Efficient Design for Secure Multipath TCP against Eavesdropper in Initial Handshake

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Multipath TCP                                                     D. Kim
Internet-Draft                                   Sungkyunkwan University
Intended status: Standards Track                        October 24, 2016
Expires: April 27, 2017

   Efficient Design for Secure Multipath TCP against Eavesdropper in
                           Initial Handshake


   Multipath TCP has become the transmission technique of choice for the
   multi-homed environment.  Recently, there have been multiple attempts
   to verify the security of Multipath TCP; but an eavesdropper in the
   initial handshake breaches the primary security goal of Multipath
   TCP.  In this paper, we introduce a secure scheme against an initial
   eavesdropper, using asymmetric key exchange.

   We optimize the public parameters to overcome two challenges to the
   use of asymmetric cryptography.  Then we show that compared to
   previously proposed methods, our scheme has low overhead, and is more
   secure.  Our approach applies to many weak authentication-based
   protocols that seek to use asymmetric cryptography.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 27, 2017.

Kim                      Expires April 27, 2017                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                   ESMPTCP                    October 2016

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   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

1.  Introduction

   TCP is currently restricted to a single path per connection, yet most
   state-of-the-art devices often support multiple network interfaces.
   Multipath TCP (MPTCP) [RFC6824] is a major extension of TCP that
   enables hosts to use multiple paths to concurrently transfer data for
   a single connection.  Concurrent transfer through multiple subflows
   for a single TCP session could improve the throughput and overall
   usage of the network resource.

   The primary security goal of MPTCP aims at being no worse than TCP
   security.  MPTCP currently provides security by exchanging keys
   during the initial handshake.  These keys are used to create HMACs to
   authenticate other hosts.  Exchanging keys in plaintext during the
   initial handshake is vulnerable at the viewpoint of security.  An
   eavesdropper in the initial handshake can hijack the MPTCP session
   using exchanged keys even after leaving the on-path location.  An
   active attacker can hijack the session by dropping the request for
   adding subflow, and can then initiate the subflow using received
   values within the request.

   These threats are considered acceptable.  The root cause of the
   threats is that the attacker could exploit the authentication values,
   whether the shared keys are exposed or not.  After establishing the
   subflow, the attacker can launch the attack [RFC6181].

   Asymmetric key exchange allows hosts to share the key without
   exposure.  Adopting SSL, an MPTCP session can negotiate shared keys
   between the end-points.  However, the overhead of SSL handshake is
   too high, considering that it occurs at every establishment of MPTCP.
   The overhead of the initial handshake affects the overall TCP

Kim                      Expires April 27, 2017                 [Page 2]
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