Efficient Design for Secure Multipath TCP against Eavesdropper in Initial Handshake
draft-kim-mptcp-semptcp-00

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Last updated 2017-04-27 (latest revision 2016-10-24)
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-kim-mptcp-semptcp-00.txt

Abstract

Multipath TCP has become the transmission technique of choice for the multi-homed environment. Recently, there have been multiple attempts to verify the security of Multipath TCP; but an eavesdropper in the initial handshake breaches the primary security goal of Multipath TCP. In this paper, we introduce a secure scheme against an initial eavesdropper, using asymmetric key exchange. We optimize the public parameters to overcome two challenges to the use of asymmetric cryptography. Then we show that compared to previously proposed methods, our scheme has low overhead, and is more secure. Our approach applies to many weak authentication-based protocols that seek to use asymmetric cryptography.

Authors

Dongyong Kim (kdysk93@skku.edu)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)