Opportunistic Security as a Countermeasure to Pervasive Monitoring
draft-kent-opportunistic-security-01
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Stephen Kent | ||
| Last updated | 2014-10-11 (Latest revision 2014-04-09) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document was prepared as part of the IETF response to concerns about "pervasive monitoring" (PM) as articulated in [I-D.farrell-perpass-attack]. It begins by describing the current criteria (discussed at the STRINT workshop [STRINT]) for addressing concerns about PM. It then examines terminology that has been used in IETF standards (and in academic publications) to describe encryption and key management techniques, with a focus on authentication vs. anonymity. Based on this analysis, it propose a new term, "opportunistic security" to describe a goal for IETF security protocols, one countermeasure to pervasive monitoring.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)