Password Authenticated Connection Establishment with IKEv2
draft-kuegler-ipsecme-pace-ikev2-08

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Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual in sec area)
Last updated 2012-03-15 (latest revision 2011-09-12)
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Send notices to dennis.kuegler@bsi.bund.de, yaronf.ietf@gmail.com, draft-kuegler-ipsecme-pace-ikev2@tools.ietf.org, paul.hoffman@vpnc.org
Network Working Group                                         D. Kuegler
Internet-Draft                          Bundesamt fuer Sicherheit in der
Intended status: Experimental                  Informationstechnik (BSI)
Expires: March 15, 2012                                       Y. Sheffer
                                                                Porticor
                                                      September 12, 2011

       Password Authenticated Connection Establishment with IKEv2
                  draft-kuegler-ipsecme-pace-ikev2-08

Abstract

   IKEv2 does not allow secure peer authentication when using short
   credential strings, i.e. passwords.  Several proposals have been made
   to integrate password-authentication protocols into IKE.  This
   document provides an adaptation of PACE (Password Authenticated
   Connection Establishment) to the setting of IKEv2 and demonstrates
   the advantages of this integration.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 15, 2012.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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Kuegler & Sheffer        Expires March 15, 2012                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft               IKEv2 with PACE              September 2011

   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.1.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   2.  Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.  Protocol Sequence  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.1.  The IKE_SA_INIT Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.2.  The IKE_AUTH Exchange, Round #1  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.3.  The IKE_AUTH Exchange, Round #2  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.4.  Creating a Long Term Shared Secret . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     3.5.  Using the Long Term Shared Secret  . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   4.  Encrypting and Mapping the Nonce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     4.1.  Encrypting the Nonce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     4.2.  Mapping the Nonce  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       4.2.1.  MODP Diffie-Hellman  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       4.2.2.  Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman  . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       4.2.3.  Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   5.  Protocol Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     5.1.  Password Processing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     5.2.  The SECURE_PASSWORD_METHODS Notification . . . . . . . . . 13
     5.3.  The PSK_PERSIST Notification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     5.4.  The PSK_CONFIRM Notification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     5.5.  The GSPM(ENONCE) Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     5.6.  The KE (KEi2/KEr2) Payloads in PACE  . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     5.7.  PACE and Session Resumption  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   6.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     6.1.  Credential Security Assumptions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     6.2.  Vulnerability to Passive and Active Attacks  . . . . . . . 15
     6.3.  Perfect Forward Secrecy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     6.4.  Randomness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     6.5.  Identity Protection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     6.6.  Denial of Service  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     6.7.  Choice of Encryption Algorithms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     6.8.  Security Model and Security Proof  . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
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