Dragonfly Key Exchange
draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03

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Document Type Active Internet-Draft (cfrg RG)
Author Dan Harkins 
Last updated 2014-02-03
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Internet Research Task Force                             D. Harkins, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                            Aruba Networks
Intended status: Informational                          February 3, 2014
Expires: August 7, 2014

                         Dragonfly Key Exchange
                      draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly-03

Abstract

   This document specifies a key exchange using discrete logarithm
   cryptography that is authenticated using a password or passphrase.
   It is resistant to active attack, passive attack, and off-line
   dictionary attack.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.  This document may not be modified,
   and derivative works of it may not be created, except to format it
   for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
   than English.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 7, 2014.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of

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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  Requirements Language  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.2.  Definitions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
       1.2.1.  Notations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
       1.2.2.  Resistance to Dictionary Attack  . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  Discrete Logarithm Cryptography  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.1.  Elliptic Curve Cryptography  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     2.2.  Finite Field Cryptography  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   3.  The Dragonfly Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.1.  Assumptions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     3.2.  Derivation of the Password Element . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       3.2.1.  Hunting and Pecking with ECC Groups  . . . . . . . . . 10
       3.2.2.  Hunting and Pecking with MODP Groups . . . . . . . . . 12
     3.3.  The Commit Exchange  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     3.4.  The Confirm Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   4.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   5.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   6.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   7.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     7.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     7.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

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1.  Introduction

   Passwords and passphrases are the predominant way of doing
   authentication in the Internet today.  Many protocols that use
   passwords and passphrases for authentication exchange password-
   derived data as a proof-of-knowledge of the password (for example,
   [RFC5996], and [RFC5433]).  This opens the exchange up to an off-line
   dictionary attack where the attacker gleans enough knowledge from
   either an active or passive attack on the protocol to run through a
   pool of potential passwords and compute verifiers until it is able to
   match the password-derived data.

   This protocol employs discrete logarithm cryptography to perform an
   efficient exchange in a way that performs mutual authentication using
   a password but is resistant to an off-line dictionary attack.

1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
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