Basic Support for Security and Privacy in IP-Based Vehicular Networks
draft-jeong-ipwave-security-privacy-09
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Jaehoon Paul Jeong , Yiwen Shen , Park Jung-Soo , Tae (Tom) Oh | ||
| Last updated | 2024-02-08 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
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draft-jeong-ipwave-security-privacy-09
IPWAVE Working Group J. Jeong, Ed.
Internet-Draft Y. Shen
Intended status: Standards Track Sungkyunkwan University
Expires: 11 August 2024 J. Park
ETRI
T. Oh
Rochester Institute of Technology
8 February 2024
Basic Support for Security and Privacy in IP-Based Vehicular Networks
draft-jeong-ipwave-security-privacy-09
Abstract
This document describes possible attacks of security and privacy in
IP Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (IPWAVE). It also
proposes countermeasures for those attacks.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 11 August 2024.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Security Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. False Information Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Impersonation Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3. Denial-of-Service Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.4. Message Suspension Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.5. Tampering Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.6. Tracking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Security Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. Identification and Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. Integrity and Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3. Non-Repudiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.4. Remote Attestation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.5. Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Appendix B. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Appendix C. Changes from
draft-jeong-ipwave-security-privacy-08 . . . . . . . . . 11
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1. Introduction
Vehicular networking has become popular by the enhancement of
Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) [ISO-ITS-IPv6]. The
vehicular networking can work based on Dedicated Short-Range
Communications (DSRC) [DSRC]. This DSRC is realized by the IEEE
Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE) [WAVE-1609.0].
Especially, IEEE 802.11-OCB (Outside the Context of Basic Support
Set) [IEEE-802.11-OCB] provides the Media Access Control (MAC) for
vehicles in vehicular networks. IP-based vehicular networking can be
supported with IPv6 over IEEE 802.11-OCB [RFC8691], which defines the
IPv6 Neighbor Discovery (ND), Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU), and
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MAC layer adaptation.
Vehicles can construct Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANET) by
themselves without any infrastructure node such as a Road-Side Unit
(RSU). Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control and Autonomous Driving
(i.e., Self-Driving) services can take advantage of this vehicular
networking for safe driving through the wireless communications among
vehicles.
When using IP-based vehicular networks in self-driving environments,
the information exchange among self-driving vehicles are critical to
the safety of vehicles since the information received from other
vehicles may be used as inputs for vehicle maneuvers. Thus,
identifying potential loopholes in the IP-based vehicular networks
becomes crucial.
This document describes possible attacks on security and
vulnerabilities of privacy in IP Wireless Access in Vehicular
Environments (IPWAVE). It also proposes countermeasures for those
attacks and vulnerabilities.
2. Terminology
This document uses the definitions defined in the IPWAVE problem
statement document [RFC9365].
3. Security Attacks
This section explains possible attacks of security and
vulnerabilities of privacy in IP-based vehicular networks.
Security and privacy are very important in V2I, V2V, and V2X
communications in vehicular networks. Only identified and authorized
vehicles should be allowed to be involved in vehicular networking.
Furthermore, in-vehicle devices in a vehicle and mobile devices of a
driver and passengers are required to communicate with other devices
in VANET or the Internet in a secure and reliable way.
In reality, there are many possible security attacks in vehicular
networks. The exemplary security attacks are false information
attack, impersonation attack, denial-of-service attack, message
suspension attack, tampering attack, and tracking. By these attacks,
the vehicles can be put into dangerous situations by false
information and information loss.
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For those attacks, security countermeasures are required to protect
vehicles. With these countermeasures, vehicles can exchange their
driving data with neighboring vehicles and infrastructure nodes
(e.g., edge computing device and cloud server) for safe driving as
well as efficient navigation in road networks.
3.1. False Information Attack
Malicious vehicles may intentionally disseminate false driving
information (e.g., location, speed, and direction) to deceive other
vehicles, which may put those vehicles in danger. Especially, a
representative example is Sybil attack. This Sybil attack makes
multiple false identities of non-existing vehicles (i.e., virtual
bogus vehicles) in order to confuse other real vehicles in safe
driving, and possibly make these real vehicles to make wrong maneuver
decisions, leading to fatalities.
A malicious vehicle can also create multiple virtual bogus vehicles,
and generate global IPv6 addresses and register them with a Mobility
Anchor (MA) via an RSU. This IP address autoconfiguration and
registration procedure from many virtual vehicles can occupy the
computation power and storage resources of a RSU and an MA and even
paralyze the two entities. Thus, the RSU and MA need to determine
whether a vehicle is genuine or bogus in the IP address
autoconfiguration and mobility management.
3.2. Impersonation Attack
Malicious vehicles can pretend to be other vehicles with forged IP
addresses or MAC address as IP address spoofing and MAC address
spoofing, respectively. This attack is called impersonation attack
to masquerade a vehicle and user.
To detect such an impersonation attack, an authentication scheme
needs to check whether the MAC address and IPv6 address of a vehicle
is associated with the vehicle's permanent identifier (e.g., a
driver's certificate identifier) or not.
3.3. Denial-of-Service Attack
Malicious vehicles (or compromised vehicles) can generate bogus
services requests to either a vehicle or a server in the vehicular
cloud so that either the vehicle or the server is extremely busy with
the requests, and cannot process valid request in a prompt way. This
attack is called Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack.
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To detect and mitigate this DoS attack, the vehicles need to
collaborate with each other to monitor a suspicious activity related
to the DoS attack, that is, the generation of messages more than the
expected threshold in a certain service.
3.4. Message Suspension Attack
Malicious vehicles can drop packets originated by other vehicles in
multihop V2V or V2I communications, which is called a Message
Suspension Attack. This packet dropping can hinder the data exchange
for safe driving in cooperative driving environments. Also, in
multihop V2V or V2I communications, this packet dropping can
interfere with the reliable data forwarding among the communicating
entities (e.g., vehicle, client, and server).
For the reliable data transfer, a vehicle performing the message
suspension attack needs to be detected by good vehicles and a good
RSU, and it should be excluded in vehicular communications.
3.5. Tampering Attack
An authorized and legitimate vehicle may be compromised by a hacker
so that it can run a malicious firmware or software (malware), which
is called a tampering attack. This tampering attack may endanger the
vehicle's computing system, steal the vehicle's information, and
track the vehicle. Also, such a malware can generate bogus data
traffic for DoS attack against other vehicles, and track other
vehicles, and collect other vehicles' information.
The forgery of firmware or software in a vehicle needs to be
protected against hackers. The forgery prevention of firmware such
as the bootloader of a vehicle's computing system can be performed by
a secure booting scheme. The safe update of the firmware can be
performed by a secure firmware update protocol. The abnormal
behaviors by the forgery of firmware or software can be monitored by
a remote attestation scheme.
3.6. Tracking
The MAC address and IPv6 address of a vehicle's wireless interface
can be used as an identifier. An hacker can track a moving vehicle
by collecting and tracing the data traffic related to the MAC address
or IPv6 address.
To avoid the illegal tracking by a hacker, the MAC address and IPv6
address of a vehicle need to be periodically updated. However, the
change of those addresses needs to minimize the impact of ongoing
sessions on performance.
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4. Security Countermeasures
This section proposes countermeasures against the attacks of security
and privacy in IP-based vehicular networks.
4.1. Identification and Authentication
Good vehicles are ones having valid certificates (e.g., X.509
certificate), which can be validated by an authentication method
through an authentication server [RFC5280].
Along with an X.509 certificate, a Vehicle Identification Number
(VIN) can be used as a vehicle's identifier to efficiently
authenticate the vehicle and its driver through a road infrastructure
node (e.g., RSU and MA), which is connected to an authentication
server in vehicular cloud. X.509 certificates can be used as
Transport Layer Security (TLS) certificates for the mutual
authentication of a TCP connection between two vehicles or between a
vehicle and a corresponding node (e.g., client and server) in the
Internet.
Good vehicles can also use a Decentralized Identifier (DID) with the
help of a verifiable claim service. In this case, vehicles can their
DID as a unique identifier, and then check the identity of any
joining vehicle with its verifiable claim.
4.2. Integrity and Confidentiality
For secure V2I or V2V communications, a secure channel between two
communicating entities (e.g., vehicle, RSU, client, and server) needs
to be used to check the integrity of packets exchanged between them
and support their confidentiality. For this secure channel, a pair
of session keys between two entities (e.g., vehicle, RSU, MA, client,
and server) needs to be set up.
For the establishment of the session keys in V2V or V2I
communications, an Internet Key Exchange Protocol version 2 (IKEv2)
can be used [RFC7296]. Also, for the session key generation, either
an RSU or an MA can play a role of a Software-Defined Networking
(SDN) Controller to make a pair of session keys and other session
parameters (e.g., a hash algorithm and an encryption algorithm)
between two communicating entities in vehicular networks [RFC9061].
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4.3. Non-Repudiation
A malicious vehicle can disseminate bogus messages to its neighboring
vehicles as a Sybil attack. This Sybil attack announces wrong
information of a vehicle's existence and mobility information to
normal vehicles. This may cause accidents (e.g., vehicle collision
and pedestrian damage). In the case of the occurrence of an
accident, it is important to localize and identify the criminal
vehicle with a non-repudiation method through the logged data during
the navigation of vehicles.
For non-repudiation, the messages generated by a vehicle can be
logged by its neighboring vehicles. As an effective non-repudiation,
a blockchain technology can be used. Each message can be treated as
a transaction and the adjacent vehicles can play a role of peers in
consensus methods such as Proof of Work (PoW) and Proof of Stake
(PoS) [Bitcoin].
4.4. Remote Attestation
To prevent a tampering attack by the forgery of firmware/software, a
secure booting can be performed by Root of Trust (RoT) and a remote
attestation can be performed through both the secure booting and RoT
[I-D.pastor-i2nsf-nsf-remote-attestation][RFC9334].
The secure booting can make sure that the bootloader of the vehicle's
computing system is a legitimate one with the digital signature of
the boofloader by using the RoT of Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
[ISO-IEC-TPM] or Google Titan Chip [Google-Titan-Chip].
A firmware update service can be made in blockchain technologies
[Vehicular-BlockChain]. The validity of a brand-new firmware can be
proven by a blockchain of the firmware, having the version history.
Thus, This blockchain can manage a brand-new firmware or software and
distribute it in a secure way.
The remote attestation can monitor the behaviors of the vehicle's
computing system such that the system is working correctly according
to the policy and configuration of an administrator or user
[I-D.pastor-i2nsf-nsf-remote-attestation][RFC9334]. For this remote
attestation, a secure channel should be established between a
verifier and a vehicle.
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4.5. Privacy
To avoid the tracking of a vehicle with its MAC address, a MAC
address pseudonym can be used, which updates the MAC address
periodically. This update triggers the update of the vehicle's IPv6
address because the IPv6 address of a network interface is generated
with the interface's MAC address. The MAC address and IPv6 address
can be updated by the guideline in [RFC4086] and a method in
[RFC4941], respectively.
The update of the MAC address and the IPv6 address affects the on-
going traffic flow because the source node or destination node of the
packets of the flow are identified with the node's MAC address and
IPv6 address. This update on a vehicle requires the update of the
neighbor caches of the vehicle's neighboring vehicles for multihop
V2V communications, as well as the neighbor caches of the vehicle's
neighboring vehicles and the neighbor tables of an RSU, and an MA in
multihop V2I communications.
Without strong confidentiality, the update of the MAC address and
IPv6 address can be observed by an adversary, so there is no privacy
benefit in tracking prevention. The update needs to be notified to
only the trustworthy vehicles, RSU, and MA.
Also, for the continuity of an end-to-end (E2E) transport-layer
(e.g., TCP, UDP, and SCTP) session, the new IP address for the
transport-layer session can be notified to an appropriate end point
through a mobility management scheme such as Mobile IP Protocols
(e.g., Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6) [RFC6275] and Proxy MIPv6 (PMIPv6)
[RFC5213]). This mobility management overhead and impact of
pseudonyms should be minimized on the performance of vehicular
networking.
5. Security Considerations
This document discussed security considerations for IPWAVE security
and privacy in Section 3 and Section 4.
6. References
6.1. Normative References
[RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.
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[RFC4941] Narten, T., Draves, R., and S. Krishnan, "Privacy
Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in
IPv6", RFC 4941, DOI 10.17487/RFC4941, September 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4941>.
[RFC5213] Gundavelli, S., Ed., Leung, K., Devarapalli, V.,
Chowdhury, K., and B. Patil, "Proxy Mobile IPv6",
RFC 5213, DOI 10.17487/RFC5213, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5213>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC6275] Perkins, C., Ed., Johnson, D., and J. Arkko, "Mobility
Support in IPv6", RFC 6275, DOI 10.17487/RFC6275, July
2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6275>.
[RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.
[RFC8691] Benamar, N., Härri, J., Lee, J., and T. Ernst, "Basic
Support for IPv6 Networks Operating Outside the Context of
a Basic Service Set over IEEE Std 802.11", RFC 8691,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8691, December 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8691>.
[RFC9061] Marin-Lopez, R., Lopez-Millan, G., and F. Pereniguez-
Garcia, "A YANG Data Model for IPsec Flow Protection Based
on Software-Defined Networking (SDN)", RFC 9061,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9061, July 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9061>.
[RFC9365] Jeong, J., Ed., "IPv6 Wireless Access in Vehicular
Environments (IPWAVE): Problem Statement and Use Cases",
RFC 9365, DOI 10.17487/RFC9365, March 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9365>.
6.2. Informative References
[I-D.pastor-i2nsf-nsf-remote-attestation]
Pastor, A., Lopez, D., and A. L. Shaw, "Remote Attestation
Procedures for Network Security Functions (NSFs) through
the I2NSF Security Controller", Work in Progress,
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Internet-Draft, draft-pastor-i2nsf-nsf-remote-attestation-
07, 11 February 2019,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-pastor-i2nsf-
nsf-remote-attestation-07>.
[RFC9334] Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and
W. Pan, "Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS)
Architecture", RFC 9334, DOI 10.17487/RFC9334, January
2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9334>.
[ISO-IEC-TPM]
ISO/IEC JTC 1, "Information technology - Trusted Platform
Module - Part 1: Overview", ISO/IEC 11889-1:2015, August
2015.
[Google-Titan-Chip]
Google, "Titan in depth: Security in plaintext", URL:
https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/gcp/titan-in-depth-
security-in-plaintext, October 2018.
[ISO-ITS-IPv6]
ISO/TC 204, "Intelligent Transport Systems -
Communications Access for Land Mobiles (CALM) - IPv6
Networking", ISO 21210:2012, June 2012.
[DSRC] ASTM International, "Standard Specification for
Telecommunications and Information Exchange Between
Roadside and Vehicle Systems - 5 GHz Band Dedicated Short
Range Communications (DSRC) Medium Access Control (MAC)
and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications",
ASTM E2213-03(2010), October 2010.
[WAVE-1609.0]
IEEE 1609 Working Group, "IEEE Guide for Wireless Access
in Vehicular Environments (WAVE) - Architecture", IEEE Std
1609.0-2013, March 2014.
[IEEE-802.11-OCB]
"Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and
Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications", IEEE Std
802.11-2016, December 2016.
[Bitcoin] Nakamoto, S., "Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash
System", URL: https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf, May 2009.
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[Vehicular-BlockChain]
Dorri, A., Steger, M., Kanhere, S., and R. Jurdak,
"BlockChain: A Distributed Solution to Automotive Security
and Privacy", IEEE Communications Magazine, Vol. 55, No.
12, December 2017.
Appendix A. Acknowledgments
This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea
(NRF) grant funded by the Korea government, Ministry of Science and
ICT (MSIT) (No. 2023R1A2C2002990).
This work was supported in part by Institute of Information &
Communications Technology Planning & Evaluation (IITP) grant funded
by the Korea government (MSIT)(No. 2022-0-01015, Development of
Candidate Element Technology for Intelligent 6G Mobile Core Network).
Appendix B. Contributors
This document is made by the group effort of IPWAVE working group.
Many people actively contributed to this document, such as Carlos J.
Bernardos and Russ Housley. The authors sincerely appreciate their
contributions.
The following are coauthors of this document:
Bien Aime Mugabarigira - Department of Electrical and Computer
Engineering, Sungkyunkwan University, 2066 Seobu-ro Jangan-gu, Suwon,
Gyeonggi-do 16419, Republic of Korea. EMail: bienaime@skku.edu
Zhong Xiang - Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering,
Sungkyunkwan University, 2066 Seobu-ro Jangan-gu, Suwon, Gyeonggi-do
16419, Republic of Korea. EMail: xz618@skku.edu
Hyeonah Jung - Department of Computer Science and Engineering,
Sungkyunkwan University, 2066 Seobu-ro Jangan-gu, Suwon, Gyeonggi-do
16419, Republic of Korea. EMail: hyeonah214@skku.edu
Appendix C. Changes from draft-jeong-ipwave-security-privacy-08
The following changes are made from draft-jeong-ipwave-security-
privacy-08:
* This version updates the version number.
Authors' Addresses
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Jaehoon Paul Jeong (editor)
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
Sungkyunkwan University
2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu
Suwon
Gyeonggi-Do
16419
Republic of Korea
Phone: +82 31 299 4957
Email: pauljeong@skku.edu
URI: http://iotlab.skku.edu/people-jaehoon-jeong.php
Yiwen Chris Shen
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
Sungkyunkwan University
2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu
Suwon
Gyeonggi-Do
16419
Republic of Korea
Phone: +82 31 299 4106
Email: chrisshen@skku.edu
URI: https://chrisshen.github.io
Jung-Soo Park
Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute
218 Gajeong-Ro, Yuseong-Gu
Daejeon
34129
Republic of Korea
Phone: +82 42 860 6514
Email: pjs@etri.re.kr
Tae Tom Oh
Golisano College of Computing and Information Sciences
Rochester Institute of Technology
One Lomb Memorial Drive
Rochester, NY 14623-5603
United States of America
Phone: +1 585 475 7642
Email: Tom.Oh@rit.edu
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