CAPWAP Threat Analysis for 802.11 Deployments
draft-kelly-capwap-threat-analysis-00

 
Document Type Replaced Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2008-04-16 (latest revision 2006-10-17)
Replaced by draft-ietf-capwap-threat-analysis
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-kelly-capwap-threat-analysis-00.txt

Abstract

Early Wireless LAN (WLAN) deployments feature a "fat" Access Point (AP) which serves as a standalone interface between the wired and wireless network segments. However, this model raises scaling, mobility, and manageability issues, and the CAPWAP protocol [CAPWAP] is being developed in reponse. CAPWAP effectively splits the fat AP functionality into two network elements, and the communication channel between these components may traverse potentially hostile hops. This document analyzes the security exposure resulting from the introduction of CAPWAP, and summarizes the associated security considerations for CAPWAP implementations and deployments.

Authors

Scott Kelly (skelly@arubanetworks.com)
Charles Clancy (clancy@ltsnet.net)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)