Collaborative Automated Course of Action Operations (CACAO) for Cyber Security
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IETF B. Jordan
Internet-Draft Symantec Corporation
Intended status: Informational A. Thomson
Expires: July 22, 2019 LookingGlass Cyber
January 18, 2019
Collaborative Automated Course of Action Operations (CACAO) for Cyber
This is the charter for the Working Group: Collaborative Automated
Course of Action Operations (CACAO) for Cyber Security
Status of This Memo
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Table of Contents
1. Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Working Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Deliverables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Threat Actors and Intrusion Sets are advancing at an increasing rate
relative to an organization's ability to defend against and respond
to cyber attacks. In addition, it is common that defenders need to
manually identify and process prevention, mitigation, and remediation
steps in order to protect their systems, networks, data, and users.
There is also currently no standard means to easily and dynamically
share proposed prevention, mitigation, or remediation steps and the
operational experience gained from these attacks or their associated
successful responses among a trusted set of organizations.
Due to the increasing sophistication and amplitude of cyber attacks
the need for a secure collaborative set of systems providing
coordinated detection and response across hosts, networks, and
security infrastructure has raised significantly. This solution is
necessary to effectively respond to threats in machine relevant time.
While some attacks may be well known to certain security experts and
researchers they are often not documented in a way that would enable
automated prevention, mitigation, or remediation.
Key to this coordinated cyber attack response is a coordinated threat
response including a standard information model; a set of functional
capabilities, associated interfaces, and protocols. These key
requirements would be defined in each of the system components across
host; network and security infrastructure to ensure that each system
can work together in a coordinated manner.
2. Working Group
To enable efficient collaboration and facilitate the rapid sharing of
preventative, mitigative, and remediative actions this working group
will focus on defining the set of technologies (protocols,
interfaces, functional capabilities, and information model) required
to detect, prevent, mitigate, and remediate threats. This solution
will also define the machine-readable actions to enable an action-
oriented defensive system. This effort will focus on providing the
functionality requirements for each system that would participate in
a coordinated threat response; the interfaces they should support
including the transport mechanism used and finally the information
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model across those systems to enable the coordinated actions in a
structured secure manner.
Each collaborative course of action will consist of a sequence of
cyber defense actions that can be executed by the various systems
that those actions target. Further, these COAs can be coordinated
and deployed across heterogeneous cyber security systems such that
both the actions requested and the resultant outcomes may be
monitored and verified. These actions will be referenceable in a
connected data structure that provides support for connected data
object and efficient operational use of those data objects such as
Threat Actors, Campaigns, Intrusion Sets, Malware, Attack Patterns,
and other adversarial techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTPs).
Where possible the working group will leverage existing efforts that
_may_ define the atomic actions to be included in a process or
sequence. The working group will not consider how shared actions are
used/enforced, except where a response is expected for such a
received shared action by a receiving party. It will also focus on
the requirements for the correct construction and correct
distribution of the structured actions and their corresponding
interfaces and protocols.
This working group has the following major goals: * Document the use
cases and requirements * Identify and document the system functions
and roles that must exist with associated protocols for a coordinated
threat response system to operate effectively * Identify and document
the configuration for a series of protocols that can be used to
distribute courses of action in both direct delivery and publish-
subscribe methods * Identify and document the mechanism(s) required
to monitor, report and alert on effective distribution of CACAO
actions and the potential threat response to those actions * Create
an information and data model that can capture and enable
collaborative courses of action (sometimes called playbooks) that
will be used in the coordinated threat response systems * Define and
create a series of tests and documents to assist with
interoperability of the various systems involved in the coordinated
threat response system.
The working group plans to create informational and standards track
documents, some of which may be published through the IETF RFC
stream. * CACAO Use Cases and Requirements * CACAO Functional
Architecture: Roles and Interfaces * CACAO Interface Specification *
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CACAO JSON Data Model * CACAO Distribution and Response Application
The working group may decide to not publish the use cases and
requirements as RFCs. That decision will be made during the lifetime
of the working group.
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