Intimate Partner Violence Digital Considerations
draft-irtf-hrpc-ipvc-01
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| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (hrpc RG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Sofia Celi , Juliana Guerra , Mallory Knodel | ||
| Last updated | 2024-11-08 | ||
| Replaces | draft-celi-irtf-hrpc-ipvc | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
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draft-irtf-hrpc-ipvc-01
None S. Celi
Internet-Draft Brave
Intended status: Informational J. Guerra
Expires: 12 May 2025
M. Knodel
CDT
8 November 2024
Intimate Partner Violence Digital Considerations
draft-irtf-hrpc-ipvc-01
Abstract
This document aims to inform how Internet protocols and their
implementations might better mitigate technical attacks at the user
endpoint by describing technology-based practices to perpetrate
intimate partner violence (IPV). IPV is a pervasive reality that is
not limited to, but can be exacerbated with, the usage of technology.
The IPV context enables the attacker to access one, some or all of:
devices, local networks, authentication mechanisms, identity
information, and accounts. These security compromises go beyond
active and passive on-path attacks [RFC7624]. With a focus on
protocols, the document describes tactics of the IPV attacker and
potential counter-measures.
Discussion Venues
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/claucece/draft-celi-ipvc.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 12 May 2025.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Definition of technology-based IPV . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Technology-based IPV attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. The tech-asisted IPV attacker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Tech-based IPV tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3. Kinds of tech-enabled IPV attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.4. Means of attacking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4. Specific abused technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
9. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1. Introduction
Intimate partner violence (IPV) refers to physical, emotional,
verbal, sexual, or economic abuse of a person by a current or former
intimate partner, hereafter referred to as the abuser or
attacker.[WHO] IPV is characterized by an unequal power dynamic that
enables the abuser to exert control and harm within romantic or
sexual relationships context. While IPV often manifests in these
contexts, it also extends to child and elder abuse or abuse
perpetrated by any member of a household.
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Digital technologies are central in modern lives and can be used as a
way to enable and enhance IPV. Technology-based IPV has profound
implications on the physical, psychological and emotional health of
survivors, affecting them not only at the individual level but also
disrupting their broader social environment [ref]. Furthermore,
technology-based IPV can create an immediate potential for offline,
real-world harm, as attackers can use these methods to control,
locate, or confront their victims in person. This blending of
digital abuse and offline harm increases the severity and urgency of
the threat faced by victims.
There is significant existing work in the field of online gender-
based violence [IPVTechBib][CSP] and technology-based IPV [Freed]
mainly focused on response and resiliency, including digital privacy
and safety strategies. Nevertheless, even when this literature
exists, IPV is not considered enough when designing digital
technologies, networks, or Internet protocols, and it is not part of
threat-modelling. Protocol design or cybersecurity best practices
rarely account for IPV-specific scenarios, as seen in only a few
cases [CETAStrategies]. These omissions highlight the need to
consider the privacy and security risks involved, as noted in
[RFC6973].
Unlike traditional "attackers", an abuser in the context of IPV is a
close and familiar figure: an "attacker you know." This attacker is
neither solely on-path nor off-path; they often have full access to
their target's devices and local networks, sharing intimate spaces
and information. Moreover, abusers can coerce and manipulate their
victims (hereafter, referred to as targets) directly.
This document outlines the tactics employed in technology-based IPV
and offers recommendations for designing protocols and technologies
to mitigate these tactics. It begins with a comprehensive overview
of IPV and related terminology, followed by an exploration of the
specific tactics used by abusers, culminating in actionable
recommendations for the digital design community
Although the category of technology-abuse includes practices such as
Child Sexual Abuse Material (CSAM), or digital manipulation of images
and videos (deepfakes) to exhibit and slander women [Witness], those
tactics are out of scope in this document, since the attacker is not
part of the victim's social environment, i.e. they do not necessarily
have access to the victim's local network. However, in some
ocasions, this distinction doesn’t always hold.
The point of this document is to describe technological means by
which abuse may be enacted. It is not claiming, and cannot claim,
that these means are inherently abusive.
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2. Definition of technology-based IPV
Technology-based intimate partner violence (IPV) refers to the use of
digital tools and technologies to enable, escalate, and reinforce
abusive behaviors. IPV itself encompasses physical, emotional,
verbal, sexual, or economic abuse committed by a current or former
intimate partner. A "partner" in this context is not limited to
romantic or sexual relationships, but can extend to anyone with a
close relationship to the victim, including household members
involved in child or elder abuse. What defines IPV is the inherent
unequal power relationship, where the abuser leverages this imbalance
to inflict harm and exert control.
In technology-based IPV, the attacker exploits various forms of
digital technology to perpetrate abuse, often through pervasive
surveillance, overt monitoring, coercive access to devices or
accounts, and manipulation of digital communications. This is known
as "digital coercive control" [Dragiewicz2018], which is a form of
abuse where access to personal technology, such as smartphones,
social media, or local networks, becomes a means for the abuser to
assert control, engage in stalking, or inflict psychological
harassment. Internet-enabled technologies amplify the abuser's
ability to conduct continuous surveillance or escalate harm remotely,
reinforcing the unequal power dynamic present in IPV situations.
While technology-facilitated abuse can affect anyone, it is crucial
to recognize its intersection with gender-based violence. As noted
by [APCFramework], "women and girls face specific cyber threats in
the digital age that are considered forms of gender-based violence as
they occur because of their gender, or because they
disproportionately affect one gender." This intersection arises
because digital abuse is embedded in the same offline structural
violence that perpetuates gender inequality, but the technological
dimension introduces new elements: searchability, persistence,
replicability, and scalability. These features allow abusers to more
easily track their targets, replicate abusive content, and escalate
harassment across platforms, magnifying the harm inflicted.
Furthermore, the unique aspects of technology-based IPV—such as the
ability to monitor in real-time, manipulate social media, or restrict
access to digital resources—can severely limit a victim's autonomy
and mobility. This creates a new layer of control that extends
beyond traditional physical spaces into the digital realm, making it
harder for victims to escape the abuse, as the abuser often has
constant or even remote access to the victim’s digital life.
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Ultimately, technology-based IPV is not just an extension of
traditional abuse; it is an evolving form of violence that
capitalizes on the pervasive and intimate nature of digital
technology to create a form of control that is difficult to detect
and even harder to escape. Addressing this issue requires a deep
understanding of both the technical tools used by abusers and the
social dynamics at play, including the broader structural
inequalities that enable such abuse.
2.1. Terminology
In the rest of this draft, we will use this terminology:
* Attacker: By "attacker" we mean a person, an abuser in an IPV
situation that is using digital tools to enable and enhance abuse.
An attacker can also be referred to as "perpetrator".
* Victim: By "victim" we mean a person who is subject or target of
an attack. Notice that we are using this term only in the
temporary context of an attack scenario. We prefer the term
"survivor", which recognizes the agency and resistance tactics of
those facing IPV, but for the purposes of this document we focus
on the fact of being subject of specific technology-based IPV
attacks.
3. Technology-based IPV attacks
In this section, we describe IPV attacks that are enabled or
exacerbated by Internet technology. First, we outline our
assumptions about this type of attacker and common tactics they may
use. Then, we describe the types of technology-enabled IPV attacks.
3.1. The tech-asisted IPV attacker
The attacker we focus on in this document is someone who either
forcefully controls accounts, devices, and/or authentication
information used to access systems, or leverages publicly available
information to exert this control. This attacker may or may not be
technologically skilled (it might be "technology savvy" or not).
From a threat model perspective, this attacker is one of the
strongest ones as it can use their abilities to gain unlimited access
to systems and devices without needing significant financial or
computational resources.
The attacker typically has (or has had) physical access to the victim
and often shares a common social network with them. In some cases,
the attacker may legally own the devices or accounts the victim uses,
further complicating the victim’s ability to maintain control.
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The attacker is not implied to have infinite computing power or
unrestricted access to external systems (e.g., companies
infrastructure). Rather, the focus is on their ability to gain
unlimited access to the victim's personal devices and accounts due to
their proximity, control, or manipulation of the victim's
authentication mechanisms and personal data.
3.2. Tech-based IPV tactics
There are many ways in which digital and networked technology can
facilitate an attacker perpetrating IPV. For an in-depth reading,
see [TBMDGMMDR] and [CDOHPFLDMR]. Below, we informally categorize
the main tactics attackers use:
* Ready-made tools: Attackers can use applications or devices that
are solely built to facilitate IPV. These types of technology are
sometimes referred to as "stalkerware" or "spouseware".
* Dual-use tools: Attackers can repurpose applications, settings or
devices built for beneficial or innocuous purposes to cause harm.
This is the case, for example, of anti-theft devices that can be
repurposed for stalking, or to location-tracking tools. The
latter is subject to its own considerations [DULT].
* Impersonation attacks: Knowing personal information coupled with
access to authentication mechanisms gives an attacker the ability
to fully authenticate to services and accounts of the victim,
effectively impersonating them. This can be executed to the
degree that the victim can no longer successfully authenticate
themselves to their services or accounts.
* UI-bound impersonation attacks: Attackers can abuse technology to
enhance IPV by abusing the User Interface (UI) of a specific tool.
In this case, attackers become authenticated but adversarial users
of a system. They cannot, however, escalate to root privileges or
access other underlying functionalities of the system. They are
bound to the UI of whatever system they managed to authenticate
to. We will explore later the ways attackers use to forcibly gain
authentication to a system.
* Social media and forums: Attackers can learn and share information
on how to use technology to enhance IPV through the usage of these
platforms. These spaces may also provide narrative justifications
for abusive behavior and facilitate cyberstalking, cyberbullying,
and doxxing.
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* Perception of Threat and Vulnerability: The awareness of a
pervasive threat can act as a powerful form of control. Attackers
often leverage the perception that technology could be used for
IPV as a means of manipulating victims, eroding their sense of
safety and agency. This can extend to perceptions of
vulnerability within the victim's network or system: the mere
suspicion of a vulnerability could compound feelings of
insecurity. Research on user perceptions of technology
trustworthiness, especially within messaging apps (see [UPMSG]),
indicates that perceived threats and vulnerabilities in
communication channels can discourage users from trusting or
seeking help through these technologies. Such dynamics can
further isolate victims and create additional barriers to
receiving support.
3.3. Kinds of tech-enabled IPV attacks
* Monitoring: A prevalent tactic to facilitate IPV is the active,
intrusive monitoring of the victim’s online activities and
accounts. This ongoing surveillance can encompass a range of
behaviors that feel invasive, often involving threats or
intimidation. The "active" nature of this monitoring means it may
be apparent to the victim or entirely hidden, depending on the
abuser's intent. Forms of monitoring include:
- Monitoring of communication, which can be e-mail-based, chat-
based or social media communications, or browsing information
(history, cookies or more) either directly on the victim's
device or through specialised applications.
- Monitoring location and whereabouts by looking at the metadata
of communication, by using location-help applications, or by
using specialized applications.
- Monitoring any data sent over the network by mounting DNS
attacks or other specialised attacks.
- Monitoring any information found on the UI by looking at
devices screens while the victim is using them.
- Data gathering by using the Internet to seek public or private
information to compile a victim's personal information for use
in harassment.
- Monitoring security cameras or systems for home security
In this type of attack, we see these dimensions:
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- Monitoring of communication content at various layers,
including the application layer (e.g., chat or email content)
and network layers (e.g., packet inspection or traffic
analysis).
- Monitoring of the UI content of application tools.
- Monitoring of location information.
* Compromise of accounts: An attacker may demand access to the
victim's accounts to continuously monitor, control, manipulate or
restrict their digital communications and activities. Unlike
passive monitoring with publicly available tools, the attacker
demands access to tools and contents in order to reduce the "life
space" or "space for action" that the victim has for independent
activities. Once access is obtained, an attacker can:
- Delete data, which can be communication data, documents and
more (essentially, any data stored in the account).
- Gain access to contacts such as friends, family or colleagues.
- Gain access to communications, audio-video content, and any
associated metadata.
- Modify or manipulate any communications, audio-video content,
and any associated metadata.
- Lock out or change the authentication mechanisms that grant
access to the account.
- Impersonate the victim by using the victim's online identity to
send false/forged messages to others or to purchase goods and
services.
- Impersonate the victim by using the victim's online identity to
publicly post information that can be private or fake,
impacting their reputation and sense of security.
- Impersonate the victim by using the victim's online or legal
identity to sign victims up for services.
- Exposing private information or media by distributing intimate
or private data (which could have been adquired via coercive
tactics).
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* Compromise of devices: This attack is similar to the above, but
the attacker demands access to the victim's devices. The goal is
the same as the above but the result is more impactful, as it
restricts access and gives access to accounts that are accessed
through the device. It can also prevent the victim from having
any connection to the Internet. Once an attacker has access to
the device, they can use it to:
- Phisically prevent the use of the abilities given by the device
(the device can be used, for example, to call police services,
which is restricted with this attack).
- Access contacts and data (media or messages) stored in it.
- Access to accounts and authentication mechanisms for other
accounts (saved passwords or authenticator apps -2-factor
authentication-, for example).
- Perform impersonation.
- Perform denial of access to the device, networks or the
Internet in general.
- Destroy the device itself and any information stored in it.
- Impersonate by using the victim's online identity, as accessed
through the device, to publicly post information that can be
private or fake.
* Exposing Private Information or Media: This attack often builds on
other the forms of attack. Once an attacker gains access to an
account or device, they can harvest sensitive data, including
personal and/or private media, messages, and private documents.
This stolen information can then be used to threaten, extort, or
humiliate the victim. For example, intimate images may be used
for blackmail, or private details such as bank account and tax
information may be exploited. The attacker may also engage in
doxxing by publicly sharing private details to damage the victim’s
reputation or relationships.
* Denial of Access: This attack can also be built upon previous
ones, and its objective is to block the victim's access to
essential services. It can include physical measures such as
destroying routers or network devices, changing Wi-Fi passwords,
or modifying network settings. This prevents the victim from
connecting to the Internet or accessing online services. Denial
of access may also target financial abuse, such as restricting the
victim's access to online banking or digital wallets, making it
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difficult or impossible for them to manage their finances. Denial
of access can also extend to digital communication disruptions,
such as flooding the victim’s communication platforms with
unwanted messages or deploying viruses to compromise their
devices. The goal is to isolate the victim, severing their
connection to the outside world, including family, friends, and
support networks.
* Threats: Often intertwined with denial of access, threats involve
sending harassing or abusive messages via email, chat, or social
media. These messages may include insults, intimidation, or
direct threats of harm. The purpose is to instill fear,
destabilize the victim's emotional state, and force compliance,
either by causing distress or pushing the victim toward further
harmful actions. Threats can escalate into more severe attacks,
including denial of access or exposure of private information.
* Harassment: Harassment can be anonymous, but in many cases, the
victim knows the identity of the attacker. However, due to the
anonymity of certain platforms, the victim may struggle to hold
the perpetrator accountable. The systems in place often require
that harassing content be permanently available for investigation,
but this can, in turn, prolong the victim's exposure to the abuse.
Harassment can manifest in various forms and dimensions:
- Ongoing Harassment: This type of harassment is persistent, with
the goal of intimidating, humiliating, and psychologically
tormenting the victim. It often involves repeated messages,
threats, or actions that make the victim feel unsafe or
violated.
- Post-Disconnection Harassment: Once the attacker no longer has
physical control over the victim, they may resort to
cyberstalking or continued harassment online. This form of
abuse allows the attacker to maintain control over the victim
by stalking their digital presence, often through social media,
messaging platforms, or by monitoring their activities in other
ways.
3.4. Means of attacking
The attacks described above can be carried out using various methods.
Below are some of the most common approaches:
* Spyware Installation and Spoofing: This method involves installing
malicious software on the victim's device to gain unauthorized
access to their accounts or to conduct active monitoring. It may
also include spoofing techniques to bypass security measures, such
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as remotely compromising security questions, passwords, or other
authentication methods. These tools are typically installed
without the victim's knowledge, giving the attacker covert access
to their personal information.
* Coercion and Control: This form of attack leverages physical,
emotional, or psychological manipulation to gain access to a
victim's devices, network credentials, or digital information. It
often involves forcing the victim to reveal sensitive details,
such as passwords, PINs, or authentication mechanisms for their
accounts and devices, creating an environment of control and fear.
* Shared Network Plans and Account Ownership: In some cases, an
attacker may be the legal owner of a device (e.g., a parent's
control over a child's device) or have access to shared family
accounts or network plans. For instance, an abuser may control a
joint bank account or device within a shared family plan, allowing
them to carry out attacks without the victim's knowledge and
without needing to install malicious software.
* Monitoring: This method involves the exploitation of social media
and other publicly available information to track the victim's
activities. It may also include the installation of monitoring
tools on the victim's devices or the abuse of "benign"
applications (e.g., location-tracking apps) in a malicious way.
The attacker uses these tools to keep tabs on the victim's
movements and interactions, often in secret.
* Exposure: This method involves the use of social media platforms
to amplify harassment. It includes actions such as posting
harmful content to embarrass, humiliate, or intimidate the victim,
or sharing private information like intimate images without
consent. This form of attack may also involve doxxing, where the
victim's personal details are shared publicly to cause distress or
harm to their relationships and reputation.
4. Specific abused technology
Research into how attackers exploit technology to enhance IPV reveals
that the following technologies are frequently abused:
* Passwords and Authentication Mechanisms: Authentication systems
are often the primary point of failure in IPV attacks. Once an
attacker gains access to a victim's account or device, they can
use that access to compromise additional accounts or devices.
Attackers can use specialized tools, often installed
surreptitiously on the victim's device, to capture authentication
data. They may also coerce victims into revealing passwords or
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bypassing security features. This includes targeting biometrics
(e.g., fingerprints, facial recognition), two-factor
authentication (2FA) systems, and other multi-layered security
methods.
* Media and Private Information: Attackers who gain access to
devices or accounts can harvest private media and sensitive
personal information. This data can then be used to extort the
victim, humiliate them (by sharing it publicly), or escalate
harassment. Private communications, photos, and other intimate
materials are particularly vulnerable to such exploitation, often
used as leverage in controlling or threatening the victim.
* Account Recovery Mechanisms: In addition to direct access to
authentication mechanisms, attackers can manipulate account
recovery processes to gain unauthorized access to accounts. This
includes exploiting weaknesses in 2FA devices, recovery email
systems, or password reset tools. By compromising these systems,
attackers can gain control over multiple online profiles,
furthering their ability to surveil and control the victim.
* Lack of Blocking Mechanisms and Exploitation of Anonymous
Channels: Many platforms and communication tools lack effective
blocking or reporting mechanisms, which attackers exploit to
continue their abuse. Common tactics include:
- Using fake phone numbers or burner accounts to contact the
victim.
- Sending messages via platforms with open channels that do not
require mutual consent (e.g., messaging apps with open chat
features).
- Exploiting "read receipts" or similar features to monitor the
victim's engagement with their messages, thereby gaining
further control.
- Abusing the absence of robust blocking features to maintain
constant contact and harassment.
5. Recommendations
The following recommendations are tailored for protocol and systems
designers to help mitigate technology-enabled IPV, recognizing that
IPV often occurs within the broader context of structural violence
(which can be gender-based violence). While these attacks are
facilitated or exacerbated by technological tools, the
recommendations focus on enabling victims to regain control, prevent
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the abuse of power, and limit attackers' ability to carry out actions
that entrench their control.
* Build proper authentication systems: Authentication mechanisms
should be designed with the following features:
- Account Access Transparency: Maintain a non-deletable and non-
modifiable list of devices with access to accounts and a record
of active sessions.
- Recovery and Revocation: Provide secure ways to recover access
to accounts and change authentication mechanisms. Allow easy
revocation of access, including when an account or device is
compromised.
- Clear Notifications: Send notifications when:
o New devices are used to access an account.
o Attempts to access accounts occur.
o Changes are made to account details.
- Approval Mechanism for Access: Implement a system that allows
users to approve or deny access attempts from new devices or
locations.
* Storage and sharing of media: Media should be handled in a way
that allows the victim to retain control:
- Media Takedown: Ensure that private media posted without
consent can be taken down at the victim's request.
- Dealing with Re-posting: Implement mechanisms to prevent re-
posting of previously reported non-consensual media, either by
blocking its sharing or by flagging it across platforms and
devices.
- Secure Reporting Mechanisms: Provide private, confidential ways
to report non-consensual media, with systems in place to ensure
the victim's privacy is protected.
* Social Media Platforms: Social media can be a powerful tool for
perpetrators, enhancing monitoring and control. Platforms should:
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- Comprehensive Blocking Systems: Provide blocking systems that
go beyond individual accounts, potentially linking accounts and
devices associated with a blocked user to prevent continued
harassment or monitoring.
- Restricted Messaging: Enable users to set privacy controls that
allow only approved contacts to send messages to their
accounts.
* Browser and Search Data: Browsers and search engines should
prioritize privacy and security:
- Automatic Deletion: Browser history, search information, and
related metadata should be deleted by default after each
session or within a specified time frame (triggerred by users,
for example). This protects users from unwanted surveillance.
* End-to-end encryption must be the default for any messaging in
order to prevent network monitoring and ensure that digital
communications remain private.
* Gender Sensitivity in Design:
- Gender-Informed Design: Designers should adopt a gender-
sensitive approach when developing tools and applications.
Recognizing the structural inequalities inherent in IPV helps
build systems that are supportive of the unique needs of
victims.
* Local Attackers and Sensitive Applications
- Security for Local Attackers: When designing sensitive
applications, ensure that they are secure against local
attackers, including those who may have physical access to the
device. Sensitive applications refer to any software or
services that handle private or confidential data, such as
personal accounts, financial tools, and communication
platforms.
* Detection Tools and Analytics
- Building Detection Tools: Develop advanced detection tools with
IPV-specific algorithms and systems. These tools should focus
on identifying patterns of control and abuse, as well as
enhancing logging and analytics for detecting unusual or
suspicious activity. Consider guidance for building such tools
[UNGUI].
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* Engineer plausible deniability for sensitive applications.
* Build detection tools and improve logging and analytics for user
agents and devices with IPV in mind.
* Transparent Reporting: IPV-related issues should not be viewed
solely as privacy concerns. It’s crucial to address areas such as
transparency in reporting mechanisms, identity management, and
proper accountability measures in tech systems to counter the
misuse of power.
It is important to note that IPV should not be mistaken to be a
privacy issue alone. Furthermore any tech-based solutions and
interventions that only address privacy can be used by attackers,
helping them to cloak their attacks from the victim and other means
of detection. Power is imbalanced in IPV and technology entrenches
power.[Citron]
It's essential to acknowledge as well that implementing these
recommendations will not fully eliminate IPV due to the broader power
imbalances in society. However, these measures can play a critical
role in addressing the use of technology to facilitate abuse.
Addressing IPV through technology must be viewed as a step toward
giving victims the tools to regain control, while simultaneously
limiting the means by which abusers can continue their attacks.
6. Resources
* Cornell Tech's Clinic to End Tech Abuse
https://www.ceta.tech.cornell.edu/
* List of domestic violence hotlines around the world
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_domestic_violence_hotlines
* Procedures and tools for clinical computer security
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity19/presentation/
havron
7. Security Considerations
This document is about security considerations.
8. IANA Considerations
This document has no actions for IANA.
9. Informative References
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[APCFramework]
Communication, A. for P., "A framework for developing
gender-reponsive cybersecurity policy", n.d.,
<https://www.apc.org/sites/default/files/gender-
cybersecurity-policy-litreview.pdf>.
[CDOHPFLDMR]
Chatterjee, R., Doerfler, P., Orgad, H., Havron, S.,
Palmer, J., Freed, D., Levy, K., Dell, N., McCoy, D.,
Ristenpart, T., and E. Tseng, "The Spyware Used in
Intimate Partner Violence", n.d.,
<https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8418618>.
[CETAStrategies]
Abuse, C. to E. T., "Resources from the Clinic to End Tech
Abuse", n.d.,
<https://www.ceta.tech.cornell.edu/resources>.
[Citron] Citron, D. K., "The Fight for Privacy: Protecting Dignity,
Identity, and Love in the Digital Age", 2023,
<https://wwnorton.com/books/9780393882315>.
[CSP] Abuse, C. to E. T., "Computer Security and Privacy for
Survivors of Intimate Partner Violence", n.d.,
<https://www.ipvtechresearch.org>.
[Dragiewicz2018]
Dragiewicz, M., Burgess, J., Matamoros-Fernández, A.,
Salter, M., Suzor, N. P., Woodlock, D., and B. Harris,
"Technology facilitated coercive control: domestic
violence and the competing roles of digital media
platforms", 6 September 2022,
<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/
abs/10.1080/14680777.2018.1447341>.
[DULT] WG, I. D., "Detecting Unwanted Location Trackers", n.d.,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/dult/about/>.
[Freed] Freed, D., Palmer, J., Minchala, D., Levy, K., Ristenpart,
T., and N. Dell, "Technologies and Intimate Partner
Violence: A Qualitative Analysis with Multiple
Stakeholders", 2017, <https://doi.org/10.1145/3134681>.
[IPVTechBib]
Maynier, E., "Selected Research Papers on Technology used
in Intimate Partner Violence", n.d.,
<https://ipvtechbib.randhome.io/>.
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[NCAV] Abuse, N. C. A. D. V., "National Statistics Domestic
Violence", 6 September 2022,
<https://ncadv.org/learn-more/statistics>.
[RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6973>.
[RFC7624] Barnes, R., Schneier, B., Jennings, C., Hardie, T.,
Trammell, B., Huitema, C., and D. Borkmann,
"Confidentiality in the Face of Pervasive Surveillance: A
Threat Model and Problem Statement", RFC 7624,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7624, August 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7624>.
[TBMDGMMDR]
Tseng, E., Bellini, R., McDonald, N., Danos, M.,
Greenstadt, R., McCoy, D., Dell, N., and T. Ristenpart,
"The Tools and Tactics Used in Intimate Partner
Surveillance: An Analysis of Online Infidelity Forums",
n.d., <https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.14341>.
[UNGUI] Division, U. N. P. F. G. T., "Guidance on safe and ethical
use of technology to address GBV and HP", n.d.,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/118/materials/
slides-118-hrpc-unfpa-gbv-tech-guidance-00>.
[UPMSG] Unbreakable, "Unbreakable: Designing for Trustworthiness
in Private Messaging", n.d.,
<https://www.designtrustworthymessaging.org/>.
[WHO] Organization, W. H., "Understanding and Addressing
Violence Against Women: Intimate Partner Violence", 2012,
<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/77432/
WHO_RHR_12.36_eng.pdf>.
[Witness] Gregory, S., "Deepfakes, misinformation and disinformation
and authenticity infrastructure responses: Impacts on
frontline witnessing, distant witnessing, and civic
journalism", n.d., <https://journals.sagepub.com/
doi/10.1177/14648849211060644>.
Acknowledgments
Thanks to:
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* Lana Ramjit and Thomas Ristenpart for their insipiring work on
this area, and guidance for this draft.
* Shivan Kaul and Pete Snyder for discussions, guidance and support.
Authors' Addresses
Sofia Celi
Brave
Email: cherenkov@riseup.net
Juliana Guerra
Email: juliana@usuarix.net
Mallory Knodel
CDT
Email: mknodel@cdt.org
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