Threat Model for BGP Path Security
draft-kent-bgpsec-threats-01
| Document | Type |
Replaced Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Stephen Kent | ||
| Last updated | 2012-01-25 (Latest revision 2011-02-11) | ||
| Replaced by | draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Replaced by draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document describes a threat model for BGP path security (BGPSEC). BGPSEC is assumed to make use of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) already developed in the SIDR WG [I-D.ietf- sidr-arch], and thus threats and attacks against the RPKI are part of this model. The model assumes that BGP path security is achieved through the application of digital signatures to AS_Path Info. The document characterizes classes of potential adversaries that are considered to be threats, and examines classes of attacks that might be launched against BGPSEC. It concludes with brief discussion of residual vulnerabilities.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)