Security Considerations in the IP-based Internet of Things
draft-irtf-t2trg-iot-seccons-01
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (t2trg RG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Oscar Garcia-Morchon , Sandeep Kumar , Mohit Sethi | ||
| Last updated | 2017-02-24 | ||
| Replaces | draft-garcia-core-security | ||
| Stream | Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) | ||
| Formats | plain text htmlized pdfized bibtex | ||
| IETF conflict review | conflict-review-irtf-t2trg-iot-seccons, conflict-review-irtf-t2trg-iot-seccons, conflict-review-irtf-t2trg-iot-seccons, conflict-review-irtf-t2trg-iot-seccons, conflict-review-irtf-t2trg-iot-seccons, conflict-review-irtf-t2trg-iot-seccons | ||
| Stream | IRTF state | (None) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
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| IESG | IESG state | I-D Exists | |
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draft-irtf-t2trg-iot-seccons-01
Network Working Group O. Garcia-Morchon
Internet-Draft S. Kumar
Intended status: Informational Philips Research
Expires: August 26, 2017 M. Sethi
Ericsson
February 22, 2017
Security Considerations in the IP-based Internet of Things
draft-irtf-t2trg-iot-seccons-01
Abstract
The Internet of Things concept refers to the usage of standard
Internet protocols to allow for human-to-thing or thing-to-thing
communication. Although the security needs are well-recognized, it
is still not fully clear how existing IP-based security protocols
should be applied to this new setting. This Internet-Draft first
provides an overview of security architecture, its deployment model
and general security needs in the context of the lifecycle of a
thing. Then, it presents challenges and requirements for the
successful roll-out of new applications and usage of standard IP-
based security protocols when applied to get a functional Internet of
Things.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 26, 2017.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Conventions and Terminology Used in this Document . . . . . . 3
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Motivation and background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. The Thing Lifecycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Security building blocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Managing Threats and Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. State of the Art . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.1. IP-based IoT Protocols and Standards . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.2. Existing IP-based Security Protocols and Solutions . . . 16
5.3. IoT Security Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.4. Guidelines and IoT Security Regulations . . . . . . . . . 21
6. IoT Security Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
6.1. Profiles Security Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6.2. Security Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
6.3. Security Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6.4. Security Bootstrapping and Management . . . . . . . . . . 29
6.5. Network Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
6.6. Application Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
7. Challenges for a Secure IoT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7.1. Constraints and Heterogeneous Communication . . . . . . . 33
7.1.1. Tight Resource Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7.1.2. Denial-of-Service Resistance . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
7.1.3. Protocol Translation and End-to-End Security . . . . 35
7.1.4. New network architectures and paradigm . . . . . . . 36
7.2. Bootstrapping of a Security Domain . . . . . . . . . . . 37
7.3. Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
7.3.1. End-to-End Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
7.3.2. Group Membership and Security . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
7.3.3. Mobility and IP Network Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . 38
7.4. Software update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
7.5. Verifying device behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
7.6. End-of-life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
7.7. Testing: bug hunting and vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . 41
7.8. Quantum-resistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
7.9. Privacy protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
7.10. Data leakage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
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7.11. Trustworthy IoT Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
8. Conclusions and Next Steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
12. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
1. Conventions and Terminology Used in this Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in "Key words for use in
RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels" [RFC2119].
2. Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT) denotes the interconnection of highly
heterogeneous networked entities and networks following a number of
communication patterns such as: human-to-human (H2H), human-to-thing
(H2T), thing-to-thing (T2T), or thing-to-things (T2Ts). The term IoT
was first coined by the Auto-ID center [AUTO-ID] in 1999. Since
then, the development of the underlying concepts has ever increased
its pace. Nowadays, the IoT presents a strong focus of research with
various initiatives working on the (re)design, application, and usage
of standard Internet technology in the IoT.
The introduction of IPv6 and web services as fundamental building
blocks for IoT applications [RFC6568] promises to bring a number of
basic advantages including: (i) a homogeneous protocol ecosystem that
allows simple integration with Internet hosts; (ii) simplified
development of very different appliances; (iii) an unified interface
for applications, removing the need for application-level proxies.
Such features greatly simplify the deployment of the envisioned
scenarios ranging from building automation to production environments
to personal area networks, in which very different things such as a
temperature sensor, a luminaire, or an RFID tag might interact with
each other, with a human carrying a smart phone, or with backend
services.
This Internet Draft presents an overview of the security aspects of
the envisioned all-IP architecture as well as of the lifecycle of an
IoT device, a "thing", within this architecture. In particular, we
review the most pressing aspects and functionalities that are
required for a secure all-IP solution.
With this, this Internet-Draft pursues several goals. First, we aim
at presenting a comprehensive view of the interactions and
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relationships between an IoT application and security. Second, we
aim at describing challenges for a secure IoT in the specific context
of the lifecycle of a resource-constrained device. The final goal of
this draft is to discuss the security considerations that need to be
taken into consideration towards a secure IoT.
The rest of the Internet-Draft is organized as follows. Section 3
depicts the lifecycle of a thing and gives general definitions for
the main security building blocks within the IoT domain. In
Section 4, we discuss threats and methodologies for managing risks
when designing a secure IoT system. Section 5 reviews existing IP-
based (security) protocols for the IoT and briefly summarizes
existing guidelines and regulations in IoT security. Section 6
proposes a number of illustrative security profiles describing how
different applications would require distinct security solutions.
Section 7 identifies existing challenges for a secure IoT and
discusses potential solutions. Section 7 includes final remarks and
conclusions.
3. Motivation and background
3.1. The Thing Lifecycle
The lifecycle of a thing refers to the operational phases of a thing
in the context of a given application or use case. Figure 1 shows
the generic phases of the lifecycle of a thing. This generic
lifecycle is applicable to very different IoT applications and
scenarios.
We consider an example, a Building Automation and Control (BAC)
system, to illustrate the lifecycle and the meaning of these
different phases. A BAC system consists of a network of
interconnected nodes that performs various functions in the domains
of HVAC (Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning), lighting,
safety etc. The nodes vary in functionality and a majority of them
represent resource constrained devices such as sensors and
luminaries. Some devices may also be battery operated or battery-
less nodes, demanding for a focus on low energy consumption and on
sleeping devices. In our example, the life of a thing starts when it
is manufactured. Due to the different application areas (i.e., HVAC,
lighting, safety) nodes are tailored to a specific task. It is
therefore unlikely that one single manufacturer will create all nodes
in a building. Hence, interoperability as well as trust
bootstrapping between nodes of different vendors is important. The
thing is later installed and commissioned within a network by an
installer during the bootstrapping phase. Specifically, the device
identity and the secret keys used during normal operation are
provided to the device during this phase. Different subcontractors
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may install different IoT devices for different purposes.
Furthermore, the installation and bootstrapping procedures may not be
a defined event but may stretch over an extended period of time.
After being bootstrapped, the device and the system of things are in
operational mode and execute the functions of the BAC system. During
this operational phase, the device is under the control of the system
owner. For devices with lifetimes spanning several years, occasional
maintenance cycles may be required. During each maintenance phase,
the software on the device can be upgraded or applications running on
the device can be reconfigured. The maintenance tasks can thereby be
performed either locally or from a backend system by means of an end-
to-end connection. Depending on the operational changes of the
device, it may be required to re-bootstrap at the end of a
maintenance cycle. The device continues to loop through the
operational phase and the eventual maintenance phase until the device
is decommissioned at the end of its lifecycle. However, the end-of-
life of a device does not necessarily mean that it is defective but
rather denotes a need to replace and upgrade the network to next-
generation devices in order to provide additional functionality.
Therefore the device can be removed and re-commissioned to be used in
a different system under a different owner by starting the lifecycle
all over again.
_Manufactured _SW update _Decommissioned
/ / /
| _Installed | _ Application | _Removed &
| / | / reconfigured | / replaced
| | _Commissioned | | | |
| | / | | | | _Reownership &
| | | _Application | | _Application | | / recommissioned
| | | / running | | / running | | |
| | | | | | | | | | \\
+##+##+###+#############+##+##+#############+##+##+##############>>>
\/ \______________/ \/ \_____________/ \___/ time //
/ / \ \ \
Bootstrapping / Maintenance & \ Maintenance &
/ re-bootstrapping \ re-bootstrapping
Operational Operational
Figure 1: The lifecycle of a thing in the Internet of Things.
3.2. Security building blocks
Security is a key requirement in the IoT due to several reasons.
First, an IoT systems enable very specific applications in which
users are involved. A broken IoT system means that the privacy and
safety of the users is endangered, this is key requirement in
application areas such as critical infrastructure or health care.
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Second, a compromised IoT system means that an attacker altered the
functionality of the devices of a given manufacturer, this not only
affects the manufacturer's brand image in a negative way but can also
leak information that is very valuable for the manufacturer, such as
proprietary algorithms. Third, the impact of attacking the IoT goes
beyond a specific device or isolated systems since compromised IoT
systems can be misused at scale, e.g., performing a Distribute Denial
of Service (DDoS) attack that limits the availability of the
compromised system or even other IT networks. The fact that many IoT
systems rely on standard IP protocols allows for easier system
integration increasing the value of the realized use cases, but this
also makes standard attacks applicable to a wide number of devices
deployed in multiple systems. This results in new requirements
regarding the implementation of security.
The term security subsumes a wide range of primitives, protocols, and
procedures. In the first place, it includes the basic provision of
security services including confidentiality, authentication,
integrity, authorization, non-repudiation, and availability, and some
augmented services, such as duplicate detection and detection of
stale packets (timeliness). These security services can be
implemented by a combination of cryptographic mechanisms, such as
block ciphers, hash functions, or signature algorithms, and non-
cryptographic mechanisms, which implement authorization and other
security policy enforcement aspects. For each of the cryptographic
mechanisms, a secure key management infrastructure is fundamental to
handling the required cryptographic keys, whereas for security policy
enforcement, one needs to properly codify authorizations as a
function of device roles and a security policy engine that implements
these authorization checks and that can implement changes hereto
throughout the system's lifecycle.
In the particular context of the IoT, security must not only focus on
the required security services, but also pay special attention to how
these are realized in the overall system and how the security
functionalities are executed. To this end, we consider five major
"building blocks" to analyze and classify security aspects in the
IoT:
1. The IoT security architecture: refers to the system elements
involved in the management of the security relationships between
things and the way these security interactions are handled (e.g.,
centralized or distributed) during the lifecycle of a thing. For
instance, a smart home could rely on a centralized key
distribution center in charge of managing cryptographic keys,
devices & users, access control and privacy policies.
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2. The security model within a smart object: describes the way
security parameters, key, processes, and applications are managed
within a smart object. This includes aspects such as application
process separation, secure storage of key materials, protection
of algorithms, etc. For instance, some smart objects might have
extremely limited resources and have limited capabilities to
protect secret keys; in contrast, other devices used in critical
applications, e.g., a pacemaker, would rely on methods to
securely protect cryptographic keys and functionality making sure
that an attacker having physical access to the device cannot
modify its operation.
3. Security bootstrapping: denotes the process by which a thing
securely joins an IoT system at a given location and point in
time. For instance, bootstrapping of a connected camera can
include the authentication and authorization of a device as well
as the transfer of security parameters allowing for its trusted
operation in a given network.
4. Network security: describes the mechanisms applied within a
network to ensure trusted operation of the IoT. Specifically, it
prevents attackers from endangering or modifying the expected
operation of networked things. For instance, network security
can include a number of mechanisms ranging from data link layer
security, MAC filtering, secure routing, and network layer
security.
5. Application security: describes mechanisms to allow transfer of
application data at the transport or upper layers (object
security). For instance, assuming an smart object such as an
environmental sensor connected to a backend system, it can mean
the exchange of secure blocks of data such as measurements by the
sensor or a software update. This data is exchanged end-to-end
independently of communication pattern, for e.g through proxies
or other store-and-forward mechanisms.
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..........................
: +-----------+:
: *+*>|Application|*****
: *| +-----------+: *
: *| +-----------+: *
: *|->| Transport |: *
: * _*| +-----------+: *
: *| | +-----------+: *
: *| |->| Network |: *
: *| | +-----------+: *
: *| | +-----------+: * *** Bootstrapping
: *| +->| L2 |: * ~~~ Transport Security
: *| +-----------+: * ''' Object Security
:+--------+ : *
:|Security| Configuration: *
:|Service | Entity : *
:+--------+ : *
:........................: *
*
......................... * .........................
:+--------+ : * : +--------+:
:|Security| Node B : * : Node A |Security|:
:|Service | : * : |Service |:
:+--------+ : * : +--------+:
: | +-----------+: * :+-----------+ |* :
: | +->|Application|: ****|Application|<*+* |* :
: | | +-----------+:''''''''''''''''''''+-----------+ |* |* :
: | | +-----------+: :+-----------+ |* |* :
: | |->| Transport |~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~| Transport |<-|* |* :
: |__| +-----------+: ................. :+-----------+ |*_|* :
: | +-----------+: : +-----------+ : :+-----------+ | * :
: |->| Network |: : | Network | : :| Network |<-| :
: | +-----------+: : +-----------+ : :+-----------+ | :
: | +-----------+: : +-----------+ : :+-----------+ | :
: +->| L2 |: : | L2 | : :| L2 |<-+ :
: +-----------+: : +-----------+ : :+-----------+ :
:.......................: :...............: :.......................:
Overview of Security Mechanisms.
Figure 2
We now discuss an exemplary security architecture relying on a
configuration entity for the management of the system with regard to
the introduced security aspects (see Figure 2). Inspired by the
security framework for routing over low power and lossy network
[ID-Tsao], we show an example of the security model of a smart object
and illustrates how different security concepts and the lifecycle
phases map to the Internet communication stack.
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In our example, we consider a centralized architecture in which a
configuration entity stores and manages the identities of the things
associated with BAC system along with their cryptographic keys.
During the bootstrapping phase, each thing executes the bootstrapping
protocol with the configuration entity, thus obtaining the required
device identities and some operational keying material. The security
service on a thing in turn stores the received keying material for
the network layer and application security mechanisms for secure
communication. The criticality of the application requires an
implementation of cryptographic algorithms that is resistant to side-
channel attacks and the protection of the proprietary application-
related algorithms executed in the device. Things can then securely
communicate with each other during their operational phase by means
of the employed network and application security mechanisms. Within
the network, communication is protected by the network provider at
MAC and network layer. At application layer, the communication
between any smart object and the application server is protected end-
to-end, ensuring the forward secrecy of the communication.
4. Managing Threats and Risks
This section explores security threats and vulnerabilities in the IoT
and discusses how to manage risks.
Security threats have been analyzed in related IP protocols including
HTTPS [RFC2818], COAP[RFC7252] 6LoWPAN [RFC4919], ANCP [RFC5713], DNS
security threats [RFC3833], SIP [RFC3261], IPv6 ND [RFC3756], and
PANA [RFC4016]. Nonetheless, the challenge is about their impacts on
scenarios of the IoTs. In this section, we specifically discuss the
threats that could compromise an individual thing, or network as a
whole. Note that these set of threats might go beyond the scope of
Internet protocols but we gather them here for the sake of
completeness. We also note that these threats can be classified
according to either (i) the thing's lifecycle phases (when does the
threat occur?) or (ii) the security building blocks (which
functionality is affected by the threat?). All these threats are
summarized in Table 2.
1. Cloning of things: During the manufacturing process of a thing,
an untrusted factory can easily clone the physical
characteristics, firmware/software, or security configuration of
the thing. Deployed things might also be compromised and their
software reserve engineered allowing for cloning or software
modifications. Such a cloned thing may be sold at a cheaper
price in the market, and yet be able to function normally, as a
genuine thing. For example, two cloned devices can still be
associated and work with each other. In the worst case scenario,
a cloned device can be used to control a genuine device or
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perform an attack. One should note here, that an untrusted
factory may also change functionality of the cloned thing,
resulting in degraded functionality with respect to the genuine
thing (thereby, inflicting potential damage to the reputation of
the original thing manufacturer). Moreover, additional
functionality can be implemented within the cloned thing, such as
a backdoor.
2. Malicious substitution of things: During the installation of a
thing, a genuine thing may be substituted with a similar variant
of lower quality without being detected. The main motivation may
be cost savings, where the installation of lower-quality things
(e.g., non-certified products) may significantly reduce the
installation and operational costs. The installers can
subsequently resell the genuine things in order to gain further
financial benefits. Another motivation may be to inflict damage
to the reputation of a competitor's offerings.
3. Eavesdropping attack: During the commissioning of a thing into a
network, it may be susceptible to eavesdropping, especially if
operational keying materials, security parameters, or
configuration settings, are exchanged in clear using a wireless
medium or if used cryptographic algorithms are not suitable for
the envisioned lifetime of the device and the system. After
obtaining the keying material, the attacker might be able to
recover the secret keys established between the communicating
entities (e.g., H2T, T2Ts, or Thing to the backend management
system), thereby compromising the authenticity and
confidentiality of the communication channel, as well as the
authenticity of commands and other traffic exchanged over this
communication channel. When the network is in operation, T2T
communication may be eavesdropped upon if the communication
channel is not sufficiently protected or in the event of session
key compromise due to a long period of usage without key renewal
or updates.
4. Man-in-the-middle attack: Both the commissioning phase and
operational phases may also be vulnerable to man-in-the-middle
attacks, e.g., when keying material between communicating
entities are exchanged in the clear and the security of the key
establishment protocol depends on the tacit assumption that no
third party is able to eavesdrop during the execution of this
protocol. Additionally, device authentication or device
authorization may be non-trivial, or may need support of a human
decision process, since things usually do not have a-priori
knowledge about each other and cannot always be able to
differentiate friends and foes via completely automated
mechanisms. Thus, even if the key establishment protocol
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provides cryptographic device authentication, this knowledge on
device identities may still need complementing with a human-
assisted authorization step (thereby, presenting a weak link and
offering the potential of man-in-the-middle attacks this way).
5. Firmware Replacement attack: When a thing is in operation or
maintenance phase, its firmware or software may be updated to
allow for new functionality or new features. An attacker may be
able to exploit such a firmware upgrade by replacing the thing's
software with malicious software, thereby influencing the
operational behavior of the thing. For example, an attacker
could add a piece of malicious code to the firmware that will
cause it to periodically report the energy usage of the lamp to a
data repository for analysis. Similarly, devices whose software
has not been properly maintained and updated might contain
vulnerabilities that might be exploited by attackers.
6. Extraction of private information: in the ambient environment the
things (such as sensors, actuators, etc.) are usually physically
unprotected and could easily be captured by an attacker. Such an
attacker may then attempt to extract private information such as
keys (e.g., device's key, private-key, group key), sensed data
(e.g., healthcare status of a user), configuration parameters
(e.g., the WiFi key), or proprietary algorithms (e.g., algorithm
performing some data analytic task) from this thing. Compromise
of a thing's unique key compromises communication channels of
this particular thing and also compromise all data communicated
over this channel.
7. Routing attack: As highlighted in [ID-Daniel], routing
information in IoT can be spoofed, altered, or replayed, in order
to create routing loops, attract/repel network traffic, extend/
shorten source routes, etc. Other relevant routing attacks
include 1) Sinkhole attack (or blackhole attack), where an
attacker declares himself to have a high-quality route/path to
the base station, thus allowing him to do manipulate all packets
passing through it. 2) Selective forwarding, where an attacker
may selectively forward packets or simply drop a packet. 3)
Wormhole attack, where an attacker may record packets at one
location in the network and tunnel them to another location,
thereby influencing perceived network behavior and potentially
distorting statistics, thus greatly impacting the functionality
of routing. 4) Sybil attack, whereby an attacker presents
multiple identities to other things in the network.
8. Privacy threat: The tracking of a thing's location and usage may
pose a privacy risk to its users. An attacker can infer
information based on the information gathered about individual
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things, thus deducing behavioral patterns of the user of interest
to him. Such information can subsequently be sold to interested
parties for marketing purposes and targeted advertising.
9. Denial-of-Service attack: Typically, things have tight memory and
limited computation, they are thus vulnerable to resource
exhaustion attack. Attackers can continuously send requests to
be processed by specific things so as to deplete their resources.
This is especially dangerous in the IoTs since an attacker might
be located in the backend and target resource-constrained devices
in an Low-Latency Network (LLN). Additionally, DoS attack can be
launched by physically jamming the communication channel, thus
breaking down the T2T communication channel. Network
availability can also be disrupted by flooding the network with a
large number of packets. On the other hand, things compromised
by attackers can be used to disrupt the operation of other
networks or systems by means of a Distributed DoS attack.
The following table summarizes the above generic security threats and
the potential point of vulnerabilities at different layers of the
communication stack. We also include related RFCs and ongoing
standardization efforts that include a threat model that might apply
to the IoTs.
+------------------+------------------+------------------+
| Manufacturing | Installation/ | Operation |
| | Commissioning | |
+------------+------------------+------------------+------------------+
|Thing's | Device Cloning |Substitution |Privacy threat |
|Model | |ACE-OAuth(draft) |Extraction of |
| | | |private inform. |
+------------+------------------+------------------+------------------+
|Application | |RFC2818, RFC7252 |RFC2818, Firmware |
|Layer | |OSCOAP(draft) |replacement |
+------------+------------------+------------------+------------------+
|Transport | | Eavesdropping & |Eavesdropping |
|Layer | | Man-in-the-middle|Man-in-the-middle |
+------------+------------------| attack, RFC7925 |------------------+
|Network | | RFC4919, RFC5713 |RFC4919,DoS attack|
|Layer | | RFC3833, RFC3756 |Routing attack |
| | | |RFC3833 |
+------------+------------------+------------------+------------------+
|Physical | | |DoS attack |
|Layer | | | |
+-------------------------------+------------------+------------------+
Figure 3: Classification of threats according to the lifecycle phases
and security building blocks.
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Dealing with above threats and finding suitable security mitigations
is challenging: there are very sophisticated threats that a very
powerful attacker could use; also, new threats and exploits appear in
a daily basis. Therefore, the existence of proper secure product
creation processes that allow managing and minimizing risks during
the lifecycle of the IoT devices is at least as important as being
aware of the threats. A non-exhaustive list of relevant processes
include:
1. A Business Impact Analysis (BIA) assesses the consequences of
loss of basic security attributes, namely, confidentiality,
integrity and availability in an IoT system. These consequences
might include impact on data lost, sales lost, increased
expenses, regulatory fines, customer dissatisfaction, etc.
Performing a business impact analysis allow determining the
business relevance of having a proper security design placing
security in the focus.
2. A Risk Assessment (RA) analyzes security threats to the IoT
system, considering their likelihood and impact, and deriving for
each of them a risk level. Risks classified as moderate or high
must be mitigated, i.e., security architecture should be able to
deal with that threat bringing the risk to a low level. Note
that threats are usually classified according to their goal:
confidentiality, integrity, and availability. For instance, a
specific threat to recover a symmetric-key used in the system
relates to confidentiality.
3. A privacy impact assessment (PIA) aims at assessing Personal
Identifiable Information (PII) that is collected, processed, or
used in the IoT system. By doing so, the goals is to fulfill
applicable legal requirements, determine risks and effects of the
manipulation of PII, and evaluate proposed protections.
4. Procedures for incident reporting and mitigation refer to the
methodologies that allow becoming aware of any security issues
that affect an IoT system. Furthermore, this includes steps
towards the actual deployment of patches that mitigate the
identified vulnerabilities.
BIA, RA, and PIA are usually to be realized during the creation of a
new IoT system, introduction of new technologies in the IoT system,
or deployment of significant system upgrades. In general, it is
recommended to re-assess them on a regular basis taking into account
new use cases or threats.
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5. State of the Art
This section is organized as follows. Section Section 5.1 summarizes
state of the art on IP-based systems, within IETF and in other
standardization bodies. Section Section 5.2 summarizes state of the
art on IP-based security protocols and their usage.
Section Section 5.3 discusses guidelines for securing the IoT as
proposed by other bodies. Section Section 5.4 analyzes status of
other relevant standards, in particular, those by NIST regarding IoT
and IoT security.
5.1. IP-based IoT Protocols and Standards
Nowadays, there exists a multitude of control protocols for the IoT.
For BAC systems, the ZigBee standard [ZB], BACNet [BACNET], or DALI
[DALI] play key roles. Recent trends, however, focus on an all-IP
approach for system control.
In this setting, a number of IETF working groups are designing new
protocols for resource constrained networks of smart things. The
6LoWPAN working group [WG-6LoWPAN] concentrates on the definition of
methods and protocols for the efficient transmission and adaptation
of IPv6 packets over IEEE 802.15.4 networks [RFC4944].
The CoRE working group [WG-CoRE] provides a framework for resource-
oriented applications intended to run on constrained IP network
(6LoWPAN). One of its main tasks is the definition of a lightweight
version of the HTTP protocol, the Constrained Application Protocol
(CoAP) [RFC7252], that runs over UDP and enables efficient
application-level communication for things.
In many smart object networks, the smart objects are dispersed and
have intermittent reachability either because of network outages or
because they sleep during their operational phase to save energy. In
such scenarios, direct discovery of resources hosted on the
constrained server might not be possible. To overcome this barrier,
the CoRE working group is specifying the concept of a Resource
Directory (RD) [ID-rd]. The Resource Directory hosts descriptions of
resources which are located on other nodes. These resource
descriptions are specified as CoRE link format [RFC6690] URIs.
While CoAP defines a standard communication protocol, a format for
representing sensor measurements and parameters over CoAP is
required. The Sensor Measurement Lists (SenML) [ID-senml] is a
specification that is currently being written to define media types
for simple sensor measurements and parameters. It has a minimalistic
design so that constrained devices with limited computational
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capabilities can easily encode their measurements and, at the same
time, servers can efficiently collect large number of measurements.
In many IoT deployments, the resource-constrained smart objects are
connected to the Internet via a gateway that is directly reachable.
For example, an IEEE 802.11 Access Point (AP) typically connects the
client devices to the Internet over just one wireless hop. However,
some deployments of smart object networks require routing between the
smart objects themselves. The IETF has therefore defined the IPv6
Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL) [RFC6550].
RPL provides support for multipoint-to-point traffic from resource-
constrained smart objects towards a more resourceful central control
point, as well as point-to-multipoint traffic in the reverse
direction. It also supports point-to-point traffic between the
resource-constrained devices. A set of routing metrics and
constraints for path calculation in RPL are also specified [RFC6551].
In addition to defining a routing protocol, the IETF has also
specified how IPv6 packets can be transmitted over various link layer
protocols that are commonly employed for resource-constrained smart
object networks. There is also ongoing work to specify IPv6
connectivity for a Non-Broadcast Multi-Access (NBMA) mesh network
that is formed by IEEE 802.15.4 TimeSlotted Channel Hopping (TSCH}
links [ID-6tisch]. Other link layer protocols for which IETF has
specified or is currently specifying IPv6 support include Bluetooth
[RFC7668], Digital Enhanced Cordless Telecommunications (DECT) Ultra
Low Energy (ULE) air interface [ID-6lodect], and Near Field
Communication (NFC) [ID-6lonfc].
JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) is a lightweight text
representation format for structured data [RFC7158]. It is often
used for transmitting serialized structured data over the network.
IETF has defined specifications for encoding public keys, signed
content, and claims to be transferred between two parties as JSON
objects. They are referred to as JSON Web Keys (JWK) [RFC7517], JSON
Web Signatures (JWS) [RFC7515] and JSON Web Token (JWT) [RFC7519].
An alternative to JSON, Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)
[RFC7049] is a concise binary data format that is used for
serialization of structured data. It is designed for extremely
resource-constrained nodes and therefore it aims to provide a fairly
small message size with minimal implementation code, and
extensibility without the need for version negotiation. There is
ongoing work to specify CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)
[ID-cose], which would provide services similar to JWS and JWT.
The Light-Weight Implementation Guidance (LWIG) working group
[WG-LWIG] is collecting experiences from implementers of IP stacks in
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constrained devices. The working group has already produced
documents such as RFC7815 [RFC7815] which defines how a minimal
Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) initiator can be implemented.
The Thing-2-Thing Research Group (T2TRG) [RG-T2TRG] is investigating
the remaining research issues that need to be addressed in order to
quickly turn the vision of IoT into a reality where resource-
constrained nodes can communicate with each other and with other more
capable nodes on the Internet.
Additionally industry alliances and other standardization bodies are
creating constrained IP protocol stacks based on the IETF work. Some
important examples of this include:
1. Thread [Thread]: Specifies the Thread protocol that is intended
for a variety of IoT devices. It is an IPv6-based network
protocol that runs over IEEE 802.15.4.
2. Industrial Internet Consortium [IIoT]: The consortium defines
reference architectures and security frameworks for development,
adoption and widespread use of Industrial Internet technologies
based on existing IETF standards.
3. Internet Protocol for Smart Objects IPSO [IPSO]: The alliance
specifies a common object model that would enable application
software any device to interoperate with other conforming
devices.
4. OneM2M [OneM2M]: The standards body defines technical and API
specifications for IoT devices. It aims to create a service
layer that can run on any IoT device hardware and software.
5. Open Connectivity Foundation (OCF) [OCF]: The foundation develops
standards and certifications primarily for IoT devices that use
Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) as the application layer
protocol.
6. Fairhair Alliance[Fairhair]: Specifies a middle-ware for IoT
based Building Automation and Lighting System that can
interoperate with different application standards for the
professional domain.
5.2. Existing IP-based Security Protocols and Solutions
In the context of the IP-based IoT solutions, consideration of TCP/IP
security protocols is important. There are a wide range of
specialized as well as general-purpose key exchange and security
solutions for the Internet domain such as IKEv2/IPsec [RFC7296], TLS
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[RFC5246], DTLS [RFC6347], HIP [RFC7401], PANA [RFC5191], and EAP
[RFC3748].
There is ongoing work to define an authorization and access-control
framework for resource-constrained nodes. The Authentication and
Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) [WG-ACE] working
group is defining a solution to allow only authorized access to
resources that are hosted on a smart object server and are identified
by a URI. The current proposal [ID-aceoauth] is based on the OAuth
2.0 framework [RFC6749].
The CoAP base specification [RFC7252] provides a description of how
DTLS can be used for securing CoAP. It proposes three different
modes for using DTLS: the PreSharedKey mode, where nodes have pre-
provisioned keys for initiating a DTLS session with another node,
RawPublicKey mode, where nodes have asymmetric-key pairs but no
certificates to verify the ownership, and Certificate mode, where
public keys are certified by a certification authority. An IoT
implementation profile [RFC7925] is defined for TLS version 1.2 and
DTLS version 1.2 that offers communications security for resource-
constrained nodes.
There is also work on Object Security based CoAP protection mechanism
being defined in OSCOAP [ID-OSCOAP].
Migault et al.{ID-dietesp} are working on a compressed version of
IPsec so that it can easily be used by resource-constrained IoT
devices. They rely on the Internet Key Exchange Protocol version 2
(IKEv2) for negotiating the compression format.
Figure 3 depicts the relationships between the discussed protocols in
the context of the security terminology introduced in Section 3.
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..........................
: +-----------+:
: *+*>|Application|***** *** Bootstrapping
: *| +-----------+: * ### Transport Security
: *| +-----------+: * === Network security
: *|->| Transport |: * ... Object security
: * _*| +-----------+: *
: *| | +-----------+: *
: *| |->| Network |: *--> -PANA/EAP
: *| | +-----------+: * -HIP
: *| | +-----------+: *
: *| +->| L2 |: * ## DTLS
: *| +-----------+: * .. OSCOAP
:+--------+ : *
:|Security| Configuration: * [] HIP,IKEv2
:|Service | Entity : * [] ESP/AH
:+--------+ : *
:........................: *
*
......................... * .........................
:+--------+ : * : +--------+:
:|Security| Node B : Secure * : Node A |Security|:
:|Service | : routing * : |Service |:
:+--------+ : framework * : +--------+:
: | +-----------+: | **** :+-----------+ |* :
: | +->|Application|:........|............:|Application|<*+* |* :
: | | +----##-----+: | :+----##-----+ |* |* :
: | | +----##-----+: | :+----##-----+ |* |* :
: | |->| Transport |#########|#############| Transport |<-|* |* :
: |__| +----[]-----+: ......|.......... :+----[]-----+ |*_|* :
: | +====[]=====+=====+===========+=====+====[]=====+ | * :
: |->|| Network |: : | Network | : :| Network ||<-| :
: | +|----------+: : +-----------+ : :+----------|+ | :
: | +|----------+: : +-----------+ : :+----------|+ | :
: +->|| L2 |: : | L2 | : :| L2 ||<-+ :
: +===========+=====+===========+=====+===========+ :
:.......................: :...............: :.......................:
Relationships between IP-based security protocols.
Figure 4
The Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2)/IPsec and the Host Identity
protocol (HIP) reside at or above the network layer in the OSI model.
Both protocols are able to perform an authenticated key exchange and
set up the IPsec transforms for secure payload delivery. Currently,
there are also ongoing efforts to create a HIP variant coined Diet
HIP [ID-HIP] that takes lossy low-power networks into account at the
authentication and key exchange level.
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Transport Layer Security (TLS) and its datagram-oriented variant DTLS
secure transport-layer connections. TLS provides security for TCP
and requires a reliable transport, while DTLS secures and uses
datagram-oriented protocols such as UDP. Both protocols are
intentionally kept similar and share the same ideology and cipher
suites.
The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) is an authentication
framework supporting multiple authentication methods. EAP runs
directly over the data link layer and, thus, does not require the
deployment of IP. It supports duplicate detection and
retransmission, but does not allow for packet fragmentation. The
Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA) is a
network-layer transport for EAP that enables network access
authentication between clients and the network infrastructure. In
EAP terms, PANA is a UDP-based EAP lower layer that runs between the
EAP peer and the EAP authenticator.
In addition, there is also new activities in IETF and W3C to define
security protocols better tailored to IoT or for specific deployment
situations.
5.3. IoT Security Guidelines
Recent large scale Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks on the Internet
Infrastructure from compromised IoT devices has prompted many
different standards bodies and consortia to provide guidelines for
developers and the Internet community at large to build secure IoT
devices and services. A subset of the different guidelines and
ongoing projects are as follows:
1. GSMA IoT security guidelines [GSMAsecurity]: GSMA has published
a set of security guidelines for the benefit of new IoT product
and service providers. The guideline are aimed at device
manufacturers, service providers, developers and network
operators. An enterprise can complete an IoT Security Self-
Assessment to demonstrate that its products and services are
aligned with the security guidelines of the GSMA.
2. BITAG Internet of Things (IoT) Security and Privacy
Recommendations [BITAG]: Broadband Internet Technical Advisory
Group (BITAG) has also published recommendations for ensuring
security and privacy of IoT device users. BITAG observes that
many IoT devices are shipped from the factory with software that
is already outdated and vulnerable. The report also states that
many devices with vulnerabilities will not be fixed either
because the manufacturer does not provide updates or because the
user does not apply them. The recommendations include that IoT
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devices should function without cloud and Internet connectivity,
and that all IoT devices should have methods for automatic
secure software updates.
3. CSA New Security Guidance for Early Adopters of the IoT [CSA]:
The Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) recommendations for early
adopters of IoT encourages enterprises to implement security at
different layers of the protocol stack. It also recommends
implementation of an authentication/authorization framework for
IoT deployments. A complete list of recommendations is
available in the report [CSA].
4. U.S. Department of Homeland Security [DHS]: DHS has put forth
six strategic principles that would enable IoT developers,
manufacturers, service providers and consumers to maintain
security as they develop, manufacture, implement or use network-
connected IoT devices.
5. NIST [NIST-Guide]: The NIST special publication urges enterprise
and US federal agencies to address security throughout the
systems engineering process. The publication builds upon the
ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288 standard and augments each process in the
system lifecyle with security enhancements.
6. NIST [nist_lightweight_project]: NIST is running a project on
lightweight cryptography with the purpose of: (i) identifying
application areas for which standard cryptographic algorithms
are too heavy, classifying them according to some application
profiles to be determined; (ii) determining limitations in those
existing cryptographic standards; and (iii) standardizing
lightweight algorithms that can be used in specific application
profiles.
7. OWASP [OWASP]: Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP)
provides security guidance for IoT manufactures, developers and
consumers. OWASP also includes guidelines for those who intend
to test and analyze IoT devices and applications.
8. IoT Security foundation [IoTSecFoundation]: IoT security
foundation has published a document that enlists various
considerations that need to be taken into account when
developing IoT applications. For example, the document states
that IoT device could use hardware-root of trust to ensure that
only authorized software runs on the device.
9. NHTSA [NHTSA]: The US National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration provides a set of non-binding guidance to the
automotive industry for improving the cyber security of
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vehicles. While some of the guidelines are general, the
document provides specific recommendations for the automotive
industry such as how various automotive manufacturer can share
cyber security vulnerabilities discovered.
10. BCP for IoT devices [ID-Moore]: This Internet draft provides a
list of minimum requirements that vendors of Internet of Things
(IoT) devices should to take into account while developing
applications, services and firmware updates in order to reduce
the frequency and severity of security incidents that arise from
compromised IoT devices.
11. ENISA [ENISA_ICS]: The European Union Agency for Network and
Information Security published a document on communication
network dependencies for ICS/SCADA systems in which security
vulnerabilities, guidelines and general recommendations are
summarized.
Other guideline and recommendation documents may exist or may later
be published. This list should be considered non-exhaustive.
5.4. Guidelines and IoT Security Regulations
Despise the need for security in the Internet is nothing new and
multiple guidelines exist, the fact is that many IoT devices and
systems are not fully secure. There are multiple reasons for this.
For instance, some manufactures focus on delivering a product without
paying enough attention to the delivered security level, lack of
expertise or budget. This, however, poses a severe threat when such
devices are deployed. The vast amount of devices and their inherent
mobile nature also implies that an initially secure system can become
insecure if a compromised device gains access to the system at some
point of time. Even if all devices in a given environment are
secure, it does not prevent external (passive) attacks originating
due to insecure devices.
Recently [FCC] the FCC has stated the need for higher regulation for
IoT systems. In fact this might be a missing component, at least in
Federal Information Systems (FIS). Today, security in US FIS is
regulated according to Federal Information Security Management Act
(FISMA). From this law, NIST derived a number of documents to
establish how to categorize FIS and determine minimum security
requirements (FIPS-PUB-199 and FIPS-PUB-200). Minimum security
requirements for FIS are specified in NIST SP 800-53r4. However, it
is very likely that existing regulations do not take into account the
specific challenges of IoT devices and networks.
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Even if such a regulation is put in place, the question is how such a
regulation can be applied in practice to non-federal deployments,
such as industrial, homes, offices, or smart cites. Each of them
exhibits unique features, involves very diverse types of users, has
different operational requirements, and combines IoT devices from
multiple manufacturers. Therefore future regulations should consider
such diverse deployment scenarios.
6. IoT Security Profiles
There is a wide range of IoT applications including building
automation systems, healthcare, smart cities, logistics, etc. For
each of these applications, properties such as device capability,
network infrastructure, or available security services can be
completely different. Furthermore, each of those applications is
featured by a different number of actors deployed in very different
environments and with very different purposes.
Consequently, when a Business Impact Analysis or Risk Assessment is
performed, not only the types of threats will be different, but also
their likelihood and potential impact. This determines that
different applications tend to require different or complementary
types of security mechanisms mitigating the identified risks.
For example, IoT applications may have different needs regarding
authentication and confidentiality. While some application might not
require any confidentiality at all, others might require strong end-
to-end confidentiality. In terms of secure bootstrapping of keys,
some applications might assume the existence and online availability
of a central key-distribution-center (KDC) within the network to
distribute and manage keys; while other applications cannot rely on
such a central party or on their availability.
This section describes some exemplary security profiles fitting the
security needs of applications with the same characteristics and
requirements. This approach is similar to that in the security
profiles in [nist_lightweight_project]. Such security profiles can
help to (i) guide the design process of different application types
by identifying open gaps; (ii) allow for later interoperability; and
(iii) prevent possible security misconfiguration. Each security
profile is identified by:
1. a short description,
2. an exemplary application that might use/require such a security
profile,
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3. the security requirements for each of the above security aspects
according to our classification in Section 3.2.
These security profiles can serve to guide the standardization
process, since these explicitly describe the basic functionalities
and protocols required to get different use cases up and running.
They can allow for later interoperability since different
manufacturers can describe the implemented security profile in their
products. Finally, the security profiles can avoid possible security
misconfiguration, since each security profile can be bound to a
different application domain so that security protocols are clearly
defined and under which circumstances they are applied.
We compare the security capabilities in each of the security profiles
according to security building blocks introduced Section 3.2, namely:
1. Security architecture,
2. Security model,
3. Security bootstrapping,
4. Network security, and
5. Application security.
IMPORTANT: Note that each of these exemplary profiles aims at
summarizing the required security requirements for different
exemplary application areas and at providing a set of initial
security features. In other words, these profiles reflect the need
for different security configurations, depending on the threat and
trust models of the underlying applications. In this sense, this
section does not provide an overview of existing protocols as done in
previous sections, but it rather explicitly describes what should be
in place to ensure secure system operation. Observe also that this
list of security profiles is not exhaustive and that it should be
considered just as an example not related to existing legal
regulations for any existing application.
The remainder of this section is organized as follows.
Section Section 6.1 first describes four generic security profiles
and discuss how different applications of IP networks, e.g., 6LoWPAN/
CoAP networks, involve different security needs. The following five
subsections summarize the expected security features or capabilities
for each the security profile with regards to "Security
Architecture", "Security Model", "Security Bootstrapping", "Network
Security", and "Application Security".
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6.1. Profiles Security Profiles
We consider four generic security profiles as summarized in the table
below:
+---------------------------------------------------------+
| Exemplary | |
| Application | Description |
+----------+---------------------------------------------------------+
|SecProf_1 |Home usage |Enables operation between home things |
| | |without interaction with central device|
+----------+-----------------+---------------------------------------+
|SecProf_2 |Managed Home |Enables operation between home things. |
| | usage |Interaction with a central and local |
| | |device is possible |
+----------+-----------------+---------------------------------------+
|SecProf_3 |Industrial usage |Enables operation between things. |
| | |Relies on central (local or backend) |
| | |device for security |
+----------+-----------------+---------------------------------------+
|SecProf_4 |Advanced |Enables ad-hoc operation between things|
| |Industrial usage |and relies on central device or |
| | |on a collection of control devices |
+----------+-----------------+---------------------------------------+
Figure 5: Security profiles and application areas.
The classification in the table considers different potential
applications in which security mechanism are chosen according to the
operational features (network size, existence of a central device,
connectivity to the Internet, importance of the exchanged
information, etc.) and threat model (what are the assets that an
attacker looks for). As already pointed out, this set of scenarios
is just exemplary and they should be further discussed based on a
broader consensus.
The security suite (SecProf_1) is catered for environments in which
IP protocols (e.g., 6LoWPAN/CoAP) can be used to enable communication
between things in an ad-hoc manner and the security requirements are
minimal. An example, is a home application in which two devices
should exchange information and no further connection with other
devices (local or with a backend) is required. In this scenario,
value of the exchanged information is low and usually happens in a
confined room, thus, it is possible to have a short period of time
during which initial secrets can be exchanged in the clear. Due to
this fact, there is no requirement to enable devices from different
manufacturers to inter operate in a secure way (keys are just
exchanged). The expected network size of applications using this
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profile is expected to be small such that the provision of network
security, e.g., secure routing, is of low importance.
The next security suite (SecProf_2) represents an evolution of
SecProf_1 in which, e.g., home devices, can be managed. A first
possibility for the securing domain management refers to the creation
of a centrally managed security domain without any connectivity to
the Internet. The central device used for management can serve as,
e.g., a key distribution center including policies for key update,
storage, etc. The presence of a central device can help in the
management of larger networks. Network security becomes more
relevant in this scenario since the IP network (e.g., 6LoWPAN/CoAP
network) can be prone to Denial of Service attacks (e.g., flooding if
L2 is not protected) or routing attacks. Similarly, the network of
devices could also be the source of a DDoS attack and a central
device connecting to the Internet can block traffic of ongoing
attacks.
SecProf_3 considers that a central device is always required for
managing the system. Example applications of this profile include
building control and automation, sensor networks for industrial use,
environmental monitoring, etc. As before, the manager can be located
in the same network (e.g., 6LoWPAN/CoAP network) and handle key
management. In this case, the first association of devices to the
network is required to be done in a secure way, i.e., requiring
authentication and authorization. This step can involve the secure
transmission of keying materials used for network security at
different layers. The information exchanged in the network is
considered to be valuable and it should be protected in the sense of
pairwise links. Commands should be secured and broadcast should be
secured with entity authentication [RFC7390]. Network should be
protected from routing attacks. A further extension to this use case
is to allow for remote management. A "backend manager" is in charge
of securely managing SW or information exchanged or collected within
the network, e.g., a 6LoWPAN/CoAP network. This requires connection
of devices to the Internet over a 6LBR involving a number of new
threats that were not present before. A list of potential attacks
include: resource-exhaustion attacks from the Internet; amplification
attacks; trust issues related a HTTP-CoAP proxy [ID-proHTTPCoAP],
etc. This use case requires protecting the communication from a
device in the backend to a device in the IP network, e.g., a 6LoWPAN/
CoAP network, end-to-end. This use case also requires measures to
provide the 6LBR with the capability of dropping fake requests coming
from the Internet. This becomes especially challenging when the 6LBR
is not trusted and access to the exchanged information is limited;
and even more in the case of a HTTP-CoAP proxy since protocol
translation is required. This use case should take care of
protecting information accessed from the backend due to privacy
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issues (e.g., information such as type of devices, location, usage,
type and amount of exchanged information, or mobility patterns can be
gathered at the backend threatening the privacy sphere of users) so
that only required information is disclosed.
The last security suite (SecProf_4) essentially represents
interoperability of all the security profiles defined previously. It
considers applications with some additional requirements regarding
operation such as: (i) ad-hoc establishment of security relationships
between things (potentially from different manufacturers) in non-
secure environments or (ii) dynamic roaming of things between
different IP network security domains. Such operational requirements
pose additional security requirements, e.g., in addition to secure
bootstrapping of a device within an IP, e.g., 6LowPan/CoAP, security
domain and the secure transfer of network operational key, there is a
need to enable inter-domains secure communication to facilitate data
sharing. In this scenario, there is also a higher pressure to ensure
that an attacker cannot compromise deployed devices and extract or
modify any type of private data such as cryptographic keys, data, or
proprietary algorithms.
6.2. Security Architecture
Most things might be required to support both centralized and
distributed operation patterns. Distributed thing-to-thing
communication might happen on demand, for instance, when two things
form an ad-hoc security domain to cooperatively fulfill a certain
task. Likewise, nodes may communicate with a backend service located
in the Internet without a central security manager. The same nodes
may also be part of a centralized architecture with a dedicated node
being responsible for the security management for group communication
between things in the IoT domain. In today's IoT, most common
architectures are fully centralized in the sense that all the
security relationships within a segment are handled by a central
party. In the ZigBee standard, this entity is the trust center.
Current proposals for 6LoWPAN/CoRE identify the 6LoWPAN Border Router
(6LBR) as such a device.
A centralized architecture allows for central management of devices
and keying materials as well as for the backup of cryptographic keys.
However, it also imposes some limitations. First, it represents a
single point of failure. This is a major drawback, e.g., when key
agreement between two devices requires online connectivity to the
central node. Second, it limits the possibility to create ad-hoc
security domains without dedicated security infrastructure. Third,
it codifies a more static world view, where device roles are cast in
stone, rather than a more dynamic world view that recognizes that
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networks and devices, and their roles and ownership, may change over
time (e.g., due to device replacement and hand-over of control).
Decentralized architectures, on the other hand, allow creating ad-hoc
security domains that might not require a single online management
entity and are operative in a much more stand-alone manner. The ad-
hoc security domains can be added to a centralized architecture at a
later point in time, allowing for central or remote management.
The choice of security architecture has many implications regarding
key management, access control, or security scope. A distributed (or
ad-hoc) architecture means that security relationships between things
are setup on the fly between a number of objects and kept in a
decentralized fashion, i.e., there is no central authority that can
interfere with the system operation. A locally centralized security
architecture means that a central device, e.g., the 6LBR, handles the
keys for all the devices in the security domain. Alternatively, a
central security architecture could also refer to the fact that smart
objects are managed from the backend. It can also refer to a public-
key infrastructure used to manage identities and digital certificates
associated to the different devices.
The security architecture for the different security profiles is
classified as follows.
+---------------------------------------------------------+
| Description |
+----------+---------------------------------------------------------+
|SecProf_1 | Distributed |
+----------+---------------------------------------------------------+
|SecProf_2 | Distributed able to move centralized (local) |
+----------+---------------------------------------------------------+
|SecProf_3 | Centralized (local &/or backend) |
+----------+---------------------------------------------------------+
|SecProf_4 | Distributed & centralized (local &/or backend) |
+----------+---------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 6: Security architectures in different security profiles.
In "SecProf_1", management mechanisms for the distributed assignment
and management of keying materials is required. Since this is a very
simple use case, access control to the formed security domain can be
enabled by means of a common secret known to all devices. In the
next security suite (SecProf_2), a central device can assume key
management responsibilities and handle the access to the network.
The last two security suites (SecProf_3 and SecProf_4) further allow
for the management of devices or some operational keying materials
from the backend. Identity and public-key management can be realized
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by means of a public-key infrastructure or a more decentralized
solution based on block-chain.
6.3. Security Model
While some applications might involve very resource-constrained
things such as, e.g., a humidity, pollution sensor, other
applications might target more powerful devices aimed at more exposed
applications. Security parameters such as keying materials,
certificates, etc. must be protected in the thing, for example by
means of tamper-resistant hardware. Keys may be shared across a
thing's networking stack to provide authenticity and confidentiality
in each networking layer. This would minimize the number of key
establishment/agreement handshake and incurs less overhead for
constrained thing. While more advanced applications may require key
separation at different networking layers, and possibly process
separation and sandboxing to isolate one application from another.
In this sense, this section reflects the fact that different
applications require different sets of security mechanisms. A very
important requirement refers to the protection of application related
parameters, data, and algorithms running on a smart object that
should be protected from extraction or manipulation.
+---------------------------------------------------------+
|Description |
+----------+---------------------------------------------------------+
|SecProf_1 |No tamper resistant |
| |Sharing keys between layers |
+----------+---------------------------------------------------------+
|SecProf_2 |No tamper resistant |
| |Sharing keys between layers |
+----------+---------------------------------------------------------+
|SecProf_3 |Tamper resistant |
| |Key and process separation |
| |Data and algorithm protection from manipulation/copy |
+----------+---------------------------------------------------------+
|SecProf_4 |(no) Tamper resistant |
| |Sharing keys between layers/Key and process separation |
| |Sandbox |
| |Data and algorithm protection from manipulation/copy |
+----------+---------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 7: Thing security models in different security profiles.
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6.4. Security Bootstrapping and Management
Bootstrapping refers to the process by which a thing initiates its
life within a security domain and includes the initialization of
secure and/or authentic parameters bound to the thing and at least
one other device in the network. Here, different mechanisms may be
used to achieve confidentiality and/or authenticity of these
parameters, depending on deployment scenario assumptions and the
communication channel(s) used for passing these parameters. The
simplest mechanism for initial set-up of secure and authentic
parameters is via communication in the clear using a physical
interface (USB, wire, chip contact, etc.). Here, one commonly
assumes this communication channel is secure, since eavesdropping
and/or manipulation of this interface would generally require access
to the physical medium and, thereby, to one or both of the devices
themselves. This mechanism was used with the so-called original
"resurrecting duckling" model, as introduced in [PROC-Stajano-99].
This technique may also be used securely in wireless, rather than
wired, set-ups, if the prospect of eavesdropping and/or manipulating
this channel are dim (a so-called "location-limited" channel
[PROC-Smetters-04][PROC-Smetters-02]). Examples hereof include the
communication of secret keys in the clear using near field
communication (NFC) - where the physical channel is purported to have
very limited range (roughly 10cm), thereby thwarting eavesdropping by
far-away adversarial devices, and in-the-clear communication during a
small time window (triggered by, e.g., a button-push) - where
eavesdropping is presumed absent during this small time window. With
the use of public-key based techniques, assumptions on the
communication channel can be relaxed even further, since then the
cryptographic technique itself provides for confidentiality of the
channel set-up and the location-limited channel - or use of
certificates - rules out man-in-the-middle attacks, thereby providing
authenticity [PROC-Smetters-02]. The same result can be obtained
using password-based public-key protocols [SPEKE], where authenticity
depends on the (weak) password not being guessed during execution of
the protocol.
It should be noted that while most of these techniques realize a
secure and authentic channel for passing parameters, these generally
do not provide for explicit authorization. As an example, with use
of certificate-based public-key based techniques, one may obtain hard
evidence on whom one shares secret and/or authentic parameters with,
but this does not answer the question as to whether one wishes to
share this information at all with this specifically identified
device (the latter usually involves a human-decision element). Thus,
the bootstrapping mechanisms above should generally be complemented
by mechanisms that regulate (security policies for) authorization.
Furthermore, the type of bootstrapping is very related to the
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required type of security architecture. Distributed bootstrapping
means that a pair of devices can setup a security relationship on the
fly, without interaction with a central device elsewhere within the
system. In many cases, it is handy to have a distributed
bootstrapping protocol based on existing security protocols (e.g.,
DTLS in CoAP) required for other purposes: this reduces the amount of
required software. A centralized bootstrapping protocol is one in
which a central device manages the security relationships within a
network. This can happen locally, e.g., handled by the 6LBR, or
remotely, e.g., from a server connected via the Internet. The
security bootstrapping for the different security profiles is as
follows.
+---------------------------------------------------------+
|Description |
+----------+---------------------------------------------------------+
|SecProf_1 |* Distributed, (e.g., Resurrecting duckling) |
| |* First key distribution happens in the clear |
+----------+---------------------------------------------------------+
|SecProf_2 |* Distributed, (e.g., Resurrecting duckling ) |
| |* Centralized (local), 6LBR acts as KDC |
| |* First key distribution occurs in the clear, if the KDC |
| | is available, the KDC can manage network access |
+----------+---------------------------------------------------------+
|SecProf_3 |* 6LBR acts as KDC. It handles node joining, provides |
| | them with keying material from L2 to application layers|
| |* Bootstrapping occurs in a secure way - either in secure|
| | environment or the security mechanisms ensure that |
| | eavesdropping is not possible. |
| |* KDC and backend can implement secure methods for |
| | network access |
+----------+---------------------------------------------------------+
|SecProf_4 |* As in SecProf_3. |
+----------+---------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 8: Security bootstrapping methods in different security
profiles
6.5. Network Security
Network security refers to the mechanisms used to ensure the secure
transport of network packets such as 6LoWPAN frames. This involves a
multitude of issues ranging from secure discovery, frame
authentication, routing security, detection of replay, secure group
communication, etc. Network security is important to thwart
potential attacks such as denial-of-service (e.g., through message
flooding) or routing attacks.
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The Internet Draft [ID-Tsao] presents a very good overview of attacks
and security needs classified according to the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability needs. A potential limitation is that
there exist no differentiation in security between different use
cases and the framework is limited to L3. The security suites
gathered in the present ID aim at solving this by allowing for a more
flexible selection of security needs at L2 and L3.
+---------------------------------------------------------+
|Description |
+----------+---------------------------------------------------------+
|SecProf_1 |* Network key creating a home security domain at L2 |
| | ensuring authentication and freshness of exchanged data|
| |* Secure multicast does not ensure origin authentication |
| |* No need for secure routing at L3 |
+----------+---------------------------------------------------------+
|SecProf_2 |* Network key creating a home security domain at L2 |
| | ensuring authentication and freshness of exchanged data|
| |* Secure multicast does not ensure origin authentication |
| |* No need for secure routing at L3 |
+----------+---------------------------------------------------------+
|SecProf_3 |* Network key creating an industry security domain at L2 |
| | ensuring authentication and freshness of exchanged data|
| |* Secure routing needed (integrity & availability) at L3 |
| | within 6LoWPAN/CoAP |
| |* Secure multicast requires origin authentication |
+----------+---------------------------------------------------------+
|SecProf_4 |* Network key creating an industry security domain at L2 |
| | ensuring authentication and freshness of exchanged data|
| |* Inter-domain authentication/secure handoff |
| |* Secure routing needed at L3 |
| |* Secure multicast requires origin authentication |
| |* 6LBR (HTTP-CoAP proxy) requires verification of |
| | forwarded messages and messages leaving or entering the|
| | 6LoWPAN/CoAP network. |
+----------+---------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 9: Network security needs in different security profiles
6.6. Application Security
In the context of 6LoWPAN/CoAP networks, application security refers
firstly to the configuration of an application layer protocol, such
as DTLS, to protect the exchanged information. It further refers to
the measures required in potential translation points (e.g., a (HTTP-
CoAP) proxy) where information can be collected and the privacy
sphere of users in a given security domain is endangered.
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Application security for the different security profiles is as
follows.
+---------------------------------------------------------+
|Description |
+----------+---------------------------------------------------------+
|SecProf_1 | - |
+----------+---------------------------------------------------------+
|SecProf_2 |* DTLS is used for end-to-end application security |
| | between management device and things and between things|
| |* DTLS ciphersuites configurable to provide |
| | confidentiality and/or authentication and/or freshness |
| |* Key transport and policies for generation of session |
| | keys are required |
+----------+---------------------------------------------------------+
|SecProf_3 |* Requirements as in SecProf_2 and |
| |* DTLS is used for end-to-end application security |
| | between management device and things and between things|
| |* Communication between KDC and each thing secured by |
| | pairwise keys |
| |* Group keys for communication in a group distributed |
| | by KDC |
| |* Privacy protection should be provided in translation |
| | points |
+----------+---------------------------------------------------------+
|SecProf_4 |* Requirements as in SecProf_3 and |
| |* TLS or DTLS can be used to send commands from the |
| | backend to the 6LBR or things in a 6LoWPAN/CoAP network|
| |* End-to-end secure connectivity from backend required |
| |* Secure broadcast in a network from backend required |
+----------+---------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 10: Application security methods in different security
profiles
The first two security profiles do not include any security at the
application layer. The reason is that, in the first case, security
is not provided and, in the second case, it seems reasonable to
provide basic security at L2. In the third security profile
(SecProf_2), DTLS becomes the way of protecting messages at
application layer between things and with the KDC running on a 6LBR.
A key option refers to the capability of easily configuring DTLS to
provide a subset of security services (e.g., some applications do not
require confidentiality) to reduce the impact of security in the
system operation of resource-constrained things. In addition to
basic key management mechanisms running within the KDC, communication
protocols for key transport or key update are required. These
protocols could be based on DTLS. The next security suite
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(SecProf_3) requires pairwise keys for communication between things
within the security domain. Finally, privacy protection should be
taken into account to limit access to valuable information -- such as
identifiers, type of collected data, traffic patterns -- in potential
translation points (proxies) or in the backend. The last security
suite (SecProf_4) further extends the previous set of requirements
considering security mechanisms to deal with translations between TLS
and DTLS or for the provision of secure multicast within a 6LoWPAN/
CoAP network from the backend.
7. Challenges for a Secure IoT
In this section, we take a closer look at the various security
challenges in the operational and technical features of the IoT and
then discuss how existing Internet security protocols cope with these
technical and conceptual challenges through the lifecycle of a thing.
Figure 2 summarizes which requirements need to be met in the
lifecycle phases as well as some of the considered protocols. This
discussion should neither be understood as a comprehensive evaluation
of all protocols, nor can it cover all possible aspects of IoT
security. Yet, it aims at showing concrete limitations of existing
Internet security protocols in some areas rather than giving an
abstract discussion about general properties of the protocols. In
this regard, the discussion handles issues that are most important
from the authors' perspectives.
7.1. Constraints and Heterogeneous Communication
Coupling resource constrained networks and the powerful Internet is a
challenge because the resulting heterogeneity of both networks
complicates protocol design and system operation. In the following
we briefly discuss the resource constraints of IoT devices and the
consequences for the use of Internet Protocols in the IoT domain.
7.1.1. Tight Resource Constraints
The IoT is a resource-constrained network that relies on lossy and
low-bandwidth channels for communication between small nodes,
regarding CPU, memory, and energy budget. These characteristics
directly impact the threats to and the design of security protocols
for the IoT domain. First, the use of small packets, e.g., IEEE
802.15.4 supports 127-byte sized packets at the physical layer, may
result in fragmentation of larger packets of security protocols.
This may open new attack vectors for state exhaustion DoS attacks,
which is especially tragic, e.g., if the fragmentation is caused by
large key exchange messages of security protocols. Moreover, packet
fragmentation commonly downgrades the overall system performance due
to fragment losses and the need for retransmissions. For instance,
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fate-sharing packet flight as implemented by DTLS might aggravate the
resulting performance loss.
The size and number of messages should be minimized to reduce memory
requirements and optimize bandwidth usage. In this context, layered
approaches involving a number of protocols might lead to worse
performance in resource-constrained devices since they combine the
headers of the different protocols. In some settings, protocol
negotiation can increase the number of exchanged messages. To
improve performance during basic procedures such as, e.g.,
bootstrapping, it might be a good strategy to perform those
procedures at a lower layer.
Small CPUs and scarce memory limit the usage of resource-expensive
crypto primitives such as public-key cryptography as used in most
Internet security standards. This is especially true, if the basic
crypto blocks need to be frequently used or the underlying
application demands a low delay.
Independently from the development in the IoT domain, all discussed
security protocols show efforts to reduce the cryptographic cost of
the required public-key-based key exchanges and signatures with ECC
[RFC5246][RFC5903][RFC7401][ID-HIP]. Moreover, all protocols have
been revised in the last years to enable crypto agility, making
cryptographic primitives interchangeable. However, these
improvements are only a first step in reducing the computation and
communication overhead of Internet protocols. The question remains
if other approaches can be applied to leverage key agreement in these
heavily resource-constrained environments.
A further fundamental need refers to the limited energy budget
available to IoT nodes. Careful protocol (re)design and usage is
required to reduce not only the energy consumption during normal
operation, but also under DoS attacks. Since the energy consumption
of IoT devices differs from other device classes, judgements on the
energy consumption of a particular protocol cannot be made without
tailor-made IoT implementations.
7.1.2. Denial-of-Service Resistance
The tight memory and processing constraints of things naturally
alleviate resource exhaustion attacks. Especially in unattended T2T
communication, such attacks are difficult to notice before the
service becomes unavailable (e.g., because of battery or memory
exhaustion). As a DoS countermeasure, DTLS, IKEv2, HIP, and Diet HIP
implement return routability checks based on a cookie mechanism to
delay the establishment of state at the responding host until the
address of the initiating host is verified. The effectiveness of
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these defences strongly depends on the routing topology of the
network. Return routability checks are particularly effective if
hosts cannot receive packets addressed to other hosts and if IP
addresses present meaningful information as is the case in today's
Internet. However, they are less effective in broadcast media or
when attackers can influence the routing and addressing of hosts
(e.g., if hosts contribute to the routing infrastructure in ad-hoc
networks and meshes).
In addition, HIP implements a puzzle mechanism that can force the
initiator of a connection (and potential attacker) to solve
cryptographic puzzles with variable difficulties. Puzzle-based
defence mechanisms are less dependent on the network topology but
perform poorly if CPU resources in the network are heterogeneous
(e.g., if a powerful Internet host attacks a thing). Increasing the
puzzle difficulty under attack conditions can easily lead to
situations, where a powerful attacker can still solve the puzzle
while weak IoT clients cannot and are excluded from communicating
with the victim. Still, puzzle-based approaches are a viable option
for sheltering IoT devices against unintended overload caused by
misconfiguration or malfunctioning things.
7.1.3. Protocol Translation and End-to-End Security
Even though 6LoWPAN and CoAP progress towards reducing the gap
between Internet protocols and the IoT, they do not target protocol
specifications that are identical to their Internet counterparts due
to performance reasons. Hence, more or less subtle differences
between IoT protocols and Internet protocols will remain. While
these differences can easily be bridged with protocol translators at
gateways, they become major obstacles if end-to-end security measures
between IoT devices and Internet hosts are used.
Cryptographic payload processing applies message authentication codes
or encryption to packets. These protection methods render the
protected parts of the packets immutable as rewriting is either not
possible because a) the relevant information is encrypted and
inaccessible to the gateway or b) rewriting integrity-protected parts
of the packet would invalidate the end-to-end integrity protection.
There are essentially four solutions for this problem:
1. Sharing credentials with gateways enables gateways to transform
(e.g., decompress, convert, etc.) packets and re-apply the
security measures after transformation. This method abandons
end-to-end security and is only applicable to simple scenarios
with a rudimentary security model.
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2. Reusing the Internet wire format in the IoT makes conversion
between IoT and Internet protocols unnecessary. However, it
leads to poor performance because IoT specific optimizations
(e.g., stateful or stateless compression) are not possible.
3. Selectively protecting vital and immutable packet parts with a
MAC or with encryption requires a careful balance between
performance and security. Otherwise, this approach will either
result in poor performance (protect as much as possible) or poor
security (compress and transform as much as possible).
4. Message authentication codes that sustain transformation can be
realized by considering the order of transformation and
protection (e.g., by creating a signature before compression so
that the gateway can decompress the packet without recalculating
the signature). This enables IoT specific optimizations but is
more complex and may require application-specific transformations
before security is applied. Moreover, it cannot be used with
encrypted data because the lack of cleartext prevents gateways
from transforming packets.
5. Object security based mechanisms can bridge the protocol worlds,
but still requires that the two worlds use the same object
security formats. Currently the IoT based object security format
based on COSE is different from the Internet based JOSE or CMS.
Legacy devices on the Internet side will need to update to the
newer IoT protocols to enable real end-to-end security.
To the best of our knowledge, none of the mentioned security
protocols provides a fully customizable solution in this problem
space.
7.1.4. New network architectures and paradigm
There is a multitude of new link layer protocols that aim to address
the resource-constrained nature of IoT devices. For example, the
IEEE 802.11 ah [IEEE802ah] has been specified for extended range and
lower energy consumption to support Internet of Things (IoT) devices.
Similarly, Low-Power Wide-Area Network (LPWAN) protocols such as LoRa
[lora], Sigfox [sigfox], NarrowBand IoT (NB-IoT) [nbiot] are all
designed for resource-constrained devices that require long range and
low bit rates. While these protocols allow the IoT devices to
conserve energy and operate efficiently, they also add additional
security challenges. For example, the relatively small MTU can make
security handshakes with large X509 certificates a significant
overhead. At the same time, new communication paradigms also allow
IoT devices to communicate directly amongst themselves with or
without support from the network. This communication paradigm is
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also referred to as Device-to-Device (D2D) or Machine-to-Machine
(M2M) or Thing-to-Thing (T2T) communication. D2D is primarily driven
by network operators that want to utilize short range communication
to improve the network performance and for supporting proximity based
service
7.2. Bootstrapping of a Security Domain
Creating a security domain from a set of previously unassociated IoT
devices is a key operation in the lifecycle of a thing and in the IoT
network. This aspect is further elaborated and discussed in the
T2TRG draft on bootstrapping [ID-bootstrap].
7.3. Operation
After the bootstrapping phase, the system enters the operational
phase. During the operational phase, things can relate to the state
information created during the bootstrapping phase in order to
exchange information securely and in an authenticated fashion. In
this section, we discuss aspects of communication patterns and
network dynamics during this phase.
7.3.1. End-to-End Security
Providing end-to-end security is of great importance to address and
secure individual T2T or H2T communication within one IoT domain.
Moreover, end-to-end security associations are an important measure
to bridge the gap between the IoT and the Internet. IKEv2 and HIP,
TLS and DTLS provide end-to-end security services including peer
entity authentication, end-to-end encryption and integrity protection
above the network layer and the transport layer respectively. Once
bootstrapped, these functions can be carried out without online
connections to third parties, making the protocols applicable for
decentralized use in the IoT. However, protocol translation by
intermediary nodes may invalidate end-to-end protection measures (see
Section 5.1). Also these protocols require end-to-end connectivity
between the devices and do not support store-and-forward scenarios.
Object security is an option for such scenarios and the work on
OSCOAP [ID-OSCOAP] is a potential solution in this space, in
particular, in the context of forwarding proxies.
7.3.2. Group Membership and Security
In addition to end-to-end security, group key negotiation is an
important security service for the T2Ts and Ts2T communication
patterns in the IoT as efficient local broadcast and multicast relies
on symmetric group keys.
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All discussed protocols only cover unicast communication and
therefore do not focus on group-key establishment. However, the
Diffie-Hellman keys that are used in IKEv2 and HIP could be used for
group Diffie-Hellman key-negotiations. Conceptually, solutions that
provide secure group communication at the network layer (IPsec/IKEv2,
HIP/Diet HIP) may have an advantage regarding the cryptographic
overhead compared to application-focused security solutions (TLS/
DTLS or OSCOAP). This is due to the fact that application-focused
solutions require cryptographic operations per group application,
whereas network layer approaches may allow to share secure group
associations between multiple applications (e.g., for neighbor
discovery and routing or service discovery). Hence, implementing
shared features lower in the communication stack can avoid redundant
security measures.
A number of group key solutions have been developed in the context of
the IETF working group MSEC in the context of the MIKEY architecture
[WG-MSEC][RFC4738]. These are specifically tailored for multicast
and group broadcast applications in the Internet and should also be
considered as candidate solutions for group key agreement in the IoT.
The MIKEY architecture describes a coordinator entity that
disseminates symmetric keys over pair-wise end-to-end secured
channels. However, such a centralized approach may not be applicable
in a distributed environment, where the choice of one or several
coordinators and the management of the group key is not trivial.
7.3.3. Mobility and IP Network Dynamics
It is expected that many things (e.g., wearable sensors, and user
devices) will be mobile in the sense that they are attached to
different networks during the lifetime of a security association.
Built-in mobility signaling can greatly reduce the overhead of the
cryptographic protocols because unnecessary and costly re-
establishments of the session (possibly including handshake and key
agreement) can be avoided. IKEv2 supports host mobility with the
MOBIKE [RFC4555][RFC4621] extension. MOBIKE refrains from applying
heavyweight cryptographic extensions for mobility. However, MOBIKE
mandates the use of IPsec tunnel mode which requires to transmit an
additional IP header in each packet. This additional overhead could
be alleviated by using header compression methods or the Bound End-
to-End Tunnel (BEET) mode [ID-Nikander], a hybrid of tunnel and
transport mode with smaller packet headers.
HIP offers a simple yet effective mobility management by allowing
hosts to signal changes to their associations [RFC5206]. However,
slight adjustments might be necessary to reduce the cryptographic
costs, for example, by making the public-key signatures in the
mobility messages optional. Diet HIP does not define mobility yet
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but it is sufficiently similar to HIP to employ the same mechanisms.
TLS and DTLS do not have standards for mobility support, however,
work on DTLS mobility exists in the form of an Internet draft
[ID-Williams]. The specific need for IP-layer mobility mainly
depends on the scenario in which nodes operate. In many cases,
mobility support by means of a mobile gateway may suffice to enable
mobile IoT networks, such as body sensor networks. However, if
individual things change their point of network attachment while
communicating, mobility support may gain importance.
7.4. Software update
IoT devices have a reputation for being insecure at the time of
manufacture. Yet they are often expected to stay functional in live
deployments for years and even decades. Additionally, these devices
typically operate unattended with direct Internet connectivity.
Therefore, a remote software update mechanism to fix vulnerabilities,
to update configuration settings, and for adding new functionality is
needed.
Schneier [SchneierSecurity] in his essay expresses concerns about the
status of software and firmware update mechanisms for Internet of
Things (IoT) devices. He highlights several challenges that hinder
mechanisms for secure software update of IoT devices. First, there
is a lack of incentives for manufactures, vendors and others on the
supply chain to issue updates for their devices. Second, parts of
the software running on the IoT devices is simply a binary blob
without any source code available. Since the complete source code is
not available, no patches can be written for that piece of code.
Third, even when updates are available, users generally have to
manually download and install those updates. However, users are
never alerted about security updates and many times do not have the
necessary expertise to manually administer the required updates.
The FTC staff report on Internet of Things - Privacy & Security in a
Connected World [FTCreport] and the Article 29 Working Party Opinion
8/2014 on the on Recent Developments on the Internet of Things
[Article29] also document the challenges for secure remote software
update of IoT devices. They note that even providing such a software
update capability may add new vulnerabilities for constrained
devices. For example, a buffer overflow vulnerability in the
implementation of a software update protocol (TR69) [TR69] and an
expired certificate in a hub device [wink] demonstrate how the
software update process itself can introduce vulnerabilities.
While powerful IoT devices that run general purpose operating systems
can make use of sophisticated software update mechanisms known from
the desktop world, a more considerate effort is needed for resource-
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constrained devices that don't have any operating system and are
typically not equipped with a memory management unit or similar
tools. The IAB also organized a workshop to understand the
challenges for secure software update of IoT devices. A summary of
the workshop and the proposed next steps have been documented
[iotsu].
7.5. Verifying device behavior
Users often have a false sense of privacy when using new Internet of
Things (IoT) appliances such as Internet-connected smart televisions,
speakers and cameras. Recent revelations have shown that this user
belief is often unfounded. Many IoT device vendors have been caught
collecting sensitive private data through these connected appliances
with or without appropriate user warnings [cctv].
An IoT device user/owner would like to monitor and know if the device
is calling home (i.e. verify its operational behavior). The calling
home feature may be necessary in some scenarios, such as during the
initial configuration of the device. However, the user should be
kept aware of the data that the device is sending back to the vendor.
For example, the user should be ensured that his/her TV is not
sending data when he/she inserts a new USB stick.
Providing such information to the users in an understandable fashion
is challenging. This is because the IoT devices are not only
resource-constrained in terms of their computational capability, but
also in terms of the user interface available. Also, the network
infrastructure where these devices are deployed will vary
significantly from one user environment to another. Therefore, where
and how this monitoring feature is implemented still remains an open
question.
7.6. End-of-life
Like all commercial devices, most IoT devices will be end-of-lifed by
vendors or even network operators. This may be planned or unplanned
(for example when the vendor or manufacturer goes bankrupt or when a
network operator moves to a different type of networking technology).
A user should still be able to use and perhaps even update the
device. This requires for some form of authorization handover.
Although this may seem far fetched given the commercial interests and
market dynamics, we have examples from the mobile world where the
devices have been functional and up-to-date long after the original
vendor stopped supporting the device. CyanogenMod for Android
devices and OpenWrt for home routers are two such instances where
users have been able to use and update their devices even after they
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were end-of-lifed. Admittedly these are not easy for an average
users to install and configure on their devices. With the deployment
of millions of IoT devices, simpler mechanisms are needed to allow
users to add new root-of-trusts and install software and firmware
from other sources once the device has been end-of-lifed.
7.7. Testing: bug hunting and vulnerabilities
Given that the IoT devices often have inadvertent vulnerabilities,
both users and developers would want to perform extensive testing on
their IoT devices, networks, and systems. Nonetheless, since the
devices are resource-constrained and manufactured by multiple
vendors, some of them very small, devices might be shipped with very
limited testing, so that bugs can remain and can be exploited at a
later stage. This leads to two main types of challenges:
1. It remains to be seen how the software testing and quality
assurance mechanisms used from the desktop and mobile world will
be applied to IoT devices to give end users the confidence that
the purchased devices are robust.
2. It is also an open question how combination of devices of
multiple vendors might actually lead to dangerous network
configurations, e.g., if combination of specific devices can
trigger unexpected behavior.
7.8. Quantum-resistance
Many IoT systems that are being deployed today will remain
operational for many years. With the advancements made in the field
of quantum computers, it is possible that large-scale quantum
computers are available in the future for performing cryptanalysis on
existing cryptographic algorithms and cipher suites. If this
happened, it would have two consequences. First, functionalities
enabled by means of RSA/ECC - namely key exchange, public-key
encryption and signature - would not be secure anymore due to Shor's
algorithm. Second, the security level of symmetric algorithms will
decrease, e.g., the security of a block cipher with a key size of b
bits will only offer b/2 bits of security due to Grover's algorithm.
This would require to move to quantum-resistant alternatives, in
particular, for those functionalities involving key exchange, public-
key encryption and signatures. While such future planning is hard,
it may be a necessity in certain critical IoT deployments which are
expected to last decades or more. Although increasing the key-size
of the different algorithms is definitely an option, it would also
incur additional computation overhead and network traffic. This
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would be undesirable in most scenarios. There have been recent
advancements in quantum-resistant cryptography.
We refer to [ETSI_GR_QSC_001] for an extensive overview of existing
quantum-resistant cryptography. RFC7696 provides guidelines for
cryptographic algorithm agility.
7.9. Privacy protection
Users will be surrounded by tens of connected devices. Even if the
communication links are encrypted and protected, information about
the users might be collected for different purposes affecting their
privacy. In [Ziegeldorf], privacy in the IoT is defined as the
threefold guarantee to the user for: 1. awareness of privacy risks
imposed by smart things and services surrounding the data subject, 2.
individual control over the collection and processing of personal
information by the surrounding smart things 3. awareness and control
of subsequent use and dissemination of personal information by those
entities to any entity outside the subject's personal control sphere.
Based on this definition, several privacy threats and challenges are
identified in the work of Ziegeldorf:
1. Identification - refers to the identification of the users and
their objects.
2. Localization - relates to the capability of locating a user and
even tracking him.
3. Profiling - is about creating a profile of the user and her
preferences.
4. Interaction - occurs when a user has been profiled and a given
interaction is preferred, presenting (e.g., visually) some
information that discloses private information.
5. Lifecycle transitions - take place when devices are, e.g., sold
without properly removing private data.
6. Inventory attacks - happen if specific information about (smart)
objects in possession of a user is disclosed.
7. Linkage - is about when information of two of more IoT systems is
combined so that a broader view on the personal data is created.
When IoT systems are deployed, the above issues should be considered
to ensure that private data remains private. How this is achieved
remains an open issue.
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7.10. Data leakage
IoT devices are resource constrained and often deployed in unattended
environments or can just be bought in the Internet. Therefore, an
attacker can have direct access to the device and apply more advance
techniques that a traditional black box model does not consider such
as side-channel attacks or code disassembly. By doing this, the
attacker can try to retrieve data such as:
1. long term keys that might be used perform attacks on devices
deployed in other locations.
2. source code that might let the user determine bugs or find
exploits to perform other types of attacks, or just sell it,
3. proprietary algorithms that could be counterfeited or modified to
perform advanced attacks.
Protection against such data leakage patterns is not trivial since
devices are inherently resource-constrained. An open question is
which techniques can be used to protect IoT devices in such a strong
attack model.
7.11. Trustworthy IoT Operation
Flaws in the design and implementation of a secure IoT device and
network can lead to secure vulnerabilities. An example is a flaw is
the distribution of an Internet-connected IoT device in which a
default password is used in all devices. Many IoT devices can be
found in the Internet by means of tools such as Shodan, and if they
have any vulnerability, it can then be exploited at scale, e.g., to
launch DDoS attacks. This is not fiction but reality as Dyn, a mayor
DNS was attacked by means of a DDoS attack originated from a large
IoT botnet composed of thousands of compromised IP-cameras. Open
questions in this area are:
1. How to prevent large scale vulnerabilities in IoT devices?
2. How to prevent attackers from exploiting vulnerabilities in IoT
devices at large scale?
3. If the vulnerability has been exploited, how do we stop a large
scale attack before any damage is caused?
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8. Conclusions and Next Steps
This Internet Draft provides IoT security researchers, system
designers and implements with an overview of both operational and
security requirements in the IP-based Internet of Things. We discuss
a general threat model, security issues, state of the art, and tools
to mitigate security threats. We further introduce a number of
potential security profiles fitting different types of IoT
deployments and discuss key security challenges.
Although big steps have been realized during the last years, as
summarized in Section Section 5.1 and many organizations are
publishing general recommendations (Section Section 5.3) describing
how the IoT should be secured, there are many challenges ahead that
require further attention. Challenges of particular importance are
bootstrapping of security, group security, secure software updates,
long-term security and quantum-resistance, privacy protection, data
leakage prevention - where data could be cryptographic keys, personal
data, or even algorithms - and ensuring a trustworthy IoT operation.
All these problems are important; however, different deployment
environment have different operational and security demands. Thus, a
potential approach is the definition and standardization of security
profiles, e.g., similar to the exemplary profiles introduced in
Section Section 6, to ensure minimum security capabilities in
different environments while ensuring interoperability.
9. Security Considerations
This document reflects upon the requirements and challenges of the
security architectural framework for the Internet of Things.
10. IANA Considerations
This document contains no request to IANA.
11. Acknowledgments
We gratefully acknowledge feedback and fruitful discussion with
Tobias Heer and Robert Moskowitz. Acknowledge the additional authors
of the previous version of this document Sye Loong Keoh, Rene Hummen
and Rene Struik.
12. Informative References
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[Article29]
"Opinion 8/2014 on the on Recent Developments on the
Internet of Things", Web http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2014/wp223_en.pdf, n.d..
[AUTO-ID] "AUTO-ID LABS", Web http://www.autoidlabs.org/, September
2010.
[BACNET] "BACnet", Web http://www.bacnet.org/, February 2011.
[BITAG] "Internet of Things (IoT) Security and Privacy
Recommendations", Web http://www.bitag.org/report-
internet-of-things-security-privacy-recommendations.php,
n.d..
[cctv] "Backdoor In MVPower DVR Firmware Sends CCTV Stills To an
Email Address In China", Web
https://hardware.slashdot.org/story/16/02/17/0422259/
backdoor-in-mvpower-dvr-firmware-sends-cctv-stills-to-an-
email-address-in-china, n.d..
[CSA] "Security Guidance for Early Adopters of the Internet of
Things (IoT)", Web
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curity_Guidance_for_Early_Adopters_of_the_Internet_of_Thin
gs.pdf, n.d..
[d2dsecurity]
Haus, M., Waqas, M., Ding, A., Li, Y., Tarkoma, S., and J.
Ott, "Security and Privacy in Device-to-Device (D2D)
Communication: A Review", Paper IEEE Communications
Surveys and Tutorials, 2016.
[DALI] "DALI", Web http://www.dalibydesign.us/dali.html, February
2011.
[DHS] "Strategic Principles For Securing the Internet of Things
(IoT)", Web
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Strategic_Principles_for_Securing_the_Internet_of_Things-
2016-1115-FINAL....pdf, n.d..
[ENISA_ICS]
"Communication network dependencies for ICS/SCADA
Systems", European Union Agency For Network And
Information Security , February 2017.
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[ETSI_GR_QSC_001]
"Quantum-Safe Cryptography (QSC);Quantum-safe algorithmic
framework", European Telecommunications Standards
Institute (ETSI) , June 2016.
[Fairhair]
"Fairhair Alliance", Web https://www.fairhair-
alliance.org/, n.d..
[FCC] "Federal Communications Comssion Response 12-05-2016",
FCC , February 2016.
[FTCreport]
"FTC Report on Internet of Things Urges Companies to Adopt
Best Practices to Address Consumer Privacy and Security
Risks", Web https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2015/01/ftc-report-internet-things-urges-
companies-adopt-best-practices, n.d..
[GSMAsecurity]
"GSMA IoT Security Guidelines", Web
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iot-security-guidelines/, n.d..
[ID-6lodect]
Mariager, P., Petersen, J., Shelby, Z., Logt, M., and D.
Barthel, "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over DECT Ultra Low
Energy", draft-ietf-6lo-dect-ule-09 , December 2016.
[ID-6lonfc]
Choi, Y., Hong, Y., Youn, J., Kim, D., and J. Choi,
"Transmission of IPv6 Packets over Near Field
Communication", draft-ietf-6lo-nfc-05 , October 2016.
[ID-6tisch]
Thubert, P., "An Architecture for IPv6 over the TSCH mode
of IEEE 802.15.4", draft-ietf-6tisch-architecture-11 ,
January 2017.
[ID-aceoauth]
Seitz, L., Selander, G., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and
H. Tschofenig, "Authentication and Authorization for
Constrained Environments (ACE)", draft-ietf-ace-oauth-
authz-05 , March 2011.
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[ID-bootstrap]
Sarikaya, B. and M. Sethi, "Secure IoT Bootstrapping : A
Survey", draft-sarikaya-t2trg-sbootstrapping-01 , July
2016.
[ID-cose] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
draft-ietf-cose-msg-24 , November 2016.
[ID-Daniel]
Park, S., Kim, K., Haddad, W., Chakrabarti, S., and J.
Laganier, "IPv6 over Low Power WPAN Security Analysis",
draft-daniel-6lowpan-security-analysis-05 , March 2011.
[ID-dietesp]
Migault, D., Guggemos, T., and C. Bormann, "Diet-ESP: a
flexible and compressed format for IPsec/ESP", draft-mglt-
6lo-diet-esp-02 , August 2016.
[ID-Hartke]
Hartke, K. and O. Bergmann, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security in Constrained Environments", draft-hartke-core-
codtls-02 , July 2012.
[ID-HIP] Moskowitz, R., "HIP Diet EXchange (DEX)", draft-moskowitz-
hip-rg-dex-06 , May 2012.
[ID-Moore]
Moore, K., Barnes, R., and H. Tschofenig, "Best Current
Practices for Securing Internet of Things (IoT) Devices",
draft-moore-iot-security-bcp-00 , October 2016.
[ID-Nikander]
Nikander, P. and J. Melen, "A Bound End-to-End
Tunnel(BEET) mode for ESP", draft-nikander-esp-beet-
mode-09 , August 2008.
[ID-OFlynn]
O'Flynn, C., Sarikaya, B., Ohba, Y., Cao, Z., and R.
Cragie, "Security Bootstrapping of Resource-Constrained
Devices", draft-oflynn-core-bootstrapping-03 , November
2010.
[ID-OSCOAP]
Selander, G., Mattsson, J., Palombini, F., and L. Seitz,
"Object Security of CoAP (OSCOAP)", draft-selander-ace-
object-security-05 , July 2016.
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[ID-proHTTPCoAP]
Castellani, A., Loreto, S., Rahman, A., Fossati, T., and
E. Dijk, "Best practices for HTTP-CoAP mapping
implementation", draft-castellani-core-http-mapping-07 ,
February 2013.
[ID-rd] Shelby, Z., Koster, M., Bormann, C., and P. Stok, "CoRE
Resource Directory", draft-ietf-core-resource-
directory-09 , October 2016.
[ID-senml]
Jennings, C., Shelby, Z., Arkko, J., Keranen, A., and C.
Bormann, "Media Types for Sensor Measurement Lists
(SenML)", draft-ietf-core-resource-directory-09 , October
2016.
[ID-Tsao] Tsao, T., Alexander, R., Dohler, M., Daza, V., and A.
Lozano, "A Security Framework for Routing over Low Power
and Lossy Networks", draft-ietf-roll-security-
framework-07 , January 2012.
[ID-Williams]
Williams, M. and J. Barrett, "Mobile DTLS", draft-barrett-
mobile-dtls-00 , March 2009.
[IEEE802ah]
"Status of Project IEEE 802.11ah, IEEE P802.11- Task Group
AH-Meeting Update.",
Web http://www.ieee802.org/11/Reports/tgah_update.htm,
n.d..
[IIoT] "Industrial Internet Consortium",
Web http://www.iiconsortium.org/, n.d..
[IoTSecFoundation]
"Establishing Principles for Internet of Things Security",
Web https://iotsecurityfoundation.org/establishing-
principles-for-internet-of-things-security/, n.d..
[iotsu] "Patching the Internet of Things: IoT Software Update
Workshop 2016", Web
https://www.ietf.org/blog/2016/07/patching-the-internet-
of-things-iot-software-update-workshop-2016/, n.d..
[IPSO] "IPSO Alliance", Web http://www.ipso-alliance.org, n.d..
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[JOURNAL-Perrig]
Perrig, A., Szewczyk, R., Wen, V., Culler, D., and J.
Tygar, "SPINS: Security protocols for Sensor Networks",
Journal Wireless Networks, September 2002.
[lora] "LoRa - Wide Area Networks for IoT", Web https://www.lora-
alliance.org/, n.d..
[nbiot] "NarrowBand IoT", Web
http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/tsg_ran/TSG_RAN/TSGR_69/Docs/
RP-151621.zip, n.d..
[NHTSA] "Cybersecurity Best Practices for Modern Vehicles", Web
https://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/nvs/
pdf/812333_CybersecurityForModernVehicles.pdf, n.d..
[NIST] Dworkin, M., "NIST Specification Publication 800-38B",
2005.
[NIST-Guide]
Ross, R., McEVILLEY, M., and J. Oren, "Systems Security
Engineering", Web
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
NIST.SP.800-160.pdf, n.d..
[nist_lightweight_project]
"NIST lightweight Project", Web www.nist.gov/programs-
projects/lightweight-cryptography,
www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016/10/17/
sonmez-turan-presentation-lwc2016.pdf, n.d..
[OCF] "Open Connectivity Foundation",
Web https://openconnectivity.org/, n.d..
[OneM2M] "OneM2M", Web http://www.onem2m.org/, n.d..
[OWASP] "IoT Security Guidance",
Web https://www.owasp.org/index.php/IoT_Security_Guidance,
n.d..
[PROC-Chan]
Chan, H., Perrig, A., and D. Song, "Random Key
Predistribution Schemes for Sensor Networks",
Proceedings IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2003.
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[PROC-Gupta]
Gupta, V., Wurm, M., Zhu, Y., Millard, M., Fung, S., Gura,
N., Eberle, H., and S. Shantz, "Sizzle: A Standards-based
End-to-End Security Architecture for the Embedded
Internet", Proceedings Pervasive Computing and
Communications (PerCom), 2005.
[PROC-Smetters-02]
Balfanz, D., Smetters, D., Steward, P., and H. Chi Wong,,
"Talking To Strangers: Authentication in Ad-Hoc Wireless
Networks", Paper NDSS, 2002.
[PROC-Smetters-04]
Balfanz, D., Durfee, G., Grinter, R., Smetters, D., and P.
Steward, "Network-in-a-Box: How to Set Up a Secure
Wireless Network in Under a Minute", Paper USENIX, 2004.
[PROC-Stajano-99]
Stajano, F. and R. Anderson, "Resurrecting Duckling -
Security Issues for Adhoc Wireless Networks",
7th International Workshop Proceedings, November 1999.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818>.
[RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, June 2002,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261>.
[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
Levkowetz, Ed., "Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP)", RFC 3748, DOI 10.17487/RFC3748, June 2004,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3748>.
[RFC3756] Nikander, P., Ed., Kempf, J., and E. Nordmark, "IPv6
Neighbor Discovery (ND) Trust Models and Threats",
RFC 3756, DOI 10.17487/RFC3756, May 2004,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3756>.
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[RFC3833] Atkins, D. and R. Austein, "Threat Analysis of the Domain
Name System (DNS)", RFC 3833, DOI 10.17487/RFC3833, August
2004, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3833>.
[RFC4016] Parthasarathy, M., "Protocol for Carrying Authentication
and Network Access (PANA) Threat Analysis and Security
Requirements", RFC 4016, DOI 10.17487/RFC4016, March 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4016>.
[RFC4251] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
Protocol Architecture", RFC 4251, DOI 10.17487/RFC4251,
January 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4251>.
[RFC4555] Eronen, P., "IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming Protocol
(MOBIKE)", RFC 4555, DOI 10.17487/RFC4555, June 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4555>.
[RFC4621] Kivinen, T. and H. Tschofenig, "Design of the IKEv2
Mobility and Multihoming (MOBIKE) Protocol", RFC 4621,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4621, August 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4621>.
[RFC4738] Ignjatic, D., Dondeti, L., Audet, F., and P. Lin, "MIKEY-
RSA-R: An Additional Mode of Key Distribution in
Multimedia Internet KEYing (MIKEY)", RFC 4738,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4738, November 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4738>.
[RFC4919] Kushalnagar, N., Montenegro, G., and C. Schumacher, "IPv6
over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs):
Overview, Assumptions, Problem Statement, and Goals",
RFC 4919, DOI 10.17487/RFC4919, August 2007,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4919>.
[RFC4944] Montenegro, G., Kushalnagar, N., Hui, J., and D. Culler,
"Transmission of IPv6 Packets over IEEE 802.15.4
Networks", RFC 4944, DOI 10.17487/RFC4944, September 2007,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4944>.
[RFC5191] Forsberg, D., Ohba, Y., Ed., Patil, B., Tschofenig, H.,
and A. Yegin, "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for
Network Access (PANA)", RFC 5191, DOI 10.17487/RFC5191,
May 2008, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5191>.
[RFC5206] Nikander, P., Henderson, T., Ed., Vogt, C., and J. Arkko,
"End-Host Mobility and Multihoming with the Host Identity
Protocol", RFC 5206, DOI 10.17487/RFC5206, April 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5206>.
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[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC5713] Moustafa, H., Tschofenig, H., and S. De Cnodder, "Security
Threats and Security Requirements for the Access Node
Control Protocol (ANCP)", RFC 5713, DOI 10.17487/RFC5713,
January 2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5713>.
[RFC5903] Fu, D. and J. Solinas, "Elliptic Curve Groups modulo a
Prime (ECP Groups) for IKE and IKEv2", RFC 5903,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5903, June 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5903>.
[RFC6345] Duffy, P., Chakrabarti, S., Cragie, R., Ohba, Y., Ed., and
A. Yegin, "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for
Network Access (PANA) Relay Element", RFC 6345,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6345, August 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6345>.
[RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
January 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.
[RFC6550] Winter, T., Ed., Thubert, P., Ed., Brandt, A., Hui, J.,
Kelsey, R., Levis, P., Pister, K., Struik, R., Vasseur,
JP., and R. Alexander, "RPL: IPv6 Routing Protocol for
Low-Power and Lossy Networks", RFC 6550,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6550, March 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6550>.
[RFC6551] Vasseur, JP., Ed., Kim, M., Ed., Pister, K., Dejean, N.,
and D. Barthel, "Routing Metrics Used for Path Calculation
in Low-Power and Lossy Networks", RFC 6551,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6551, March 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6551>.
[RFC6568] Kim, E., Kaspar, D., and JP. Vasseur, "Design and
Application Spaces for IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless
Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs)", RFC 6568,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6568, April 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6568>.
[RFC6690] Shelby, Z., "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Link
Format", RFC 6690, DOI 10.17487/RFC6690, August 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6690>.
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[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
[RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049,
October 2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>.
[RFC7158] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", RFC 7158, DOI 10.17487/RFC7158, March
2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7158>.
[RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>.
[RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.
[RFC7390] Rahman, A., Ed. and E. Dijk, Ed., "Group Communication for
the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7390,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7390, October 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7390>.
[RFC7401] Moskowitz, R., Ed., Heer, T., Jokela, P., and T.
Henderson, "Host Identity Protocol Version 2 (HIPv2)",
RFC 7401, DOI 10.17487/RFC7401, April 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7401>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
[RFC7517] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC7668] Nieminen, J., Savolainen, T., Isomaki, M., Patil, B.,
Shelby, Z., and C. Gomez, "IPv6 over BLUETOOTH(R) Low
Energy", RFC 7668, DOI 10.17487/RFC7668, October 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7668>.
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[RFC7696] Housley, R., "Guidelines for Cryptographic Algorithm
Agility and Selecting Mandatory-to-Implement Algorithms",
BCP 201, RFC 7696, DOI 10.17487/RFC7696, November 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7696>.
[RFC7815] Kivinen, T., "Minimal Internet Key Exchange Version 2
(IKEv2) Initiator Implementation", RFC 7815,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7815, March 2016,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7815>.
[RFC7925] Tschofenig, H., Ed. and T. Fossati, "Transport Layer
Security (TLS) / Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
Profiles for the Internet of Things", RFC 7925,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7925, July 2016,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7925>.
[RG-T2TRG]
"IRTF Thing-to-Thing (T2TRG) Research Group",
Web https://datatracker.ietf.org/rg/t2trg/charter/,
December 2015.
[SchneierSecurity]
"The Internet of Things Is Wildly Insecure--And Often
Unpatchable", Web
https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2014/01/
the_internet_of_thin.html, n.d..
[sigfox] "Sigfox - The Global Communications Service Provider for
the Internet of Things (IoT)",
Web https://www.sigfox.com/, n.d..
[SPEKE] "IEEE P1363.2: Password-based Cryptography", 2008.
[THESIS-Langheinrich]
Langheinrich, M., "Personal Privacy in Ubiquitous
Computing", PhD Thesis ETH Zurich, 2005.
[Thread] "Thread Group", Web http://threadgroup.org/, n.d..
[TinyDTLS]
"TinyDTLS", Web http://tinydtls.sourceforge.net/, February
2012.
[TR69] "Too Many Cooks - Exploiting the Internet-of-TR-
069-Things", Web https://media.ccc.de/v/31c3_-_6166_-_en_-
_saal_6_-_201412282145_-_too_many_cooks_-
_exploiting_the_internet-of-tr-069-things_-
_lior_oppenheim_-_shahar_tal, n.d..
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[WG-6LoWPAN]
"IETF 6LoWPAN Working Group",
Web http://tools.ietf.org/wg/6lowpan/, February 2011.
[WG-ACE] "IETF Authentication and Authorization for Constrained
Environments (ACE) Working Group",
Web https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/ace/charter/, June
2014.
[WG-CoRE] "IETF Constrained RESTful Environment (CoRE) Working
Group", Web https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/core/charter/,
February 2011.
[WG-LWIG] "IETF Light-Weight Implementation Guidance (LWIG) Working
Group", Web https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/lwig/charter/,
March 2011.
[WG-MSEC] "MSEC Working Group",
Web http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/msec/, n.d..
[wink] "Wink's Outage Shows Us How Frustrating Smart Homes Could
Be",
Web http://www.wired.com/2015/04/smart-home-headaches/,
n.d..
[ZB] "ZigBee Alliance", Web http://www.zigbee.org/, February
2011.
[Ziegeldorf]
Ziegeldorf, J., Garcia-Morchon, O., and K. Wehrle,,
"Privacy in the Internet of Things: Threats and
Challenges", Paper Security and Communication Networks -
Special Issue on Security in a Completely Interconnected
World, 2013.
Authors' Addresses
Oscar Garcia-Morchon
Philips Research
Canal Park 2
Cambridge, 02141
United States
Email: oscar.garcia@philips.com
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Sandeep S. Kumar
Philips Research
High Tech Campus
Eindhoven, 5656 AA
The Netherlands
Email: sandeep.kumar@philips.com
Mohit Sethi
Ericsson
Hirsalantie 11
Jorvas
Finland
Email: mohit@piuha.net
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