I-PAKE: Identity-Based Password Authenticated Key Exchange
draft-kwon-yoon-kim-ipake-01

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Last updated 2013-05-03
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Internet Engineering Task Force                T.Kwon, Sejong University
INTERNET-DRAFT                                      H. Yoon, Samsung SDS
Intended Status: Standards Track                     S. Kim, Samsung SDS
Expires: November 4, 2013                                    May 3, 2013

      I-PAKE: Identity-Based Password Authenticated Key Exchange  
                   draft-kwon-yoon-kim-ipake-01

Abstract

   Although password authentication is the most widespread user
   authentication method today, cryptographic protocols for mutual
   authentication and key agreement, i.e., password authenticated key
   exchange (PAKE), in particular authenticated key exchange (AKE) based
   on a password only, are not actively used in the real world. This
   document introduces a quite novel form of PAKE protocols that employ
   a particular concept of ID-based encryption (IBE). The resulting
   cryptographic protocol is the ID-based password authenticated key
   exchange (I-PAKE) protocol which is a secure and efficient PAKE
   protocol in both soft- and hard-augmented models. I-PAKE achieves the
   security goals of AKE, PAKE, and hard-augmented PAKE. I-PAKE also
   achieves the great efficiency by allowing the whole pre-computation
   of the ephemeral Diffie-Hellman public keys by both server and
   client.

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                        Expires November 4, 2013                [Page 1]
INTERNET DRAFT                   I-PAKE                      May 3, 2013

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Table of Contents

   1  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.1  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   2.  Requirements Notation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     2.1 Definitions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     2.2 Abbreviations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     2.3 Underlying Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     2.4 Notations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   3 Identity-Based Password Authenticated Key Exchange . . . . . . .  9
     3.1 Initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       3.1.1 System Initialization  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       3.1.2 Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     3.2 Protocol Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   4  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     4.1 General - Completeness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
       4.1.1 Mutual Authentication  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
       4.1.2 Key Agreement  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     4.2 I-PAKE - AKE Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
       4.2.1 Passive Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
       4.2.2 Active Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
       4.2.3 Forward Secrecy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
       4.2.4 Known Session Key  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
       4.2.5 Key Control  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     4.3 I-PAKE - Dictionary Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
       4.3.1 On-line Dictionary Attack  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
       4.3.2 Off-line Dictionary Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     4.4 I-PAKE - Server Compromise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
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