Authenticated Handshake for QUIC
draft-kazuho-quic-authenticated-handshake-01

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QUIC                                                              K. Oku
Internet-Draft                                                    Fastly
Intended status: Experimental                                 C. Huitema
Expires: January 6, 2020                            Private Octopus Inc.
                                                           July 05, 2019

                    Authenticated Handshake for QUIC
              draft-kazuho-quic-authenticated-handshake-01

Abstract

   This document explains a variant of QUIC protocol version 1 that uses
   the ESNI Keys to authenticate the Initial packets thereby making the
   entire handshake tamper-proof.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 6, 2020.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Notational Conventions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Differences from QUIC version 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Protocol Version Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.2.  The "QUIC-AH" TLS Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.3.  Initial Packet  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       2.3.1.  Mapping to Connections  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       2.3.2.  Protection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       2.3.3.  Destination Connection ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.4.  Version Negotiation Packet  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.5.  Connection Close Packet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.6.  Retry Packet  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   3.  Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.1.  Using GCM to Authenticate Initial Packets . . . . . . . .   6
     3.2.  Split Mode  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.1.  Resisting the duplicate context attack  . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.2.  Resisting Address Substitution Attacks  . . . . . . . . .   8
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   6.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Appendix B.  Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     B.1.  Since draft-kazuho-quic-authenticated-handshake-00  . . .  10
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10

1.  Introduction

   As defined in Secure Using TLS to Secure QUIC [QUIC-TLS], QUIC
   version 1 [QUIC-TRANSPORT] protects the payload of every QUIC packet
   using AEAD making the protocol injection- and tamper-proof, with the
   exception being the Initial packets.  Initial packets are merely
   obfuscated because there is no shared secret between the endpoints
   when they start sending the Initial packets against each other.

   However, when Encrypted Server Name Indication for TLS 1.3 [TLS-ESNI]
   is used, a shared secret between the endpoints can be used for
   authentication from the very first packet of the connection.

   This document defines a Packet Protection method for Initial packets
   that incorporates the ESNI shared secret, so that spoofed Initial
   packets will be detected and droped.

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1.1.  Notational Conventions
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