BGP operations and security
draft-jdurand-bgp-security-02
| Document | Type |
Replaced Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Jerome Durand , Ivan Pepelnjak, Gert Döring | ||
| Last updated | 2013-03-20 (Latest revision 2012-09-21) | ||
| Replaced by | draft-ietf-opsec-bgp-security | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Replaced by draft-ietf-opsec-bgp-security | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
BGP (Border Gateway Protocol) is the protocol almost exclusively used in the Internet to exchange routing information between network domains. Due to this central nature, it's important to understand the security measures that can and should be deployed to prevent accidental or intentional routing disturbances. This document describes measures to protect the BGP sessions itself (like TTL, MD5, control plane filtering) and to better control the flow of routing information, using prefix filtering and automatization of prefix filters, max-prefix filtering, AS path filtering, route flap dampening and BGP community scrubbing.
Authors
Jerome Durand
Ivan Pepelnjak
Gert Döring
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)