Asymmetric Loss-Tolerant Authentication
draft-krose-alta-00

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Network Working Group                                            K. Rose
Internet-Draft                                 Akamai Technologies, Inc.
Intended status: Experimental                              July 08, 2019
Expires: January 9, 2020

                Asymmetric Loss-Tolerant Authentication
                          draft-krose-alta-00

Abstract

   Establishing authenticity of a stream of datagrams in the presence of
   multiple receivers is naively achieved through the use of per-packet
   asymmetric digital signatures, but at high computational cost for
   both senders and receivers.  Timed Efficient Stream Loss-Tolerant
   Authentication (TESLA) instead employs relatively cheap symmetric
   authentication, achieving asymmetry via time-delayed key disclosure,
   while adding latency to verification and imposing requirements on
   time synchronization between receivers and the sender to prevent
   forgery.  This document introduces Asymmetric Loss-Tolerant
   Authentication (ALTA), which employs an acyclic graph of message
   authentication codes (MACs) transmitted alongside data payloads, with
   redundancy to enable authentication of all received payloads in the
   presence of certain patterns of loss, along with regularly paced
   digital signatures.  ALTA requires no time synchronization and
   enables authentication of payloads as soon as sufficient
   authentication material has been received.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 9, 2020.

Rose                     Expires January 9, 2020                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                    ALTA                         July 2019

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Protocol Details  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.1.  ALTA Payload  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       4.1.1.  Authentication Tag  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.2.  Digital Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       4.2.1.  Application Data  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.3.  Scheme Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   5.  ALTA Configuration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.1.  Performance Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       5.1.1.  MAC selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       5.1.2.  Digital signature selection . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.2.  Out-of-band Metadata  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   6.  Operational Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     7.1.  Parsing an ill-formed or inconsistent payload . . . . . .   9
     7.2.  Index overflow  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     7.3.  Truncated MACs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10

1.  Introduction

   Authenticity of streaming data may be inexpensively established via
   symmetric message authentication codes (MACs) using keys pre-shared
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