SeND Hash Threat Analysis
draft-kukec-csi-hash-threat-02
| Document | Type |
Replaced Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Ana Kukec , Suresh Krishnan , Sheng Jiang | ||
| Last updated | 2008-10-27 (Latest revision 2008-07-01) | ||
| Replaced by | RFC 6273 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Replaced by draft-ietf-csi-hash-threat | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document analysis the use of hashes in SeND, possible threats and the impact of recent attacks on hash functions used by SeND. Current SeND specification [rfc3971] uses SHA-1 [sha-1] hash algorithm and PKIX certificates [rfc3280] and does not provide support for the hash algorithm agility. Based on previous analysis, this document suggests multiple hash support that should be included in the SeND update specification.
Authors
Ana Kukec
Suresh Krishnan
Sheng Jiang
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)