I-PAKE: Identity-Based Password Authenticated Key Exchange
draft-kwon-yoon-kim-ipake-01
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Internet Engineering Task Force T.Kwon, Sejong University
INTERNET-DRAFT H. Yoon, Samsung SDS
Intended Status: Standards Track S. Kim, Samsung SDS
Expires: November 4, 2013 May 3, 2013
I-PAKE: Identity-Based Password Authenticated Key Exchange
draft-kwon-yoon-kim-ipake-01
Abstract
Although password authentication is the most widespread user
authentication method today, cryptographic protocols for mutual
authentication and key agreement, i.e., password authenticated key
exchange (PAKE), in particular authenticated key exchange (AKE) based
on a password only, are not actively used in the real world. This
document introduces a quite novel form of PAKE protocols that employ
a particular concept of ID-based encryption (IBE). The resulting
cryptographic protocol is the ID-based password authenticated key
exchange (I-PAKE) protocol which is a secure and efficient PAKE
protocol in both soft- and hard-augmented models. I-PAKE achieves the
security goals of AKE, PAKE, and hard-augmented PAKE. I-PAKE also
achieves the great efficiency by allowing the whole pre-computation
of the ephemeral Diffie-Hellman public keys by both server and
client.
Status of this Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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Expires November 4, 2013 [Page 1]
INTERNET DRAFT I-PAKE May 3, 2013
Copyright and License Notice
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1 Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Requirements Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3 Underlying Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.4 Notations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3 Identity-Based Password Authenticated Key Exchange . . . . . . . 9
3.1 Initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1.1 System Initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1.2 Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2 Protocol Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4 Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1 General - Completeness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1.1 Mutual Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1.2 Key Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.2 I-PAKE - AKE Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.2.1 Passive Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.2.2 Active Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.2.3 Forward Secrecy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.2.4 Known Session Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.2.5 Key Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.3 I-PAKE - Dictionary Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.3.1 On-line Dictionary Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.3.2 Off-line Dictionary Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
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