat of transcript : (length: 74 bytes)
         206f7fd31863b18b0cc9830fc842c60dea80120ccf2fd375498225e4
         5a520653610341446120e1b730a4956c0f853d96c5d125cebeeea469
         52c07c6f66da65bd9ffd2f71a46203414462
       DSI = G.DSI_ISK, b'CPace255_ISK': (length: 12 bytes)
         43506163653235355f49534b
       prefix_free_cat(DSI,sid,K)||MSGa||MSGb: (length: 137 bytes)
         0c43506163653235355f49534b107e4b4791d6a8ef019b936c79fb7f
         2c57202a905bc5f0b93ee72ac4b6ea8723520941adfc892935bf6f86
         d9e199befa6024206f7fd31863b18b0cc9830fc842c60dea80120ccf
         2fd375498225e45a520653610341446120e1b730a4956c0f853d96c5
         d125cebeeea46952c07c6f66da65bd9ffd2f71a46203414462
       ISK result: (length: 64 bytes)
         99a9e0ff35acb94ad8af1cd6b32ac409dc7d00557ccd9a7d19d3b462
         9e5f1f084f9332096162438c7ecc78331b4eda17e1a229a47182eccc
         9ea58cd9cdcd8e9a

B.1.6.  Test vector for ISK calculation parallel execution

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 29]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

       ordered cat of transcript : (length: 74 bytes)
         20e1b730a4956c0f853d96c5d125cebeeea46952c07c6f66da65bd9f
         fd2f71a46203414462206f7fd31863b18b0cc9830fc842c60dea8012
         0ccf2fd375498225e45a5206536103414461
       DSI = G.DSI_ISK, b'CPace255_ISK': (length: 12 bytes)
         43506163653235355f49534b
       prefix_free_cat(DSI,sid,K)||oCat(MSGa,MSGb):
       (length: 137 bytes)
         0c43506163653235355f49534b107e4b4791d6a8ef019b936c79fb7f
         2c57202a905bc5f0b93ee72ac4b6ea8723520941adfc892935bf6f86
         d9e199befa602420e1b730a4956c0f853d96c5d125cebeeea46952c0
         7c6f66da65bd9ffd2f71a46203414462206f7fd31863b18b0cc9830f
         c842c60dea80120ccf2fd375498225e45a5206536103414461
       ISK result: (length: 64 bytes)
         3cd6a9670fa3ff211d829b845baa0f5ba9ad580c3ba0ee790bd0e9cd
         556290a8ffce44419fbf94e4cb8e7fe9f454fd25dc13e689e4d6ab0a
         c2211c70a8ac0062

B.1.7.  Corresponding ANSI-C initializers

   const uint8_t tc_PRS[] = {
    0x50,0x61,0x73,0x73,0x77,0x6f,0x72,0x64,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_CI[] = {
    0x0a,0x41,0x69,0x6e,0x69,0x74,0x69,0x61,0x74,0x6f,0x72,0x0a,
    0x42,0x72,0x65,0x73,0x70,0x6f,0x6e,0x64,0x65,0x72,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_sid[] = {
    0x7e,0x4b,0x47,0x91,0xd6,0xa8,0xef,0x01,0x9b,0x93,0x6c,0x79,
    0xfb,0x7f,0x2c,0x57,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_g[] = {
    0x4e,0x60,0x98,0x73,0x30,0x61,0xc0,0xe8,0x48,0x66,0x11,0xa9,
    0x04,0xfe,0x5e,0xdb,0x04,0x98,0x04,0xd2,0x61,0x30,0xa4,0x41,
    0x31,0xa6,0x22,0x9e,0x55,0xc5,0xc3,0x21,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_ya[] = {
    0x45,0xac,0xf9,0x31,0x16,0xae,0x5d,0x3d,0xae,0x99,0x5a,0x7c,
    0x62,0x7d,0xf2,0x92,0x43,0x21,0xa8,0xe8,0x57,0xd9,0xa2,0x00,
    0x80,0x71,0x31,0xe3,0x88,0x39,0xb0,0xc2,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_ADa[] = {
    0x41,0x44,0x61,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_Ya[] = {
    0x6f,0x7f,0xd3,0x18,0x63,0xb1,0x8b,0x0c,0xc9,0x83,0x0f,0xc8,
    0x42,0xc6,0x0d,0xea,0x80,0x12,0x0c,0xcf,0x2f,0xd3,0x75,0x49,
    0x82,0x25,0xe4,0x5a,0x52,0x06,0x53,0x61,

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 30]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

   };
   const uint8_t tc_yb[] = {
    0xa1,0x45,0xe9,0x14,0xb3,0x47,0x00,0x2d,0x29,0x8c,0xe2,0x05,
    0x13,0x94,0xf0,0xed,0x68,0xcf,0x36,0x23,0xdf,0xe5,0xdb,0x08,
    0x2c,0x78,0xff,0xa5,0xa6,0x67,0xac,0xdc,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_ADb[] = {
    0x41,0x44,0x62,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_Yb[] = {
    0xe1,0xb7,0x30,0xa4,0x95,0x6c,0x0f,0x85,0x3d,0x96,0xc5,0xd1,
    0x25,0xce,0xbe,0xee,0xa4,0x69,0x52,0xc0,0x7c,0x6f,0x66,0xda,
    0x65,0xbd,0x9f,0xfd,0x2f,0x71,0xa4,0x62,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_K[] = {
    0x2a,0x90,0x5b,0xc5,0xf0,0xb9,0x3e,0xe7,0x2a,0xc4,0xb6,0xea,
    0x87,0x23,0x52,0x09,0x41,0xad,0xfc,0x89,0x29,0x35,0xbf,0x6f,
    0x86,0xd9,0xe1,0x99,0xbe,0xfa,0x60,0x24,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_ISK_IR[] = {
    0x99,0xa9,0xe0,0xff,0x35,0xac,0xb9,0x4a,0xd8,0xaf,0x1c,0xd6,
    0xb3,0x2a,0xc4,0x09,0xdc,0x7d,0x00,0x55,0x7c,0xcd,0x9a,0x7d,
    0x19,0xd3,0xb4,0x62,0x9e,0x5f,0x1f,0x08,0x4f,0x93,0x32,0x09,
    0x61,0x62,0x43,0x8c,0x7e,0xcc,0x78,0x33,0x1b,0x4e,0xda,0x17,
    0xe1,0xa2,0x29,0xa4,0x71,0x82,0xec,0xcc,0x9e,0xa5,0x8c,0xd9,
    0xcd,0xcd,0x8e,0x9a,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_ISK_SY[] = {
    0x3c,0xd6,0xa9,0x67,0x0f,0xa3,0xff,0x21,0x1d,0x82,0x9b,0x84,
    0x5b,0xaa,0x0f,0x5b,0xa9,0xad,0x58,0x0c,0x3b,0xa0,0xee,0x79,
    0x0b,0xd0,0xe9,0xcd,0x55,0x62,0x90,0xa8,0xff,0xce,0x44,0x41,
    0x9f,0xbf,0x94,0xe4,0xcb,0x8e,0x7f,0xe9,0xf4,0x54,0xfd,0x25,
    0xdc,0x13,0xe6,0x89,0xe4,0xd6,0xab,0x0a,0xc2,0x21,0x1c,0x70,
    0xa8,0xac,0x00,0x62,
   };

B.1.8.  Test vectors for G_X25519.scalar_mult_vfy: low order points

   Test vectors for which G_X25519.scalar_mult_vfy(s_in,ux) must return
   the neutral element or would return the neutral element if bit #255
   of field element representation was not correctly cleared.  (The
   decodeUCoordinate function from RFC7748 mandates clearing bit #255
   for field element representations for use in the X25519 function.).

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 31]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

   u0: 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
   u1: 0100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
   u2: ecffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff7f
   u3: e0eb7a7c3b41b8ae1656e3faf19fc46ada098deb9c32b1fd866205165f49b800
   u4: 5f9c95bca3508c24b1d0b1559c83ef5b04445cc4581c8e86d8224eddd09f1157
   u5: edffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff7f
   u6: daffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
   u7: eeffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff7f
   u8: dbffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
   u9: d9ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
   ua: cdeb7a7c3b41b8ae1656e3faf19fc46ada098deb9c32b1fd866205165f49b880
   ub: 4c9c95bca3508c24b1d0b1559c83ef5b04445cc4581c8e86d8224eddd09f11d7

   u0 ... ub MUST be verified to produce the correct results q0 ... qb:

   Additionally, u0,u1,u2,u3,u4,u5 and u7 MUST trigger the abort case
   when included in MSGa or MSGb.

   s = af46e36bf0527c9d3b16154b82465edd62144c0ac1fc5a18506a2244ba449aff
   qN = G_X25519.scalar_mult_vfy(s, uX)
   q0: 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
   q1: 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
   q2: 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
   q3: 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
   q4: 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
   q5: 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
   q6: d8e2c776bbacd510d09fd9278b7edcd25fc5ae9adfba3b6e040e8d3b71b21806
   q7: 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
   q8: c85c655ebe8be44ba9c0ffde69f2fe10194458d137f09bbff725ce58803cdb38
   q9: db64dafa9b8fdd136914e61461935fe92aa372cb056314e1231bc4ec12417456
   qa: e062dcd5376d58297be2618c7498f55baa07d7e03184e8aada20bca28888bf7a
   qb: 993c6ad11c4c29da9a56f7691fd0ff8d732e49de6250b6c2e80003ff4629a175

B.2.  Test vector for CPace using group X448 and hash SHAKE-256

B.2.1.  Test vectors for calculate_generator with group X448

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 32]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

     Inputs
       H   = SHAKE-256 with input block size 136 bytes.
       PRS = b'Password' ; ZPAD length: 117 ; DSI = b'CPace448'
       CI = b'\nAinitiator\nBresponder'
       CI = 0a41696e69746961746f720a42726573706f6e646572
       sid = 5223e0cdc45d6575668d64c552004124
     Outputs
       generator_string(G.DSI,PRS,CI,sid,H.s_in_bytes):
       (length: 176 bytes)
         0843506163653434380850617373776f726475000000000000000000
         00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
         00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
         00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
         000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000160a4169
         6e69746961746f720a42726573706f6e646572105223e0cdc45d6575
         668d64c552004124
       hash generator string: (length: 56 bytes)
         769e06d6c41c8cf1c87aa3df8e687167f6d0a2e41821e856276a0221
         d88272359d0b43204b546174c9179c83c107b707f296eafaa1c5a293
       decoded field element of 448 bits: (length: 32 bytes)
         769e06d6c41c8cf1c87aa3df8e687167f6d0a2e41821e856276a0221
         d8827235
       generator g: (length: 56 bytes)
         6fdae14718eb7506dd96e3f7797896efdb8db9ec0797485c9c48a192
         2e44961da097f2908b084a5de33ab671630660d27d79ffd6ee8ec846

B.2.2.  Test vector for MSGa

     Inputs
       ADa = b'ADa'
       ya (little endian): (length: 56 bytes)
         21b4f4bd9e64ed355c3eb676a28ebedaf6d8f17bdc365995b3190971
         53044080516bd083bfcce66121a3072646994c8430cc382b8dc543e8
     Outputs
       Ya: (length: 56 bytes)
         396bd11daf223711e575cac6021e3fa31558012048a1cec7876292b9
         6c61eda353fe04f33028d2352779668a934084da776c1c51a58ce4b5
       MSGa: (length: 61 bytes)
         38396bd11daf223711e575cac6021e3fa31558012048a1cec7876292
         b96c61eda353fe04f33028d2352779668a934084da776c1c51a58ce4
         b503414461

B.2.3.  Test vector for MSGb

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 33]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

     Inputs
       ADb = b'ADb'
       yb (little endian): (length: 56 bytes)
         848b0779ff415f0af4ea14df9dd1d3c29ac41d836c7808896c4eba19
         c51ac40a439caf5e61ec88c307c7d619195229412eaa73fb2a5ea20d
     Outputs
       Yb: (length: 56 bytes)
         53c519fb490fde5a04bda8c18b327d0fc1a9391d19e0ac00c59df9c6
         0422284e593d6b092eac94f5aa644ed883f39bd4f04e4beb6af86d58
       MSGb: (length: 61 bytes)
         3853c519fb490fde5a04bda8c18b327d0fc1a9391d19e0ac00c59df9
         c60422284e593d6b092eac94f5aa644ed883f39bd4f04e4beb6af86d
         5803414462

B.2.4.  Test vector for secret points K

       scalar_mult_vfy(ya,Yb): (length: 56 bytes)
         e00af217556a40ccbc9822cc27a43542e45166a653aa4df746d5f8e1
         e8df483e9baff71c9eb03ee20a688ad4e4d359f70ac9ec3f6a659997
       scalar_mult_vfy(yb,Ya): (length: 56 bytes)
         e00af217556a40ccbc9822cc27a43542e45166a653aa4df746d5f8e1
         e8df483e9baff71c9eb03ee20a688ad4e4d359f70ac9ec3f6a659997

B.2.5.  Test vector for ISK calculation initiator/responder

       unordered cat of transcript : (length: 122 bytes)
         38396bd11daf223711e575cac6021e3fa31558012048a1cec7876292
         b96c61eda353fe04f33028d2352779668a934084da776c1c51a58ce4
         b5034144613853c519fb490fde5a04bda8c18b327d0fc1a9391d19e0
         ac00c59df9c60422284e593d6b092eac94f5aa644ed883f39bd4f04e
         4beb6af86d5803414462
       DSI = G.DSI_ISK, b'CPace448_ISK': (length: 12 bytes)
         43506163653434385f49534b
       prefix_free_cat(DSI,sid,K)||MSGa||MSGb: (length: 209 bytes)
         0c43506163653434385f49534b105223e0cdc45d6575668d64c55200
         412438e00af217556a40ccbc9822cc27a43542e45166a653aa4df746
         d5f8e1e8df483e9baff71c9eb03ee20a688ad4e4d359f70ac9ec3f6a
         65999738396bd11daf223711e575cac6021e3fa31558012048a1cec7
         876292b96c61eda353fe04f33028d2352779668a934084da776c1c51
         a58ce4b5034144613853c519fb490fde5a04bda8c18b327d0fc1a939
         1d19e0ac00c59df9c60422284e593d6b092eac94f5aa644ed883f39b
         d4f04e4beb6af86d5803414462
       ISK result: (length: 64 bytes)
         4030297722c1914711da6b2a224a44b53b30c05ab02c2a3d3ccc7272
         a3333ce3a4564c17031b634e89f65681f52d5c3d1df7baeb88523d2e
         481b3858aed86315

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 34]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

B.2.6.  Test vector for ISK calculation parallel execution

       ordered cat of transcript : (length: 122 bytes)
         3853c519fb490fde5a04bda8c18b327d0fc1a9391d19e0ac00c59df9
         c60422284e593d6b092eac94f5aa644ed883f39bd4f04e4beb6af86d
         580341446238396bd11daf223711e575cac6021e3fa31558012048a1
         cec7876292b96c61eda353fe04f33028d2352779668a934084da776c
         1c51a58ce4b503414461
       DSI = G.DSI_ISK, b'CPace448_ISK': (length: 12 bytes)
         43506163653434385f49534b
       prefix_free_cat(DSI,sid,K)||oCat(MSGa,MSGb):
       (length: 209 bytes)
         0c43506163653434385f49534b105223e0cdc45d6575668d64c55200
         412438e00af217556a40ccbc9822cc27a43542e45166a653aa4df746
         d5f8e1e8df483e9baff71c9eb03ee20a688ad4e4d359f70ac9ec3f6a
         6599973853c519fb490fde5a04bda8c18b327d0fc1a9391d19e0ac00
         c59df9c60422284e593d6b092eac94f5aa644ed883f39bd4f04e4beb
         6af86d580341446238396bd11daf223711e575cac6021e3fa3155801
         2048a1cec7876292b96c61eda353fe04f33028d2352779668a934084
         da776c1c51a58ce4b503414461
       ISK result: (length: 64 bytes)
         925e95d1095dad1af6378d5ef8b9a998bd3855bfc7d36cb5ca05b0a7
         a93346abcb8cef04bceb28c38fdaf0cc608fd1dcd462ab523f3b7f75
         2c77c411be3ac8fb

B.2.7.  Corresponding ANSI-C initializers

   const uint8_t tc_PRS[] = {
    0x50,0x61,0x73,0x73,0x77,0x6f,0x72,0x64,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_CI[] = {
    0x0a,0x41,0x69,0x6e,0x69,0x74,0x69,0x61,0x74,0x6f,0x72,0x0a,
    0x42,0x72,0x65,0x73,0x70,0x6f,0x6e,0x64,0x65,0x72,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_sid[] = {
    0x52,0x23,0xe0,0xcd,0xc4,0x5d,0x65,0x75,0x66,0x8d,0x64,0xc5,
    0x52,0x00,0x41,0x24,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_g[] = {
    0x6f,0xda,0xe1,0x47,0x18,0xeb,0x75,0x06,0xdd,0x96,0xe3,0xf7,
    0x79,0x78,0x96,0xef,0xdb,0x8d,0xb9,0xec,0x07,0x97,0x48,0x5c,
    0x9c,0x48,0xa1,0x92,0x2e,0x44,0x96,0x1d,0xa0,0x97,0xf2,0x90,
    0x8b,0x08,0x4a,0x5d,0xe3,0x3a,0xb6,0x71,0x63,0x06,0x60,0xd2,
    0x7d,0x79,0xff,0xd6,0xee,0x8e,0xc8,0x46,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_ya[] = {
    0x21,0xb4,0xf4,0xbd,0x9e,0x64,0xed,0x35,0x5c,0x3e,0xb6,0x76,
    0xa2,0x8e,0xbe,0xda,0xf6,0xd8,0xf1,0x7b,0xdc,0x36,0x59,0x95,

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 35]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

    0xb3,0x19,0x09,0x71,0x53,0x04,0x40,0x80,0x51,0x6b,0xd0,0x83,
    0xbf,0xcc,0xe6,0x61,0x21,0xa3,0x07,0x26,0x46,0x99,0x4c,0x84,
    0x30,0xcc,0x38,0x2b,0x8d,0xc5,0x43,0xe8,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_ADa[] = {
    0x41,0x44,0x61,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_Ya[] = {
    0x39,0x6b,0xd1,0x1d,0xaf,0x22,0x37,0x11,0xe5,0x75,0xca,0xc6,
    0x02,0x1e,0x3f,0xa3,0x15,0x58,0x01,0x20,0x48,0xa1,0xce,0xc7,
    0x87,0x62,0x92,0xb9,0x6c,0x61,0xed,0xa3,0x53,0xfe,0x04,0xf3,
    0x30,0x28,0xd2,0x35,0x27,0x79,0x66,0x8a,0x93,0x40,0x84,0xda,
    0x77,0x6c,0x1c,0x51,0xa5,0x8c,0xe4,0xb5,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_yb[] = {
    0x84,0x8b,0x07,0x79,0xff,0x41,0x5f,0x0a,0xf4,0xea,0x14,0xdf,
    0x9d,0xd1,0xd3,0xc2,0x9a,0xc4,0x1d,0x83,0x6c,0x78,0x08,0x89,
    0x6c,0x4e,0xba,0x19,0xc5,0x1a,0xc4,0x0a,0x43,0x9c,0xaf,0x5e,
    0x61,0xec,0x88,0xc3,0x07,0xc7,0xd6,0x19,0x19,0x52,0x29,0x41,
    0x2e,0xaa,0x73,0xfb,0x2a,0x5e,0xa2,0x0d,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_ADb[] = {
    0x41,0x44,0x62,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_Yb[] = {
    0x53,0xc5,0x19,0xfb,0x49,0x0f,0xde,0x5a,0x04,0xbd,0xa8,0xc1,
    0x8b,0x32,0x7d,0x0f,0xc1,0xa9,0x39,0x1d,0x19,0xe0,0xac,0x00,
    0xc5,0x9d,0xf9,0xc6,0x04,0x22,0x28,0x4e,0x59,0x3d,0x6b,0x09,
    0x2e,0xac,0x94,0xf5,0xaa,0x64,0x4e,0xd8,0x83,0xf3,0x9b,0xd4,
    0xf0,0x4e,0x4b,0xeb,0x6a,0xf8,0x6d,0x58,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_K[] = {
    0xe0,0x0a,0xf2,0x17,0x55,0x6a,0x40,0xcc,0xbc,0x98,0x22,0xcc,
    0x27,0xa4,0x35,0x42,0xe4,0x51,0x66,0xa6,0x53,0xaa,0x4d,0xf7,
    0x46,0xd5,0xf8,0xe1,0xe8,0xdf,0x48,0x3e,0x9b,0xaf,0xf7,0x1c,
    0x9e,0xb0,0x3e,0xe2,0x0a,0x68,0x8a,0xd4,0xe4,0xd3,0x59,0xf7,
    0x0a,0xc9,0xec,0x3f,0x6a,0x65,0x99,0x97,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_ISK_IR[] = {
    0x40,0x30,0x29,0x77,0x22,0xc1,0x91,0x47,0x11,0xda,0x6b,0x2a,
    0x22,0x4a,0x44,0xb5,0x3b,0x30,0xc0,0x5a,0xb0,0x2c,0x2a,0x3d,
    0x3c,0xcc,0x72,0x72,0xa3,0x33,0x3c,0xe3,0xa4,0x56,0x4c,0x17,
    0x03,0x1b,0x63,0x4e,0x89,0xf6,0x56,0x81,0xf5,0x2d,0x5c,0x3d,
    0x1d,0xf7,0xba,0xeb,0x88,0x52,0x3d,0x2e,0x48,0x1b,0x38,0x58,
    0xae,0xd8,0x63,0x15,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_ISK_SY[] = {
    0x92,0x5e,0x95,0xd1,0x09,0x5d,0xad,0x1a,0xf6,0x37,0x8d,0x5e,

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 36]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

    0xf8,0xb9,0xa9,0x98,0xbd,0x38,0x55,0xbf,0xc7,0xd3,0x6c,0xb5,
    0xca,0x05,0xb0,0xa7,0xa9,0x33,0x46,0xab,0xcb,0x8c,0xef,0x04,
    0xbc,0xeb,0x28,0xc3,0x8f,0xda,0xf0,0xcc,0x60,0x8f,0xd1,0xdc,
    0xd4,0x62,0xab,0x52,0x3f,0x3b,0x7f,0x75,0x2c,0x77,0xc4,0x11,
    0xbe,0x3a,0xc8,0xfb,
   };

B.2.8.  Test vectors for G_X448.scalar_mult_vfy: low order points

   Test vectors for which G_X448.scalar_mult_vfy(s_in,ux) must return
   the neutral element.  This includes points that are non-canonicaly
   encoded, i.e. have coordinate values larger than the field prime.

   Weak points for X448 smaller than the field prime (canonical)

     u0: (length: 56 bytes)
       0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
       000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
     u1: (length: 56 bytes)
       0100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
       000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
     u2: (length: 56 bytes)
       fefffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe
       ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff

   Weak points for X448 larger or equal to the field prime (non-
   canonical)

     u3: (length: 56 bytes)
       fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe
       ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
     u4: (length: 56 bytes)
       00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000ff
       ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff

   All of the above points u0 ... u4 MUST trigger the abort case
   when included in the protocol messages MSGa or MSGb.

   Expected results for X448 resp. G_X448.scalar_mult_vfy

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 37]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

     scalar s: (length: 56 bytes)
       af8a14218bf2a2062926d2ea9b8fe4e8b6817349b6ed2feb1e5d64d7a4
       523f15fceec70fb111e870dc58d191e66a14d3e9d482d04432cadd
     G_X448.scalar_mult_vfy(s,u0): (length: 56 bytes)
       0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
       000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
     G_X448.scalar_mult_vfy(s,u1): (length: 56 bytes)
       0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
       000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
     G_X448.scalar_mult_vfy(s,u2): (length: 56 bytes)
       0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
       000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
     G_X448.scalar_mult_vfy(s,u3): (length: 56 bytes)
       0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
       000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
     G_X448.scalar_mult_vfy(s,u4): (length: 56 bytes)
       0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
       000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

   Test vectors for scalar_mult with nonzero outputs

     scalar s: (length: 56 bytes)
       af8a14218bf2a2062926d2ea9b8fe4e8b6817349b6ed2feb1e5d64d7a4
       523f15fceec70fb111e870dc58d191e66a14d3e9d482d04432cadd
     point coordinate u_curve on the curve: (length: 56 bytes)
       ab0c68d772ec2eb9de25c49700e46d6325e66d6aa39d7b65eb84a68c55
       69d47bd71b41f3e0d210f44e146dec8926b174acb3f940a0b82cab
     G_X448.scalar_mult_vfy(s,u_curve): (length: 56 bytes)
       3b0fa9bc40a6fdc78c9e06ff7a54c143c5d52f365607053bf0656f5142
       0496295f910a101b38edc1acd3bd240fd55dcb7a360553b8a7627e

     point coordinate u_twist on the twist: (length: 56 bytes)
       c981cd1e1f72d9c35c7d7cf6be426757c0dc8206a2fcfa564a8e7618c0
       3c0e61f9a2eb1c3e0dd97d6e9b1010f5edd03397a83f5a914cb3ff
     G_X448.scalar_mult_vfy(s,u_twist): (length: 56 bytes)
       d0a2bb7e9c5c2c627793d8342f23b759fe7d9e3320a85ca4fd61376331
       50ffd9a9148a9b75c349fac43d64bec49a6e126cc92cbfbf353961

B.3.  Test vector for CPace using group ristretto255 and hash SHA-512

B.3.1.  Test vectors for calculate_generator with group ristretto255

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 38]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

     Inputs
       H   = SHA-512 with input block size 128 bytes.
       PRS = b'Password' ; ZPAD length: 100 ;
       DSI = b'CPaceRistretto255'
       CI = b'\nAinitiator\nBresponder'
       CI = 0a41696e69746961746f720a42726573706f6e646572
       sid = 7e4b4791d6a8ef019b936c79fb7f2c57
     Outputs
       generator_string(G.DSI,PRS,CI,sid,H.s_in_bytes):
       (length: 168 bytes)
         11435061636552697374726574746f3235350850617373776f726464
         00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
         00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
         00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
         00000000000000000000000000000000160a41696e69746961746f72
         0a42726573706f6e646572107e4b4791d6a8ef019b936c79fb7f2c57
       hash result: (length: 64 bytes)
         a5ce446f63a1ae6d1fee80fa67d0b4004a4b1283ec5549a462bf33a6
         c1ae06a0871f9bf48545f49b2a792eed255ac04f52758c9c60448306
         810b44e986e3dcbb
       encoded generator g: (length: 32 bytes)
         9c5712178570957204d89ac11acbef789dd076992ba361429acb2bc3
         8c71d14c

B.3.2.  Test vector for MSGa

     Inputs
       ADa = b'ADa'
       ya (little endian): (length: 32 bytes)
         1433dd19359992d4e06d740d3993d429af6338ffb4531ce175d22449
         853a790b
     Outputs
       Ya: (length: 32 bytes)
         a8fc42c4d57b3c7346661011122a00563d0995fd72b62123ae244400
         e86d7b1a
       MSGa: (length: 37 bytes)
         20a8fc42c4d57b3c7346661011122a00563d0995fd72b62123ae2444
         00e86d7b1a03414461

B.3.3.  Test vector for MSGb

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 39]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

     Inputs
       ADb = b'ADb'
       yb (little endian): (length: 32 bytes)
         0e6566d32d80a5a1135f99c27f2d637aa24da23027c3fa76b9d1cfd9
         742fdc00
     Outputs
       Yb: (length: 32 bytes)
         fc8e84ae4ab725909af05a56ef9714db6930e4a5589b3fee6cdd2662
         36676d63
       MSGb: (length: 37 bytes)
         20fc8e84ae4ab725909af05a56ef9714db6930e4a5589b3fee6cdd26
         6236676d6303414462

B.3.4.  Test vector for secret points K

       scalar_mult_vfy(ya,Yb): (length: 32 bytes)
         3efef1706f42efa354020b087b37fbd9f81cf72a16f4947e4a042a7f
         1aaa2b6f
       scalar_mult_vfy(yb,Ya): (length: 32 bytes)
         3efef1706f42efa354020b087b37fbd9f81cf72a16f4947e4a042a7f
         1aaa2b6f

B.3.5.  Test vector for ISK calculation initiator/responder

       unordered cat of transcript : (length: 74 bytes)
         20a8fc42c4d57b3c7346661011122a00563d0995fd72b62123ae2444
         00e86d7b1a0341446120fc8e84ae4ab725909af05a56ef9714db6930
         e4a5589b3fee6cdd266236676d6303414462
       DSI = G.DSI_ISK, b'CPaceRistretto255_ISK':
       (length: 21 bytes)
         435061636552697374726574746f3235355f49534b
       prefix_free_cat(DSI,sid,K)||MSGa||MSGb: (length: 146 bytes)
         15435061636552697374726574746f3235355f49534b107e4b4791d6
         a8ef019b936c79fb7f2c57203efef1706f42efa354020b087b37fbd9
         f81cf72a16f4947e4a042a7f1aaa2b6f20a8fc42c4d57b3c73466610
         11122a00563d0995fd72b62123ae244400e86d7b1a0341446120fc8e
         84ae4ab725909af05a56ef9714db6930e4a5589b3fee6cdd26623667
         6d6303414462
       ISK result: (length: 64 bytes)
         0e33c5822bd495dea94ba7af161501f1b2d6a16d464b5d6e1a53dcbf
         b9244b9ba66c09c430fffdfe4fb4e99b4ea46f991a272de0431c132c
         2c79fd6de1a7e5e4

B.3.6.  Test vector for ISK calculation parallel execution

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 40]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

       ordered cat of transcript : (length: 74 bytes)
         20fc8e84ae4ab725909af05a56ef9714db6930e4a5589b3fee6cdd26
         6236676d630341446220a8fc42c4d57b3c7346661011122a00563d09
         95fd72b62123ae244400e86d7b1a03414461
       DSI = G.DSI_ISK, b'CPaceRistretto255_ISK':
       (length: 21 bytes)
         435061636552697374726574746f3235355f49534b
       prefix_free_cat(DSI,sid,K)||oCat(MSGa,MSGb):
       (length: 146 bytes)
         15435061636552697374726574746f3235355f49534b107e4b4791d6
         a8ef019b936c79fb7f2c57203efef1706f42efa354020b087b37fbd9
         f81cf72a16f4947e4a042a7f1aaa2b6f20fc8e84ae4ab725909af05a
         56ef9714db6930e4a5589b3fee6cdd266236676d630341446220a8fc
         42c4d57b3c7346661011122a00563d0995fd72b62123ae244400e86d
         7b1a03414461
       ISK result: (length: 64 bytes)
         ca36335be682a480a9fc63977d044a10ff7adfcda0f2978fbcf8713d
         2a4e23e25c05a9a02edcfbff2ede65b752f8ea1f4454d764ad8ed860
         7c158ef662614567

B.3.7.  Corresponding ANSI-C initializers

   const uint8_t tc_PRS[] = {
    0x50,0x61,0x73,0x73,0x77,0x6f,0x72,0x64,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_CI[] = {
    0x0a,0x41,0x69,0x6e,0x69,0x74,0x69,0x61,0x74,0x6f,0x72,0x0a,
    0x42,0x72,0x65,0x73,0x70,0x6f,0x6e,0x64,0x65,0x72,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_sid[] = {
    0x7e,0x4b,0x47,0x91,0xd6,0xa8,0xef,0x01,0x9b,0x93,0x6c,0x79,
    0xfb,0x7f,0x2c,0x57,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_g[] = {
    0x9c,0x57,0x12,0x17,0x85,0x70,0x95,0x72,0x04,0xd8,0x9a,0xc1,
    0x1a,0xcb,0xef,0x78,0x9d,0xd0,0x76,0x99,0x2b,0xa3,0x61,0x42,
    0x9a,0xcb,0x2b,0xc3,0x8c,0x71,0xd1,0x4c,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_ya[] = {
    0x14,0x33,0xdd,0x19,0x35,0x99,0x92,0xd4,0xe0,0x6d,0x74,0x0d,
    0x39,0x93,0xd4,0x29,0xaf,0x63,0x38,0xff,0xb4,0x53,0x1c,0xe1,
    0x75,0xd2,0x24,0x49,0x85,0x3a,0x79,0x0b,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_ADa[] = {
    0x41,0x44,0x61,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_Ya[] = {
    0xa8,0xfc,0x42,0xc4,0xd5,0x7b,0x3c,0x73,0x46,0x66,0x10,0x11,

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 41]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

    0x12,0x2a,0x00,0x56,0x3d,0x09,0x95,0xfd,0x72,0xb6,0x21,0x23,
    0xae,0x24,0x44,0x00,0xe8,0x6d,0x7b,0x1a,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_yb[] = {
    0x0e,0x65,0x66,0xd3,0x2d,0x80,0xa5,0xa1,0x13,0x5f,0x99,0xc2,
    0x7f,0x2d,0x63,0x7a,0xa2,0x4d,0xa2,0x30,0x27,0xc3,0xfa,0x76,
    0xb9,0xd1,0xcf,0xd9,0x74,0x2f,0xdc,0x00,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_ADb[] = {
    0x41,0x44,0x62,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_Yb[] = {
    0xfc,0x8e,0x84,0xae,0x4a,0xb7,0x25,0x90,0x9a,0xf0,0x5a,0x56,
    0xef,0x97,0x14,0xdb,0x69,0x30,0xe4,0xa5,0x58,0x9b,0x3f,0xee,
    0x6c,0xdd,0x26,0x62,0x36,0x67,0x6d,0x63,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_K[] = {
    0x3e,0xfe,0xf1,0x70,0x6f,0x42,0xef,0xa3,0x54,0x02,0x0b,0x08,
    0x7b,0x37,0xfb,0xd9,0xf8,0x1c,0xf7,0x2a,0x16,0xf4,0x94,0x7e,
    0x4a,0x04,0x2a,0x7f,0x1a,0xaa,0x2b,0x6f,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_ISK_IR[] = {
    0x0e,0x33,0xc5,0x82,0x2b,0xd4,0x95,0xde,0xa9,0x4b,0xa7,0xaf,
    0x16,0x15,0x01,0xf1,0xb2,0xd6,0xa1,0x6d,0x46,0x4b,0x5d,0x6e,
    0x1a,0x53,0xdc,0xbf,0xb9,0x24,0x4b,0x9b,0xa6,0x6c,0x09,0xc4,
    0x30,0xff,0xfd,0xfe,0x4f,0xb4,0xe9,0x9b,0x4e,0xa4,0x6f,0x99,
    0x1a,0x27,0x2d,0xe0,0x43,0x1c,0x13,0x2c,0x2c,0x79,0xfd,0x6d,
    0xe1,0xa7,0xe5,0xe4,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_ISK_SY[] = {
    0xca,0x36,0x33,0x5b,0xe6,0x82,0xa4,0x80,0xa9,0xfc,0x63,0x97,
    0x7d,0x04,0x4a,0x10,0xff,0x7a,0xdf,0xcd,0xa0,0xf2,0x97,0x8f,
    0xbc,0xf8,0x71,0x3d,0x2a,0x4e,0x23,0xe2,0x5c,0x05,0xa9,0xa0,
    0x2e,0xdc,0xfb,0xff,0x2e,0xde,0x65,0xb7,0x52,0xf8,0xea,0x1f,
    0x44,0x54,0xd7,0x64,0xad,0x8e,0xd8,0x60,0x7c,0x15,0x8e,0xf6,
    0x62,0x61,0x45,0x67,
   };

B.3.8.  Test case for scalar_mult with valid inputs

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 42]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

       s: (length: 32 bytes)
         7cd0e075fa7955ba52c02759a6c90dbbfc10e6d40aea8d283e407d88
         cf538a05
       X: (length: 32 bytes)
         021ca069484e890c9e494d8ed6bb0f66cbd9a8f0ef67168f36c51e0e
         feb8f347
       G.scalar_mult(s,decode(X)): (length: 32 bytes)
         62aaa018755dc881902097c2a993c0b7c0a4fe33bce2c0182b46a44c
         40b95119
       G.scalar_mult_vfy(s,X): (length: 32 bytes)
         62aaa018755dc881902097c2a993c0b7c0a4fe33bce2c0182b46a44c
         40b95119

B.3.9.  Invalid inputs for scalar_mult_vfy

   For these test cases scalar_mult_vfy(y,.) MUST return the
   representation of the neutral element G.I.  When points Y_i1 or Y_i2
   are included in MSGa or MSGb the protocol MUST abort.

       s: (length: 32 bytes)
         7cd0e075fa7955ba52c02759a6c90dbbfc10e6d40aea8d283e407d88
         cf538a05
       Y_i1: (length: 32 bytes)
         011ca069484e890c9e494d8ed6bb0f66cbd9a8f0ef67168f36c51e0e
         feb8f347
       Y_i2 == G.I: (length: 32 bytes)
         00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
         00000000
       G.scalar_mult_vfy(s,Y_i1) = G.scalar_mult_vfy(s,Y_i2) = G.I

B.4.  Test vector for CPace using group decaf448 and hash SHAKE-256

B.4.1.  Test vectors for calculate_generator with group decaf448

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 43]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

     Inputs
       H   = SHAKE-256 with input block size 136 bytes.
       PRS = b'Password' ; ZPAD length: 112 ;
       DSI = b'CPaceDecaf448'
       CI = b'\nAinitiator\nBresponder'
       CI = 0a41696e69746961746f720a42726573706f6e646572
       sid = 5223e0cdc45d6575668d64c552004124
     Outputs
       generator_string(G.DSI,PRS,CI,sid,H.s_in_bytes):
       (length: 176 bytes)
         0d435061636544656361663434380850617373776f72647000000000
         00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
         00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
         00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
         000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000160a4169
         6e69746961746f720a42726573706f6e646572105223e0cdc45d6575
         668d64c552004124
       hash result: (length: 112 bytes)
         8955b426ff1d3a22032d21c013cf94134cee9a4235e93261a4911edb
         f68f2945f0267c983954262c7f59badb9caf468ebe21b7e9885657af
         b8f1a3b783c2047ba519e113ecf81b2b580dd481f499beabd401cc77
         1d28915fb750011209040f5f03b2ceb5e5eb259c96b478382d5a5c57
       encoded generator g: (length: 56 bytes)
         c811b3f6b0d27b58a74d8274bf5f9ca6b7ada15b0bf57b79a6b45c13
         2eb0c28bdcc3abf4e5932cea97a80997ead1c146b98b1a1f1def30f3

B.4.2.  Test vector for MSGa

     Inputs
       ADa = b'ADa'
       ya (little endian): (length: 56 bytes)
         d8d2e26c821a12d7f59a8dee023d3f6155976152e16c73cbf68c303d
         f0404399f0a7b614a65df50a9788f00b410586b443f738ad7ff03930
     Outputs
       Ya: (length: 56 bytes)
         223f95a5430a2f2a499431696d23ea2d0a90f432e5491e45e4005f3d
         d785e7be1235b79252670099bc993c2df5c261dfb7a8989f091e2be3
       MSGa: (length: 61 bytes)
         38223f95a5430a2f2a499431696d23ea2d0a90f432e5491e45e4005f
         3dd785e7be1235b79252670099bc993c2df5c261dfb7a8989f091e2b
         e303414461

B.4.3.  Test vector for MSGb

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 44]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

     Inputs
       ADb = b'ADb'
       yb (little endian): (length: 56 bytes)
         91bae9793f4a8aceb1b5c54375a7ed1858a79a6e72dab959c8bdf3a7
         5ac9bb4de2a25af4d4a9a5c5bc5441d19b8e3f6fcce7196c6afc2236
     Outputs
       Yb: (length: 56 bytes)
         b6ba0a336c103c6c92019ae4cfbcb88d8f6bfc361e979c9e0d3a0967
         e630094ba3d1555821ac1f979996ef5ce79f012ffe279ac89b287bee
       MSGb: (length: 61 bytes)
         38b6ba0a336c103c6c92019ae4cfbcb88d8f6bfc361e979c9e0d3a09
         67e630094ba3d1555821ac1f979996ef5ce79f012ffe279ac89b287b
         ee03414462

B.4.4.  Test vector for secret points K

       scalar_mult_vfy(ya,Yb): (length: 56 bytes)
         dc504938fb70eb13916697aa3e076e82537c171aa326121399c896fe
         ea0e198b41b6bae300bb86f8c61d4b170eee4717b5497016f34364a9
       scalar_mult_vfy(yb,Ya): (length: 56 bytes)
         dc504938fb70eb13916697aa3e076e82537c171aa326121399c896fe
         ea0e198b41b6bae300bb86f8c61d4b170eee4717b5497016f34364a9

B.4.5.  Test vector for ISK calculation initiator/responder

       unordered cat of transcript : (length: 122 bytes)
         38223f95a5430a2f2a499431696d23ea2d0a90f432e5491e45e4005f
         3dd785e7be1235b79252670099bc993c2df5c261dfb7a8989f091e2b
         e30341446138b6ba0a336c103c6c92019ae4cfbcb88d8f6bfc361e97
         9c9e0d3a0967e630094ba3d1555821ac1f979996ef5ce79f012ffe27
         9ac89b287bee03414462
       DSI = G.DSI_ISK, b'CPaceDecaf448_ISK': (length: 17 bytes)
         435061636544656361663434385f49534b
       prefix_free_cat(DSI,sid,K)||MSGa||MSGb: (length: 214 bytes)
         11435061636544656361663434385f49534b105223e0cdc45d657566
         8d64c55200412438dc504938fb70eb13916697aa3e076e82537c171a
         a326121399c896feea0e198b41b6bae300bb86f8c61d4b170eee4717
         b5497016f34364a938223f95a5430a2f2a499431696d23ea2d0a90f4
         32e5491e45e4005f3dd785e7be1235b79252670099bc993c2df5c261
         dfb7a8989f091e2be30341446138b6ba0a336c103c6c92019ae4cfbc
         b88d8f6bfc361e979c9e0d3a0967e630094ba3d1555821ac1f979996
         ef5ce79f012ffe279ac89b287bee03414462
       ISK result: (length: 64 bytes)
         ebe28369491f8899a5af3b339d4993881b69d22607c58719da6eaab3
         8f0d9025eae413ca2b072b156ce4a0d4778ff471a63c4d908cab70bc
         2081951d504cbb03

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 45]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

B.4.6.  Test vector for ISK calculation parallel execution

       ordered cat of transcript : (length: 122 bytes)
         38b6ba0a336c103c6c92019ae4cfbcb88d8f6bfc361e979c9e0d3a09
         67e630094ba3d1555821ac1f979996ef5ce79f012ffe279ac89b287b
         ee0341446238223f95a5430a2f2a499431696d23ea2d0a90f432e549
         1e45e4005f3dd785e7be1235b79252670099bc993c2df5c261dfb7a8
         989f091e2be303414461
       DSI = G.DSI_ISK, b'CPaceDecaf448_ISK': (length: 17 bytes)
         435061636544656361663434385f49534b
       prefix_free_cat(DSI,sid,K)||oCat(MSGa,MSGb):
       (length: 214 bytes)
         11435061636544656361663434385f49534b105223e0cdc45d657566
         8d64c55200412438dc504938fb70eb13916697aa3e076e82537c171a
         a326121399c896feea0e198b41b6bae300bb86f8c61d4b170eee4717
         b5497016f34364a938b6ba0a336c103c6c92019ae4cfbcb88d8f6bfc
         361e979c9e0d3a0967e630094ba3d1555821ac1f979996ef5ce79f01
         2ffe279ac89b287bee0341446238223f95a5430a2f2a499431696d23
         ea2d0a90f432e5491e45e4005f3dd785e7be1235b79252670099bc99
         3c2df5c261dfb7a8989f091e2be303414461
       ISK result: (length: 64 bytes)
         2996d1953320581b587f473cfd5c974c5a8597b22b37fefe49bdb7b8
         4073424f7f7a6e456498665a69530741398c6010bdb346f79944acc9
         0c5c537fa35cd29a

B.4.7.  Corresponding ANSI-C initializers

   const uint8_t tc_PRS[] = {
    0x50,0x61,0x73,0x73,0x77,0x6f,0x72,0x64,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_CI[] = {
    0x0a,0x41,0x69,0x6e,0x69,0x74,0x69,0x61,0x74,0x6f,0x72,0x0a,
    0x42,0x72,0x65,0x73,0x70,0x6f,0x6e,0x64,0x65,0x72,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_sid[] = {
    0x52,0x23,0xe0,0xcd,0xc4,0x5d,0x65,0x75,0x66,0x8d,0x64,0xc5,
    0x52,0x00,0x41,0x24,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_g[] = {
    0xc8,0x11,0xb3,0xf6,0xb0,0xd2,0x7b,0x58,0xa7,0x4d,0x82,0x74,
    0xbf,0x5f,0x9c,0xa6,0xb7,0xad,0xa1,0x5b,0x0b,0xf5,0x7b,0x79,
    0xa6,0xb4,0x5c,0x13,0x2e,0xb0,0xc2,0x8b,0xdc,0xc3,0xab,0xf4,
    0xe5,0x93,0x2c,0xea,0x97,0xa8,0x09,0x97,0xea,0xd1,0xc1,0x46,
    0xb9,0x8b,0x1a,0x1f,0x1d,0xef,0x30,0xf3,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_ya[] = {
    0xd8,0xd2,0xe2,0x6c,0x82,0x1a,0x12,0xd7,0xf5,0x9a,0x8d,0xee,
    0x02,0x3d,0x3f,0x61,0x55,0x97,0x61,0x52,0xe1,0x6c,0x73,0xcb,

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 46]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

    0xf6,0x8c,0x30,0x3d,0xf0,0x40,0x43,0x99,0xf0,0xa7,0xb6,0x14,
    0xa6,0x5d,0xf5,0x0a,0x97,0x88,0xf0,0x0b,0x41,0x05,0x86,0xb4,
    0x43,0xf7,0x38,0xad,0x7f,0xf0,0x39,0x30,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_ADa[] = {
    0x41,0x44,0x61,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_Ya[] = {
    0x22,0x3f,0x95,0xa5,0x43,0x0a,0x2f,0x2a,0x49,0x94,0x31,0x69,
    0x6d,0x23,0xea,0x2d,0x0a,0x90,0xf4,0x32,0xe5,0x49,0x1e,0x45,
    0xe4,0x00,0x5f,0x3d,0xd7,0x85,0xe7,0xbe,0x12,0x35,0xb7,0x92,
    0x52,0x67,0x00,0x99,0xbc,0x99,0x3c,0x2d,0xf5,0xc2,0x61,0xdf,
    0xb7,0xa8,0x98,0x9f,0x09,0x1e,0x2b,0xe3,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_yb[] = {
    0x91,0xba,0xe9,0x79,0x3f,0x4a,0x8a,0xce,0xb1,0xb5,0xc5,0x43,
    0x75,0xa7,0xed,0x18,0x58,0xa7,0x9a,0x6e,0x72,0xda,0xb9,0x59,
    0xc8,0xbd,0xf3,0xa7,0x5a,0xc9,0xbb,0x4d,0xe2,0xa2,0x5a,0xf4,
    0xd4,0xa9,0xa5,0xc5,0xbc,0x54,0x41,0xd1,0x9b,0x8e,0x3f,0x6f,
    0xcc,0xe7,0x19,0x6c,0x6a,0xfc,0x22,0x36,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_ADb[] = {
    0x41,0x44,0x62,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_Yb[] = {
    0xb6,0xba,0x0a,0x33,0x6c,0x10,0x3c,0x6c,0x92,0x01,0x9a,0xe4,
    0xcf,0xbc,0xb8,0x8d,0x8f,0x6b,0xfc,0x36,0x1e,0x97,0x9c,0x9e,
    0x0d,0x3a,0x09,0x67,0xe6,0x30,0x09,0x4b,0xa3,0xd1,0x55,0x58,
    0x21,0xac,0x1f,0x97,0x99,0x96,0xef,0x5c,0xe7,0x9f,0x01,0x2f,
    0xfe,0x27,0x9a,0xc8,0x9b,0x28,0x7b,0xee,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_K[] = {
    0xdc,0x50,0x49,0x38,0xfb,0x70,0xeb,0x13,0x91,0x66,0x97,0xaa,
    0x3e,0x07,0x6e,0x82,0x53,0x7c,0x17,0x1a,0xa3,0x26,0x12,0x13,
    0x99,0xc8,0x96,0xfe,0xea,0x0e,0x19,0x8b,0x41,0xb6,0xba,0xe3,
    0x00,0xbb,0x86,0xf8,0xc6,0x1d,0x4b,0x17,0x0e,0xee,0x47,0x17,
    0xb5,0x49,0x70,0x16,0xf3,0x43,0x64,0xa9,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_ISK_IR[] = {
    0xeb,0xe2,0x83,0x69,0x49,0x1f,0x88,0x99,0xa5,0xaf,0x3b,0x33,
    0x9d,0x49,0x93,0x88,0x1b,0x69,0xd2,0x26,0x07,0xc5,0x87,0x19,
    0xda,0x6e,0xaa,0xb3,0x8f,0x0d,0x90,0x25,0xea,0xe4,0x13,0xca,
    0x2b,0x07,0x2b,0x15,0x6c,0xe4,0xa0,0xd4,0x77,0x8f,0xf4,0x71,
    0xa6,0x3c,0x4d,0x90,0x8c,0xab,0x70,0xbc,0x20,0x81,0x95,0x1d,
    0x50,0x4c,0xbb,0x03,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_ISK_SY[] = {
    0x29,0x96,0xd1,0x95,0x33,0x20,0x58,0x1b,0x58,0x7f,0x47,0x3c,

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 47]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

    0xfd,0x5c,0x97,0x4c,0x5a,0x85,0x97,0xb2,0x2b,0x37,0xfe,0xfe,
    0x49,0xbd,0xb7,0xb8,0x40,0x73,0x42,0x4f,0x7f,0x7a,0x6e,0x45,
    0x64,0x98,0x66,0x5a,0x69,0x53,0x07,0x41,0x39,0x8c,0x60,0x10,
    0xbd,0xb3,0x46,0xf7,0x99,0x44,0xac,0xc9,0x0c,0x5c,0x53,0x7f,
    0xa3,0x5c,0xd2,0x9a,
   };

B.4.8.  Test case for scalar_mult with valid inputs

       s: (length: 56 bytes)
         dd1bc7015daabb7672129cc35a3ba815486b139deff9bdeca7a4fc61
         34323d34658761e90ff079972a7ca8aa5606498f4f4f0ebc0933a819
       X: (length: 56 bytes)
         c803a6c8171ac38b66c5306553f45a487a24eb8581414444715bd2e5
         cf4c749a3b56a550f3c9a6ea3efa6e11ae6a6da12b98ef2f51174b9a
       G.scalar_mult(s,decode(X)): (length: 56 bytes)
         b831a1f804fd3c902ae82f731d298aebf9152ea855f5b5da5ee88584
         84c55a7f65cc3ccf5f678496dc4cb1c8d6bc7ed17d2fe535fdc8f60e
       G.scalar_mult_vfy(s,X): (length: 56 bytes)
         b831a1f804fd3c902ae82f731d298aebf9152ea855f5b5da5ee88584
         84c55a7f65cc3ccf5f678496dc4cb1c8d6bc7ed17d2fe535fdc8f60e

B.4.9.  Invalid inputs for scalar_mult_vfy

   For these test cases scalar_mult_vfy(y,.) MUST return the
   representation of the neutral element G.I.  When points Y_i1 or Y_i2
   are included in MSGa or MSGb the protocol MUST abort.

       s: (length: 56 bytes)
         dd1bc7015daabb7672129cc35a3ba815486b139deff9bdeca7a4fc61
         34323d34658761e90ff079972a7ca8aa5606498f4f4f0ebc0933a819
       Y_i1: (length: 56 bytes)
         c703a6c8171ac38b66c5306553f45a487a24eb8581414444715bd2e5
         cf4c749a3b56a550f3c9a6ea3efa6e11ae6a6da12b98ef2f51174b9a
       Y_i2 == G.I: (length: 56 bytes)
         00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
         00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
       G.scalar_mult_vfy(s,Y_i1) = G.scalar_mult_vfy(s,Y_i2) = G.I

B.5.  Test vector for CPace using group NIST P-256 and hash SHA-256

B.5.1.  Test vectors for calculate_generator with group NIST P-256

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 48]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

     Inputs
       H   = SHA-256 with input block size 64 bytes.
       PRS = b'Password' ; ZPAD length: 23 ;
       DSI = b'CPaceP256_XMD:SHA-256_SSWU_NU_'
       CI = b'\nAinitiator\nBresponder'
       CI = 0a41696e69746961746f720a42726573706f6e646572
       sid = 34b36454cab2e7842c389f7d88ecb7df
     Outputs
       generator_string(PRS,G.DSI,CI,sid,H.s_in_bytes):
       (length: 104 bytes)
         1e4350616365503235365f584d443a5348412d3235365f535357555f
         4e555f0850617373776f726417000000000000000000000000000000
         0000000000000000160a41696e69746961746f720a42726573706f6e
         6465721034b36454cab2e7842c389f7d88ecb7df
       generator g: (length: 65 bytes)
         04993b46e30ba9cfc3dc2d3ae2cf9733cf03994e74383c4e1b4a92e8
         d6d466b321c4a642979162fbde9e1c9a6180bd27a0594491e4c231f5
         1006d0bf7992d07127

B.5.2.  Test vector for MSGa

     Inputs
       ADa = b'ADa'
       ya (big endian): (length: 32 bytes)
         c9e47ca5debd2285727af47e55f5b7763fa79719da428f800190cc66
         59b4eafb
     Outputs
       Ya: (length: 65 bytes)
         0478ac925a6e3447a537627a2163be005a422f55c08385c1ef7d051c
         a94593df5946314120faa87165cba131c1da3aac429dc3d99a9bac7d
         4c4cbb8570b4d5ea10
       MSGa: (length: 70 bytes)
         410478ac925a6e3447a537627a2163be005a422f55c08385c1ef7d05
         1ca94593df5946314120faa87165cba131c1da3aac429dc3d99a9bac
         7d4c4cbb8570b4d5ea1003414461

B.5.3.  Test vector for MSGb

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 49]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

     Inputs
       ADb = b'ADb'
       yb (big endian): (length: 32 bytes)
         a0b768ba7555621d133012d1dee27a0013c1bcfddd675811df12771e
         44d77b10
     Outputs
       Yb: (length: 65 bytes)
         04df13ffa89b0ce3cc553b1495ff027886564d94b8d9165cd50e5f65
         4247959951bfac90839fca218bf8e2d1258eb7d7d9f733fe4cd558e6
         fa57bf1f801aae7d3a
       MSGb: (length: 70 bytes)
         4104df13ffa89b0ce3cc553b1495ff027886564d94b8d9165cd50e5f
         654247959951bfac90839fca218bf8e2d1258eb7d7d9f733fe4cd558
         e6fa57bf1f801aae7d3a03414462

B.5.4.  Test vector for secret points K

       scalar_mult_vfy(ya,Yb): (length: 32 bytes)
         27f7059d88f02007dc18c911c9b4034d3c0f13f8f7ed9603b0927f23
         fbab1037
       scalar_mult_vfy(yb,Ya): (length: 32 bytes)
         27f7059d88f02007dc18c911c9b4034d3c0f13f8f7ed9603b0927f23
         fbab1037

B.5.5.  Test vector for ISK calculation initiator/responder

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 50]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

       unordered cat of transcript : (length: 140 bytes)
         410478ac925a6e3447a537627a2163be005a422f55c08385c1ef7d05
         1ca94593df5946314120faa87165cba131c1da3aac429dc3d99a9bac
         7d4c4cbb8570b4d5ea10034144614104df13ffa89b0ce3cc553b1495
         ff027886564d94b8d9165cd50e5f654247959951bfac90839fca218b
         f8e2d1258eb7d7d9f733fe4cd558e6fa57bf1f801aae7d3a03414462
       DSI = G.DSI_ISK, b'CPaceP256_XMD:SHA-256_SSWU_NU__ISK':
       (length: 34 bytes)
         4350616365503235365f584d443a5348412d3235365f535357555f4e
         555f5f49534b
       prefix_free_cat(DSI,sid,K)||MSGa||MSGb: (length: 225 bytes)
         224350616365503235365f584d443a5348412d3235365f535357555f
         4e555f5f49534b1034b36454cab2e7842c389f7d88ecb7df2027f705
         9d88f02007dc18c911c9b4034d3c0f13f8f7ed9603b0927f23fbab10
         37410478ac925a6e3447a537627a2163be005a422f55c08385c1ef7d
         051ca94593df5946314120faa87165cba131c1da3aac429dc3d99a9b
         ac7d4c4cbb8570b4d5ea10034144614104df13ffa89b0ce3cc553b14
         95ff027886564d94b8d9165cd50e5f654247959951bfac90839fca21
         8bf8e2d1258eb7d7d9f733fe4cd558e6fa57bf1f801aae7d3a034144
         62
       ISK result: (length: 32 bytes)
         ddc1b133c387ecf344c0b496bc1223656cd6e7d99a5def8b3b026796
         50811fc9

B.5.6.  Test vector for ISK calculation parallel execution

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 51]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

       ordered cat of transcript : (length: 140 bytes)
         4104df13ffa89b0ce3cc553b1495ff027886564d94b8d9165cd50e5f
         654247959951bfac90839fca218bf8e2d1258eb7d7d9f733fe4cd558
         e6fa57bf1f801aae7d3a03414462410478ac925a6e3447a537627a21
         63be005a422f55c08385c1ef7d051ca94593df5946314120faa87165
         cba131c1da3aac429dc3d99a9bac7d4c4cbb8570b4d5ea1003414461
       DSI = G.DSI_ISK, b'CPaceP256_XMD:SHA-256_SSWU_NU__ISK':
       (length: 34 bytes)
         4350616365503235365f584d443a5348412d3235365f535357555f4e
         555f5f49534b
       prefix_free_cat(DSI,sid,K)||oCat(MSGa,MSGb):
       (length: 225 bytes)
         224350616365503235365f584d443a5348412d3235365f535357555f
         4e555f5f49534b1034b36454cab2e7842c389f7d88ecb7df2027f705
         9d88f02007dc18c911c9b4034d3c0f13f8f7ed9603b0927f23fbab10
         374104df13ffa89b0ce3cc553b1495ff027886564d94b8d9165cd50e
         5f654247959951bfac90839fca218bf8e2d1258eb7d7d9f733fe4cd5
         58e6fa57bf1f801aae7d3a03414462410478ac925a6e3447a537627a
         2163be005a422f55c08385c1ef7d051ca94593df5946314120faa871
         65cba131c1da3aac429dc3d99a9bac7d4c4cbb8570b4d5ea10034144
         61
       ISK result: (length: 32 bytes)
         6ea775b0fb3c31502687565a52150fc595c63fe901a11d5fc1995cd5
         089a17ae

B.5.7.  Corresponding ANSI-C initializers

   const uint8_t tc_PRS[] = {
    0x50,0x61,0x73,0x73,0x77,0x6f,0x72,0x64,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_CI[] = {
    0x0a,0x41,0x69,0x6e,0x69,0x74,0x69,0x61,0x74,0x6f,0x72,0x0a,
    0x42,0x72,0x65,0x73,0x70,0x6f,0x6e,0x64,0x65,0x72,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_sid[] = {
    0x34,0xb3,0x64,0x54,0xca,0xb2,0xe7,0x84,0x2c,0x38,0x9f,0x7d,
    0x88,0xec,0xb7,0xdf,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_g[] = {
    0x04,0x99,0x3b,0x46,0xe3,0x0b,0xa9,0xcf,0xc3,0xdc,0x2d,0x3a,
    0xe2,0xcf,0x97,0x33,0xcf,0x03,0x99,0x4e,0x74,0x38,0x3c,0x4e,
    0x1b,0x4a,0x92,0xe8,0xd6,0xd4,0x66,0xb3,0x21,0xc4,0xa6,0x42,
    0x97,0x91,0x62,0xfb,0xde,0x9e,0x1c,0x9a,0x61,0x80,0xbd,0x27,
    0xa0,0x59,0x44,0x91,0xe4,0xc2,0x31,0xf5,0x10,0x06,0xd0,0xbf,
    0x79,0x92,0xd0,0x71,0x27,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_ya[] = {
    0xc9,0xe4,0x7c,0xa5,0xde,0xbd,0x22,0x85,0x72,0x7a,0xf4,0x7e,

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 52]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

    0x55,0xf5,0xb7,0x76,0x3f,0xa7,0x97,0x19,0xda,0x42,0x8f,0x80,
    0x01,0x90,0xcc,0x66,0x59,0xb4,0xea,0xfb,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_ADa[] = {
    0x41,0x44,0x61,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_Ya[] = {
    0x04,0x78,0xac,0x92,0x5a,0x6e,0x34,0x47,0xa5,0x37,0x62,0x7a,
    0x21,0x63,0xbe,0x00,0x5a,0x42,0x2f,0x55,0xc0,0x83,0x85,0xc1,
    0xef,0x7d,0x05,0x1c,0xa9,0x45,0x93,0xdf,0x59,0x46,0x31,0x41,
    0x20,0xfa,0xa8,0x71,0x65,0xcb,0xa1,0x31,0xc1,0xda,0x3a,0xac,
    0x42,0x9d,0xc3,0xd9,0x9a,0x9b,0xac,0x7d,0x4c,0x4c,0xbb,0x85,
    0x70,0xb4,0xd5,0xea,0x10,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_yb[] = {
    0xa0,0xb7,0x68,0xba,0x75,0x55,0x62,0x1d,0x13,0x30,0x12,0xd1,
    0xde,0xe2,0x7a,0x00,0x13,0xc1,0xbc,0xfd,0xdd,0x67,0x58,0x11,
    0xdf,0x12,0x77,0x1e,0x44,0xd7,0x7b,0x10,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_ADb[] = {
    0x41,0x44,0x62,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_Yb[] = {
    0x04,0xdf,0x13,0xff,0xa8,0x9b,0x0c,0xe3,0xcc,0x55,0x3b,0x14,
    0x95,0xff,0x02,0x78,0x86,0x56,0x4d,0x94,0xb8,0xd9,0x16,0x5c,
    0xd5,0x0e,0x5f,0x65,0x42,0x47,0x95,0x99,0x51,0xbf,0xac,0x90,
    0x83,0x9f,0xca,0x21,0x8b,0xf8,0xe2,0xd1,0x25,0x8e,0xb7,0xd7,
    0xd9,0xf7,0x33,0xfe,0x4c,0xd5,0x58,0xe6,0xfa,0x57,0xbf,0x1f,
    0x80,0x1a,0xae,0x7d,0x3a,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_K[] = {
    0x27,0xf7,0x05,0x9d,0x88,0xf0,0x20,0x07,0xdc,0x18,0xc9,0x11,
    0xc9,0xb4,0x03,0x4d,0x3c,0x0f,0x13,0xf8,0xf7,0xed,0x96,0x03,
    0xb0,0x92,0x7f,0x23,0xfb,0xab,0x10,0x37,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_ISK_IR[] = {
    0xdd,0xc1,0xb1,0x33,0xc3,0x87,0xec,0xf3,0x44,0xc0,0xb4,0x96,
    0xbc,0x12,0x23,0x65,0x6c,0xd6,0xe7,0xd9,0x9a,0x5d,0xef,0x8b,
    0x3b,0x02,0x67,0x96,0x50,0x81,0x1f,0xc9,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_ISK_SY[] = {
    0x6e,0xa7,0x75,0xb0,0xfb,0x3c,0x31,0x50,0x26,0x87,0x56,0x5a,
    0x52,0x15,0x0f,0xc5,0x95,0xc6,0x3f,0xe9,0x01,0xa1,0x1d,0x5f,
    0xc1,0x99,0x5c,0xd5,0x08,0x9a,0x17,0xae,
   };

B.5.8.  Test case for scalar_mult_vfy with correct inputs

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 53]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

       s: (length: 32 bytes)
         f012501c091ff9b99a123fffe571d8bc01e8077ee581362e1bd21399
         0835643b
       X: (length: 65 bytes)
         0476ab88669dc640ca098b3d19ed87084d22d7e7c86b3b87451554d6
         93a7d98fb6bf0a6938fe0cec7be7563499ba3792909c8b9f4c936ef5
         2828b78a8d6254f49c
       G.scalar_mult(s,X) (full coordinates): (length: 65 bytes)
         0492b0eb1fe6a988797a85e6de8ec5de7ec685c83164570d79f0d568
         b918bfe7718b049dac20ea4631d8c4f321ddb48d70416f4929eb9a85
         2528114d3a560537c7
       G.scalar_mult_vfy(s,X) (only X-coordinate):
       (length: 32 bytes)
         92b0eb1fe6a988797a85e6de8ec5de7ec685c83164570d79f0d568b9
         18bfe771

B.5.9.  Invalid inputs for scalar_mult_vfy

   For these test cases scalar_mult_vfy(y,.) MUST return the
   representation of the neutral element G.I.  When including Y_i1 or
   Y_i2 in MSGa or MSGb the protocol MUST abort.

       s: (length: 32 bytes)
         f012501c091ff9b99a123fffe571d8bc01e8077ee581362e1bd21399
         0835643b
       Y_i1: (length: 65 bytes)
         0476ab88669dc640ca098b3d19ed87084d22d7e7c86b3b87451554d6
         93a7d98fb6bf0a6938fe0cec7be7563499ba3792909c8b9f4c936ef5
         2828b78a8d6254f4f3
       Y_i2: (length: 1 bytes)
         00
       G.scalar_mult_vfy(s,Y_i1) = G.scalar_mult_vfy(s,Y_i2) = G.I

B.6.  Test vector for CPace using group NIST P-384 and hash SHA-384

B.6.1.  Test vectors for calculate_generator with group NIST P-384

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 54]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

     Inputs
       H   = SHA-384 with input block size 128 bytes.
       PRS = b'Password' ; ZPAD length: 87 ;
       DSI = b'CPaceP384_XMD:SHA-384_SSWU_NU_'
       CI = b'\nAinitiator\nBresponder'
       CI = 0a41696e69746961746f720a42726573706f6e646572
       sid = 5b3773aa90e8f23c61563a4b645b276c
     Outputs
       generator_string(PRS,G.DSI,CI,sid,H.s_in_bytes):
       (length: 168 bytes)
         1e4350616365503338345f584d443a5348412d3338345f535357555f
         4e555f0850617373776f726457000000000000000000000000000000
         00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
         00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
         00000000000000000000000000000000160a41696e69746961746f72
         0a42726573706f6e646572105b3773aa90e8f23c61563a4b645b276c
       generator g: (length: 97 bytes)
         04bb6f046a601d0a0b134c6221e20e83c3f9ac0390be56c5a95b68eb
         f41c82ade6f4977ea21341239d194c38dabd1a7eb5887d9fed2550a1
         d5e6789327f2a039cd9c41239b240f775f5f2bef8744561b3a7e98f3
         2234cb1b318f66616de777aeef

B.6.2.  Test vector for MSGa

     Inputs
       ADa = b'ADa'
       ya (big endian): (length: 48 bytes)
         ef433dd5ad142c860e7cb6400dd315d388d5ec5420c550e9d6f0907f
         375d988bc4d704837e43561c497e7dd93edcdb9d
     Outputs
       Ya: (length: 97 bytes)
         047214fc512921b3fa0b555b41d841c9c20227fa1ab0dda5bfc051f6
         de9be7983e6df11d4e8da738b739adfbd85d8f5e80b2b4bbc66f3dff
         c02136ee19773d05f9c0242c0dd51857763de98a2fdfec73a4b1010c
         bc419c7b23b50adedbb3ff6644
       MSGa: (length: 102 bytes)
         61047214fc512921b3fa0b555b41d841c9c20227fa1ab0dda5bfc051
         f6de9be7983e6df11d4e8da738b739adfbd85d8f5e80b2b4bbc66f3d
         ffc02136ee19773d05f9c0242c0dd51857763de98a2fdfec73a4b101
         0cbc419c7b23b50adedbb3ff664403414461

B.6.3.  Test vector for MSGb

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 55]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

     Inputs
       ADb = b'ADb'
       yb (big endian): (length: 48 bytes)
         50b0e36b95a2edfaa8342b843dddc90b175330f2399c1b36586dedda
         3c255975f30be6a750f9404fccc62a6323b5e471
     Outputs
       Yb: (length: 97 bytes)
         04e34cbd45b13ad11552ea7100b19899fa52662e268f2086e21262f7
         46efcb18e4b51ecfaf2e8ebab82addb6245f9bb1ff8138317c8045c4
         d2550e1566832b94acb91b670c4c4c00e59f5c15c74d4260e490caca
         aa860c11b8f369b72d5871bd94
       MSGb: (length: 102 bytes)
         6104e34cbd45b13ad11552ea7100b19899fa52662e268f2086e21262
         f746efcb18e4b51ecfaf2e8ebab82addb6245f9bb1ff8138317c8045
         c4d2550e1566832b94acb91b670c4c4c00e59f5c15c74d4260e490ca
         caaa860c11b8f369b72d5871bd9403414462

B.6.4.  Test vector for secret points K

       scalar_mult_vfy(ya,Yb): (length: 48 bytes)
         e5ef578c410effb4ec114998a59fa5832f6101be479f1a97b021f224
         e378c3fb1f77f87a92e39fb415edf5458b3815bf
       scalar_mult_vfy(yb,Ya): (length: 48 bytes)
         e5ef578c410effb4ec114998a59fa5832f6101be479f1a97b021f224
         e378c3fb1f77f87a92e39fb415edf5458b3815bf

B.6.5.  Test vector for ISK calculation initiator/responder

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 56]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

       unordered cat of transcript : (length: 204 bytes)
         61047214fc512921b3fa0b555b41d841c9c20227fa1ab0dda5bfc051
         f6de9be7983e6df11d4e8da738b739adfbd85d8f5e80b2b4bbc66f3d
         ffc02136ee19773d05f9c0242c0dd51857763de98a2fdfec73a4b101
         0cbc419c7b23b50adedbb3ff6644034144616104e34cbd45b13ad115
         52ea7100b19899fa52662e268f2086e21262f746efcb18e4b51ecfaf
         2e8ebab82addb6245f9bb1ff8138317c8045c4d2550e1566832b94ac
         b91b670c4c4c00e59f5c15c74d4260e490cacaaa860c11b8f369b72d
         5871bd9403414462
       DSI = G.DSI_ISK, b'CPaceP384_XMD:SHA-384_SSWU_NU__ISK':
       (length: 34 bytes)
         4350616365503338345f584d443a5348412d3338345f535357555f4e
         555f5f49534b
       prefix_free_cat(DSI,sid,K)||MSGa||MSGb: (length: 305 bytes)
         224350616365503338345f584d443a5348412d3338345f535357555f
         4e555f5f49534b105b3773aa90e8f23c61563a4b645b276c30e5ef57
         8c410effb4ec114998a59fa5832f6101be479f1a97b021f224e378c3
         fb1f77f87a92e39fb415edf5458b3815bf61047214fc512921b3fa0b
         555b41d841c9c20227fa1ab0dda5bfc051f6de9be7983e6df11d4e8d
         a738b739adfbd85d8f5e80b2b4bbc66f3dffc02136ee19773d05f9c0
         242c0dd51857763de98a2fdfec73a4b1010cbc419c7b23b50adedbb3
         ff6644034144616104e34cbd45b13ad11552ea7100b19899fa52662e
         268f2086e21262f746efcb18e4b51ecfaf2e8ebab82addb6245f9bb1
         ff8138317c8045c4d2550e1566832b94acb91b670c4c4c00e59f5c15
         c74d4260e490cacaaa860c11b8f369b72d5871bd9403414462
       ISK result: (length: 48 bytes)
         401601de4a9f25bd57fc85985c9abf1de75191d68306b584547e6ac9
         e959cf2df49a9bf2205c3617ce99a169971bdbf8

B.6.6.  Test vector for ISK calculation parallel execution

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 57]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

       ordered cat of transcript : (length: 204 bytes)
         6104e34cbd45b13ad11552ea7100b19899fa52662e268f2086e21262
         f746efcb18e4b51ecfaf2e8ebab82addb6245f9bb1ff8138317c8045
         c4d2550e1566832b94acb91b670c4c4c00e59f5c15c74d4260e490ca
         caaa860c11b8f369b72d5871bd940341446261047214fc512921b3fa
         0b555b41d841c9c20227fa1ab0dda5bfc051f6de9be7983e6df11d4e
         8da738b739adfbd85d8f5e80b2b4bbc66f3dffc02136ee19773d05f9
         c0242c0dd51857763de98a2fdfec73a4b1010cbc419c7b23b50adedb
         b3ff664403414461
       DSI = G.DSI_ISK, b'CPaceP384_XMD:SHA-384_SSWU_NU__ISK':
       (length: 34 bytes)
         4350616365503338345f584d443a5348412d3338345f535357555f4e
         555f5f49534b
       prefix_free_cat(DSI,sid,K)||oCat(MSGa,MSGb):
       (length: 305 bytes)
         224350616365503338345f584d443a5348412d3338345f535357555f
         4e555f5f49534b105b3773aa90e8f23c61563a4b645b276c30e5ef57
         8c410effb4ec114998a59fa5832f6101be479f1a97b021f224e378c3
         fb1f77f87a92e39fb415edf5458b3815bf6104e34cbd45b13ad11552
         ea7100b19899fa52662e268f2086e21262f746efcb18e4b51ecfaf2e
         8ebab82addb6245f9bb1ff8138317c8045c4d2550e1566832b94acb9
         1b670c4c4c00e59f5c15c74d4260e490cacaaa860c11b8f369b72d58
         71bd940341446261047214fc512921b3fa0b555b41d841c9c20227fa
         1ab0dda5bfc051f6de9be7983e6df11d4e8da738b739adfbd85d8f5e
         80b2b4bbc66f3dffc02136ee19773d05f9c0242c0dd51857763de98a
         2fdfec73a4b1010cbc419c7b23b50adedbb3ff664403414461
       ISK result: (length: 48 bytes)
         1eb17f7f7126a07acd510e9d60c84f63dc0113ac34f8d359e8f692a9
         06f828bde926d9ff65202c9801e9884aa05a43b6

B.6.7.  Corresponding ANSI-C initializers

   const uint8_t tc_PRS[] = {
    0x50,0x61,0x73,0x73,0x77,0x6f,0x72,0x64,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_CI[] = {
    0x0a,0x41,0x69,0x6e,0x69,0x74,0x69,0x61,0x74,0x6f,0x72,0x0a,
    0x42,0x72,0x65,0x73,0x70,0x6f,0x6e,0x64,0x65,0x72,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_sid[] = {
    0x5b,0x37,0x73,0xaa,0x90,0xe8,0xf2,0x3c,0x61,0x56,0x3a,0x4b,
    0x64,0x5b,0x27,0x6c,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_g[] = {
    0x04,0xbb,0x6f,0x04,0x6a,0x60,0x1d,0x0a,0x0b,0x13,0x4c,0x62,
    0x21,0xe2,0x0e,0x83,0xc3,0xf9,0xac,0x03,0x90,0xbe,0x56,0xc5,
    0xa9,0x5b,0x68,0xeb,0xf4,0x1c,0x82,0xad,0xe6,0xf4,0x97,0x7e,
    0xa2,0x13,0x41,0x23,0x9d,0x19,0x4c,0x38,0xda,0xbd,0x1a,0x7e,

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 58]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

    0xb5,0x88,0x7d,0x9f,0xed,0x25,0x50,0xa1,0xd5,0xe6,0x78,0x93,
    0x27,0xf2,0xa0,0x39,0xcd,0x9c,0x41,0x23,0x9b,0x24,0x0f,0x77,
    0x5f,0x5f,0x2b,0xef,0x87,0x44,0x56,0x1b,0x3a,0x7e,0x98,0xf3,
    0x22,0x34,0xcb,0x1b,0x31,0x8f,0x66,0x61,0x6d,0xe7,0x77,0xae,
    0xef,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_ya[] = {
    0xef,0x43,0x3d,0xd5,0xad,0x14,0x2c,0x86,0x0e,0x7c,0xb6,0x40,
    0x0d,0xd3,0x15,0xd3,0x88,0xd5,0xec,0x54,0x20,0xc5,0x50,0xe9,
    0xd6,0xf0,0x90,0x7f,0x37,0x5d,0x98,0x8b,0xc4,0xd7,0x04,0x83,
    0x7e,0x43,0x56,0x1c,0x49,0x7e,0x7d,0xd9,0x3e,0xdc,0xdb,0x9d,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_ADa[] = {
    0x41,0x44,0x61,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_Ya[] = {
    0x04,0x72,0x14,0xfc,0x51,0x29,0x21,0xb3,0xfa,0x0b,0x55,0x5b,
    0x41,0xd8,0x41,0xc9,0xc2,0x02,0x27,0xfa,0x1a,0xb0,0xdd,0xa5,
    0xbf,0xc0,0x51,0xf6,0xde,0x9b,0xe7,0x98,0x3e,0x6d,0xf1,0x1d,
    0x4e,0x8d,0xa7,0x38,0xb7,0x39,0xad,0xfb,0xd8,0x5d,0x8f,0x5e,
    0x80,0xb2,0xb4,0xbb,0xc6,0x6f,0x3d,0xff,0xc0,0x21,0x36,0xee,
    0x19,0x77,0x3d,0x05,0xf9,0xc0,0x24,0x2c,0x0d,0xd5,0x18,0x57,
    0x76,0x3d,0xe9,0x8a,0x2f,0xdf,0xec,0x73,0xa4,0xb1,0x01,0x0c,
    0xbc,0x41,0x9c,0x7b,0x23,0xb5,0x0a,0xde,0xdb,0xb3,0xff,0x66,
    0x44,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_yb[] = {
    0x50,0xb0,0xe3,0x6b,0x95,0xa2,0xed,0xfa,0xa8,0x34,0x2b,0x84,
    0x3d,0xdd,0xc9,0x0b,0x17,0x53,0x30,0xf2,0x39,0x9c,0x1b,0x36,
    0x58,0x6d,0xed,0xda,0x3c,0x25,0x59,0x75,0xf3,0x0b,0xe6,0xa7,
    0x50,0xf9,0x40,0x4f,0xcc,0xc6,0x2a,0x63,0x23,0xb5,0xe4,0x71,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_ADb[] = {
    0x41,0x44,0x62,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_Yb[] = {
    0x04,0xe3,0x4c,0xbd,0x45,0xb1,0x3a,0xd1,0x15,0x52,0xea,0x71,
    0x00,0xb1,0x98,0x99,0xfa,0x52,0x66,0x2e,0x26,0x8f,0x20,0x86,
    0xe2,0x12,0x62,0xf7,0x46,0xef,0xcb,0x18,0xe4,0xb5,0x1e,0xcf,
    0xaf,0x2e,0x8e,0xba,0xb8,0x2a,0xdd,0xb6,0x24,0x5f,0x9b,0xb1,
    0xff,0x81,0x38,0x31,0x7c,0x80,0x45,0xc4,0xd2,0x55,0x0e,0x15,
    0x66,0x83,0x2b,0x94,0xac,0xb9,0x1b,0x67,0x0c,0x4c,0x4c,0x00,
    0xe5,0x9f,0x5c,0x15,0xc7,0x4d,0x42,0x60,0xe4,0x90,0xca,0xca,
    0xaa,0x86,0x0c,0x11,0xb8,0xf3,0x69,0xb7,0x2d,0x58,0x71,0xbd,
    0x94,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_K[] = {
    0xe5,0xef,0x57,0x8c,0x41,0x0e,0xff,0xb4,0xec,0x11,0x49,0x98,

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 59]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

    0xa5,0x9f,0xa5,0x83,0x2f,0x61,0x01,0xbe,0x47,0x9f,0x1a,0x97,
    0xb0,0x21,0xf2,0x24,0xe3,0x78,0xc3,0xfb,0x1f,0x77,0xf8,0x7a,
    0x92,0xe3,0x9f,0xb4,0x15,0xed,0xf5,0x45,0x8b,0x38,0x15,0xbf,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_ISK_IR[] = {
    0x40,0x16,0x01,0xde,0x4a,0x9f,0x25,0xbd,0x57,0xfc,0x85,0x98,
    0x5c,0x9a,0xbf,0x1d,0xe7,0x51,0x91,0xd6,0x83,0x06,0xb5,0x84,
    0x54,0x7e,0x6a,0xc9,0xe9,0x59,0xcf,0x2d,0xf4,0x9a,0x9b,0xf2,
    0x20,0x5c,0x36,0x17,0xce,0x99,0xa1,0x69,0x97,0x1b,0xdb,0xf8,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_ISK_SY[] = {
    0x1e,0xb1,0x7f,0x7f,0x71,0x26,0xa0,0x7a,0xcd,0x51,0x0e,0x9d,
    0x60,0xc8,0x4f,0x63,0xdc,0x01,0x13,0xac,0x34,0xf8,0xd3,0x59,
    0xe8,0xf6,0x92,0xa9,0x06,0xf8,0x28,0xbd,0xe9,0x26,0xd9,0xff,
    0x65,0x20,0x2c,0x98,0x01,0xe9,0x88,0x4a,0xa0,0x5a,0x43,0xb6,
   };

B.6.8.  Test case for scalar_mult_vfy with correct inputs

       s: (length: 48 bytes)
         6e8a99a5cdd408eae98e1b8aed286e7b12adbbdac7f2c628d9060ce9
         2ae0d90bd57a564fd3500fbcce3425dc94ba0ade
       X: (length: 97 bytes)
         04a32d8d8e1057d37b090d92f46d0bac1874e6cd7c13774774385c30
         39fa8fa3539884b436e49743d2d6279f5bd69dda5fe79fc6ecfb8547
         bf32d8c64ac51f177a70041a1300944f255eea38ca7e964c9d02c5e7
         e28d744e7cdc0bd80437363999
       G.scalar_mult(s,X) (full coordinates): (length: 97 bytes)
         045eb8202664ec20fed23ed6005c7be398174946a0f6a8a2e5fd2fed
         9ca159f22652899f820a2d472f926f57de30035a9d11e8006fb66e79
         f3db5d58bd5688954c7284d1e4a616a935dfb761955be13d29de5745
         074a863140dcc9a5c0056ced3b
       G.scalar_mult_vfy(s,X) (only X-coordinate):
       (length: 48 bytes)
         5eb8202664ec20fed23ed6005c7be398174946a0f6a8a2e5fd2fed9c
         a159f22652899f820a2d472f926f57de30035a9d

B.6.9.  Invalid inputs for scalar_mult_vfy

   For these test cases scalar_mult_vfy(y,.) MUST return the
   representation of the neutral element G.I.  When including Y_i1 or
   Y_i2 in MSGa or MSGb the protocol MUST abort.

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 60]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

       s: (length: 48 bytes)
         6e8a99a5cdd408eae98e1b8aed286e7b12adbbdac7f2c628d9060ce9
         2ae0d90bd57a564fd3500fbcce3425dc94ba0ade
       Y_i1: (length: 97 bytes)
         04a32d8d8e1057d37b090d92f46d0bac1874e6cd7c13774774385c30
         39fa8fa3539884b436e49743d2d6279f5bd69dda5fe79fc6ecfb8547
         bf32d8c64ac51f177a70041a1300944f255eea38ca7e964c9d02c5e7
         e28d744e7cdc0bd80437363938
       Y_i2: (length: 1 bytes)
         00
       G.scalar_mult_vfy(s,Y_i1) = G.scalar_mult_vfy(s,Y_i2) = G.I

B.7.  Test vector for CPace using group NIST P-521 and hash SHA-512

B.7.1.  Test vectors for calculate_generator with group NIST P-521

     Inputs
       H   = SHA-512 with input block size 128 bytes.
       PRS = b'Password' ; ZPAD length: 87 ;
       DSI = b'CPaceP521_XMD:SHA-512_SSWU_NU_'
       CI = b'\nAinitiator\nBresponder'
       CI = 0a41696e69746961746f720a42726573706f6e646572
       sid = 7e4b4791d6a8ef019b936c79fb7f2c57
     Outputs
       generator_string(PRS,G.DSI,CI,sid,H.s_in_bytes):
       (length: 168 bytes)
         1e4350616365503532315f584d443a5348412d3531325f535357555f
         4e555f0850617373776f726457000000000000000000000000000000
         00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
         00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
         00000000000000000000000000000000160a41696e69746961746f72
         0a42726573706f6e646572107e4b4791d6a8ef019b936c79fb7f2c57
       generator g: (length: 133 bytes)
         0400523c2be75a6fdb50e33d917597f182810ea6afe04b7297fccdfc
         f8c1c9f0f1a0c794056c729c275a654d1f9f52cd3d1d0ecc8f2f6a1b
         ab958d36cc539c558496a901bbe4fd573f2a6e6cc0c9afee3ee25c4b
         6f0474dd012eff5af0cbf55c4ec3c0ab4f1187353f815eb2a01ebc52
         d076d45a77a9b86d14fb21066df1d09f10b0a97546

B.7.2.  Test vector for MSGa

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 61]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

     Inputs
       ADa = b'ADa'
       ya (big endian): (length: 66 bytes)
         016fac7bb757452e7b788d68a1510eda90113c65db1213fa08927d50
         bcf2635fd66ca254e82927071001353e265082fd609af47ad06fab42
         0c2295df4056ee9ff997
     Outputs
       Ya: (length: 133 bytes)
         0400484dcee6d54cb356830cd764079360a03b06a7db1a82188e09c9
         2e02d7e78a1e3710da9554db11697d242893e2114d6cbee89f5999b7
         e545d9fdf59f4c9acd408901ad73e01ec22ae6ecc122cf257e81826e
         348cd410ddb9245c61889fe97b2bbb98b2038eb2ed23e989ec7013a6
         10fb2f3b4fb958cc860dd10c98745b9d89e37f2bf9
       MSGa: (length: 139 bytes)
         c2850400484dcee6d54cb356830cd764079360a03b06a7db1a82188e
         09c92e02d7e78a1e3710da9554db11697d242893e2114d6cbee89f59
         99b7e545d9fdf59f4c9acd408901ad73e01ec22ae6ecc122cf257e81
         826e348cd410ddb9245c61889fe97b2bbb98b2038eb2ed23e989ec70
         13a610fb2f3b4fb958cc860dd10c98745b9d89e37f2bf903414461

B.7.3.  Test vector for MSGb

     Inputs
       ADb = b'ADb'
       yb (big endian): (length: 66 bytes)
         011a946e2d0f48dc440ae3f4fd9126198237042fd1d41d037068c284
         6d43ec130cbc55ef1208496be068f8682bcaf6156e51598e27c1fb24
         d77b43957bbc129bab80
     Outputs
       Yb: (length: 133 bytes)
         0401edf767bd7d9e67ff137b8f3210c55e9192e9ac8a10f32a2f0eef
         9ce34524a543e0d4eb9b3328ca114b02ab23b291f61b5bc814639a9e
         caff07e870733131747637004c2df1bec8abe6b252e7fe91bdb6f724
         2e65c36e7b960646c89aaf0262a4803ee4c90d1b58775a409a135bd1
         8fedbf4ba0eae172b4fe8a0fada83d699e44f2f861
       MSGb: (length: 139 bytes)
         c2850401edf767bd7d9e67ff137b8f3210c55e9192e9ac8a10f32a2f
         0eef9ce34524a543e0d4eb9b3328ca114b02ab23b291f61b5bc81463
         9a9ecaff07e870733131747637004c2df1bec8abe6b252e7fe91bdb6
         f7242e65c36e7b960646c89aaf0262a4803ee4c90d1b58775a409a13
         5bd18fedbf4ba0eae172b4fe8a0fada83d699e44f2f86103414462

B.7.4.  Test vector for secret points K

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 62]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

       scalar_mult_vfy(ya,Yb): (length: 66 bytes)
         0070a7460122c65d86bf9dd012ab45fc94be362619d1a1f0e75f1433
         3ed8b873b5724616b88dadaaba5f28bb783aeb01f60df5fdb8c0a237
         45900f462f405debfd51
       scalar_mult_vfy(yb,Ya): (length: 66 bytes)
         0070a7460122c65d86bf9dd012ab45fc94be362619d1a1f0e75f1433
         3ed8b873b5724616b88dadaaba5f28bb783aeb01f60df5fdb8c0a237
         45900f462f405debfd51

B.7.5.  Test vector for ISK calculation initiator/responder

       unordered cat of transcript : (length: 278 bytes)
         c2850400484dcee6d54cb356830cd764079360a03b06a7db1a82188e
         09c92e02d7e78a1e3710da9554db11697d242893e2114d6cbee89f59
         99b7e545d9fdf59f4c9acd408901ad73e01ec22ae6ecc122cf257e81
         826e348cd410ddb9245c61889fe97b2bbb98b2038eb2ed23e989ec70
         13a610fb2f3b4fb958cc860dd10c98745b9d89e37f2bf903414461c2
         850401edf767bd7d9e67ff137b8f3210c55e9192e9ac8a10f32a2f0e
         ef9ce34524a543e0d4eb9b3328ca114b02ab23b291f61b5bc814639a
         9ecaff07e870733131747637004c2df1bec8abe6b252e7fe91bdb6f7
         242e65c36e7b960646c89aaf0262a4803ee4c90d1b58775a409a135b
         d18fedbf4ba0eae172b4fe8a0fada83d699e44f2f86103414462
       DSI = G.DSI_ISK, b'CPaceP521_XMD:SHA-512_SSWU_NU__ISK':
       (length: 34 bytes)
         4350616365503532315f584d443a5348412d3531325f535357555f4e
         555f5f49534b
       prefix_free_cat(DSI,sid,K)||MSGa||MSGb: (length: 397 bytes)
         224350616365503532315f584d443a5348412d3531325f535357555f
         4e555f5f49534b107e4b4791d6a8ef019b936c79fb7f2c57420070a7
         460122c65d86bf9dd012ab45fc94be362619d1a1f0e75f14333ed8b8
         73b5724616b88dadaaba5f28bb783aeb01f60df5fdb8c0a23745900f
         462f405debfd51c2850400484dcee6d54cb356830cd764079360a03b
         06a7db1a82188e09c92e02d7e78a1e3710da9554db11697d242893e2
         114d6cbee89f5999b7e545d9fdf59f4c9acd408901ad73e01ec22ae6
         ecc122cf257e81826e348cd410ddb9245c61889fe97b2bbb98b2038e
         b2ed23e989ec7013a610fb2f3b4fb958cc860dd10c98745b9d89e37f
         2bf903414461c2850401edf767bd7d9e67ff137b8f3210c55e9192e9
         ac8a10f32a2f0eef9ce34524a543e0d4eb9b3328ca114b02ab23b291
         f61b5bc814639a9ecaff07e870733131747637004c2df1bec8abe6b2
         52e7fe91bdb6f7242e65c36e7b960646c89aaf0262a4803ee4c90d1b
         58775a409a135bd18fedbf4ba0eae172b4fe8a0fada83d699e44f2f8
         6103414462
       ISK result: (length: 64 bytes)
         9f6bd237f8740689ea9871b45200720a2d834106985bb3a0f2ab3ea5
         35cd22cfa8a68eb8ac373462fda361532e4f5fb3059e8400252324ee
         d9a8348171b20cd0

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 63]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

B.7.6.  Test vector for ISK calculation parallel execution

       ordered cat of transcript : (length: 278 bytes)
         c2850401edf767bd7d9e67ff137b8f3210c55e9192e9ac8a10f32a2f
         0eef9ce34524a543e0d4eb9b3328ca114b02ab23b291f61b5bc81463
         9a9ecaff07e870733131747637004c2df1bec8abe6b252e7fe91bdb6
         f7242e65c36e7b960646c89aaf0262a4803ee4c90d1b58775a409a13
         5bd18fedbf4ba0eae172b4fe8a0fada83d699e44f2f86103414462c2
         850400484dcee6d54cb356830cd764079360a03b06a7db1a82188e09
         c92e02d7e78a1e3710da9554db11697d242893e2114d6cbee89f5999
         b7e545d9fdf59f4c9acd408901ad73e01ec22ae6ecc122cf257e8182
         6e348cd410ddb9245c61889fe97b2bbb98b2038eb2ed23e989ec7013
         a610fb2f3b4fb958cc860dd10c98745b9d89e37f2bf903414461
       DSI = G.DSI_ISK, b'CPaceP521_XMD:SHA-512_SSWU_NU__ISK':
       (length: 34 bytes)
         4350616365503532315f584d443a5348412d3531325f535357555f4e
         555f5f49534b
       prefix_free_cat(DSI,sid,K)||oCat(MSGa,MSGb):
       (length: 397 bytes)
         224350616365503532315f584d443a5348412d3531325f535357555f
         4e555f5f49534b107e4b4791d6a8ef019b936c79fb7f2c57420070a7
         460122c65d86bf9dd012ab45fc94be362619d1a1f0e75f14333ed8b8
         73b5724616b88dadaaba5f28bb783aeb01f60df5fdb8c0a23745900f
         462f405debfd51c2850401edf767bd7d9e67ff137b8f3210c55e9192
         e9ac8a10f32a2f0eef9ce34524a543e0d4eb9b3328ca114b02ab23b2
         91f61b5bc814639a9ecaff07e870733131747637004c2df1bec8abe6
         b252e7fe91bdb6f7242e65c36e7b960646c89aaf0262a4803ee4c90d
         1b58775a409a135bd18fedbf4ba0eae172b4fe8a0fada83d699e44f2
         f86103414462c2850400484dcee6d54cb356830cd764079360a03b06
         a7db1a82188e09c92e02d7e78a1e3710da9554db11697d242893e211
         4d6cbee89f5999b7e545d9fdf59f4c9acd408901ad73e01ec22ae6ec
         c122cf257e81826e348cd410ddb9245c61889fe97b2bbb98b2038eb2
         ed23e989ec7013a610fb2f3b4fb958cc860dd10c98745b9d89e37f2b
         f903414461
       ISK result: (length: 64 bytes)
         8cc687c86f7405f1ccef348d6f97111d1cedc50813f7315bfb2eb1e9
         52b3222eb72332e785565c1b8ddbb545710afc519203e29b1e7731d5
         fa0d62948ad8e210

B.7.7.  Corresponding ANSI-C initializers

   const uint8_t tc_PRS[] = {
    0x50,0x61,0x73,0x73,0x77,0x6f,0x72,0x64,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_CI[] = {
    0x0a,0x41,0x69,0x6e,0x69,0x74,0x69,0x61,0x74,0x6f,0x72,0x0a,
    0x42,0x72,0x65,0x73,0x70,0x6f,0x6e,0x64,0x65,0x72,
   };

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 64]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

   const uint8_t tc_sid[] = {
    0x7e,0x4b,0x47,0x91,0xd6,0xa8,0xef,0x01,0x9b,0x93,0x6c,0x79,
    0xfb,0x7f,0x2c,0x57,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_g[] = {
    0x04,0x00,0x52,0x3c,0x2b,0xe7,0x5a,0x6f,0xdb,0x50,0xe3,0x3d,
    0x91,0x75,0x97,0xf1,0x82,0x81,0x0e,0xa6,0xaf,0xe0,0x4b,0x72,
    0x97,0xfc,0xcd,0xfc,0xf8,0xc1,0xc9,0xf0,0xf1,0xa0,0xc7,0x94,
    0x05,0x6c,0x72,0x9c,0x27,0x5a,0x65,0x4d,0x1f,0x9f,0x52,0xcd,
    0x3d,0x1d,0x0e,0xcc,0x8f,0x2f,0x6a,0x1b,0xab,0x95,0x8d,0x36,
    0xcc,0x53,0x9c,0x55,0x84,0x96,0xa9,0x01,0xbb,0xe4,0xfd,0x57,
    0x3f,0x2a,0x6e,0x6c,0xc0,0xc9,0xaf,0xee,0x3e,0xe2,0x5c,0x4b,
    0x6f,0x04,0x74,0xdd,0x01,0x2e,0xff,0x5a,0xf0,0xcb,0xf5,0x5c,
    0x4e,0xc3,0xc0,0xab,0x4f,0x11,0x87,0x35,0x3f,0x81,0x5e,0xb2,
    0xa0,0x1e,0xbc,0x52,0xd0,0x76,0xd4,0x5a,0x77,0xa9,0xb8,0x6d,
    0x14,0xfb,0x21,0x06,0x6d,0xf1,0xd0,0x9f,0x10,0xb0,0xa9,0x75,
    0x46,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_ya[] = {
    0x01,0x6f,0xac,0x7b,0xb7,0x57,0x45,0x2e,0x7b,0x78,0x8d,0x68,
    0xa1,0x51,0x0e,0xda,0x90,0x11,0x3c,0x65,0xdb,0x12,0x13,0xfa,
    0x08,0x92,0x7d,0x50,0xbc,0xf2,0x63,0x5f,0xd6,0x6c,0xa2,0x54,
    0xe8,0x29,0x27,0x07,0x10,0x01,0x35,0x3e,0x26,0x50,0x82,0xfd,
    0x60,0x9a,0xf4,0x7a,0xd0,0x6f,0xab,0x42,0x0c,0x22,0x95,0xdf,
    0x40,0x56,0xee,0x9f,0xf9,0x97,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_ADa[] = {
    0x41,0x44,0x61,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_Ya[] = {
    0x04,0x00,0x48,0x4d,0xce,0xe6,0xd5,0x4c,0xb3,0x56,0x83,0x0c,
    0xd7,0x64,0x07,0x93,0x60,0xa0,0x3b,0x06,0xa7,0xdb,0x1a,0x82,
    0x18,0x8e,0x09,0xc9,0x2e,0x02,0xd7,0xe7,0x8a,0x1e,0x37,0x10,
    0xda,0x95,0x54,0xdb,0x11,0x69,0x7d,0x24,0x28,0x93,0xe2,0x11,
    0x4d,0x6c,0xbe,0xe8,0x9f,0x59,0x99,0xb7,0xe5,0x45,0xd9,0xfd,
    0xf5,0x9f,0x4c,0x9a,0xcd,0x40,0x89,0x01,0xad,0x73,0xe0,0x1e,
    0xc2,0x2a,0xe6,0xec,0xc1,0x22,0xcf,0x25,0x7e,0x81,0x82,0x6e,
    0x34,0x8c,0xd4,0x10,0xdd,0xb9,0x24,0x5c,0x61,0x88,0x9f,0xe9,
    0x7b,0x2b,0xbb,0x98,0xb2,0x03,0x8e,0xb2,0xed,0x23,0xe9,0x89,
    0xec,0x70,0x13,0xa6,0x10,0xfb,0x2f,0x3b,0x4f,0xb9,0x58,0xcc,
    0x86,0x0d,0xd1,0x0c,0x98,0x74,0x5b,0x9d,0x89,0xe3,0x7f,0x2b,
    0xf9,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_yb[] = {
    0x01,0x1a,0x94,0x6e,0x2d,0x0f,0x48,0xdc,0x44,0x0a,0xe3,0xf4,
    0xfd,0x91,0x26,0x19,0x82,0x37,0x04,0x2f,0xd1,0xd4,0x1d,0x03,
    0x70,0x68,0xc2,0x84,0x6d,0x43,0xec,0x13,0x0c,0xbc,0x55,0xef,
    0x12,0x08,0x49,0x6b,0xe0,0x68,0xf8,0x68,0x2b,0xca,0xf6,0x15,

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 65]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

    0x6e,0x51,0x59,0x8e,0x27,0xc1,0xfb,0x24,0xd7,0x7b,0x43,0x95,
    0x7b,0xbc,0x12,0x9b,0xab,0x80,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_ADb[] = {
    0x41,0x44,0x62,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_Yb[] = {
    0x04,0x01,0xed,0xf7,0x67,0xbd,0x7d,0x9e,0x67,0xff,0x13,0x7b,
    0x8f,0x32,0x10,0xc5,0x5e,0x91,0x92,0xe9,0xac,0x8a,0x10,0xf3,
    0x2a,0x2f,0x0e,0xef,0x9c,0xe3,0x45,0x24,0xa5,0x43,0xe0,0xd4,
    0xeb,0x9b,0x33,0x28,0xca,0x11,0x4b,0x02,0xab,0x23,0xb2,0x91,
    0xf6,0x1b,0x5b,0xc8,0x14,0x63,0x9a,0x9e,0xca,0xff,0x07,0xe8,
    0x70,0x73,0x31,0x31,0x74,0x76,0x37,0x00,0x4c,0x2d,0xf1,0xbe,
    0xc8,0xab,0xe6,0xb2,0x52,0xe7,0xfe,0x91,0xbd,0xb6,0xf7,0x24,
    0x2e,0x65,0xc3,0x6e,0x7b,0x96,0x06,0x46,0xc8,0x9a,0xaf,0x02,
    0x62,0xa4,0x80,0x3e,0xe4,0xc9,0x0d,0x1b,0x58,0x77,0x5a,0x40,
    0x9a,0x13,0x5b,0xd1,0x8f,0xed,0xbf,0x4b,0xa0,0xea,0xe1,0x72,
    0xb4,0xfe,0x8a,0x0f,0xad,0xa8,0x3d,0x69,0x9e,0x44,0xf2,0xf8,
    0x61,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_K[] = {
    0x00,0x70,0xa7,0x46,0x01,0x22,0xc6,0x5d,0x86,0xbf,0x9d,0xd0,
    0x12,0xab,0x45,0xfc,0x94,0xbe,0x36,0x26,0x19,0xd1,0xa1,0xf0,
    0xe7,0x5f,0x14,0x33,0x3e,0xd8,0xb8,0x73,0xb5,0x72,0x46,0x16,
    0xb8,0x8d,0xad,0xaa,0xba,0x5f,0x28,0xbb,0x78,0x3a,0xeb,0x01,
    0xf6,0x0d,0xf5,0xfd,0xb8,0xc0,0xa2,0x37,0x45,0x90,0x0f,0x46,
    0x2f,0x40,0x5d,0xeb,0xfd,0x51,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_ISK_IR[] = {
    0x9f,0x6b,0xd2,0x37,0xf8,0x74,0x06,0x89,0xea,0x98,0x71,0xb4,
    0x52,0x00,0x72,0x0a,0x2d,0x83,0x41,0x06,0x98,0x5b,0xb3,0xa0,
    0xf2,0xab,0x3e,0xa5,0x35,0xcd,0x22,0xcf,0xa8,0xa6,0x8e,0xb8,
    0xac,0x37,0x34,0x62,0xfd,0xa3,0x61,0x53,0x2e,0x4f,0x5f,0xb3,
    0x05,0x9e,0x84,0x00,0x25,0x23,0x24,0xee,0xd9,0xa8,0x34,0x81,
    0x71,0xb2,0x0c,0xd0,
   };
   const uint8_t tc_ISK_SY[] = {
    0x8c,0xc6,0x87,0xc8,0x6f,0x74,0x05,0xf1,0xcc,0xef,0x34,0x8d,
    0x6f,0x97,0x11,0x1d,0x1c,0xed,0xc5,0x08,0x13,0xf7,0x31,0x5b,
    0xfb,0x2e,0xb1,0xe9,0x52,0xb3,0x22,0x2e,0xb7,0x23,0x32,0xe7,
    0x85,0x56,0x5c,0x1b,0x8d,0xdb,0xb5,0x45,0x71,0x0a,0xfc,0x51,
    0x92,0x03,0xe2,0x9b,0x1e,0x77,0x31,0xd5,0xfa,0x0d,0x62,0x94,
    0x8a,0xd8,0xe2,0x10,
   };

B.7.8.  Test case for scalar_mult_vfy with correct inputs

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 66]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

       s: (length: 66 bytes)
         0182dd7925f1753419e4bf83429763acd37d64000cd5a175edf53a15
         87dd986bc95acc1506991702b6ba1a9ee2458fee8efc00198cf0088c
         480965ef65ff2048b856
       X: (length: 133 bytes)
         0400bf0a2632f954515e65c55553e25cde4c8bf3a48e5df86a3ef845
         fcf15c8d9a4640171188ff835df48b8f934070d225daa591e270a9cc
         539b82e8dc145caf38aeb900c30b83a1c9792e95c4a25f75b58001d3
         6331c2b71a86591e1b510a1740335bc9947da1f6bab91b86900c9258
         b28ee7b5ea33af2a8138a75cde4287613ab6673bcc
       G.scalar_mult(s,X) (full coordinates): (length: 133 bytes)
         040100763e7ebe6a051e2195b1980686a2a5d7edbc1d9284e38d1e9e
         13673b65b6b3b5cb1b1ab146a315c32425edee8fdca06a07cf72d26d
         31e38ec6a38481b4f18d8600b2a7df9cc7db6cbf75b2eee98f9f14e5
         e24a789d45b9709278e8b74b30eb32d55fb8cfea4258dcf9de7fb36a
         67326584d5c8121c4802801115b908b937361c9828
       G.scalar_mult_vfy(s,X) (only X-coordinate):
       (length: 66 bytes)
         0100763e7ebe6a051e2195b1980686a2a5d7edbc1d9284e38d1e9e13
         673b65b6b3b5cb1b1ab146a315c32425edee8fdca06a07cf72d26d31
         e38ec6a38481b4f18d86

B.7.9.  Invalid inputs for scalar_mult_vfy

   For these test cases scalar_mult_vfy(y,.) MUST return the
   representation of the neutral element G.I.  When including Y_i1 or
   Y_i2 in MSGa or MSGb the protocol MUST abort.

       s: (length: 66 bytes)
         0182dd7925f1753419e4bf83429763acd37d64000cd5a175edf53a15
         87dd986bc95acc1506991702b6ba1a9ee2458fee8efc00198cf0088c
         480965ef65ff2048b856
       Y_i1: (length: 133 bytes)
         0400bf0a2632f954515e65c55553e25cde4c8bf3a48e5df86a3ef845
         fcf15c8d9a4640171188ff835df48b8f934070d225daa591e270a9cc
         539b82e8dc145caf38aeb900c30b83a1c9792e95c4a25f75b58001d3
         6331c2b71a86591e1b510a1740335bc9947da1f6bab91b86900c9258
         b28ee7b5ea33af2a8138a75cde4287613ab6673b3a
       Y_i2: (length: 1 bytes)
         00
       G.scalar_mult_vfy(s,Y_i1) = G.scalar_mult_vfy(s,Y_i2) = G.I

Authors' Addresses

   Michel Abdalla
   DFINITY - Zurich

   Email: michel.abdalla@gmail.com

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 67]
Internet-Draft                    CPace                    November 2021

   Bjoern Haase
   Endress + Hauser Liquid Analysis - Gerlingen

   Email: bjoern.m.haase@web.de

   Julia Hesse
   IBM Research Europe - Zurich

   Email: JHS@zurich.ibm.com

Abdalla, et al.            Expires 19 May 2022                 [Page 68]