Opportunistic Security as a Countermeasure to Pervasive Monitoring
draft-kent-opportunistic-security-00

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Network Working Group                                            S. Kent
Internet-Draft                                          BBN Technologies
Intended status: Informational                             April 1, 2014
Expires: October 3, 2014

   Opportunistic Security as a Countermeasure to Pervasive Monitoring
                  draft-kent-opportunistic-security-00

Abstract

   This document was prepared as part of the IETF response to concerns
   about "pervasive monitoring" (PM) as articulated in
   [I-D.farrell-perpass-attack].  It begins by describing the current
   criteria (discussed at the STRINT workshop [STRINT]) for addressing
   concerns about PM.  It then examines terminology that has been used
   in IETF standards (and in academic publications) to describe
   encryption and key management techniques, with a focus on
   authentication vs. anonymity.  Based on this analysis, it propose a
   new term, "opportunistic security" to describe a goal for IETF
   security protocols, one countermeasure to pervasive monitoring.

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on October 3, 2014.

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   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents

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   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Removing Impediments to Using Encryption in the Internet  . .   2
   2.  Why not "Opportunistic Encryption"? . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Authentication, Key Management and Existing IETF Protocols  .   6
   4.  Anonymous, Pseudonymous, and Unauthenticated  . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   6.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

1.  Removing Impediments to Using Encryption in the Internet

   Recent discussions in the IETF about countering pervasive monitoring
   (PM) have focused on increasing the use of encryption.  In many
   contexts, it is perceived that requiring authentication as part of
   establishing an encrypted session is the major impediment to more
   widespread use of encryption.  Many IETF security protocols commonly
   call for such authentication as part of establishing an encrypted
   session.  Thus much of the current flurry of activity focuses on
   removing this impediment.

   The term "opportunistic encryption" has been used frequently to refer
   to newly proposed techniques for encouraging more widespread use of
   encryption.  However, this term has not always been used
   consistently, and the term already has a precise meaning in the IETF
   [RFC4322].  The next section of this document examines terminology
   relevant to the topic, and suggests use of a new term: "opportunistic
   security", a compromise based on the many terms that have been
   offered.  It also proposes a definition for this term, based on
   principles adopted during the STRINT Workshop.

   Opportunistic Security (for realtime communication) is defined as a
   set of mechanisms for a security protocol that exhibit the following
   characteristics:

   1.  It is invisible to users, and, more broadly, to applications that
       initiate sessions.  (Lack of visibility is considered critical,
       so that users do not become confused by the variability in the
       set of security services they are being afforded.  Similarly, an
       application that has not mandated explicit use of security

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