Security Threats to Network-based Localized Mobillity Management
draft-kempf-netlmm-threats-00
| Document | Type |
Replaced Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | James Kempf , Christian Vogt | ||
| Last updated | 2008-03-03 (Latest revision 2006-02-15) | ||
| Replaced by | RFC 4832 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Replaced by draft-ietf-netlmm-threats | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document discusses security threats to NETLMM-based mobility management with a focus on threats on the interface between mobile nodes and access routers. Threats to the NETLMM protocol itself, which runs between the access routers and mobility anchor points, are similar to those faced by other protocols between network entities like routers. These threats are handled in the NETLMM protocol specification. In contrast, threats on the interface between mobile nodes and access routers are different, because the access routers are presenting the NETLMM domain as a single subnet, in order to allow mobile nodes to continue using the same IP address as they move from one access router to another.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)