Asymmetric Manifest Based Integrity
draft-jholland-mboned-ambi-02

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Mboned                                                        J. Holland
Internet-Draft                                                   K. Rose
Intended status: Experimental                  Akamai Technologies, Inc.
Expires: October 28, 2019                                 April 26, 2019

                  Asymmetric Manifest Based Integrity
                     draft-jholland-mboned-ambi-02

Abstract

   This document defines Asymmetric Manifest-Based Integrity (AMBI).
   AMBI allows each receiver of a stream of multicast packets to check
   the integrity of the contents of each packet in the data stream.
   AMBI operates by passing cryptographically verifiable manifests for
   the data packets, over out-of-band communication channels.

Status of This Memo

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Holland & Rose          Expires October 28, 2019                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                    AMBI                        April 2019

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Comparison with TESLA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Protocol Specification  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Packet Identifiers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       2.1.1.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       2.1.2.  RTP Sequence Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.1.3.  SRTP Sequence Number  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.1.4.  UDP Option  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.2.  Anchor Message  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.2.1.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       2.2.2.  DNS-based Anchor URI Bootstrap  . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       2.2.3.  Anchor Message YANG model . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       2.2.4.  Example Anchor Message  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     2.3.  Manifests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       2.3.1.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       2.3.2.  Manifest Layout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   3.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     4.1.  Packet Identifiers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   5.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     5.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     5.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20

1.  Introduction

   Multicast transport poses security problems that are not easily
   addressed by the same security mechanisms used for unicast transport.

   The "Introduction" sections of the documents describing TESLA
   [RFC4082], and TESLA in SRTP [RFC4383], and TESLA with ALC and NORM
   [RFC5776] present excellent overviews of the challenges unique to
   multicast authentication, briefly summarized here:

   o  A MAC based on a symmetric shared secret cannot be used because
      each packet has multiple receivers that do not trust each other.

   o  Asymmetric per-packet signatures can handle only very low bit-
      rates because of the computational overhead.

   o  An asymmetric signature of a larger message comprising multiple
      packets requires reliable receipt of all such packets, something
      that cannot be guaranteed in a timely manner even for protocols
      that do provide reliable delivery, and the retransmission of which
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