Secure Proxy ND Support for SEND
draft-krishnan-csi-proxy-send-00
| Document | Type | Replaced Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Suresh Krishnan , Julien Laganier , Marco Bonola | ||
| Last updated | 2008-11-04 (Latest revision 2008-06-06) | ||
| Replaced by | RFC 6496 | ||
| Stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats |
Expired & archived
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| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Replaced by draft-ietf-csi-proxy-send | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-krishnan-csi-proxy-send-00.txt
Abstract
Secure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) specifies a method for securing Neighbor Discovery (ND) signaling against specific threats. As specified today, SEND assumes that the node advertising an address is the owner of the address and is in possession of the private key used to generate the digital signature on the message. This means that the Proxy ND signaling initiated by nodes that do not possess knowledge of the address owner's private key cannot be secured using SEND. This document extends the current SEND specification with support for Proxy ND, the Secure Proxy ND Support for SEND.
Authors
Suresh Krishnan
Julien Laganier
Marco Bonola
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)