Asymmetric Manifest Based Integrity
draft-jholland-mboned-ambi-03

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Mboned                                                        J. Holland
Internet-Draft                                                   K. Rose
Intended status: Standards Track               Akamai Technologies, Inc.
Expires: March 6, 2020                                September 03, 2019

                  Asymmetric Manifest Based Integrity
                     draft-jholland-mboned-ambi-03

Abstract

   This document defines Asymmetric Manifest-Based Integrity (AMBI).
   AMBI allows each receiver or forwarder of a stream of multicast
   packets to check the integrity of the contents of each packet in the
   data stream.  AMBI operates by passing cryptographically verifiable
   hashes of the data packets inside manifest messages, and sending the
   manifests over authenticated out-of-band communication channels.

Status of This Memo

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   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Holland & Rose            Expires March 6, 2020                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                    AMBI                    September 2019

   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Comparison with TESLA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Protocol Operation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.1.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.2.  Buffering and Validation Windows  . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.2.1.  Inter-packet Gap  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.3.  Packet Digests  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       2.3.1.  Digest Profile  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       2.3.2.  Pseudoheader  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     2.4.  Manifests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       2.4.1.  Manifest Layout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     2.5.  Transitioning to Other Manifest Streams . . . . . . . . .  14
   3.  Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   4.  YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     4.1.  Tree Diagram  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     4.2.  Module  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     5.1.  The YANG Module Names Registry  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     5.2.  Media Type  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     6.1.  Predictable Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   7.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20

1.  Introduction

   Multicast transport poses security problems that are not easily
   addressed by the same security mechanisms used for unicast transport.

   The "Introduction" sections of the documents describing TESLA
   [RFC4082], and TESLA in SRTP [RFC4383], and TESLA with ALC and NORM
   [RFC5776] present excellent overviews of the challenges unique to
   multicast authentication, briefly summarized here:

   o  A MAC based on a symmetric shared secret cannot be used because
      each packet has multiple receivers that do not trust each other,
      and using a symmetric shared secret exposes the same secret to
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