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Securing Group Management in IPv6 with Cryptographically Generated Addresses

Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (gsec RG)
Expired & archived
Authors Claude Castelluccia , Claude Castelluccia
Last updated 2002-07-05
RFC stream Internet Research Task Force (IRTF)
Intended RFC status (None)
Stream IRTF state (None)
Consensus boilerplate Unknown
Document shepherd (None)
IESG IESG state Expired
Telechat date (None)
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)

This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:


Currently, group membership management in IP Multicast and Anycast can be abused in order to launch denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. The root of the problem is that routers cannot determine if a given host is authorized to join a group (sometimes referred to as the 'Proof-of-Membership Problem' [ECUMN00]). We propose a solution for IPv6 based on Group Cryptographically Generated Addresses (G-CGA). These addresses have characteristics of statistical uniqueness and cryptographic verifiability that lend themselves to severely limiting certain classes of DoS attacks. Our scheme is fully distributed and does not require any trusted third party or pre-established security association between the routers and the hosts. This is not only a huge gain in terms of scalability, reliability and overhead, but also in terms of privacy.


Claude Castelluccia
Claude Castelluccia

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)