Computational Puzzles for SPAM Reduction in SIP
draft-jennings-sip-hashcash-06

Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2007-07-09
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-jennings-sip-hashcash-06.txt

Abstract

One of the techniques used in SPAM prevention and various solutions for denial of service attacks is to force the SIP client requesting a service to perform a calculation that limits the rate and increases the cost of the request. This draft defines a way to allow a UAS to ask the UAC to compute a computationally expensive hash based function and present the result to the UAS. Although the computation is expensive for the UAC to compute, it is cheap for the UAS to verify. The solution also allows for proxies to compute and check the puzzle on behalf of the UAC or UAS. This draft currently outlines enough information to evaluate and consider this approach or even run experiments. It would need finalization around the forking topics discussed in the open issues before it would be implementable in production system.

Authors

Cullen Jennings (fluffy@cisco.com)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)