Certificate Transparency
draft-laurie-pki-sunlight-02

The information below is for an old version of the document
Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2012-10-18
Stream (None)
Intended RFC status (None)
Formats plain text pdf html bibtex
Reviews
Stream Stream state (No stream defined)
Consensus Boilerplate Unknown
RFC Editor Note (None)
IESG IESG state I-D Exists
Telechat date
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)
Network Working Group                                          B. Laurie
Internet-Draft                                                A. Langley
Expires: April 21, 2013                                        E. Kasper
                                                        October 18, 2012

                        Certificate Transparency
                      draft-laurie-pki-sunlight-02

Abstract

   The aim of Certificate Transparency is to have every public end-
   entity and intermediate TLS certificate issued by a known Certificate
   Authority recorded in one or more certificate logs.  In order to
   detect mis-issuance of certificates, all logs are publicly auditable.
   In particular, domain owners or their agents will be able to monitor
   logs for certificates issued on their own domain.

   To protect clients from unlogged mis-issued certificates, logs sign
   all recorded certificates, and clients can choose not to trust
   certificates that are not accompanied by an appropriate log
   signature.  For privacy and performance reasons log signatures are
   embedded in the TLS handshake via the TLS authorization extension
   [RFC5878], or in the certificate itself via an X.509v3 certificate
   extension [RFC5280].

   To ensure a globally consistent view of the log, logs also provide a
   global signature over the entire log.  Any inconsistency of logs can
   be detected through cross-checks on the global signature.
   Consistency between any pair of global signatures, corresponding to
   snapshots of the log at different times, can be efficiently shown.

   Logs are only expected to certify that they have seen a certificate,
   and thus we do not specify any revocation mechanism for log
   signatures in this document.  Logs are append-only, and log
   signatures will be valid indefinitely.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months

Laurie, et al.           Expires April 21, 2013                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft          Certificate Transparency            October 2012

   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 21, 2013.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Laurie, et al.           Expires April 21, 2013                 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft          Certificate Transparency            October 2012

Table of Contents

   1.  Cryptographic components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.1.  Merkle Hash Trees  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
       1.1.1.  Merkle audit paths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
       1.1.2.  Merkle consistency proofs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       1.1.3.  Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   2.  Log Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     2.1.  Log Entries  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     2.2.  Merkle Tree  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     2.3.  Audit Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   3.  Client Messages  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   4.  Security and Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     4.1.  Misissued Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     4.2.  Detection of Misissue  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     4.3.  Misbehaving logs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   5.  Efficiency Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   6.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Laurie, et al.           Expires April 21, 2013                 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft          Certificate Transparency            October 2012
Show full document text