Threat Model for BGP Path Security
draft-kent-bgpsec-threats-01

 
Document Type Replaced Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2012-01-25 (latest revision 2011-02-11)
Replaced by draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-kent-bgpsec-threats-01.txt

Abstract

This document describes a threat model for BGP path security (BGPSEC). BGPSEC is assumed to make use of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) already developed in the SIDR WG [I-D.ietf- sidr-arch], and thus threats and attacks against the RPKI are part of this model. The model assumes that BGP path security is achieved through the application of digital signatures to AS_Path Info. The document characterizes classes of potential adversaries that are considered to be threats, and examines classes of attacks that might be launched against BGPSEC. It concludes with brief discussion of residual vulnerabilities.

Authors

Stephen Kent (kent@bbn.com)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)